SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA

A Study of Chinese Work Units

VICTOR N. SHAW

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Introduction

China is undergoing reform as well as experiencing a developmental trend toward modernization and democratization. Fundamental social change is in the making. The social control system is faced with a challenge and revolution. Is present social control about to break down, leading to loss of community ties, dislocation, chaos, and social disorganization?

To answer this question, we must understand the basic structure, process, nature, history, and change of current social control. Is it diffusive, community-based? If it is, the breakdown of community ties may lead to social disorganization, and development of professional control networks will be the way to pull the society out of chaos and build a law-based social order. Is it excessive? When an excessive control structure loosens, it may collapse with a tremendously disruptive force that could send the society into chaos.

To understand the present Chinese social control system and be prepared for its transformation under reform, modernization, and democratization, I choose to begin with social control in Chinese work organizations. In China, work organizations are unitarily called *danwei* or "work units." The English translation of "work units" may sound strange and awkward but the term is probably the most frequently used phrase in contemporary China. Among ordinary people, "work unit" refers not only to where an individual works but also to where he or she lives and belongs. In official language, it means a basic social cell that receives and executes various policy programs of the communist party and government. What most signifies the importance of work units is that Chinese people tend to use "work unit" rather than "name" to identify individuals.

In a first-time encounter, Chinese usually do not ask "Who are you?" or "What is your name?" Instead, they ask "What is your work unit?"

Popular use of "work unit" in China is simply a reflection that the work unit is a salient social phenomenon and holds an important position in individual work and life. In terms of political economy, the work unit can be considered a building block of contemporary China. At the very least, it is a workplace where a group of people are employed to carry out a line of business under the socialist state planning. On the basis of its status as a workplace, a work unit automatically becomes a residing place, a living neighborhood, or a community. The communist party system reaches out to it, making it serve as a local party branch to recruit, discipline, and manage party members, and to pass on and implement party policy lines. The state and local authorities also penetrate into the work unit. Their primary demand is that the work unit function as a governmental agency to ensure that a group of social members are properly fed, employed, and managed, and that local order is maintained within the enclave of a social unit.

With these links through individual work and life to the community, communist party system, and governmental bureaucracy, Chinese work units become important sites of social control. In fact, various apparatuses and processes within their confines constitute the backbone of the overall Chinese social control system. Study of those structures and practices, therefore, could provide crucial insights into social control in contemporary China.

In my view, social control refers to any mechanism or practice that secures individual compliance, maintains collective order and normative consistency, and deals with problematic or deviant situations. Under this definition, social control mechanisms may include partnership, peer group, interest club, friendship, marriage, family, neighborhood, school, workplace, community, and government. There is also an obvious contrast between associating or rewarding and alienating or punishing measures of social control. With regard to the former, behavior to be controlled may be a crime or any deviant, immoral, and wicked act. The person to whom control is applied may be a fool, derelict, lawbreaker, or rebel. Forms of social control may include punishment, segregation, deterrence, prevention, treatment, or rehabilitation. On the positive side, socialization of children, newlyweds, new recruits, or immigrants to the mainstream society usually involves various associating or rewarding efforts of family, school, employer, charity, social welfare, or governmental agency.

Theoretically, I am not committed to or confined by any particular framework or paradigm. Various social theories, including radical theory,

conflict perspective, functionalism, exchange perspective, and interactionism, are drawn upon for systematic and insightful understandings of different forms of social control in Chinese work units and their contextual underpinnings within the communist political economy.

Research data for this work are mainly from three sources. The first source is my direct observations and experiences in China. I studied, worked, and lived with four different work units in Wuhan, the provincial capital of Hubei. Wuhan is the fourth largest Chinese city, located literally in the middle of the country between developed coastal areas and undeveloped hinterlands, and between political capital Beijing and economic front Shenzhen. In Wuhan my four different roles as student, researcher, university faculty member, and governmental official afforded me the opportunity to access important formal documents, visit various work units, and talk to a host of people about their life and work. My research and official positions enabled me to travel extensively and gain exposure to many different people, work units, and social situations across the country. Most important, I was not merely a non-participant observer at the work unit. I was a real-life participant who had to follow the conditions of a work unit life.

The second source of information is official documents about work units and their social control requirements. Official documents include regulations, cases, and statistics. They contain facts but also reflect official expectations of how work units are organized for specific business tasks and general social control.

Third, to complement and test official records as well as my real-life observation and experience, I conducted a comprehensive interview of 100 present and former Chinese work unit members who sojourned in the United States at the time of interview. Respondents were selected by judgment through a snowball procedure. A spread of location, rank, line of business, and scale of Chinese work units was obtained to affirm that the main forms of social control are universally and uniformly practiced across the country.

The text consists of five parts, or twenty-two chapters. Part I introduces the general structure and process of Chinese work units and social control practices, formulates a conceptual framework, and provides information about data collection. Part II identifies the major forms of social control in Chinese work units: control through ideology, residency, confidential records, civil reward and penalty, administrative disciplining, quasi-justice, para-security, collective vigilance, and mass inclusion. Each is discussed and analyzed with respect to structure, process, nature, and

change. Comparisons are made with control throughout Chinese history and outside China.

Part III examines communist political economy and Chinese culture; it attempts to contextually explain why various forms of social control in Chinese work organizations are possible, unavoidable, and sustained. Part IV documents employee reaction to and evaluation of the Chinese work unit and its various forms of social control. A comparison of Chinese work units with American employers is presented with regard to the mode and nature of work control. Part V explores China's current system reforms and long-term trends toward modernization and democratization; it projects possible future changes on the Chinese social control mechanisms.

I conclude with a review of how my research motivation and a number of pragmatic concerns derived from it have been addressed by this endeavor and what theoretical, methodological, and policy implications I can draw from the Chinese experience for the study of organizational behavior and social control.

Part I

SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORKS UNITS: THE GENERAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

As observed by Chinese scholars in the West, China is a cellular society (Henderson and Cohen 1984). Individuals are organized into social units which in turn are managed by the governmental machinery. From outside or above, the society appears to be orderly and comprised of unitary cells.

The basic cell of Chinese society has taken different forms over time. There were natural tribes in early periods, family-kinship-clan networks in feudal dynasties, and the officially installed *Baojia* system in the nationalist years of the first half of the twentieth century (Dutton 1992). Under socialist rule the basic cell or building block is work organization: *danwei*, or "work unit." From a historical point of view, therefore, the socialist work unit is either a continuation or a new version of the cellular nature of Chinese society.

Chinese Work Units: A General Survey

The Chinese work unit is an officially established or registered organization. It owns property, occupies a plot of land, undertakes a type of enterprise, feeds a group of people, and builds up a wide range of vertical and horizontal relationships within the society.

In rural areas, a work unit is a production brigade or a village committee which consists of several natural villages. The brigade or village committee is economically self-sufficient and therefore, excluded from the state planning. Politically, it does not have a coherent structure or an active agenda and is loosely coordinated by the township government. As such, it is left out of my description and analysis.

In cities or towns, a work unit is organized around a line of production, business, service, profession, or administrative function. The state classification of work units is based upon two standards. One is ownership, which distinguishes work units into three types: publicly, collectively, or privately owned. The other is line of business. The twelve main lines of business set by the state include: (1) agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, and water conservancy; (2) industry; (3) geological survey and prospecting; (4) construction; (5) transportation, post, and communications; (6) commerce, trade, material supply, storage, food services, and sales; (7) real estate, public utilities, residential services, and counseling; (8) public health, sports, and social welfare; (9) education, culture, arts, radio, and television; (10) scientific research and technological services; (11) finance and insurance; and (12) governmental agencies, party offices, and social organizations. Under each main line of business, numerous subtypes can be identified according to different classification

criteria. For instance, industry includes light and heavy industry. Heavy industry may include mining, raw materials, and manufacturing industry, each of which may further include other subfields. On the other hand, the twelve main lines of business usually include three lines of enterprise: the primary, which refers to agriculture; the secondary, which encompasses industry and transportation; and the tertiary, which consists of commercial, financial, technological, and informational services.

In such a broad landscape of business or enterprise, a particular work unit can be any of hundreds of thousands of work and business establishments. For instance, it can be a manufacturing or processing factory, tea farm, fishing ground, mining field, travel agency, department store, hotel, restaurant, hospital, school, university, research institute, governmental agency, or technological service center.

The complexity of internal structure and the variety of external connections for a work unit change by size, rank, and line of business. Inside a work unit are a management network and a party system, each of which has a clear division of labor and a systematic structure and process of administration, discipline, and control. On the outside, a work unit is engaged in various lines of social relationship: with its supervising agencies, local governments, local community, its clientele, and the market or profession of its line of enterprise. Generally, a work unit has its own organization and activity that impact both the society and individuals. For individuals, it is where they work, live, build a social network, and realize their goals for career development and personal success. For the society, it is a basic unit of action. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in particular, it is the first and last organizational bastion where policy lines and programs are executed. In an initial look, the Chinese work unit is surely not a mere workplace.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite the importance of work units in Chinese society, few systematic studies have been conducted on the topic. In the West, Chinese scholars pay attention to either "macro" phenomena or "micro" cases and fail to appropriately address important "meso" social dynamics. Available references for Chinese work units are scattered in lines or pages among a number of books and papers on contemporary China.

Limited references are generally confined to industrial, management, and ethnographic studies of Chinese enterprises and professional organizations. In management studies of industrial enterprises, organizational layouts and management flow-charts are provided in a generalized form or

through some particular cases. The study theme for the Mao era was mainly to demonstrate the social pressure of highly organized work routines and the participatory nature of socialist economy. For example, Shih Ping (1973) describes the life of workers under Chinese communism and includes some general facts about work units in heavy political overtones. Bettelheim (1974) studies industrial organization during the Cultural Revolution, based upon his fieldwork with General Knitwear Factory, a production unit of 3,400 employees in Beijing.

Recent research focuses on the managerial reform of factories and its impact on management, work values, business style, structural arrangement, and task performance (Warner 1985; Frankenstein 1986; Shenkar and Ronen 1987). Schermerhorn and Nyaw (1991), in a study of managerial leadership in industrial enterprises, identify three simultaneous systems within Chinese work units: the life-support system, the business and operation system, and the socio-political support system. According to Schermerhorn and Nyaw the life and socio-political support systems are both ancillary, in relation to the business operation system that essentially serves the economic purposes of the enterprise. However, as the life-support system assists employees to fulfill life needs and the socio-political support system is designed to advance socialist ideology, they represent a large proportion of an enterprise's day-to-day operating concerns. Schermerhorn and Nyaw (1991) also discuss the parallel authority structure of the party in Chinese enterprises. They point out that rule, plan, goal, and role formalization and inflexibility exist as substitutes for direct managerial leadership. They also note that the external state and party supervision and control over internal enterprise affairs tend to foster learned helplessness among Chinese administrative cadres and discourage them from taking leadership in the workplace.

Unlike industrial and management studies which involve scientific analysis of general structure and process, ethnographic descriptions are usually based upon participatory or non-participatory observations of journalists who are stationed in China or visitors who tour China with an academic intention to understand the country. There are country-wide, generalized descriptions that include bits of information about the structure and process of work units (Alexander and Alexander 1979). There are also case-specific observations of particular work units, such as Jackson's (1992) case study of Sichuan No. 1 Textile Factory, which has about 10,000 employees on its work force. Butterfield (1990), in his ethnographic description of Chinese social life under communism, provides various snapshots of work units and their leverages upon individuals. Henderson and Cohen (1984) conduct an observational study

of a Chinese hospital. Taking a medical perspective, they provide detailed information about the organizational arrangements and operational routines of a standard work unit.

If the general structure and external connection of Chinese work units have been occasionally studied, their social control mechanism or practice remains basically unaddressed in the literature. A very few descriptions and preliminary analyses of the work unit with regard to its internal organization and function for law and social order point to that direction (Whyte and Parish 1984; Troyer, Clark, and Rojek 1989). But monograph studies on work units' organization and function for social stability and political control, in general, have not yet been seriously undertaken.

Given the fragmented and incomplete information supplied by industrial studies and ethnographic descriptions on the structure and process of work units, I attempt to provide a systematic description and analysis of the variety, institutional setup, and relational dynamic of Chinese work units.

VARIETIES OF CHINESE WORK UNITS

How many work units are there in China? How many employees are formally associated with them? How many Chinese people and what portion of Chinese society are under the influence of work units? Drawing from recent official statistics, I hope to establish some estimates on and present a picture of the variety and influence of Chinese work units.

Table 1.1 provides numbers across the main lines of business. First, in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, and water conservancy, formal work units include town or township governments and state farms. There are also non-profit state units that provide services to rural villages and individual peasants. They include: agricultural technical stations, livestock breeding stations, veterinary stations, seed stations or companies, and seed multiplication farms. Not shown in Table 1.1 are an additional 19,089,000 township enterprises with a total of 96,091,100 employees (State Statistical Bureau 1992). Although they are not owned and run by the state, these township enterprises are closely monitored by related governmental agencies and are modeled after standard work units in both internal organization and external networking.

In industry, there are 8,079,600 enterprise units with a work force of 107,866,500 people (State Statistical Bureau 1992). The state and collective enterprises identified in Table 1.1 are all considered formal work units. Others, which are urban and rural individual enterprises, are large

Table 1.1
Work Units and Employees by Lines of Business

Line of Business	Work Units	Employees
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery and Water Conservancy	(formal units) 57,900 (non-profit) 34,357	(farms) 5,591,000 630,200
Industry	(state units) 104,700 (collective units) 1,577,200	45,350,900 55,159,700
Geological Survey and Prospecting	952	1,044,400
Construction	(state units) 4,638 (collective units) 9,187	6,389,000 4,194,000
Transportation, Post, and Telecommunications	(transportation) 7,076 (post & telecom) 54,006	6,787,000 1,018,000
Commerce, Food Services, Service Trade, and Material Supply and Marketing	9,798,000	29,449,000
Health Care, Sports, and Social Welfare	(health units) 209,036 (sports schools) 3,742 (non-profit welfare) 42,266 (welfare enterprises) 44,218	5,025,000 27,400 163,100 1,694,200
Education and Culture	(education) 994,075 (culture) 228,033	13,171,000 1,352,500
Scientific Research	5,879	1,077,600

Table 1.1 (cont'd.)

Banking and Insurance	126,728	1,592,600
Governments, Parties, and Social Organizations	not available	1,136,000
Grand Total	13,301,993	180,852,600

Source: State Statistical Bureau. 1992. *China Statistical Yearbook*. Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service Center.

in number but employ a relatively small portion of the industrial labor force.

In geological survey and prospecting, work units are organized by teams of specialty. These include mineral prospecting, regional geological survey, petroleum survey, sea geological survey, hydrological and engineering geological survey, physical-chemical prospecting, and topological survey.

In construction, there are state-owned construction and installation enterprises and enterprise-affiliated units, urban collective enterprises, and rural construction teams. Rural construction teams, which are not included in the table, total 59,269 (State Statistical Bureau 1992). Although they are not state or collective units, most rural construction teams are sizable and are located in urban construction sites. As a result, they share with formal work units certain features of organizational and social control.

The transportation and communication category includes work units in railways, highways, waterways, ports, civil aviation, and pipelines, as well as those in postal and telecommunications services.

Commerce, food services, service trade, and material supply and marketing refer to a general line of enterprise covering numerous business areas. For example, commerce has units in administration, retail sales, storage, and transportation. Service trade includes hotels, barber shops, public baths, laundry and dyeing shops, photo studios, and repair shops.

Health care, sports, and social welfare each have different professional divisions. Health care units include hospitals, sanatoriums, clinics, specialized stations, sanitation and anti-epidemic stations, and maternity and child-care centers. Sports units include physical culture or sports schools and spare-time sports schools. Social welfare agencies consist of both

non-profit organizations and enterprise units. The former may include convalescent homes and sanatoriums, social welfare homes, and homes for disabled veterans or elderly people. The latter may include any business unit in industry, agriculture, commerce, and services.

Education and culture constitute a large part of the tertiary enterprise. Educational units include institutions of higher learning, secondary and primary schools, and kindergartens. Cultural units include art institutions, film institutions, publishing and distributions units, cultural relics units, radio, and television broadcasting. There are also subfields under each category. For instance, art institutions are divided into performance troupes, show places, art creation or research institutions, exhibition halls, and performance companies. Film institutions consist of film studios, processing factories, film distribution and projection and administration units, cinemas and theaters, public meeting halls and clubs, and film machinery manufacture and maintenance units. Publishing and distribution units include publishing houses, printing houses, and bookstores. Cultural relics units include museums, cultural relics agencies, and cultural relics shops.

Scientific research encompasses state-owned units at the county level or above. They include institutions for natural sciences and technology, social sciences, and the humanities, as well as scientific and technological information and literature.

Banking and insurance units include head offices, branches at provincial or prefectural or county levels, urban district offices, division offices, local business offices, and savings deposit stations.

Finally, governmental agencies, parties, and social organizations are deployed at central, provincial, prefectural or municipal, county, and township levels. The number of units is hard to count because governmental and party bureaucracies at the county level and above are gigantic, branching into different functional agencies. Each agency is generally seen as a unit. Town or township governments are usually organized as one unit and housed in one compound. There are 55,600 town and township governments across the country (State Statistical Bureau 1992).

The totals of work units and employees shown in Table 1.1 are not entirely accurate. One reason is that the number of governments, parties, and social organizations is not available and the subtotal of employees in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, and water conservancy does not include those working in town and township governments. Thus the totals shown are less than their respective real figures. On the other hand, it is likely that some types of work units and their employees are double-counted or repeated several times under different lines of business.

For instance, enterprise units under welfare may also be listed under industry, commerce, or construction if they are involved in those lines of business.

Despite these inaccuracies and other problems, the grand totals in Table 1.1 (i.e., about 13 million work units and 180 million unit members) represent a good estimate of real-world numbers. In fact, work unit membership can be checked against the statistical total of formal employees across the country. The so-called formal employees include those who work for state owned and collectively owned work units in cities and towns. They are considered formal because they are regular, permanent employees who are entitled to all state-allowed benefits. According to the official data of 1992, there were 594.32 million people in the labor force. Among them were 147.92 million formal employees, which included 108.89 million state, 36.21 million collective, and 2.82 million other employees (Gao 1993). In 1991, formal employees totaled 145.08 million (Gao 1993). The difference between this figure and the 180.85 million shown in Table 1.1 can be accounted for by temporary, non-regular, or contract employees. Recruitment and use of contract workers have become increasingly popular in enterprises. In 1992, there were about 5.85 million people entering state and collective work units. Not all new recruits were given permanent status. More and more new hirings are done on a contract basis (Gao 1993).

Another relevant figure is the total population in cities and towns. In official statistics, this population is mainly composed of work unit employees and their immediate family members. It also includes families that reside in towns or cities by origin. Urban residents in the latter category usually live on some forms of family business that cater to work units and unit employees in their towns or cities. However, since their urban residency makes them eligible for employment within a work unit, children of those urban households customarily look to state or collective units for a change of life. It is, therefore, legitimate to say that the officially listed population in towns and cities are people who build their life within or around work units. In other words, they are all under the influence of work units. In 1992, 323.72 million people had urban residency and lived in towns and cities (Gao 1993). This represented 27.63% of the entire population.

In general, there are about 13 million Chinese work units. They occur in all possible lines of business or areas of human activity and maintain absolute dominance there. People who are employed by and are directly under the influence of work units total around 180 million. Other people are related to work units through their parents, spouses, siblings, children,

family businesses, or urban residency. The total number of people who are literally under the influence, both direct and indirect, of work units is around 325 million, or about 28% of the entire Chinese population.

EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS OF WORK UNITS

Externally, a work unit is interwoven with the overall social system through various horizontal and vertical connections (see Figure 1.1). There are two main sources of authority delivering downward control to the work unit. One is the CCP system, which uses the work unit as a bastion through which to pass on its will and carry out its policy programs. The other is the government, which delivers or collects planning quotas to or from the work unit, regulates its behavior, and assigns social responsibility to it. Depending upon different social situations, these two sources of control can exert various types of supervision, pressure, and restraint on a work unit. To illustrate the point, let me draw two cases from my own experience and observation.

Case One is a university under the Ministry of Construction where I worked as a lecturer for three years. The university is engaged in both undergraduate and graduate education with specialization in urban planning, construction, municipal management, civil engineering, and landscape design. With regard to its outside control, there are three latitudinal levels and two longitudinal lines. The three latitudinal levels are the central, provincial, and municipal. The two longitudinal lines are the party bureaucracy and governmental administration. Beginning with the line of party, the university committee is directly under the CCP provincial committee. The central ministry's leading party group has authority over it. The municipal party committee can extend its influence to it. For instance, appointment of its party secretaries is done by the provincial party committee in pre-consultation with the central ministry's leading party group and with post-notification filed to the municipal party committee.

On the administrative side the university is a subunit of the Ministry of Construction, from which it receives financial appropriation, administrative monitoring, and professional supervision. Therefore, it is included in the state planning. As an educational institution, it is subject to related rules or practices imposed by the central, provincial, and municipal Education Commissions. Likewise, its research activities are under the review of the Commission of Science and Technology at the three levels. On life-related matters, control is exclusively from the municipal government, which has jurisdiction over the university's household registration,

Figure 1.1
The Chinese Work Unit: External Connections

residential organizations, public security, civil or criminal procedures, and supply of basic survival needs such as water, coal, electricity, food, and other services. The municipal government exists as both a service agency (which determines the quality of campus life) and a local authority (which allocates social responsibility to the university). Compared to the ministry and the province, however, it is not a stakeholder or a manipulative authority to the university. The university is a distinguished establishment in the city and has almost the same rank as the municipal government granted by the state.

Case Two is a pharmaceutical factory under a municipal Bureau of Medical and Pharmaceutical Administration (BMPA). I visited the factory five years ago and recently met its chief engineer and one of its department heads in the United States. I had several long interviews with both of them and obtained detailed information about the factory's external connections and internal structure. Regarding control from the outside, the factory becomes a part of the state planning through the municipal Economic Commission that oversees all bureaus of economic production in the city. The municipal BMPA supervises the factory in material supply, production management, product marketing, and other business matters. Scientific development, technological application, and production safety are respectively under the regulatory purview of the municipal Commission of Science and Technology and other bureaus of specialty. Because the factory is large, the provincial and even central BMPAs are involved in allocating its personnel and market quotas. On the party side, the factory party committee is under the CCP municipal committee and directly supervised by the latter's organizational department. In addition, there is a party committee in the municipal Economic Commission and a party branch in the municipal BMPA. They both have direct influence over the factory party system.

The factory was previously administered by the provincial BMPA. The outside control it received at that time was even more crosscutting and complex among provincial, municipal, and central authorities.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF WORK UNITS

Internally, a work unit has a central leadership structure and a unit-wide system that branches out to all functional sections (see Figure 1.2). First, the party apparatus is a full-blown control mechanism whose primary function is to oversee the unit administration and population. The percentage of party members varies across different work units and even among those of the same size or rank. In terms of structure, total member-

Figure 1.2
The Chinese Work Unit: Internal Structure

ship is usually not as important as the size and rank of a work unit. In fact, the party structure always parallels the administrative system with a scale and scope in proportion to the functional division and need of the work unit. At the center, the party system consists of standing committee, control committee, administrative office, propaganda department, organizational department, department for united front work, department for armed forces, and mass organizations such as youth association, youth league, women's federation, and employees' union. The same structure governs all functional departments in a scale proportional to their size. As a result, each functional division has a party branch. Each section or production group has a party or youth league sub-branch, with three members respectively in charge of propaganda, organization, and secretarial responsibilities.

The party system embraces a full range of control functions. Its control committee operates as a judicial system. It investigates party members' rule-breaking behavior and advises the standing committee on the delivery of proper punishments. The organization department is allocated the power of recruitment, appointment, promotion, and discipline for all party members and officials. The propaganda department reaches out to the entire unit population; it runs moral and ideological control over both party members and non-partisan employees. The department for united front work is responsible to network socially known persons, non-partisan intellectuals, and those unit members who have relatives in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and overseas. The department for armed forces administers the people's militia and contributes to the security and defense of the local community. All mass organizations, including those for youth and women, are required to organize their respective constituents for the party policy lines.

Second, the unit administration or management system is built up according to the task or line of business involved. For example, in Case One (the university), there are central divisions for instruction, scientific research, application, and student affairs, and various departments including urban planning, construction, management, landscape, and basic sciences. In Case Two (the pharmaceutical factory), the management divisions include those for planning, design, research, quality control, equipment, production technology, safety, supply and storage, business management, and mechanical power. The production system branches out according to the manufacturing process of pharmaceutical products into various workshops, and further into numerous teams or groups.

Apart from the functional divisions specific to the lines of business involved, all work units share in their structure several unitary setups.

These are central business office and departments for finance, public security, personnel, and general affairs or services. With regard to social control, they all play a role. For instance, the central business office holds the unit seal and issues letters of introduction and important credentials for all employees who need to go outside the unit for business or other purposes. Because the letter of introduction is a passport for hotel accommodations, travel tickets, and legal entry to other work units, all unit members' travel and work opportunities are virtually under the office's control. Control structures and processes of the security department, the personnel department with its dossier section, and the general services department with its residential network, are all comprehensive and will be explored in later chapters.

In general, there is an independent control structure within the Chinese work unit. This structure displays peculiar characteristics that merit attention from control and organizational studies. First, in its physical layout, the control apparatus parallels the conventional task-oriented structure to its basic unit. In all work units, the party organization follows the track of every functional department down to the smallest cell, such as a class in a school or a production team in a factory. Second, in terms of institutional authority, the party places itself above the administration, and the control build-up overrides the conventional task-performing structure at every level. In all Chinese work units, especially before the responsibility reform, all decision-making power is monopolized by the party system. The administration is publicly known as a loyal executor of the party's decisions. Third, with regard to the structure-goal relationship, the primary goal of the party structure is to put the organization and its membership under the CCP's control. Therefore, control is not functional for some other higher goals. It is for itself, that is, the CCP's rule over a social unit and a segment of the population. Fourth, the existence of a control-oriented party structure does not reduce but virtually reinforces the necessity of inserting standard control operations into the conventional task-oriented structure. Business safety and security, personnel dossiers, and administrative discipline can be seen as standard control means because they are used in all organizations for maintaining order and attaining goals. In Chinese work units, because of the CCP leadership and its concern with order, the security division often operates on an extensive scale. Dossier filing and administrative disciplining are also carried out systematically and intensively. Finally, even as the control buildup holds a grip on the work organization, all unit members are also subject to a kind of total control from residency to workplace, and from action to ideology and ethics. In all work units, when members are involved in disputes or

say something inappropriate, they can be approached by their direct party leaders. Even a bedroom dispute, if frequent or loud enough to be heard by neighbors, can invite visits from neighborhood mediators.

Social Control in Chinese Work Units: Introductory Highlights

Social Control in Chinese Work Units: Introductory Highlights

The existence of a specialized control structure makes control activities a continuous process. *Routine control* comes from the normal functioning of the party machine and control sectors in the administration and residential network. The main goals are to make sure that tasks are conducted within the CCP policy lines, that public order is maintained, and that all other activities are under control. Added to *routine control* are *contingency control* and *problem control*. The former is activated for official campaigns such as legal education and the anti-pornography movement, or important events such as the CCP national convention. The latter involves proactive or reactive control of any problematic situation. For instance, a security guard catches a thief and puts him or her in custody, a party official lectures an employee for work negligence, or a residential mediator investigates and mediates a dispute in the neighborhood.

From a structural perspective, processual control activities can be examined through inter- and intra-organizational relations. First, there is organization-to-organization control exerted upon the work unit by its leading agencies. Second, there is organization-to-division control featuring the power the party holds over the administration, the administration holds over its departments, and a department holds over its sections, within a work unit. Third, there is organization-to-individual control experienced by individuals from social and organizational authorities. Table 2.1 outlines these three typologies of social control.

Means for internal organization-to-division control and external organization-to-organization control are essentially the same. They include

Table 2.1
Social Control Typologies

Type	Means or Forms
Organization to Organization	Exclusive Meeting Classified Document Official Media Quota Appropriation Rank Conferment Personnel Appointment
Organization to Division	Exclusive Meeting Classified Document Official Media Quota Appropriation Rank Conferment Personnel Appointment
Organization to Individuals	Ideology Residency Confidential Records Civil Reward and Penalty Administrative Disciplining Quasi-Justice Para-Security Vigilance Inclusion

exclusive meetings, classified documents, mass media, quota appropriation, rank conferment, and personnel appointment. The exclusive meeting is an information-briefing, decision-making, and directive-delivering occasion. Between a work unit and its supervising agency, unit officials of specific ranks and specialties are regularly called into special or general meetings in which the supervising agency's authorities announce important policies, attend to local reports, and make various assignments. A similar pattern occurs between the central authority and its functional divisions within the work unit. It is a daily operational practice for unit or departmental leaders to meet closed-door for important decisions. Work

unit members recognize that "meet and decide" is a pervasive phenomenon in their organizational life.

Classified documents and mass media represent another important means of control. In fact, classified documents are used more often than meetings. The supervising agency directs subordinate work units mainly through commands and policy guides. Upon receipt of directives from the upper authorities, the work unit applies them to local situations and then sends them down to related divisions either with changes or in its own name. On the party side, the upper CCP committee passes on documents from Beijing to work units according to the CCP rules on classified documents. Likewise, the unit distributes received party documents to appropriate ranks or positions. Also important is mass media, especially the official media. As the CCP's mouthpiece, newspapers, radio, and television provide both policy guides and implementation methods for organizational actions. In almost all formal work units, the CCP central committee's *People's Daily*, the provincial committee's daily, the supervising agency's daily, and other related publications are delivered to the basic section. In most cases a unit-wide radio and loudspeaker system relays central and provincial radio stations' prime news programs. "Read, listen, and watch" are all activated for efficient control and goal attainment.

More substantive control is exerted through quota appropriation, rank conferment, and personnel appointment. For the university in Case One (mentioned in Chapter 1), budget, faculty, enrollment, equipment, material supply, open-up or close-out of departments, and the presidency are all decided by or subject to approvals from the ministry. The party system is controlled by the provincial committee, especially with regard to appointment of secretaries and access to classified documents. Within the university, between administration and functional departments, between departments and sections, the former exerts control over the latter in the allocation of ranks, honors, monetary and material quotas, and personnel. Obviously, allocation of resources lends the upper authority an opportunity for ecological control over its subordinate units (Czarniawska-Joerges 1989).

Organization-to-individual control takes various forms. They include: control in the form of ideology through political study and self-criticism; control of behavior through residency; creation of enduring official identities through confidential records; and sanctioning of deviance through civil rewards or penalties, administrative disciplining, quasi-justice, and para-security. For example, quasi-justice and para-security represent a "formalized" form of control. It is guided by the police and court to detect,

sanction, and control undesirable thoughts and speeches, rule-violating behavior, and minor criminal acts within the work unit.

As far as control of individuals is concerned, work units have actually incorporated family, neighborhood, spiritual control, and other elements into an effective system of social and organizational control. Most urban families are formed within work units. Their fate and daily life revolve around the householder's position and performance in the work unit. A person in an important position or receiving frequent praise as a model in a work unit can secure more housing and material goods to meet his or her household needs. His or her family members are more respected in daily interpersonal activities. His or her children receive better treatment in schools, especially in the work unit's self-established schools.

Most neighborhood committees are set up in the residential areas of work units. Although they have to maintain connections with the government's street office, the police, and people's courts, they are given direct supervision mostly by the work units where they are located. It is understandable that when individual households are so intimately tied to work units, residential committees have to operate under the influence of the work units.

Spiritual control is implemented by work units, too. Mao urged the work unit to become a "big school" for people to learn Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. Political study is officially enforced in the work unit, each of which has propaganda staff and instruments to educate people and keep them informed of basic party policies. Deng's talk after the 1989 Tiananmen Square event was said to have been transmitted to every employee and then every urban resident, in one day, through the work unit network.

In addition, the work unit has discretionary powers to hold its employees in line. First, it holds three "magic weapons" over its employees: household registration, dossier keeping, and administrative disciplining. Household registration is a survival necessity for urban residents. To live in a place legally, individuals must have permission to register their households with local police and food supply departments. Permission for household registration is exclusively issued by the work unit. Without it, individuals are not only denied access to foods, medical care, and other subsistence needs but also are liable to be evicted by the police.

The dossier is a permanent record created by the government for each individual about his or her political attitudes, job performance, and ordinary behavior. It accompanies the individual from the first day of schooling until death. A work unit is in charge of dossier keeping and

writing for its employees during their stay with the unit. An improper thought or a behavioral mistake, if written into the dossier, could be a life-time stigma obstructing a person's progress. Obviously, the dossier is a matter everyone has to worry about; therefore, it gives the work unit arbitrary power to subdue its employees.

Administrative disciplining includes warning, public criticism, negative records in the dossier, deprivation of benefits or honors, demotion, and removal from the unit. Each work unit has its own definitions of inappropriate or deviant behavior, procedures to handle it, and prescribed penalties. They are contextually supported by more general regulations or rules from the state and local governments. For example, the state allows work units to penalize households that are not in compliance with the official family planning policy through administrative discipline. It is up to the work unit to figure out a concrete scale of penalty in proportion to all possible rule violations, such as early marriage, early childbearing, and having more than one child.

Second, work units are allocated the responsibility of civil dispute mediation and the power for direct or indirect law enforcement. Mediation committees and mediators exist across factories, mines, and enterprises. For law enforcement, each medium-sized or large work unit has a public security department. It is staffed with trained para-police personnel, equipped with law-enforcement instruments, and maintains direct contact with the state police force. In a small work unit, there is at least one person who is formally responsible for public security. The public security department or the person in charge of public security can hold suspects in custodial segregation, interrogate them, and in some cases incarcerate them for a period of time within the work unit. By an unspecified division of labor, the unit security office can take troublemakers, thieves, minor violators, and other malefactors within the unit and settle those cases on its own. Only crimes that cause serious outcomes or casualty are passed along to the police and court. This practice has habitually been seen as a realization of Mao's mandate that the proletarian dictatorship be carried out locally by work units.

This book is the first systematic effort to study social control and the leverage of work organizations in social control in contemporary China. In examining the major forms of social control, I focus attention on the official justification and sanction for each control practice: that is, why it is applied, how it is concretely executed, what undesirable act is targeted, and what possible impact it has upon individuals, social solidarity, and the goal attainments of work units and society if the defined undesirable acts are not controlled.

Conceptual Framework and Research Design

The idea of social control can be traced to Comte, and further to Plato and Aristotle (Roucek 1978). As associated with authority, power, order, and influence, social control draws attention from founding sociologists such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons. As a formal sociological concept, however, it was first elaborated by Ross (1901) in his pioneering study of law, belief, public opinion, suggestion, education, custom, religion, personal ideals, ceremony, art, enlightenment, illusion, social evaluation, and ethics. After Ross, social control takes on a variety of meanings and interpretations in the sociological literature (Janowitz 1975). According to the functionalist conception, social control refers to any social or cultural means that secures individual conformity to social norms or specific role expectations (Roucek 1978). Along this line, Reiss (1951) and Toby (1957) formulate personal-social control models that are further expanded by the containment theory of Reckless (1962). Matza (1964) develops a perspective on social control that explains why some adolescents drift in and out of delinquency. Hirschi (1969), from his measurement of belief, attachment, involvement, and commitment, proposes a bonding theory of social control. Integrated with strain theory by Elliott (1979) and with learning theory by Thornberry (1987), the theoretical framework based upon bonds of individuals to society continues to be a dominant paradigm in the literature of social control.

Other conceptions that do not center on social bonds and delinquency are also formulated and become recognized by prominent specialists in the field. For example, Gibbs (1981) defines social control as an attempt by one or more individuals to manipulate the behavior of another individual

or individuals. In an interactionist perspective, he classifies social control into referential, allegative, vicarious, modulative, and prelusive types. Black equalizes social control to "all of the practices by which people define and respond to deviant behavior" (1984:xi) and recommends treating social control as a dependent variable. Subsequent studies draw upon anthropological and sociological data and attempt to distinguish social control in terms of penal, compensatory, therapeutic, and conciliatory styles, as well as inaction, unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral forms. Different styles and forms of social control are then examined against gender, relational distance, social status, group ties, hierarchy, and organization. The effectiveness of control is also analyzed with regard to deviance prevention, detection, and treatment (Horwitz 1990).

In this book, I treat social control as any mechanism or practice for securing individual compliance, maintaining collective order and normative consistency, or dealing with problematic or deviant situations. As far as Chinese social control is concerned, the West versus the Third World, formal versus informal, primary versus secondary group, social versus organizational, regulative versus suggestive, and external versus internal control are of particular interest.

THE WEST VERSUS THE THIRD WORLD

The agent applying or securing social control can be a primary group such as family, interest club, and closely knit community, or a secondary authority such as an employment organization, a security or justice system, or the state machinery. Prior to the modern era, most countries had similar modes of social control heavily relying on primary relations for mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1964).

A characteristic Western form of social control came to the fore after the Industrial and Bourgeois Revolutions. Its salient feature was the decline of *Gemeinschaft* and its replacement by *Gesellschaft* as a dominant base of human relations and social control (Tonnies 1955). On the increasing side of formal control, three transformations can be identified: (1) development of a state apparatus to control crime and care for dependency; (2) application of scientific knowledge to differentiate deviants and dependents into separate types; and (3) segregation of deviants and dependents into mental hospitals, reformatories, and other closed institutions for treatment, punishment, and custody (Cohen 1982).

With religious mission, imperialist advance, and colonialist occupation, Western forms of social control gradually entered the Third World countries as a necessary instrument to curb the chaos caused by the

collapse of traditional clan- or community-based or patriarchal modes of social control and to maintain the order of internal inequality and external dependency created by Western-style modernization. According to Cohen (1982), three models can be generalized to capture the ideology, process, and consequence of the transfer of Western control to the Third World. At best, benign transfer brings about a progress from barbarity and prejudice to humanism, rationality, and scientific comprehension. At worst, malignant implantation results in dependency, exploitation, and repression. In between is a paradoxical damage that is inevitable when the relevance of the Western control experience to the Third World is taken into account.

In addition to Cohen's three models, there is another important dimension for the study of Western control in the Third World. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has put Western ideology, technology, and commercialism into an unchallengeable dominance in development and redevelopment in the world. Western forms of social control are expected to take the global lead and be modeled by more and more late industrializers. On the other hand, characteristic Western modes of social control have been under attack in the West since the 1960s. The critiques appeal to those very features that bear heritage to the history of the Third World countries. In other words, control transfers across borders are no longer a one-way traffic (Marx 1991). From their respective histories and from each other, the West and the rest of the world begin to learn about new transformations in social control.

FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL CONTROL

Formal social control involves an external secondary authority enforcing promulgated laws and imposing sanctions through explicit procedures and complex bureaucracies (Kassebaum 1974). It begins with the emergence of slave systems, feudal lords, or city-states in civilized history. Informal social control, in contrast, applies spiritual or materialistic incentives to engage individuals in collective actions for goal attainment or dispute settlement outside a court for the return of community order (Abel 1982). Based upon primary group relations, it is as old as the human existence.

Since the 1960s, Western capitalist countries have experienced a movement from formal justice to an informal process for controlling conduct and handling conflict. Ideologically, some attribute the shift to "disappointment in the capacity of the state to effect social change, hostility to bureaucrats and professionals, disillusionment with therapy and rehabilitation, and the belief that institutionalization has failed" (Abel

1982:3). Others, such as Marxist criminologists, interpret the movement as an extension of the criminal justice system's control (Selva and Bohm 1987). Practically, informalist programs in the movement appear to effect some basic changes. For example, alternative dispute resolution programs are said "(1) to relieve congestion in the courts, as well as to reduce costs and delays; (2) to increase the community's involvement in the dispute resolution process; (3) to make justice more immediate and accessible; and (4) to provide more effective dispute resolution" (Westermann and Burfeind 1991:162-63).

The dialectics of formalism and informalism in social control in capitalist societies take some scholars to socialist states where efforts are made to deformalize the law in search of "socialist justice." Lukacs (1972) studies legal transformations under socialism and finds a similar paradox between formal justice and informal process. Unger (1976) examines law and social control in socialist nations and realizes that they also exhibit both mass participation and centralism. Despite the parallel between capitalism and socialism in the dialectical experience of unifying the form and substance of social control, Spitzer asserts that there are good examples under socialism to learn about "how deformalization and formalization are related to major structural change" (1982:192).

SOCIAL VERSUS ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL

Social control literally includes all forms or styles of control existent in a society. It not only encompasses control implemented by a central authority or realized through a dominant ideology, but also covers control applied within and among all localized groups, organizations, or territories in a unified jurisdiction.

Control within a locale, however, is often approached under its own name. For control in organizations, perspectives are normally developed in the name of organizational control. The dominant power and influence perspective equates organizational control with the power or sum of interpersonal influence (Etzioni 1965). Blau and Scott (1962) draw upon Weber's authority theory and develop an approach that views organizational control as a process that creates and monitors rules through a hierarchical authority structure. A cybernetic theory treats organizational control as a cybernetic process of testing, measuring, and providing feedback (Ouchi 1979). Other perspectives include those of rule selection-organizational efficiency (Arrow 1964), information flows (Galbraith 1973), myths of institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan 1977),

social power (Storey 1983), managerial and autonomous activities (Dermer 1988), and resource dependence (Green and Welsh 1988).

With appropriate definitions, these perspectives also attempt to relate organizational control to other variables for quantitative and qualitative understandings of control phenomena. For instance, patterns of control are correlated with the important organizational functioning, such as authority structure, power distribution, employee satisfaction, and organizational performance, efficiency, and survival. Tannenbaum (1968) uses the control graph technique to measure the amount of control exercised by hierarchical echelons of organizations. Others study the relationship between turbulent environment or economic decline and organizational control of highly differentiated tasks (Czarniawska-Joerges 1989).

SOCIAL CONTROL VERSUS SOCIAL SUPPORT

Parsons (1951) distinguishes socialization from social control. He uses the former to denote a process by which individuals learn collective values, internalize regulative rules and suggestive customs, and develop social networks. Social control is seen instead as a sanctioning mechanism to deal with situations where socialization fails and deviance occurs. Later social control studies focus on the effect of social bonds in controlling delinquency and other deviance. As such, they blur Parsons' conceptual distinction, diversify the meaning and scope of social control, and even overlap it with social support. For instance, a number of studies argue that the concept of social support may be incorporated into the social control theory of deviance (Brownfield and Sorenson 1991).

The underlying connection of control with support is embedded in the group, institution, or network with which individuals are associated. For example, when one joins a club to gain resources and support for one's personal interest, one automatically puts oneself under the control of its charter, by-laws, ethics, and other membership obligations. In other words, the club exists as both a source of support and an authority of control, like the inseparable coupling of the head and tail on a coin.

However, the logical inseparability of control from support is often taken for granted. Organizations and individuals usually recognize only the conspicuous balance between support and control and, thereby, calculate how much control can be suffered or implemented with respect to the support received or given. Variables entered in the calculation can be the attraction of support, the availability of surrogates, and the unfavorability of control. Perceived imbalance may lead to individual exodus from organizations and a debacle of organizational goals. Exchange

theory can therefore be invoked to explain voluntary acceptance by individuals or application by organizations of support and control.

WHAT CONTROL STUDIES LACK

Despite serious efforts from different perspectives, some fundamentals remain missing in control studies. First, control is not always addressed in its own right. Although social bonds theory attends to mechanisms that keep adolescents in line, the general social control literature treats control mainly as a means to deal with troublesome or rule-breaking behavior. In organizational analysis, control is addressed only if it enhances the realization of organizational goals. Emphasis is not put on control itself but on its functional by-products such as order or goal attainment.

Second, the main thrust of control study is rarely directed at the structure and process of control. The bulk of social control literature takes for granted the role of a crime-fighting justice system and is confined to the passive reaction of control agencies. The structure and operation of proactive control mechanisms or practices are usually not addressed. In organizational studies, a standard organization is assumed to be exclusively for profits or other business goals. Effort is rarely made to understand the physical layout of control and its concrete processes.

Third, although some studies relate the transformation of social control to political and economic changes, political economy and culture are not given proper attention in the study of organizational control. When control is simplified as a mere instrument for organizational goals, the necessity is logically ruled out to study the external pressure from culture and mode of production for political control. In short, the present literature makes control subject to social order or organizational goals, and it fails to approach those cases in which control becomes a substantive goal itself and is executed through an independent structure and process parallel to the conventional task-oriented apparatus.

THE UNIQUE POSITION OF CHINESE SOCIAL CONTROL

China is a Third World country, practices socialism, and remains the homeland of East Asian civilization. These factors put China in a unique position in the world. In fact, China has been a key reference, explicitly or implicitly, for other nations in terms of their development and other important affairs (Oksenberg 1973). With regard to social control, Chinese socialist legal informalism contributes to Western debates and

arguments for diversion, deformalization, and decriminalization (Cohen 1968; Li 1978; Kessler 1982; Troyer et al. 1989).

China has a long tradition in decentralized, grass-roots management of social conflicts. Confucianism distinguished between *Li* (moral code) and *Fa* (formal law) and stressed conflict resolution through informal, extra-legal conciliation (Lubman 1967; Cohen 1968). Socialist revolution discredited the traditional *Li* and *Fa*; but in attempting to deformalize law and generate community-based mass justice, it has reinforced traditional forms of informal social control. In the initial years, informalism went so far that people's tribunals were set up to conduct mass trials and to sentence "reactionaries" and "bad elements" to death (Leng and Chiu 1985). In his speech entitled *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among People*, Mao (1978) distinguished the antagonistic contradiction between "enemies" and "people" from the non-antagonistic contradiction among people themselves, and he designated a domain for didactic, informal, and rehabilitative methods of control and dispute resolution. Leng and Chiu (1985) document legal development under Mao and characterize it as people's justice through mobilization campaigns. Li is impressed by this informal people's justice "with so few legal specialists" and finds that the Chinese system remains "simple in structure, method, and content so that relatively untrained people or even members of the general public can play an active role in the legal process" (1978:10). In general, as Oksenberg (1973) points out, Mao was wary of the vulnerability of the state and preferred noninstitutional means to sustain a cause among the populace.

The post-Mao period has seen the expansion of formal control agencies such as education, laws, the police, courts, and prisons (Gan 1989). Formalism takes greater hold. But informalism has not yet lost its ingrained influence. A unified ideology, a strong family, a high degree of community solidarity, and a close link between citizens and authority still function for socialization and crime prevention (Troyer et al. 1989). The formal versus informal tension remains while the modernization process continues.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORK UNITS

With regard to the contrasts mentioned above, some preliminary assessments can be made about the nature of social control in Chinese work units. First, despite the fact that most work units apply modern technological and material facilities in standard lines of business, they are

organized and operated according to the East Asian mode of human relations and socialist political economy. Social control in Chinese work organizations is thus an illustration of the Third World and socialist styles or forms of control.

Second, control in Chinese work units is of both a general and local nature. It is general because many of its practices are universal all over the country. It is local because it is executed within a specific work unit on the basis of the unit's organizational authority and resources.

Third, control in Chinese work units is both formal and informal. The sense of formalism lies in the work unit being a primarily official organization with authority granted directly from the state. In fact, a work unit is a part of the state and acts as a tangible entity wherein the state's power and control reach out to individuals. On the other hand, work units are different from the governmental machinery and are removed from the state's coercive systems of security, courts, and punishment regimes. The control structure and process that a work unit institutes within its enclave are based upon work relations and remain in most cases suggestive and regulative. In other words, they are informal.

Fourth, control in Chinese work units is patriarchal, inherently associated with provisions of care and support. Like a family head, clan elder, or tribal chief, work unit leaders are supposed to not only keep members in line with correct attitudes and behaviors but also support them to do a good job and earn a decent living. Like brothers and sisters, unit members also tend to offer surveillance and concern to each other. Beyond this basic interconnection, control and support may even be put "on bargain" between work unit members and their organizational authority for their respective gain and loss.

Fifth, underlying the above characteristics, control in Chinese work units is not simply executed by the regular administrative or management network. There is a universally installed party device whose primary function is for social and organizational control. Structurally, the party setup parallels the administrative system to the basic organizational cell. By functional duty it oversees the administration, reinforces all the regular controls normally assumed by the management authority, and makes sure that the entire work unit follows the policy lines set by the party. The parallel party structure and its exclusive control authority, as a "patent" product of the communist political economy, represent a special creation in modern social and organizational control practices.

In all, social control in Chinese work units presents a unique case for new theoretical conceptualization and synthesis. In this book I do not commit to any particular tradition, framework, or paradigm of social

control theories. Instead, I draw upon all appropriate theoretical perspectives and tools to develop my individual explanations and general theories about forms of social control in Chinese work units in terms of structure, process, nature, change, foundation, and controllees' reaction. Given the extent of criticism associated with functionalism, it is *a priori* pointed out that my research focus on a systematic documentation of various social control structures and processes in their workable forms does not mean, either implicitly or explicitly, that functional approach is especially favored and pursued over other sociological perspectives. In fact, an objective and analytic presentation of what a system is and how it works has no effect to prove that functionalism is a viable framework. Also, it should be made clear that inefficiency, failure, resistance, and rebellion are always present in a functionally working or workable system. Social control practices in Chinese work units are no exception in this regard.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION

My unit of analysis in this study is the work unit. The referenced population, therefore, consists of all Chinese work units regardless of location, size, profession or business engaged in, and other organizational features. Given the scope of my research subjects, I can choose two viable approaches. One is to select typical or representative work units for a period of detailed and thorough fieldwork. The other is to draw a manageable sample of work units, randomly or purposively, for surveys or in-depth interviews with their leaders and employees.

For this book I used both case study and sampling procedure, but in a unique way. Because I worked for four Chinese work units, I draw from my personal observations and experiences in the sense of case studies. I interviewed a sample of former and present employees of Chinese work units who sojourned in the United States at the time of interview, through a judgment sampling procedure. The characteristics of respondents and their work units are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

My own observations and experience in China center on my ten years (1979-1989) of study, work, and life through four different work units in Wuhan, Hubei Province. Wuhan is the fourth largest city in China. From east to west, it lies between developed coastal areas and undeveloped hinterlands. From north to south, it lies between the political capital, Beijing, and the economic front, Shenzhen. The first work unit I stayed with is a university under the State Commission of Education. It has about 4,000 employees and 10,000 undergraduate and graduate students in various academic disciplines. With a history of nearly one hundred years,

Table 3.1
Characteristics of Interview Respondents

Variable	Percentage
AGE	
25 and under	3
26-35	55
36-45	32
46 and above	10
SEX	
Male	61
Female	39
EDUCATION	
High school and below	12
Undergraduate	48
Graduate	40
JOB	
Official	13
Researcher	30
Teacher	35
Manual worker	7
Staff member	15
NUMBER OF WORK UNITS SERVED	
1 unit	56
2-3 units	32
More than 3 units	12
LENGTH OF STAY WITH THE LAST WORK UNIT	
2 years and under	18
3-4 years	22
5-6 years	23
More than 6 years	37
LENGTH OF STAY IN THE UNITED STATES	
1 year and under	28
2 years	18
3 years	19
4 years and more	35
WORK IN THE UNITED STATES	
Yes	57
No	43

Table 3.2
Characteristics of Work Units

Variable	Percentage
LINE OF BUSINESS	
Commerce	7
Production	15
Service	7
Government	14
Research	27
University	30
LOCATION	
Northwest	4
Northeast	50
Southeast	26
Southwest	20
OFFICIAL RANK	
Ministry/Province	7
Prefecture	62
County	21
Section	10
EMPLOYEE COUNT	
10-200	20
201-1000	37
1001-3000	29
3001-12000	14
SUPERVISING AGENCY	
Central government	56
Provincial government	23
Municipal government	16
County government	5

it is highly regarded as one of the top institutions of higher learning in China. I stayed there for seven years and worked through two of its departments and one of its institutes to obtain my bachelor's and master's degrees.

The second is a university under the Ministry of Construction. With a specialization in civil engineering and urban management, it has a planned scale of about 1,000 employees and 5,000 students. When I joined its

faculty, it was still in its start-up phase. New recruits were brought to the campus from all over the country. It became stabilized when I left it after three years of service.

The third is an academy under Hubei Provincial Government. It is a research organization of about 400 employees. I was associated with it as a cooperative researcher for two years. The research projects conducted within it include both academic and policy-related studies.

The fourth is a township government under Wuhan Municipality. It is located in suburban Wuhan. As the lowest form of government, it is not fragmented by division of labor. Instead, all its functional departments are housed within one compound to make the township government a unified and integrated work unit of about 100 officials and staff. I served it for one year as a deputy head.

My study and work with these four state-owned units afforded me an opportunity to access important official documents and gain detailed information about organizational setups and social control practices in Chinese work units. Because of work-related needs, I also visited numerous work units in Wuhan and other parts of the country. From 1979 to 1989, I had business travels to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hebei, Helongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi, and Shanxi, more than half of the thirty provinces and municipalities under direct jurisdiction of the central government. These visits enabled me to examine the varieties of work units and make meaningful comparisons of social control practices across different parts of China.

In 1994 I went back to China and revisited all four work units I had stayed with previously. Walking on their premises and talking to former colleagues as well as new faces, I got a sense of what has changed and what remains the same over time. In the five years of my absence, China has experienced several significant events, including the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, political setback after the incident, and resurgence of economic reform following Deng's trip to the South in 1992. All these events have left their impacts on work units and individual Chinese workers.

The interview in the United States was undertaken in 1993. It involved an in-depth questionnaire interview of 100 former (79%) and present (21%) Chinese work unit members. The entry requirements were set as: (1) formal affiliation with a Chinese work unit and on-site stay with it for more than half a year; and (2) current leave from the work unit has not been longer than ten years.

The interview began with background information about the respondents themselves and their work units. It then asked for substantive data about social control practices through family, residential committee, security department, dossier, spiritual control, administrative disciplining, and direct experience. General closing questions allowed respondents to evaluate their work and life experience in work units in terms of social control and social support.

Part II

THE FORMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORK UNITS

Social control mechanisms or practices in Chinese work units are built upon the management or administrative hierarchy and are exercised along with the administrative line of command or control. In this part, I identify the major forms of social control and describe their functions, practices, nature, and change in Chinese or post-socialist and social contexts.

Part II

THE FORMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORK UNITS

Social control mechanisms or practices in Chinese work units are built upon the managerial or administrative leadership and, thereby, are executed along with the business activities of the unit organization. In this part, I identify the major forms of social control and examine their structure, procedure, nature, and change in Chinese organizational and social contexts.

Control through Ideology

Ideological control is based upon "the controllee's trust and leaders' capacity to offer a convincing interpretation of reality, an attractive vision of the possible future, and a prescription on how to reach that vision" (Czarniawska-Joerges 1989:7).

Ideological control has existed since the beginning of human civilization and has been continually exercised in different periods of history around the world (Steinhoff 1991). According to world-system theory, international mass media are being dominated by Western power centers with a characteristic one-way flow of programs and information from the West to the rest of the world (Sami 1986). As more and more people become educated and socialized through Western values, ideals, and knowledge, the world moves closer to coming under total ideological control by the West.

At the national level, intensive ideological control is continually reported as an essential part of work and life in former and present socialist countries. The fact has been dramatized as if ideological control were a patented invention exclusively on the part of socialism. In capitalist nations, the application of ideological control is also seen in both national development and local management. The welfare state in Britain and Germany is recognized to have a primary function for political repression and ideological control (Claus 1982). In Italy, the need for capitalistic development is constantly modified by the desire of the ruling class for ideological control and social-political stability (Paolo 1978). Czarniawska-Joerges (1989) studies ideological control in local governments in Italy and the United States and finds that it is an important

strategy to effect change or implement special programs. She also details ideological control in a Swedish company. As confessed by the company President, ideological control was put in use immediately after the start of the company and has become the main mode of control at the top levels of management. The ideological control adopted by the company is based upon Goebbels' theory that it finally becomes true if it is repeated often enough.

In China, ideological control is publicly known as spiritual control. Coupled with the Confucian ideal of ruling people by wisdom, spiritual control is a deeply rooted Chinese tradition. Confucian philosophy taught officials and members of the intelligentsia that those who win the people's mind win the earth under heaven (Confucius 1971). In *The Art of War*, Senzi stressed attacking the mind as a better strategy than attacking the castle. Recent studies charge that autocratic political rule combined with ideological control arrested scientific exploration, led to cultural monotony, and prevented China from developing a democratic economy (Qian 1982).

The communist revolution discredited Confucianism, sectional doctrines, and other cultural legacies but has not abandoned the idea of spiritual control. Mao said that the key to revolutionary success is to propagandize, persuade, and educate the masses (Mao 1975). In terms of intensity and scope, spiritual control has been reinforced under the CCP reign, becoming a basic feature of common citizens' daily life. To a degree, "freedom of silence" cherished by some old-fashioned Chinese scholars is not even possible for an illiterate peasant in a remote area under the CCP mass propaganda.

Chinese studies in the West have analyzed the role of ideology and spiritual control in Chinese political dynamics. Mass media researchers point out that the CCP utilizes propaganda to spread its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the population for social programs (Hawkins 1982; Womack 1986). Political analysts find that ideological tension results in mass movements and that spiritual control legitimizes political establishments (Barnett 1967; Davis and Vogel 1990). Legal scholars notice that political studies, legal education, heroic models, and thought reform provide the CCP with effective weapons to propagandize rules and legal codes, normalize individual behavior, and rehabilitate deviants in labor camps (Cohen 1968; Wilson, Greenblatt, and Wilson 1977; Brady 1982; Troyer et al. 1989).

The core of communist spiritual control is composed of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng's talks, and party documents. Around the core there are patriotism, internationalism, worship of com-

munist leaders, reverence for revolutionary history, and other rhetoric of socialist ideology. To effectively implement spiritual control, the CCP has in general developed the following strategies. One is to establish an all-inclusive socialist theory for a uniform explanation of everything from the past to future, from the Sun to the Earth, and from important state policies to daily life chores. Excerpts from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Deng, and official documents constitute the cornerstone of this theoretical system. Another strategy is to maintain a powerful "thought and political work" apparatus, censoring people's every word and behavior to ensure that all citizens have one mind toward the party and government. Still another strategy is to publicize policies through media, bulletins, and street posters, ensuring that all sources utter one voice to the common people. Western visitors to China are often impressed by slogans and posters stretched across streets and on high buildings (Butterfield 1990). But if they understood Chinese well and spent some time on mass media, they would know better how much spiritual pressure newspapers, radio, and television create on ordinary people. The final strategy is to mandate weekly political study for all employees in officially registered work units, requiring village and neighborhood committees to publicize party policies through mass meetings (Troyer et al. 1989).

Chinese work units, in the overall spiritual control, serve as relay stations through which party thoughts and policies can reach individuals. Mao called the work unit a school where people learn revolutionary theories and turn them into actions. In official jargon, it is the propaganda front for the party to convey its will and decisions to the masses (*Qiushi* 1990).

STRUCTURE

To propagandize the masses about socialist spirit and current political situations is customarily seen as a sacred task of the work unit, a task that is inseparable from its business or professional duties. There exists, both implicitly and explicitly, a general perception that every division, department, or section of the work unit, every leader or party member positioned in the unit system, even every conscientious unit member, has responsibility to pass along the party and governmental policies to the ordinary masses.

Most important is that all Chinese work units have a special propaganda structure to carry out ideological tasks (see Figure 4.1). Like the system of political commissars paralleling each rank to the basic unit in the military, the work unit's propaganda network follows the track of

Figure 4.1
Ideological Control

management or administration to the lowest level. Concretely, it begins at the center with the unit CCP committee's propaganda department, through some middle ranks, to a particular person in charge of propaganda affairs for the smallest group. This person, upon the directive from the unit propaganda department, can call the group together at any time and place to relate major political news or conduct general political studies. In the interview, I recruited three propaganda officials from a northeastern factory, a southwestern university, and a state commission in Beijing. All three said that their propaganda networks always stand ready to have their entire work units constantly tuned with the party ideology and policy lines.

The loci of unit propaganda depend upon the scale, line of business, and other characteristics of the work unit. In large and medium-sized work units it is the department of propaganda under the unit party committee. In small units it is the central business office, department of personnel, or entire unit party branch that takes the lead for ideological control. One respondent from a joint venture reported that his unit's propaganda task is included in the duty of its department of public relations.

Around the locus department, mass organizations such as the union, youth league, and women's federation also play an important role in propaganda work. According to interview reports, the workers' union in commerce, production, and service units often has more visibility than the party committee in putting up propaganda posters and organizing entertainments. On university campuses, the radio station and newsletter are usually run by the youth league and student association. In most cases, the general pattern seems to be that the party pushes mass organizations to the front to deal with people directly on ideological issues, with itself staying in the background for ultimate control.

The commonly used propaganda means include wired broadcasting systems, official documents, study materials, newsletters, wall newspapers, bulletins, blackboard news, entertainments, shows, films, and art performances. In recent years, quite a number of work units have installed a closed-circuit television system as a more effective form of political propaganda, entertainment, and news delivery. In fact, 25% of respondents said their work units have such a system. Moreover, 54% of respondents reported that their work units have a radio broadcasting system. All respondents said their work units use newsletters, blackboard news, bulletins, and/or wall newspapers for propaganda purpose.

The responsibility of putting different propaganda means into effect is distributed among the party department of propaganda, employees' union, youth league, women's federation, and other mass groups, with the party committee as the general director. According to the interview, the propa-

ganda department is mainly in charge of compiling and distributing official documents and study materials. Shows, performances, and other entertainments with propaganda content are the responsibility of the union or youth league, but with help from other departments. Blackboard news is often prepared by all functional departments and is displayed where it can be publicly seen and read. In universities, the blackboard news administered by the youth league and student association at the campus center is often regarded as an exemplary piece on campus. The youth league and student association are both directly supervised by the university party propaganda department.

PROCESS

What duties does the work unit's propaganda buildup assume? A variety of activities were reported in the interview. They include: publicizing party policy lines and state rules, informing unit members of current situations (mainly political events), delivering unit news and administrative directives, praising good persons and good events within the unit, establishing models and advancing unit task performances, organizing shows and excursions and entertainments that convey communist values and create a sense of collectivity, and managing important unit events such as anniversary celebrations. A number of institutionalized or occasional means and actions contribute to these propaganda goals or tasks.

First, wired radio regularly broadcasts news, propaganda, and recreational programs. In work units where most employees live collectively on the unit premises, the radio network usually runs three times a day. The morning broadcast relays the central people's station's popular program of news and newspaper excerpts. The noon broadcast is devoted to unit news, including administrative directives, good persons, good events, political study materials, and important notices. The evening broadcast begins with the provincial or central people's station's program of hook-up broadcasting from all local people's stations, followed by music and recreational programs.

Availability of radio service is related to the work unit's line of business, location, rank, and employee population. In the interview, it was reported that university and production units, units in the West, and large units are most likely to have radio systems. For instance, 93% of universities, 80% of production units, 71% of work units in the West, and 84% of large work units with over 1,100 employees are reported to have a radio network. In the four work units I stayed with, the radio broadcasting system is completely installed and activated regularly. The one in the

township government is connected "up" to the central station in the district government and "down" to most families in villages under jurisdiction.

Second, closed-circuit television (in those work units where it is installed) serves as a perfect complement to radio. In both universities where I studied and taught, there is a campus-wide closed-circuit television system. The broadcast starts at about 7:00 pm when all unit households finish dinner and sit down to rest. It begins with unit news and then broadcasts short movies or series films. Like radio, television broadcasts can become intensive political or educational sessions if special propaganda programs are deemed necessary. Both radio and television also are effective for emergency or important announcements.

Third, wall newspapers and blackboard news constitute a basic picture of work unit life. They are prepared daily, weekly, or monthly and are displayed in front offices, hallways, or any gathering place. Focus may be on special events or general topics. The language is simple and easy to understand. In most cases, pictures and different colors are used to capture readers' attention.

Fourth, weekly political study has been institutionalized as a standard practice. There is no clearly written rule about it. But according to the interview and my own observation, it is well enforced throughout the country. All respondents said their work units have regular political studies. Unit employees are called together once a week in teams or groups to study official documents, important editorials, or current political events. The study is customarily scheduled on a Thursday or Saturday afternoon, lasting two to three hours.

In Mao's era, political study was a sacred occasion. Production or business was closed down, all members were present, and the study was strictly focused on political issues. Under economic reform, the practice continues but with a number of changes. For example, whereas interviewees from governmental and professional units said their work units continue to close doors for political studies, those from factories and businesses reported that political study in their units is now arranged in off-shift time and that workers take turns studying important political documents. Production is no longer stopped. Also, most work units make more meaningful use of the time for political study. A majority of respondents said their political study is not solely for discussing political issues. Important business affairs and local news are also put on the agenda. One interviewee stated that her unit has a production meeting every Monday morning. That is the only occasion where important political news is passed along among unit members.

Interestingly, a number of interviewees said their work units' political study is a time for chatting, complaining, boasting, cursing, gossiping, relaxing, and housecleaning. This may be somewhat exaggerated. By my own experience, political study is basically a serious occasion for the study of political news and documents. One interviewee from a county government commission in southeastern China recalled that they were required to memorize the CCP's Decisions on Historical Events. Another, recently from Beijing, said that several political sessions in her work unit had been devoted to the study of Deng's talks during his 1992 tour to the South. After study of proper materials, non-political business is usually addressed and casual talking takes place. For instance, some interviewees remembered that they talked about bonus distributions and work assignments. Most agreed that political study affords a good opportunity to gain general knowledge.

Attendance for political study is mandatory. Absence without prior request leads to implicit and explicit penalties. Penalties reported from the interview include loss of the chance to know important news, lower grade on political performance in the annual evaluation, unfavorable impression from leaders, negative impact on future promotion or training opportunity, oral criticism, and loss of monthly bonus. Although a few said it does not matter much whether one goes or not, most agreed that it is better to go if they want to remain with their work units and proceed smoothly.

Finally, division-wide or unit-wide mass meetings are often called for important campaigns and political events. Many respondents indicated that their work units hold all-employee meetings in divisions or throughout the entire unit after almost every CCP's national congress, for a concentrated study of major party decisions and policy changes. Emergency situations may also provoke a mass convention. For instance, one interviewee recalled that an emergency all-employee meeting was called in her work unit immediately after the Soviet coup in 1991. In such a meeting internal news is delivered, followed by detailed instruction from unit leaders on how to do the work and how to talk or react to others in society at large under the shadow of the crisis. Apart from propaganda, mass meetings are also called for routine business affairs, annual opening-up, and summing-up. Across all work units covered by the interview, all-employee meetings at the unit level average about five times a year, with the highest up to fifty times a year. At the division level, the frequency is three and half times a month, with the highest being once a day. The scale and nature of work units are two important variables related to frequency of meetings. In large units, meetings are usually held at the division level. Unit-wide meetings are seldom called because of logistical constraints.

What is the effect of these various means and activities of propaganda? A number of interviewees said they are superficial, dogmatic, and disliked by most unit employees. However, all agreed they are the main sources of information from which they know the party, society, and even the world.

NATURE

Between the two complementary mechanisms specified by Parsons (1951) to ensure the social system of adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance, ideological control leans more toward socialization than social control. The essence of ideological control is to inculcate desired values, ideals, and worldviews into the minds of controllees and thereby to keep them in line or have them achieve the goal intended by the controller. In terms of how it is addressed to the controlled, ideological control is indirect, implicit, inducible, and suggestive. Brain washing, an extreme form of spiritual manipulation and control, may sound threatening. But ideological control, in general, is not of a coercive nature.

In the setting of Chinese work units, ideological control exists as an organizational process to shape the actions of unit members for the unit's task performance in particular and for the society's collective goal in general. It starts with the general point of view by which people see themselves, their organization, society, and the entire world, and it attempts to present them a critical attitude toward the past and present and a vision of desired future states of affairs. Being embedded in the cultural, psychological, and social reality, communist ideology and spiritual control are able to attack any competitive or subversive ideology and remain responsive to the needs and wishes of the controlled.

The effect of ideological control is primarily epitomized in mass motivation and policy legitimation. By motivation, people are enthusiastically aroused to self-consciously commit to the goals and programs of their work units in particular and their society in general. Through legitimation, important policy changes are made theoretically justifiable and practically necessary. Skepticism is thus cleared, opposition is removed, and the entire population is included with total dedication in the new initiatives. Because of the preprogrammed effects of motivation and legitimation, direct control through ideology often takes a small charge. It is put in use only when unit members are not motivated and do not consciously act upon the seemingly legitimized official initiatives. For instance, as reported by the interview, when members do not actively support a movement, they are given special thought-and-political work by

their leaders. Or when they are verbally against a program, they are sent to an intensive political seminar conducted by unit propaganda officials. Direct ideological control can become very intense when the slightest deviation is identified.

In terms of content, Chinese ideological control is vivid, strategic, and dramatic. It is not merely empty words said by revolutionary leaders. Using Gibbs' (1981) social control typology, his five modes of referential, prelusive, vicarious, allegative, and modulative control can be found even in one single political lesson. In the interview, a petty official told a story about a political lecture she received face-to-face from her leader in a closed-door office. In one episode, her leader said: "What you think is wrong. It is against Mao's instruction that we should believe in the masses. If you do what you think, you would lose the trust from the masses. Look at Jiao Yulu (a model county head) and see what you can learn from him." In this episode a model is set up (modulative), one allegation is made (allegative), a negative consequence is fabricated (vicarious), and Mao's authority is mobilized (referential). Gibbs' (1981) main modes of control are all put on display.

Finally, Chinese spiritual control is politicized, serving more to prevent political dissidence than criminal deviance (Wilson et al. 1977). In the interview, most respondents seemed to understand the rules of the game implicitly or explicitly set by the CCP, and they agreed that shouting an anti-party slogan or cursing officially honored revolutionary leaders would be deemed by the CCP standard as more serious than assaulting common citizens in the street. For example, the three persons who defaced Mao's portrait on the Gate of Heavenly Peace in the 1989 Tiananmen Square event were sentenced to prison terms. The sentence was not merely based on the damage they had inflicted on state property. It was also meted out in terms of the value of a spiritual symbol. Some older respondents recalled that spiritual control under Mao was often highly intense. During the Cultural Revolution, an overwhelming sentiment was that non-political violence is correctable but that open opposition against the party deserves a severe and swift sentence. Spiritual betrayal was intolerable. Some civilians received harsh punishments simply because they intentionally or inadvertently uttered or wrote words defined as reactionary (Esmein 1973; Butterfield 1990).

CHANGE

Spiritual control under Mao, as the CCP itself admits later under Deng, features a blind belief in official ideologies and revolutionary

leaders, and a fantasy with one idol, one goal, one mind, and one voice built upon Mao's charisma (*Qiushi* 1990). Deng begins his program by advocating a liberation of people's thought. This generates motivation for policy shifts but also raises suspicion about Mao's thoughts, creating a fundamental problem for CCP spiritual control. As a practical politician, Deng knows that spiritual control is indispensable to his leadership and that a new ideology has to be provided to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Mao's charisma and idealism (Cui 1990). He advocates legal formalism as a replacement to Mao's continuous revolution under the proletarian dictatorship. The Constitution is revised, criminal and civil codes and procedures are promulgated, and various laws and rules are put into effect. In 1985 a five-year legal education campaign was staged to publicize all laws and rules across the country (Gan 1989). In control techniques, Deng often risks his limitations to learn from Mao and the CCP leftists how to rally a country under one banner. Since the Tiananmen Square event in 1989, the CCP has reinforced propaganda to counteract the "peace evolution" sabotage from both within and without. Mao and other communist leaders are being re-honored through films and media programs, generating a wave of "Mao Heat." Old revolutionary songs are being re-sung across the country, creating a mass nostalgia for the past spiritual uniformity (*People's Daily* 1991). The propaganda rhetoric reflects the desperate effort of the current CCP leadership to retain spiritual control over the population.

The present spiritual control, however, contains manifest and latent problems. First, Mao's charisma and idealism broke down, but Deng's legacy has not built up strongly enough as an alternative. Second, there is no longer a convincing theory for the people with regard to official policies in all possible fields. As pointed out by many interviewees, self-contradictions become evident in official justifications for economic reform and adherence to socialism. Third, with opening-up policies, more and more people are cognizant of free speech, free belief, the coexistence of different ideologies in Western democracies, and the difference in living standards between China and developed countries. Some begin to blame history and the authority's obsession with socialism. Individual interests are openly claimed. Less and less attention is paid to the official ideology. Despite the dominance of CCP propaganda, current spiritual belief and allegiance are diverse across the population. There are not only socialism and communism but also feudalism, capitalism, and even "everything-ism" (Chu and Ju 1993).

This public mood has tremendous impact upon ideological control in Chinese work organizations. In the interview, I talked to a deputy depart-

mental party secretary who is responsible for propaganda. He admitted that people do not like any propaganda and that officials are wary of saying "big words." So propaganda is subtly applied by talking with people at strategic times and trying to move their hearts. The deputy departmental secretary defines his own strategy as visiting unit members when they are sick or have special problems. He often arranges to talk with unit members when they feel badly about failures in promotion. He said: "We all strive for promotion and know how frustrated a person could be from a promotion failure. We try to help and move them. I never try to say big words. That doesn't work. Another thing is that none of us leaders is willing to grab power in hands. Collective leadership helps us, preventing any single leader from bearing too much liability."

Ideological control in Chinese work units is carried out by a special organizational structure coordinated by the unit party committee. The structure is composed of the party department of propaganda, employees' union, youth league, women's federation, and other mass groups. Means of propaganda include wired radio systems, official documents, study materials, newsletters, wall newspapers, bulletins, blackboard news, shows, entertainments, films, art performances, and closed-circuit television systems. The propaganda task is multi-faceted, including (1) publicizing party policies and state rules; (2) informing the unit population of current political situations; (3) delivering unit news and administrative directives; (4) praising good persons and good events within the unit; (5) establishing models and advancing the unit's task performance; (6) organizing shows, performances, excursions, and entertainments that convey communist values and create a sense of collectivity; and (7) managing important unit events such as anniversary celebrations.

Chinese ideological control is unique in that it is based upon communist ideologies and implemented by the political-economic machinery controlled by the communist party. It is inclusive and intensive, involving all citizens for deep and constant exposure to its content. Finally, from a global point of view, Chinese ideological control can be seen as a part of the ideological control imposed by the West upon the world. Communism itself is a product of Western ideologies. In China, as in other developing countries, communism used to be a weapon against mainstream Westernism. It now may help promote ever more dominant Western values and ideologies.

Control through Residency

Residential control occurs where people live together in villages, neighborhoods, or any collectively related community. Depending upon the social context in which it occurs, residential control may take different forms with different contents.

Across all former and present socialist countries, neighborhood networks are usually anchored to the work and governmental authorities and are assigned to provide grass-roots aid for officially-initiated social support and control programs. Community organizations in Cuba, like the similarly positioned residential committee in China, not only act as local vigilance and security organizations safeguarding residents' interests and properties, but also function for the implementation of official programs. These programs are not necessarily of a security or control nature. They may involve any policy or arrangement to provide supplies, care, or general social support to the public. For instance, free health care from national, provincial, municipal, regional, and polyclinic organizations is crucially dependent upon the neighborhood defense committee to reach the targeted patients and medical problems (Boffey 1978).

Residential control in Western countries is epitomized by the widely known neighborhood watch program, which focuses on increasing residents' sense of and participation in their community as a means to reduce the fear of criminal activity. In Ireland it is reported that strong value orientations, frequent involvement in community organizations, and victimization to non-serious offenses motivate residents to participate in the neighborhood watch program (Hourihan 1987). In England the "cocoon" neighborhood watch, along with other measures such as target hardening

and removal of obvious sources of cash, is found to help reduce burglary in a public housing estate (Pease 1991). Development of and participation in community crime prevention programs in the United States are generally based upon two theoretical perspectives. One argues that perceived crime problems stimulate collective action. The other stresses that a strong sense of social cohesion and a dedicated involvement in community associations alleviate the fear of crime and motivate residents to participate in the neighborhood watch program. In reality, it is likely that residents join in the neighborhood defense because they are fearful of crimes and have already been involved in other community affairs.

Western residential control in general is not systematically organized by and connected to the governmental agencies for social control or support functions. In special projects, however, the form and content of control can be systematic, all-inclusive, and inseparable from social support. For instance, in public housing facilities for the poor, battered spouses, abused children, or alcohol and drug addicts, housing is provided for free or for a nominal rent. Health care, therapy, counseling, child care, headstart programs, and other services are made available for the residents. These programs are usually sponsored by governmental or charity-related grants, and they are run by private professional agencies. The residents are given full services but are essentially controlled from committing crimes and disturbing the social order.

In China, control by residence is a country-wide practice constraining individual movement from place to place. It includes mainly household registration with police stations, exclusive supply of foods, electricity, and other subsistence needs upon the registration, report of short-term visits, and letters of introduction for tickets, accommodations, and visits to other work units. The loci of residential control lie in the family and neighborhood.

The Chinese family, as a traditional form of social relationship, has been studied by Western scholars. For Mao's years, studies concentrate on the commune and its impact on the restructuring of family and kinship networks (Strong 1964; Parish and Whyte 1978). In the post-Mao period, studies turn to family planning and aging issues (Davis and Harrell 1990). Research on social control functions of the family, however, is rare for the communist era (Whyte and Parish 1984; Troyer et al. 1989).

The neighborhood is formed by a group of households living together in a town or city. Based upon this grass-roots grouping, the CCP has established a gigantic network of neighborhood committees across the country. They operate locally under the CCP's supervision and help strengthen its control over the entire society. Chinese neighborhood or-

ganizations have interested Western scholars in a number of dimensions. Politically, analysts try to evaluate the importance of those organizations in aiding the CCP to mobilize the masses for political movements and social programs (Goodman 1984). In reaction to Western legal formalism, some scholars hope to learn from the Chinese neighborhood committee how to solve concrete problems and maintain local order (Lewis 1971; Li 1978). In the 1980s, the Eisenhower Foundation sponsored five delegation visits to China in cooperation with the Chinese Ministries of Justice and Public Security. With both implicit and explicit intentions to learn from the Chinese experience, delegation scholars collected information from fifteen Chinese cities about neighborhood networks and their roles in social control (Troyer et al. 1989).

The Chinese work unit, with residential control in practice, becomes not only a task-performance organization but an all-inclusive community. Different from Western employment entities, it exerts a substantive leverage upon its employees.

STRUCTURE

The basic units of residential control are individual families. They are networked into neighborhood committees, which are further connected to the party and administrative leadership of the work unit, street office of the municipal government, local police, and people's court, functioning like a coordinating body (see Figure 5.1).

In the work unit, a family is usually formed around an adult who works for the unit. The unit housing administration section assigns the family a room, apartment, or house in the unit living compound with a corresponding housing certificate. The unit security department gives it a household registration permit. The unit department of general affairs provides it a proof of subsistence supply. With these three and other appropriate documents, the family goes to the local police station to register itself as a household and get a household booklet. With the booklet and other unit proofs, it goes to the district bureau of foods supply for staple foods, subsidies for non-staple foods, coals, coal gases, and tickets for rationed groceries. Individual unit members are assigned to live in a dormitory. Their registrations with the municipal police and bureau of foods supply are collectively done by the unit departments of security and general affairs.

Families living in the unit compound are clustered into groups according to the architectural structure or physical pattern of housing facilities. A typical residential housing is a five-story building with four gates. Each

Figure 5.1
Residential Control

gate has ten to fifteen families, with two to three on each floor. They form a basic unit, called "gate." The gates in the entire building form a residential group of forty or sixty households. The group joins with others to form a residential committee, which covers about 500 families.

At each gate a leader is chosen by residents, hand-picked by the residential committee, or assigned by the unit leadership. For each building or residential group, the leader is selected similarly or emerges from gate leaders. According to the interview and my own experience, residential gate or group leaders are often activists, party members, or petty officials. Several respondents reported that unit leaders or party members are assigned housing among ordinary unit members. In case troubles arise in the residential areas during off-work time, they can be available to deal with them.

The residential committee is formalized, with its own staff and office facilities. By the standard setup specified by the Constitution, it has one chairperson and one or two deputy chairpersons if necessary (National People's Congress 1990). Inside each residential committee there are four subcommittees: one for mediation, one for united defense and security, one for family planning, and one for patriotic health movement. These four subcommittees can each have an office and formal organizational staff. For example, mediation committee members or mediators are elected by residents and certified by the lower level of people's government or court. They are mainly "solid citizens" such as retired or current cadres, petty officials, elders, people in responsible jobs, and those who represent residents geographically or occupationally.

To the outside, the residential committee is under the leadership of the work unit's department of general affairs or services, like one of the latter's sections. It also receives guidance from the street office of the city government, which includes the police station, people's courts, district bureau of foods supply, public health station, and other branches.

In the interview, 95% of respondents said there are residential committees in their neighborhoods as officially named. The other 5% reported similar organizations managing residential matters but called differently. In factories, it is sometimes the workers' union that acts as a residential committee. In the military, the spouse committee takes care of family and life-related matters in the living compound. The size of the committee varies according to the residential population. The largest reported is up to thirty people, which includes employees for convenience stores and other neighborhood services. Usually, about three to five persons are in charge.

Residential committee members are supposedly elected by local residents. In fact, however, they are often recruited from reliable and

warmhearted retirees by the committee chairs, who are normally appointed by the unit leadership. Prospective candidates can also be directly contacted by the street office of the city government. If they agree to do the work, they are given a formal appointment and a badge or armband that they wear when they are on duty. According to the interview, most residential committee members are retirees and housewives. But some respondents said that in recent years young people are also being hired for residential committees. As it is located within and serves the work unit, each unit division can even arrange regular employees or retired party members to help the residential committee with its service tasks. Since pension or regular salary is offered through the state's unitary wage delivery, neither members nor chairs receive additional paychecks for their work with the residential committee. But gifts or compensations can be given by both the street office of the city government and the work unit. The cash compensation for retirees or unemployed housewives is about ten to twenty Yuan a month. One respondent reported that his wife is a residential group head. She was contacted by the residential committee chair for the position and takes no formal remuneration from it. However, she gets gifts as well as written thanks from the street office of the city government and the work unit during important festivals such as the Spring Festival. Moreover, her family is sometimes excused from paying the fees they help collect from residents for housing management, electricity, and public health.

PROCESS

When individuals and their families are put in place in the residential network, they automatically become subject to its various control practices.

Living Pattern

There are generally four patterns of living for work unit members: in the unit residential compounds, in the unit dormitories, with parents, and with spouses. Among interview respondents, 40% said they live in their work units' residential compounds. These are usually people who are senior, remain with the unit for a long time, or have established their positions in the unit's rank and file. For instance, among respondents under the age of 36, only 24% said they live in their units' housing compounds. But among those who are above age 35, 57% are assigned to live on their work units' residential housing premises. Housing compounds are

mostly located within the work units. Only 9% said their living compounds are built outside, at a distance from the work unit's business areas.

Dormitories are generally built within the work units. People who are assigned to live in dormitories are usually newcomers or young couples waiting for a formal housing assignment to the residential compound. Males are more likely to live in the dormitory than females, who may prefer to stay with their parents or are able to benefit from their husbands' housing assignment. In the interview, 28% of respondents reported they live in their units' dormitories. Among them, only 25% are females.

The rest live either with their spouses (15%) or parents (17%), whose housing also derives from their work units and is located within a unit residential compound. As expected, these two groups are overrepresented by females. Among those respondents living with their spouses, 66% are females. Women make up 71% of those living with their parents.

Mutual Help and Surveillance

The physical pattern of public housing facilities provides an ideal setting for mutual collective surveillance. Whether they live in their own units' residential compounds or dormitories, or on the premises of their spouses' or parents' units, work unit members always live collectively in public facilities. Neighbors are either their own colleagues, leaders, and acquaintances or those of their spouses or parents. Thus there is pressure for individual families or persons to behave correctly and follow collective rules. In the interview, various reports showed the interconnectedness of life among neighbors. One beneficial aspect is the help received from neighbors. For example, there were two elderly couples among the study group. The wife from one and the husband from the other were selected as formal interviewees. Both admitted that it is their neighbors who take care of their residential matters while they are traveling, like now in the United States. Two student wives thankfully remembered the help they received from their neighbors when their husbands were abroad. One said that her neighbors helped her move heavy objects. The other was grateful that her neighbors introduced her to good hospitals where she could receive quality treatment. Rendering or obtaining help from each other requires that neighbors maintain a keen interest in each other. This implies a collective solidarity.

Mutual help sometimes takes the form of conflict management. In the interview, cases revealed how neighbors help to resolve quarrels. For instance, one respondent reported: "We four young staff living in our dormitory played mahjongg. By our rule, the defeated person had to pay

finer. But one guy did not want to pay his dues. A quarrel was then started, which led to a fight. Neighbors came out and the event was brought to end by ourselves." Another recalled: "A couple in our building quarreled. The husband beat the wife and the wife ran out of the door. All neighbors came to help. I took the wife to my home and persuaded her to forgive her husband. I sent her home and warned her husband that his unit leaders would be notified if he beat her again. The husband admitted his wrongdoing and promised not to do it again."

Intervention by Leaders

Unit leaders can intervene in a unit member's life at any time. The intervention can touch upon matters of almost any private nature. In Mao's years, it was not uncommon for unit leaders to help members find wives or husbands and arrange for marriage and family life. Even now, according to one interviewee from the military, the would-be wife or husband of a military officer can be still questioned by his or her upper leaders.

The fact that unit members live with their leaders in the work unit's residential compound means that leaders can easily stage an intervention when necessary. Several interviewees mentioned that their leaders are assigned to live in apartments or housing units distributed proportionally among those of ordinary members. One said that he lived with a deputy minister right in the same building. Leaders are called or rush to the scene when a need arises. Unlike the mutual help offered by neighbors, the settlement they deliver is a formal sanction imposed by the unit authority. Also, it means that the event receives attention from the unit leadership and has impacts on the members involved. One respondent reported a case in which she acted as a neighbor: "One couple lived below our floor. The husband suspected that his wife had an extra-marriage affair. He beat her. She went to his unit leaders and asked for divorce. The husband did not want to divorce her and the dispute lingered for half a year. I myself tried to mediate them into reconciliation. The couple is now still together. However, because of the dispute, the husband moved out of our work unit."

Some cases are violent and can be a danger to petty officials. One respondent reported an interesting case in which a leader was injured and hospitalized: "Not long ago, a colleague was out on business travel and had sex with a woman. The woman's brother got the pictures showing them together and mailed them to the colleague's wife and demanded compensation for his sister. A quarrel and fight occurred between the

colleague and his wife. Our leader came to help and he himself was beaten and sent to hospital."

Residential Committee as Watchdog

The residential committee in the work unit forges the unit's connections with the lowest level of government. It also takes social responsibility and feedback from the local community on behalf of the work unit. To residents, it is both a social control mechanism that implements rules and maintains order and a social support network that provides life- and work-related services.

In the interview, various functions assumed by the residential committee were reported. Generally, they fall under five types (see Table 5.1). Type one involves care for children, elders, and those in need: immunization for children, child care in the summer, summer entertainments and outdoor activities for school children, emergency care for dependents when residents are busy with their work, junior delinquents, post-birth care services, activities and help for elders, cooking for and sending clothes to residents in need, and implementing the state's five-protection welfare program for the aged, weak, orphaned or widowed, infirm, and disabled (which involves assistance in the form of guaranteed food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and funeral expenses). Type two involves life-related community services: milk and newspaper subscription and delivery, telephone or drop-by messages, helping the postmen locate unclear addresses, receiving gifts and returning items on behalf of residents, delivering coupons and tickets, repairs, refuse collection, planting trees, running elevators, obtaining coal-gas for residents, running convenience stores, haircut shops, and public bathrooms, introducing massage and sewing services, and holiday arrangements. Type three involves implementing rules and directives from the upper authority: census, family planning, distributing condoms and contraceptives, issuing marriage permits, patriotic health campaigns, passing-on of the upper government's policies, and providing information to officials about residents. Type four involves residential hygiene and local order: sanitation, security, spiritual needs, dispute resolution, aiding local police, residential regulations, scheduling residents to guard their housing units, killing mice, and preventing households from raising dogs, cats, poultry, or pet animals. Type five involves local coordination: community organizations and activities, charitable affairs, mass organizations, public announcements, and building community coherence.

Table 5.1**Social Control: The Residential Committee**

Service or Duty	Governmental Connection
Care for Children and Elderly	Family Planning, Public Health, Welfare, Supply Station
Life-Related Services	Supply Station
Implementing Rules and Directives	Police, People's Court, Street Office of Government
Residential Hygiene and Local Order	Public Health, Police, People's Court
Local Coordination	Street Office of Government, Work Unit Leadership

These functions can be better understood in terms of the residential committee's links with the government. First, with orders from the police, the residential committee and its subcommittee for united security and defense pass on and implement city-wide or community-specific rules and regulations concerning residential security and order. One across-the-board rule reported by all respondents is that no pets, poultry, and domestic animals are allowed in public housing facilities. One interviewee supplied an interesting story: "My husband took a dog home. Children liked it and played with it, which caused attention from the residential committee. The committee invited the unit security together and came to my home when only our maid was home. They searched my home and found nothing, because we sent out the dog in the early morning. I was very angry with them because they did not have our permission to search my home."

The story would not be a surprise to another respondent who described the regulations set by the residential committee: "If you raise chickens or dogs, the committee asks you to do away with them. If you refuse to follow its order, it calls the police to catch the animals and kill them."

The residential committee and its security subsidiary also provide direct aid to the police for routine updating of household registration, registration of visitors residing with a household for a short time, criminal

search and investigation, and other security-related matters. Inside the work unit they are responsible for patrolling residential areas, arranging households on duty for their gates or buildings, and reporting significant incidents to the unit security or police. In one episode, an informant told: "Two youngsters from the residential compound fought each other. The residential committee called the police station. The dispatched officers took them to the station and gave them a lecture."

Second, with connection to the district bureau of public health, epidemic prevention center, and local hospitals, the residential committee helps deliver immunizations to children, implement family planning programs, arrange pre- and post-birth medical care for women, and enforce other outreach services to residents. One respondent had worked as a public health doctor for thirty-five years. She said: "The residential committee was an indispensable mass organization for health-related campaigns. They helped us a lot in identifying problems, contacting local residents, and organizing activities."

For the family planning program, the committee is in charge of (1) propagandizing state policies and raising residents' awareness of the advantages of delaying marriage and birth; (2) issuing marriage and birth permits (according to the interview, childbearing begins with applying for a quota from the unit leadership; the residential committee then takes the quota and forwards it to the street office of the city government; individual couples then receive a permit from the residential committee); and (3) providing birth-related services. Within residential areas, the committee takes charge of daily sanitation and patriotic health campaigns: it delivers drugs to kill mice, cockroaches, family germs, and other harmful parasites or insects; checks each household's outside cleanness and orderliness; and selects the model family in public health.

Third, in contact with supply stations, the residential committee helps residents pick up coupons or tickets for rice, oil, meat, coal, cloth, other living products, cash subsidies, and rationing stamps for groceries and daily necessities. It may set up department stores, grocery stores, supply stands, free markets, and other convenience stores to deliver or sell state-supplied or rationed articles as well as commercial products. According to the interview, these stores are convenient but do not necessarily offer lower prices. In addition to commercial or supply set-ups, the committee can extend their services to all possible life-related areas. For instance, it can ask work units or unit divisions for contributions to build a garden, a bike shelter, or other facilities in the residential compound. One respondent proudly said: "Our residential committee was a model one. It organizes retired doctors and nurses from our neighborhood to provide medical

services for residents, such as electronic therapy, massage, acupuncture, and shot clinic. Little fee is collected."

Fourth, with supervision from the people's court or procuratorate and justice administration, the residential committee, through its subcommittee of mediation, is actively involved in conflict management among residents. It watches for latent and manifest conflicts within and among families, and it resorts to education, persuasion, and assistance for prevention and settlement. Cases for mediation may involve marriage, parental support, inheritance, housing and land, debt, production management, juvenile problems with school or work, and minor theft. Results from the procedure are recorded if the matter is a serious one. For most cases, results are put into effect without any formal decrees or documentary records (Bureau of People's Mediation 1983; Sun 1988).

In the interview, various stories were related about mediation and conflict management in neighborhoods. A majority of cases involved inter- or intra-family problems. The residential committee can be called to the scene by residents. As one respondent said generally: "When a dispute breaks out between two families or a couple gets into a fight, neighbors usually help find the residential committee or unit leaders to persuade them back to peace."

Sometimes the residential committee actively intervenes. One respondent reported: "A couple quarreled and fought. The residential committee came to separate them for individual persuasion." Another described: "In the family below our floor, the son was sent to prison. The husband often quarreled with his wife over their son. When they fought, the residential committee came to calm them down by education and persuasion."

The strategy adopted by the residential committee is variable. Sometimes it resorts to human relations and even tricks. About this tactic, one respondent told an interesting story:

Two families disputed over the storage of household stuff in the doorway. Due to the gossips among women, bad words were passed around, which led to an open quarrel between them. The residential committee learned that the two families' children played together and often went to each other's home to eat. It thus decided to mediate the case by having children persuade their respective parents. The two families were reconciled by this strategy. They celebrated their renewal of relations by eating together the Spring Festival dinner.

Sometimes it alludes to a possible intervention by upper authorities to forcibly persuade disputants back to peace. This was illustrated by another respondent's story: "Two neighbors were in a dispute. The residential committee came to mediate. The two were called together for a

meeting and told that if they did not agree to mediation, their unit leaders would be notified of the dispute. As no one wanted the dispute to impact their work, the committee's order was followed."

In general, the residential committee is not as strong as might be expected. The settlement it brings to a conflict is informal. Major or delicate disputes may have to go beyond it for a tenable resolution. This is true in "high-class" residential compounds, as pointed out by one respondent from a research institute: "In a neighborhood where intellectuals and officials live, the residential committee composed of poorly educated housewives does not have much authority to intervene; unit leaders have more power to deal with problematic situations." It is also true in "working-class" neighborhoods, as witnessed by another respondent from a factory: "When the residential committee or workers' union fails to mediate a dispute, it is turned to unit leaders for final resolution."

Finally, the residential committee offers residents natural, handy, or emergency help. For example, it receives for residents messages, gifts, and articles returned from outside or drop-by visitors. Any outside agencies that want to cover the residential area for their services or products can use the committee as a bridge or local stand. In recent years, a number of city evening newspapers rely upon it for residential distribution. Also, when residents run into an emergency situation, they can turn to the residential committee for direct support. One respondent recalled: "When my wife gave birth to my child, I was not home. It was the residential committee that called my work unit to send my wife to hospital and took care of my home when both of us were away."

NATURE

Residential control targets the physical side of controllees, reflecting the surveillance idea of panopticon in the prison control of convicted criminals. The fundamental difference, as such a surveillance idea is applied to the residential networks in civil life settings, is that the resultant residential control is non-coercive, integrative, socializable, and easily accepted by the controlled as a part of their lifestyle.

The essence of residential control is to attach individuals closely to their families, neighborhoods, and workplaces. Families and neighborhoods are traditional and natural institutions. They socialize their members, resolve survival problems for them, and pay no significant cost to keep them in line. Apparently, when individuals are committed to their families and primary groups, the possibility of movement to other places, access to other choices, and deviation from a stable life course is auto-

matically decreased. In the settings of Chinese work units, the additional (yet significant) part is that family, neighborhood, and workplace become a unified network that is further connected to governmental scrutiny, control, and supervision.

As applied in a non-confrontational manner, the direct cost of residential control is minimized. There is no need to deploy a formal control force in the neighborhood. The expense that might otherwise result from dealing with problematic or rule-breaking incidents caused by the void of primary support is also saved. However, to ensure the effectiveness or maximize the utility of residential control, positive investments have to be properly made. For instance, jobs are provided, subsistence needs are supplied, services are delivered, and the entire neighborhood is linked to the society-wide system of control and support.

To the Chinese work unit, an organization designed for production or other business affairs, the practice of residential control may not be cost-effective at all. A complaint was made by the head of First Automobile Factory, where 80% of its 60,000 work force are allegedly employed in non-manufacturing positions such as policing and barbering: "Each year, I have to worry about housing for 2,000 couples getting married, nurseries for 2,000 newborn babies, and jobs for 2,500 school-leavers. I am mayor as well as factory head. Of course I have a bigger burden than my counterparts in the U.S." (Leung 1989:A14). Complaints like his are quite common among Chinese work unit leaders.

On the other hand, the Chinese work unit is given substantive leverage over its employees through residential control. For instance, the work unit issues permits for household registration and supply of subsistence needs. Although the number of permits is allocated to the unit by a complicated agreement among central, provincial, and municipal governments, it is the work unit that decides how to distribute the permits among its employees and how to contend for them if the allocated number is used up. As evidenced by the interview, it is not uncommon for unit members to wait for years for their separated spouses to be transferred into the city for reunion. They have to continuously plead with their unit leaders, personnel department, and even upper officials, and therefore are often subject to abuses and humiliations. I personally experienced the procedure when I managed to bring my wife from a hospital in a remote county to my university clinic. Another illustrative aspect is that work units control the issuance of identification cards and letters of introduction. I learned from my own experience, affirmed also by the interview, that the once-issued identification card is not accepted alone in most instances and that a letter of introduction has to be surrendered each time for each outside business

visit. In other words, employees are subject to their work units' approvals not only for each outside business trip but also for each visit to a unit during the trip.

Can the control a work unit has over its employees be translated into high job performance or productivity? This is hard to judge. The answer is not unilaterally determined by the work unit as long as it is under the state's supervision and the state does not change its belief in the effectiveness of residential control in keeping social order and stability.

CHANGE

Residential control featuring household registration is a tradition in the long history of Chinese civilization. In the past, it was based upon the Confucian doctrine of filial duty and served as a mechanism for the feudal government to collect taxes and recruit corvee labor and conscript armies (Dutton 1992).

Family

Throughout Chinese history, the family and its extended kinship assumed most socialization functions, deterring affiliated members from deviant behavior. Continuing a family name in good reputation was perceived as the sacred duty of all male members. Damaging it could lead to expulsion from the family (Ebrey and Watson 1986). However, although they were a positive force for individual socialization and local order, family and kinship networks also contributed to regional conflicts and remained a primary source for organized resistance to the governmental authority.

During the CCP reign, family and kinship networks have undergone tremendous changes. Mao treated the family as a basic revolutionary unit. Within the family, he advocated an equalization of wife with husband, and children with parents, in participating in socialist revolution and construction. Outside it, Mao took various strategies to break the kinship and organize individual families into a residential network connected to both work units and the people's government. While worship of ancestors, life-cycle events, and other activities featuring kinship relations were prohibited, households were organized in a new way for various CCP programs (e.g., security, sanitation, mediation, and political education programs in the neighborhood). During the Cultural Revolution class struggle was introduced into the kinship, rearranging network members with blood relationship into a simple division of antagonistic fronts. In the extreme,

as recalled by older respondents, the solidarity of a nuclear family was even penetrated. The wife was asked to fight her tainted husband, and children were intimidated to draw a class line from their stigmatized parents. The radical movement, while manipulating the family for revolutionary control, caused unprecedented damage to family and kinship relationships (Yue and Wakesman 1985).

Under Deng's pragmatic program, the family becomes basically an economic unit. In rural areas, Deng's production responsibility system allows a family to rent the state land for independent cultivation or collective production with other families within or outside a kinship. Urban reform puts the family into a similar position for private business or contracting of state enterprises. Family and kinship networks that were previously injured through political movements begin to resume their natural functions in the economic development. The family reclaims its influence over direct members with blood linkages. The kinship network re-activates itself with mutual visits, gift exchanges, ceremonial rituals, and entertainments among associated members.

On the other hand, the CCP and its desired arrangement for the family and kinship remain in effect. The kinship, as an organized relationship among families, is apparently not allowed to challenge the CCP's policy implementation power, replacing the officially supported residential and work unit network. The family, with modernization and other social changes, is gradually on the decline in socializing juniors and constraining deviant behavior. For instance, voluntary education is implemented up to the primary or junior high school level. Children are sent at age 6 to school, or even earlier to child-care centers. They are raised more and more in a social rather than family environment. According to the interview, both parents in almost all families hold positions in a work unit. They rush children to school in the early morning and pick them up in the late afternoon. At home, children do school assignments and parents work on jobs they bring home. The interaction is simplified to the extent that parents only make sure children finish homework, eat well, and dress properly. As noted in a national conference on family and early prevention of juvenile delinquency, social competition and individual development have caused families to drift from social ethics and collective conscience. Spiritual negligence coincides with materialist spoiling, making children prone to delinquent behavior. Among juvenile delinquents' families, it is found that 27.8% are spoiling and 17% neglecting families (Gan 1989). Neither type takes proper care of children's education due to the parents' preoccupation with their own work.

The family, as a basic unit for either Mao's continuous revolution or Deng's economic reform, has been a CCP control target and has served the CCP's need for social order. Under CCP rule, the structure of family becomes simple and the nuclear family becomes a majority type in cities. The generation difference is leveled off, male and female members are equalized, and the old authority of an indisputable household head is decentralized among family members. Socialization of children and control of immediate members are still a basic family feature. But how the family educates children and deals with problematic situations among its members, and how a family networks with other families, are no longer significantly affected by blood- or marriage-based kinship. Rather, they are shaped by the official education, residential, and work unit systems.

Neighborhood

The neighborhood committee is able to accomplish various functions because many households live in the neighborhood for a long time. People know each other well and are able to identify strangers without difficulty. In Mao's years, it was common that residents left their doors open, children played around, and adults entertained themselves in the same courtyard (Lewis 1971). It was taken for granted to keep an eye on each other's children, property, and business, and to report noticeable happenings to the parties concerned. In other words, local residents sought an interactive social environment, and self-control was routinized as a community lifestyle. However, despite the CCP's skillful manipulation, this natural cohesion among local residents often clashed with the official requirements of neighborhoods in policy implementation and social control. The tension was especially salient during the years of class struggles.

In recent years, due to a large mobile population created by economic reform, the solidarity of neighborhood has declined. According to the interview, urban residents are becoming more concerned with their own affairs, showing less interest in helping others. Privacy is claimed. Security is a primary concern. The majority feel uncomfortable to expose private affairs in public and insecure to unlock their doors when leaving home.

Generally, although it is formalized by the CCP into a residential network, the neighborhood and its solidarity based upon residents' mutual trust and loyalty have been undermined through Mao's class struggle and Deng's modernization drive. Residents' willingness and cooperation become now more important for local matters. Official demands of

neighborhood groupings for social control have to be less mandatory and more related to residents' practical needs or interests. For example, most respondents reported that mediation of civil disputes is welcome in their neighborhoods. Official statistics also show a considerable increase of mediation committees and settlements in recent years (Gan 1989). The reason is probably that disputes are generated from below and that residents need an authority to stabilize solutions and press for voluntary acceptance. In other words, official demands for compensatory or conciliatory control become effective when they serve residents' needs.

In summary, Chinese residential control begins with individual families and is officially carried out by neighborhood committees. The neighborhood committee consists of subcommittees for mediation, united defense and security, patriotic health movement, and family planning. It functions under the party and administrative leadership of a work unit and is directly connected to the street office of the city government, police stations, and local people's courts.

The neighborhood committee plays multiple roles as security safeguard, public health inspector, conflict resolution forum, and party and state policy conveyor and implementor. Moreover, control activities in the residential compounds of a work unit involve mutual help and surveillance among residents, and unit leaders' intervention.

The essential features of Chinese residential control are: (1) it is based upon family and neighborhood; (2) it is interwoven with the work organization; (3) it serves the needs of both governmental authorities and local residents; and (4) it is all-inclusive and interlocked with social support.

Control through Confidential Records

Control through confidential records is a practice by which information about individuals is systematically collected, processed, and stored as a basis for delivery of rewards, services, therapies, or punishments. Controllers can be either official authorities or private agencies. In the United States, for instance, the Social Security Administration keeps legal records of residents and non-residents for various civil and criminal purposes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains files of important suspects and serious offenders. A private credit company may also make use of specially collected information and manipulate persons or organizations for its own benefits.

Acquisition, retention, and use of individual records have a long tradition of widespread use. In the West, personal and organizational information is collected and maintained by both governmental and private agencies in written, auditory, visual, electronic, and other forms. The conflict between the public's right to know and the individual's personal privacy is first recognized in archives access administration (Steward 1974). Legislated, contracted, and limited approaches are thereafter undertaken to compromise one with the other (Baumann 1986). Legislation and administrative regulations are provided for the proper application of dossier records, especially with regard to social control implications in contemporary society. In the United States, the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts require federal agencies to permit individuals to (1) determine what records pertaining to them are collected or used; (2) prevent the unanticipated use of those records without their consent; (3) have access to those records; (4) ensure those records are used for a

necessary and lawful purpose; and (5) claim remedies for willful and intentional misuse of those records (Legislative Reference Bureau 1988).

In reality, however, records can be collected, managed, and used with biases and errors, which often causes undue disposal of control or beneficial treatments. In France, for instance, judicial financial aid is allocated to the people by an assumedly objective standard of needs. An examination of dossier records revealed that the nature of decisions is modified by various factors unrelated to the prescribed governmental standard, such as local considerations, personal characteristics, and even conditions relative to the examination of case files (Valetas 1976). In the United States, a study of confidential records about police misconduct showed that court records and citizens' complaints are kept and used in a way that delays investigation and biases discipline decisions toward officers. "Missing" records are commonplace in all police misconduct incidents. Officers with mental, drug, or alcohol problems are often retained on the force (Perry 1987).

In social science studies, a developing "dossier dictatorship" has been recognized that stockpiles "freeze-dried stigma" and helps the state manufacture deviance for better surveillance of private citizens (Goodwin and Humphreys 1982). Scholars in social problem discourse argue that the dossier-building phenomenon has become a social problem and needs to be researched under the sociology of social problems. According to Reichel (1977), massive dossier-building has a potential for violating such social values as civil liberty and individual privacy. In studying it as a social problem, three questions need to be raised: (1) What is the nature of the data to be recorded? (2) What are the procedures for ensuring data accuracy? and (3) How long are the data used?

In China, the history of personal files goes far back to Eastern Zhou (770-221 B.C.), when intelligence files were produced to ensure the genealogical appropriateness of court officials (Wang 1984). During the Sui-Tang period (581-907), in addition to the family background, examination results were kept on files for officials and scholars who took imperial examinations. Applying Foucault's (1977) notion of ascending and descending individuality, the exclusive practice of policing the nobles through personal files signified the ascending individuality. In terms of descending individuality, the system of criminal records began in the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.-A.D. 220) along with the emergence of the surveillance and reprieve system. According to Dutton (1992), however, a disciplined society or a descending mode of subjectification was not fully achieved until the contemporary era, when the filing system extended from both nobles and criminals to include all commoners.

STRUCTURE

Control through confidential records in contemporary China is a nation-wide practice implemented by work units. Everyone has a dossier beginning at the first grade of school and lasting until death. The dossier is kept and annually updated by the work unit with which the person is associated.

Work units are mandated to have special sections or persons in charge of membership dossiers. In the interview, all respondents reported that their work units have special organizational sections or persons to manage unit members' dossiers. Depending upon the size of the unit, a dossier section can be an independent department or can be staffed with only one person who may also have other work responsibilities. Its location in the work unit hierarchy is a function of the types of dossiers managed, which in turn are determined by the status and rank of dossier subjects. Generally, dossiers are of three main types: those for party members and official position holders, those for nominal cadres, and those for ordinary employees (see Table 6.1). Dossiers for party members and middle-rank officials are administered by the unit party committee and held by its department of organization. Those for lower-rank officials and nominal cadres are managed by the unit administration and kept under the department of personnel. Nominal cadres are those people who do not hold any official position but are classified as cadres. By state rule, those who are graduated from polytechnic schools and above are automatically treated as cadres. There is a tremendous gap between cadres and ordinary employees. The latter can be converted into the former only by years of service, special rewards, or other extraordinary qualifications. As such, dossiers for ordinary workers are kept separately from those for cadres. In universities, research institutes, and professional units where most employees are cadres, dossiers for a few workers are reportedly managed by the same dossier section but are categorically put on different shelves. In factories, state farms, and service units, management takes care only of workers' dossiers. Dossiers for cadres such as technical personnel and management officials are kept in the district or municipal bureaus that supervise the unit. As reported by a respondent from a factory, "Workers' dossiers are stored in the unit, but unit cadres' are kept in the municipal bureau of electronics."

The rule of keeping dossiers for subordinate organizations applies to all work units. In fact, dossiers for the top leaders of work units are all maintained by the upper agency's in-charge division. The purpose is to keep dossiers out of the reach of the persons concerned and to render the

Table 6.1
Type and Deposit of Dossiers

Type	Dossier Subject	Deposit
Party Dossier	Party Members Ranked Officials	CCP Organization Department and/or Supervising Agency
Cadres Dossier	Cadres, Teachers Researchers Low-Rank Officials	Unit Dossier Section Personnel and/or Supervising Agency
Ordinary Dossier	Workers, Staff Service Persons	Unit Dossier Section Labor

upper authority the ultimate control of confidential records. One respondent from a central ministry stated: "Dossiers for ordinary officials or cadres are kept in our own division. Officials' of the division level and above are kept in the ministry's bureau of personnel or party department of organization."

The dossier sections located differently in the work unit are supervised by the corresponding divisions in the upper agency that leads the unit. Step by step, it is connected to the central CCP Department of Organization for party members and ranking officials, Ministry of Personnel for cadres, and Ministry of Labor for workers. The State Bureau of Archives may also influence the supply of appropriate techniques for documentary classification and management. In all, control through dossiers has its own network that cuts horizontally across work units and moves vertically through different levels of the governmental bureaucracy.

PROCESS

In the interview, I recruited a respondent who served in her work unit as a dossier official for an extensive exploration of all aspects of dossier writing, keeping, and using. There were also six interviewees who said they had reviewed their own dossiers or those of others, and two party officials who had access to the dossiers of cadres, party members, and officials under their leadership. The general sample population, while gaining no access to a formal, complete dossier in their life, still had some

knowledge about its format, the way it is built, and the effect it has on their work and life.

Format and Content

The format of dossiers is standardized (see Figure 6.1). A dossier package is assigned to each person with his or her name, sex, age, and affiliating institution on a label affixed to the outside. Included in the package are ten items. Item one is a resume that details the person's biographical data, education, and work experiences. A unique feature about biographical data is that it records the social class background of the person's family or parents. The entry was first put on debate during the period of spiritual relaxation after Mao. It has now become neutralized as the general family background for ordinary cadres and employees. But for party members and ranking officials, it was reported that class origin is still a required dossier entry. Item two is an autobiography written in the perspective of personal redemption and public recognition. Item three is a depository of self-evaluations and leaders' evaluations through different periods. Item four is a collection of examinations or appraisals survived or failed by the person. Item five encompasses investigative materials obtained for specific purposes, such as promotion. They essentially document the person's political attitudes, lifestyle ethics, and day-to-day behavior. Item six is about organizational affiliation, recording when the person joined the party or youth league and what has been achieved for the organization. Item seven records rewards, honors, models, ranks, and other achievements. Item eight holds all negative records the person has accumulated over time. There are specific rules as to what punishments or mistakes are entered into the dossier. For instance, any formal warning must be kept in the file. The cancellation of or clearance from punishments is also put under this category. Item nine keeps assessments, announcements, and approvals for transfer, retirement, promotion, removal, wage adjustment, temporary leave, and special assignment. Item ten is a memorandum for whatever related materials are supplied to the work unit about the person.

Annual Evaluation

It is obvious that some dossier items are simply a depository for whatever is eligible or required to be enclosed. Other items are regularly updated. Still others are generated by special events. Among those regularly updated, item three leads directly to an institutionalized practice of annual evaluation in the work unit. The evaluation is conducted at the end

Figure 6.1
Dossier Access, Management, and Format

of each calendar year. It covers almost all aspects but mainly political attitudes, work performance, and ethic quality. The process begins with a meeting where unit members are informed of evaluation rules or criteria. Each person is then asked to write up his or her deeds during the year; this is called self-evaluation. Next, self-evaluations are brought together and discussed among co-workers and leaders to generate a mass evaluation for each person. The self-evaluation may also be modified at this stage. Following the mass evaluation, unit leaders take their turn to give official comments to each member, which are formally written down as evaluation-by-leaders. Unlike self-evaluations and mass evaluations, which are known to the evaluated and evaluators, evaluations-by-leaders are usually kept confidential with no access to the person concerned. With this rule in place, it is mandated that division leaders write evaluations for ordinary members. Division leaders are appraised by the unit administration. Administrative officials are graded by the main unit leaders, whose evaluations are done by the upper supervisory agency. The annual evaluation, with self-, mass, and leaders' appraisals altogether, is entered in the dossier.

Access to Dossiers

Access to dossiers is restricted. No person is allowed to read his or her own dossier. The rule is warranted by the structural arrangement for dossier management. The interview respondent who worked as a dossier registrar in her work unit said that she has access to all unit members' dossiers filed with her section, including dossiers for party members and cadres. However, there are two exceptions: (1) her own dossier is kept away from her by her direct leader, and (2) her leaders' dossiers are kept in the upper agency. The rule is that leaders can read the dossiers of their direct subordinates. Ordinary cadres or employees cannot know anything about their own dossiers and those of others, especially their leaders.

Rule-breaking occurs under situations of negligence or a justifiable reason. In the interview, whereas 94% of interviewees said they never read their own dossiers, 6% said they did. The situations and reasons under which they were allowed or had the opportunity to review their own dossiers are variable. One respondent said: "It was right before leaving the country and the person in charge of dossiers was an acquaintance of mine. She jokingly said to me: 'Serve yourself! It will not mean anything any more.' She implied that I would not go back and my dossier would therefore become a history."

Two other respondents related situations in which dossier officials partially or completely relaxed the dossier management rule that required

them to prepare requested materials from personal dossiers. In fact, a dossier official may not want to give the impression to other unit members that he or she is there to serve them. One of the two respondents said: "I asked the dossier person for a copy of my transcripts. He handed me my dossier package and let me do it. I took the needed pieces from my dossier, xeroxed them, and returned them back. All these were done under his close watch. I realized later that he did not do it for me by himself because he enjoyed directing me, a youngster, how to do something." The second respondent stated: "In applying for U.S. schools, I needed to copy my transcripts. The lady in charge handed me my dossier and asked whether I could do it by myself. I said yes. She then went back to her other work. I seized the chance to look at my dossier and found nothing significant. Materials supplied by myself, like self-evaluations, took much of space. I thought she gave me my dossier because she knew that nothing in it needs to hide from me."

Yet another respondent described an occasion on which dossier officials left their working table or office without properly closing dossier materials and the door. As dossiers are not kept in their due places, they are approached by aggressive employees acting together. The respondent stated: "One day, I accidentally saw several of my colleagues bustling around a table in the unit's dossier office. I went in to see what was happening. When I saw them looking at the dossiers, I squeezed in and got a look at mine and those of others."

Two more respondents revealed that loopholes exist in the work unit's dossier management. For instance, dossiers are not always properly separated to ensure that those managing dossiers have no access to their own. One respondent reported: "I was a group leader. I was asked to put my co-workers' evaluation scores into their dossiers and got a chance to see my own dossier and many of others." Another said: "I saw my dossier when I served as the departmental secretary. Nothing significant was inside. Most materials were written or supplied by myself."

In general, abuse of power, negligence, and lack of strict classification exist in the dossier management of work units.

Use of Dossiers

According to the interview and my own observations, dossiers are exclusively used by leaders and the work unit or upper authority for decisions in promotion, recruitment to the party, transfer, or special assignment. For promotion, unit leaders or upper authorities order dossier officials to present the needed dossier to them. After reviewing the dossier,

they may dispatch officials from the unit department of organization or personnel to visit the targeted person's hometown, schools, and former workplaces to verify facts recorded in the dossier or to collect new information. The new information so obtained is entered into the dossier under item five for future consideration.

In transfer, it is the receiving side that sends a formal request for a dossier to the work unit with which the would-be transferred person is currently associated. The decision made by the present work unit to release or withhold the dossier is critical to the success or failure of a transfer. If the dossier is withheld, the receiving work unit is usually not allowed to make a formal decision of acceptance even it has enough information about the person. It is commonly said, "Keeping the dossier, you have the person." If the dossier is released, it is usually sent through registered mail or hand-carried under seal by a reliable third person. Upon receipt of the dossier, the receiving work unit may dispatch its officials to obtain more information about the person.

In special assignment or enrollment to the party, a similar reference to the dossier is made. However, since the leaders responsible for such a decision have face-to-face contacts with the targeted member, their impression and knowledge based upon routine interactions can play a significant part.

Apparently, dossier officials are responsible to entertain investigative visitors from other work units and upper authorities. The interviewee who worked as a dossier registrar said that when visitors ask for information about a present or former unit member, she talks with them on the basis of the member's dossier records. The rules specify that visitors cannot claim direct access to the dossier. However, if they want a formal written statement, she can prepare one in accord with a dossier and give it to them after gaining the approval of her direct leaders. For the convenience of dealing with outside requests, a shortened duplicate is usually prepared in each member's dossier. This duplicate can be made available to visitors from the outside.

Finally, dossier officials are not as powerful as might be imagined. Their due duty is to keep dossiers and take care of transfers when ordered or approved by unit leaders. They have no control over what is written in a dossier and how those records are used for important personnel decisions. But they can have an influence is when they tell outside visitors or brief unit leaders about a member's dossier record. Also, if they are corrupt, they may use their key to the office of dossier files for their own benefit.

Individual Attitudes toward the Dossier

The dossier is important for job placement, transfer, promotion, and other opportunity. How much do individuals care about their dossiers? In the interview, 40% of respondents indicated they are concerned about their dossier and worry about what might be recorded in it. There were 29% saying no and 31% feeling uncertain about or unaware of what would be written into their dossier and what impact dossier records might have upon them. Among those who did not worry, one respondent offered a simple explanation: "I have no control over it; why worry then?"

Data analysis showed that older respondents, females, and those of lower education tend to take their dossiers more seriously than do their younger, male, and more highly educated counterparts. For example, while only 17% of respondents under age 36 care about their dossiers, all those older than 45 said they have learned through experience that the dossier is important and therefore are concerned about what is recorded in it. One respondent from a central governmental agency offered an explanatory generalization: "Those people who have job transfers, high expectations for promotion, or long years of work tend to be concerned with their dossiers and acknowledge the importance of control through confidential records."

On the importance of control through dossiers, 74% of respondents regarded it as important, 26% not too important, none not important at all. Although males and females equally realized its importance, more young than older respondents tended to downplay control through dossiers. More highly educated respondents showed better understanding than those of lower education of the necessity of dossier keeping and writing in modern work organizations. Two interviewees' comments were illustrative. One with primary schooling complained: "I have not done anything wrong in history. Control through dossiers is an unreasonable practice." Another with a graduate degree said: "It is a necessary record helping the work unit have better information about its employees."

NATURE

As a civilized form of social control, control through dossier records is latent, indirect, non-coercive, and non-confrontational.

First, control through dossiers is based upon the spirit of modern science and bureaucracy. As applauded by Weber (1958), the development of modern records facilitates effective control of people and material flows in bureaucracy and the social system and is one of the indispensable factors of capitalism. With justifications provided in the name of better

treatment and more effective management, information about individuals, organizations, and their activities can be legitimately, conveniently, and systematically collected, processed, stored, and used.

Second, control through dossier records can be applied across time and space without the physical presence of controllers and controllees. Controllers can set up a file for any target, investigate related events in the past and at present, and use such evidence unilaterally to reach a verdict or any fateful decision about the controlled. For controllees, the scary part of control through confidential records lies in that information about them is used without their knowledge for recommended or imposed delivery of rewards or punishments. The controllees are uncertain about what information is held about them, what consequence the information may have upon them, and how soon. For instance, a person spotted by the police and put under surveillance for criminal acts becomes nervous, often because he or she does not know what evidence the police have, and when and how the police may take actions on the basis of that information. A person waiting for promotion is usually kept in the dark as to what evidence his or her superiors use for the decision. With no recourse to escape the control, he or she can do nothing but be always careful about words and deeds. One respondent commented: "There is something mysterious about my dossier. I've known its existence since my primary school but known nothing about its contents. Every time I go through an important point and know my dossier is being reviewed by the upper authorities, I cannot help being nervous and scared. This warns me to be more careful about my speech and behavior in daily routines."

Third, control through dossier records looks back into history and lags behind current developments. Also, records are not updated as frequently as they should be. Once an item is entered, it may take a complicated procedure to clear it away. To the detriment of the controlled, "freeze-dried stigmas" are often kept in the record with long-term negative impacts. The Chinese dossier, as a permanent record created by the government for each individual, is especially retrospective. According to the interview respondents, there are no guidelines for clearing negative records in a personal dossier. A moderate mistake may need an extraordinary effort, such as a formal petition to the work unit leadership, to be cleared away. On the other hand, as long as a mistake is kept in the file, it remains a factual stigma obstructing upward mobility.

In all, dossier building and control through confidential records, while justifiable for organizational needs in contemporary social processes, may result in unusual fear and damage on the part of the controlled. The

practice deserves serious academic scrutiny from both conservative and liberal perspectives.

CHANGE

Despite the tradition of policing nobles and criminals through confidential records in Chinese history, the communist control through dossiers is developed and operated in a somewhat characteristically new fashion. Dossiers for party members and cadres began in Yanan, with political underpinnings drawn from, and practical concerns addressed by, Lenin's theory of party organization and construction (*Qiushi* 1990). Party and cadre dossiers were detailed in content. They were kept confidential, frequently scrutinized, and often mysteriously used. When dossiers were extended to other walks of life, they became a model for the development of worker files in industry, student records in education, and personnel dossiers in professional units.

The practice of keeping worker and professional files was borrowed from the former Soviet Union's worker records. Theoretical justification was set to meet and satisfy production and development needs, that is, labor discipline and quality control in factories and work units. The initial form of files, resembling the Soviet workbook system, included such components as work registration cards, work guarantee books, and other duty- or performance-related recording and scrutinizing devices (Wang 1984).

In 1956 the first national conference was called for cadre personnel file workers. The conference promulgated the Temporary Regulations on Cadre File Management Work, which set goals and guidelines for the unification and systematization of cadre files across the country (Wang 1984). The successful standardization of cadre files led to the extension of related experiences in other areas. In worker files, the early form was overhauled with political, ideological, and moral details added to its main body of content. As Dutton (1992) points out, the practice demonstrates an extension and intensification of the discipline regime.

Later years of politicization under Mao, epitomized by the Cultural Revolution, sent the political and ideological components of cadre, worker, student, professional, and other personnel files to an even higher level of importance. At the time, it was argued that the influence of family and community be detailed in the dossier for a better understanding of individual thoughts and acts. The disciplinary matrix was thus connected to neighborhood and community policing. Individuals were given no escape from the authority's scrutiny of their daily life and work activities.

The dossier format formed under Mao continues under Deng's reform program. The procedure for collecting information for each formal item and the exclusive authority of work units in administering control through dossiers remain in effect. However, some changes have taken place. For instance, the class origin of the person's family is no longer required content. Less political concern is put on the investigation, evaluation, writing, and use of dossier records. More significant, the social context of control through dossiers has become challenging. More and more work units and employment organizations, like private and joint businesses, have begun to bypass the government-sponsored dossiers in their decisions for personnel enrollment, job placement, promotion, transfer, and other assignment.

Some interviewee comments were illustrative of this change. One respondent said: "In the past, withholding dossier was equal to abducting a person. Now many joint ventures and collective enterprises do not care about the official dossiers at all." Another commented: "In recent years, many work units receive people without asking their previous units to release the dossiers. The dossier is no longer a key to job transfer." In general, as stated concisely by a respondent from a governmental agency, control through dossiers has "more influence before, but much less today."

In all, control through confidential records is executed by one or multiple dossier sections under the unit party committee for CCP members and officials and the unit administration for ordinary employees. Format, content, annual evaluation entry, access, management, and use of dossiers are all standardized by specific rules and organizational procedures.

In terms of applicable laws or administrative orders and human manipulations in actual practice, Chinese control through dossier records is not much different from that in other countries. However, there are several unique points about the Chinese dossier operation. First, unlike the resumes or curriculum vitae prepared by individuals for study or job applications in the West, Chinese dossiers are written by teachers or unit leaders and are officially kept and transferred with no or restricted access to individuals. Second, unlike Western reference letters that are specific in terms of time, subject, and purpose, Chinese dossiers are a permanent, all-inclusive record about an individual from the first day of schooling to death. Third, Chinese dossiers have a standard format that includes sections for personal data, family background, political attitude, job performance, ethics, and general behavior. Finally, the authority to keep and use Chinese dossiers is officially granted to work units. The work unit writes comprehensive dossier evaluations for its employees about their

political activity, work accomplishments, and other related matters. As everyone is concerned with the dossier and attempts to maintain a clean record throughout his or her career, the work unit thereby secures a strong means of control over its employees.

Control through Civil Reward and Penalty

Control through civil reward and penalty is a basic organizational feature of modern bureaucracy (Hall 1991). In business management as well as governmental administration, rewards and penalties are regularly used to advance employee morale, encourage membership commitment to the collective cause, or prevent deviance. Rewards and related rhetoric make goals, preferred values and ethics, approved ways and means, and intended states of affairs explicit and specific to the individuals. They keep individual members within the common course of a collectivity and motivate them to contribute to the collective cause through joined or independent actions. Penalty is the other side of this double-edged control. It demonstrates to the individuals what is bad, wrong, and shameful; deters them from sliding into it; and makes them bear the cost if they jump out of line. The trick of control through reward and penalty is that although only a few are targeted, all members of the collectivity feel its pressure and effect.

In the West, society-wide rewards come in various forms such as grants, fellowships, awards, special funding, and honors. Public criticism, denunciation, or protest are also aired in different forms against individuals or behaviors. Sponsors or judging subjects are not limited to governmental agencies. In fact, private organizations often take a leading role in the arena of civil rewards. They identify local or special needs, provide financial and moral support for the development of desired areas or subjects, single out particular deeds for rewards, and help diversify cultural values and substantive interests across the society. Governmental awards, in contrast, are usually more symbolic and less practical. As

such, even an ordinary act, if it is judged by the authority as useful to signify a particular value, can become a reward target. For example, a state governor can award medals of bravery to teenagers to advance heroism and mutual help among public schoolers (*Honolulu Advertiser* 1993).

Within each profession, line of business, or work organization, rewards or penalties can be arranged as a part of routine management or annual summing-up rhetoric. In the United States, for example, teacher, police officer, soldier, volunteer, mother, or family of the year are often selected and awarded across the country or within a state, county, or community. In public schools, students are evaluated once each quarter and are selectively rewarded for full attendance, good citizenship, or excellent performance. In state universities and federal research organizations, rewards are given to faculty, research associates, students, or staff for their services, special contributions, or routine job performance. There are also formal or informal selections of negative models or worst vocational roles in some locales or professions. In the entertainment world, for instance, worst films, books, actors, actresses, or directors are often designated for negative publicity.

In China, reward and penalty are systematized with much political rhetoric or symbolism. For rewards, there are models, activists, mass meeting praises, small awards, honorary certificates, and various other "tricks" at different levels for different activities during different time intervals. On the penalty side, unfavorable impression, public shame, negative labeling, criticism, unfriendly treatment, no entry to the party or youth league, and no conversion to cadres are examples of informally instituted penalizing practices. The formal punishment meted out by the work unit is usually through administrative disciplining (see Chapter 8).

Reward is constantly used. To ordinary Chinese, it is a significant part of their work and life. In universities, students can be cited as "three-good" students, excellent youth league members, or study models. Faculty members can be promoted on the basis of awards or honorary titles they have received from inside or outside. Both can become a model or activist during a campaign, such as an activist during the tree-planting month. As all are highly inspired by the intensive use of politically charged rewards, failure to obtain such rewards places pressure on an individual. For some, the fact of not being awarded amounts to a public denial and an internal punishment. I was awarded as a "three-good" student and an excellent student cadre during my undergraduate years, and I knew personally how much extra care an awarded student has to take in front of department officials, professors, and classmates. Before being awarded, a person has

to work hard, behave well, and avoid controversies. After receiving an award, the person is supposed to be a model in work, political activity, and daily behavior. Because of public attention and official scrutiny, tremendous pressure builds up, both externally and internally, on the part of awardees.

In short, expectation for an award and the reality of being awarded or unawarded make candidates and all those involved more subordinate and obedient, and therefore lend the authority an effective instrument of control.

STRUCTURE

There is no special structural setup exclusively for delivering rewards or meting out a penalty. The task is executed directly by the organizational authority of the work unit. Thus, control through rewards or penalties is routinized and becomes an integrated part of organizational life. It also implies that control is politicized and takes a work unit's organizational authority to justify its necessity and highlight its importance.

The organizational authority refers to the core leadership at a functional level. In other words, section leaders decide on and deliver sectional awards or penalties to their sectional constituents. The departmental authority allocates rewards and penalties among eligible members within a department. At the unit level, it is the central administration of the work unit that makes decisions as to who are awarded or penalized. There are also cross-level and cross-function connections. First, for the higher level to make an award or penalty decision, the lower level must supply its representatives or eligible candidates for consideration. Second, a functional department may take directives or criteria from the upper authority of its specialty, establish a screening procedure, and directly deliver or ask a due authority to grant special awards or penalties to selected persons or functional units. For example, the residential committee receives from the street office of the municipal government its policies for model or "need-to-improve" families. It checks each household according to the city guidelines, determines which one is selected for what category, and reports its list of candidates to the work unit leadership and the street office of the municipal government. When awards and honorary certificates for model families (or warnings for need-to-improve families) are issued from the street office of the city government, the residential committee may choose to send them directly or have the unit leaders announce and present them,

to the selected families, in a unit mass meeting if it is deemed necessary to so publicize the event.

In all, establishment, selection, and presentation of awards or penalties reside in the normal organizational structure and process of work units. They are decided and conducted by unit leaders as an integral part of organizational activities.

PROCESS

There are various types of rewards and penalties from within or without work units (see Figure 7.1). They come to functional divisions or individuals of the work unit under different names but serve one purpose: to motivate various interests to stick to the common ideal and goal of the work unit or higher authorities. Based upon documentary records and interview reports, four major types of rewards are generalized. Negative labeling and penalties can be constructed accordingly.

The first type can be called the prototype reward, which is established along with vocational roles, selected at each organizational level, and presented to constituents by different authorities. It is local and role-specific, because models or rewards can be determined and formalized in the first instance by the lowest authority. It is also cross-sectional and general, because models or awardees at the first, second, or third instances may be brought to the next upper level to compete for a higher honorary title or award. Among students, youth league members, athletes, cadres, mediators, security guards, party members, dossier officials, or unit employees in general, role models or advanced representatives can be selected in a section, department, or work unit, or through each of these layers or tiers up to the national level. For example, a youth league member may begin with his or her local branch, becoming an excellent member for a year. He or she may then be elevated through the work unit, city, and province and finally emerge as one of the nationally known excellent youth league members who are selected and awarded annually by the central youth league committee in Beijing. Because of the role generalization at higher levels, other models may merge with each other and end up at the national level with a common title or honor, such as the advanced employees in the country or within a central ministry. For example, a person from a factory may begin with the title of an advanced worker. He or she may join an excellent faculty member from a university, a model researcher from an institute, or a representative cadre from a governmental agency, and emerge finally as a model employee in a ministry.

Figure 7.1
Levels, Types, and Contents of Rewards

The second type can be called the campaign-derived reward. It comes with a particular national or local campaign, serving as an energizing mechanism to motivate the masses for the intended goals of the campaign. It constitutes a type because campaigns are frequent and characteristic features of contemporary Chinese life. Among those nationally known are the tree-planting holiday, civic virtue month, legal education campaign, security and safety month, learning from Lei Feng campaign, and patriotic health movement. During a campaign all work unit members are mobilized, their thoughts and acts are observed and evaluated with each other or by the leaders in charge, and praises or awards are given to those who show special dedication and contribution. For instance, during the civic virtue month, unit members are expected to behave well and do one or more good things for others or the public. Those who participate in a typical event that demonstrates civic virtue as defined by the authority or who do good things that are publicly recognized, may be awarded as model citizens, activists, or some other honorary title. Campaign rewards can proceed to the national level of publicity and recognition.

The third type is the emergency-derived reward, which is made temporally and spatially specific to a fact or event. The emergency event and the rewarded individual might be a fire and a person braving it to save life and property, a violent act and a person to fight it, a drowning child and a person to carry out the rescue, or a problem and a person to solve it. For instance, one interviewee reported that a party branch secretary of a workshop in her factory rescued a little child when he was swimming in a lake. He sent the child home and did not leave his name. The parents of the rescued child were very grateful and came to the work unit to report his good deeds. As a result, the party propaganda department of the work unit wrote articles about him and his good deeds for the city newspaper and radio station. The branch secretary was thus publicly praised. Moreover, he was formally awarded by the unit in a mass meeting and elevated as an advanced party secretary by the municipal bureau that supervises the factory.

The fourth type is the reward or praise given routinely, either formally or informally by unit leaders, for members' good thoughts or acts in daily work and life. There are various meetings in a section, a division, or the entire work unit. Leaders habitually single out individual members for praise and public recognition or as a model for others to follow. Even on a work site, an observant leader can make comments on a particular act and give oral credit to the person who performs it well. For instance, a person can be praised by his or her division leaders for coming to work on time in the past month or always coming early to prepare the office for others. Or

during an inspection tour, a workshop leader can report to an upper leader that a worker has maintained a record of no poor-quality products for half a year. All these are routinely done with task-performance activities.

The content of each type of reward is different. It may be oral praise, mention of good practices in a leader's report or speech, specially designed certificates, good points recorded in the dossier, an extra bonus, a pay raise, or a monetary award. In general, a reward may have four possible components. The first is a formal, well-decorated certificate that provides official proof of the reward. The certificate can be in multiple copies: one for the individual to keep; one to be entered in his or her dossier; and one for the section, division, or work unit to display in a public place. The second is a medal, sculpture, or statue with the title and covering period of the honor and the name of its recipient inscribed on it. The statue can be also put on exhibition in the work unit. The third is a publicity show for public recognition. This can be done through a mass meeting in which the awardee sits on the stage as a dignitary. But the most effective way is through official newspapers, radio, and television, or through a local wired loudspeaker system and blackboard news. The fourth is a disposable benefit that can be redeemed politically or economically. For example, a reward may come as an amount of cash or an extra bonus plus a number of good points that can be translated into personal assets for political appointment or professional promotion. One respondent reported that he was elected through his work unit as a New Long March shock worker in his city. He received a certificate and a medal, had publicity exposure in local media, and obtained an extra bonus at the year's end. In addition, the honor helped him obtain an early promotion to a higher professional level.

The occasion on which a reward is presented varies according to the type of reward. In most cases, a mass meeting is called for the official presentation. Such an occasion is supposed to generate a maximum amount of positive effect. A head title written in large characters is hung above the meeting stage to inform the audience of the purpose of the reward meeting. The pre-selected awardees are loudly announced with their names attractively posted on the wall. They either sit on the stage or are called to the stage when their rewards are presented. The program begins with the leaders' speeches on the importance of rewards and the procedure of award selection. The awardees are then asked to report their deeds. After the meeting, they may be approached by reporters for publicity in mass media. To individual awardees and spectators, the entire process amounts to a political rhetoric that overwhelms them with total dedication to the collective state of affairs desired by the authority.

Criticism and penalty can be meted out in similar ways. The prototype penalty may identify a vocational role as poor or need-to-improve, such as a poor doctor and a need-to-improve worker. In a campaign, some unit members may be labeled as backward or inactive. An emergency situation may reflect apathy toward human life and disregard for public property. In daily work and life, unit members can be routinely targeted for criticism by leaders. The content of a penalty and the occasion on which it is delivered are also comparable to those of rewards.

NATURE

Civil reward or penalty can be positive or negative. Whereas a reward glorifies the giver, the receiver, the spectators, the deed it recognizes, and the site on which it occurs, a penalty serves as a warning to every side concerned. This form of social control can be manipulated by an authority to socialize its constituents to a set of preferred values, have them follow a desired track or state of affairs, and motivate them to contribute to an intended goal. With rewards, the controlled are often unaware of being induced, manipulated, or controlled.

First, reward or penalty and the related rhetoric act as a socialization or resocialization mechanism. They teach people what values are preferred, what acts are desired, what goals are intended, and how to make themselves integrated to the collective cause or what it means to be set apart from the mainstream. The mechanism is simple, easy to understand and follow. For instance, awardees are selected from the general population, the award procedure is conducted in the specific context, and important points are highlighted by key awarding components. Everybody present can learn the message gradually, contextually, and naturally.

Second, rewards motivate people to do extra, to perform extraordinarily, or to at least keep pace with the normal progress favored by the authority of work units. Penalties do likewise, but from an opposite direction. Human beings are not only susceptible to tricks, lures, and incentives but also are affected by warnings, threats, and penalties. Awarding a person in a collective is like giving a stimulating push to the lead horse in a race. On the other hand, issuing real or perceived penalty deters any racing member from falling behind the rank. As the rest follow it and do not drop out, the horse in the forefront can determine whether a race turns into an exciting one. In other words, rewards or penalties can be used as a pace-setter for the authority to control the process of collective actions.

Third, whereas penalties give a sense of relief to those not penalized, rewards create a shadow over those who are not awarded but who are of a similar identity with the awardees. For a very few the shadow may mean a denial, punishment, or reason for doing little, deviating from the course, sabotaging the process, or exiting from the system. But for the majority it exerts pressure for more active participation in the collective cause. Generally after a rewarding or penalizing rhetoric, most people are likely to examine their past actions, highlight what is right and wrong, and make efforts to do as well as or better than others for the next round of awards or else avoid further penalties.

Fourth, the cost of control through civil rewards is low. When people are (1) made cognizant by rewards and the awarding rhetoric of what is the best, (2) motivated to do their best, or (3) pressured to do as well as others, the authority in charge saves itself from costly motivating, disciplining, or punishing procedures. Indeed, negligence, dereliction, deviance, rule-breaking, and other problematic incidents decrease and the cost for controlling them or correcting their consequences declines when people are positively socialized and kept in line. The cost of control through civil penalties is also minimized.

Fifth, control through rewards is executed without the controllees' awareness of being controlled. There is no use of force. Everything is done in a positive manner. The rewarded person is glorified and made more dedicated. All concerned members observe the procedure, become excited, and experience increased motivation or positive pressure. Resistance, unhappy feelings, and negative measures are minimized while a healthy morale, good work order, effective performance, and high productivity are rendered to the authority in charge. Also, control through civil penalties, as it is applied mildly in the organizational context, is not likely to generate excessive feelings of coercion and alienation on the part of individuals. It serves mainly to advance collective identity and commitment.

CHANGE

The system of civil rewards and penalties was instituted early in Chinese history. In Western Zhou (1122-770 B.C.), imperial power was shared by several dukes or princes who ruled over a territory awarded to them by the emperor after tribal wars. In the later feudal dynasties, rewards of land, wife, concubine, official post, gold or silver, and other valuable articles are seen in both historical records and works of literature (Qiushi 1990).

The communist reward and penalty system grew out of the peasant uprising and mass movement in which incentives and disincentives become indispensable for promoting a continuous revolutionary enthusiasm. Critical of the material rewards misused in the past, the new awarding practice focuses on the fairness of procedure and spiritual meaningfulness of reward objects. The principle of being clear about reward and penalty is publicly stressed. Propaganda values of reward practice and self-criticism or mass criticism are theoretically explored. Generally, as justified by the official strategy of positive encouragement in combination with negative education, reward or penalty and the related rhetoric constitute an important part of the communist mass propaganda program.

In Mao's years, use of rewards and penalties was frequent, politicized, and based upon spiritual objects. Works units were organized like the military. Political, ideological, and economic programs were intensively executed from time to time. Along with those programs, various study, work, and production competitions or exercises were initiated at each level of organization or government. Loudspeakers and blackboard news praised winners or criticized inactive persons. Mass meetings were regularly called to glorify those who took the lead in an initiative or to rebuke those who lagged behind a movement. As respondents who worked under Mao's era unanimously reported, work units in those years were highly organized. Unit members were constantly in an exciting mood, as if they were in a swirl of enthusiasm. Most people were motivated or pressured to move ahead.

The spiritual effect of reward and penalty is no longer emphatically highlighted under Deng. While the form of civil reward and penalty still reflects the heritage from Mao (mainly in the procedure of selection and inventory of titles), the content of rewards and penalties is overhauled with substantive benefits or disincentives that match the new orientation of materialistic and practical effects favored by both authorities and individuals. The implication of the reward and penalty rhetoric also has a different perspective. According to the interview respondents, the honor of advanced employees or dishonor of backward employees is still in the reward and penalty repertoire of work units. The procedure for selecting a model or need-to-improve employee remains about the same. But the standard by which a person is elevated in status or is negatively labeled has changed from the previous stress on political behavior to the current focus on job performance. Better individual performance is associated with the work unit's higher productivity and better economic effect. To reflect this relationship, the unit authority begins to allocate a small part of its material gain to the award-worthy persons or its loss to a blamewor-

thy part. In other words, instead of just being praised or glorified through rhetoric, awardees are given bonuses, wage increases, cash, promotions, and other direct benefits. Criticism and educational sessions also give way to a loss of regular benefits or even a payment of fines for those who deserve a penalty. As a number of respondents reported, their work units' annual summing-up meeting now becomes a time to distribute bonuses to extraordinary contributors in particular and "good-enough" employees in general. A very few backward members are no longer shamed by open criticism. A smaller general bonus benefit or no bonus serves more than shame. The mentality of unit leaders also changes. They begin to feel embarrassed or powerless if they just make empty praises or rebukes and have nothing substantive to display and hand out to their employees.

In summary, control through civil reward and penalty is a standard organizational exercise for the work unit management. Rewards and penalties may be role-oriented, campaign-related, or emergency-derived, or they may serve as a meeting rhetoric and governing trick. They can be given to all eligible unit members at different levels inside or beyond the work unit.

Three characteristics can be identified about Chinese civil rewards and penalties. First, Chinese rewards and penalties are formally controlled by the governmental agencies or state-operated work units. Although there are recent reports that peasants or private businesses make formal awards to engineers or technicians trained by the state (*China's Scholars Abroad* 1993), private organizations do not play a significant role. Second, the procedure for selecting an awardee or a backward person is formalized (often from the top down), and draws attention from both leaders and ordinary organizational members. Democracy is in place. Public opinion has its weight. But because of active involvement from leaders, judgments from the top affect the process. Finally, a significant amount of political rhetoric is created before, during, and after the reward or penalty process. As the effect for positive encouragement and negative education is officially claimed, various means of propaganda are mobilized. The rhetoric from one reward or penalty procedure often lingers until that from another replaces it.

Control through Administrative Disciplining

Disciplining begins with the family and extends through the community to what Foucault (1977) called carceral institutions such as prisons, insane asylums, reform schools, and reformatories. The target of disciplining can be either body or soul. Disciplining the body involves an exhausting recycling of power and knowledge into and out of the body as if it is a special site of productive and efficient power and knowledge (Foucault 1977). The disciplining of soul emerges from an important transformation in modern history. As it ascends to dominance, contemporary society becomes characterized by an increasing objectification and disciplining of subjectivity and an intensified ordering of the soul (Van-Kreiken 1990). Social members, while gaining increased individualization, become self-controlled, administered, and depressed beings. Overall, the disciplining of body and soul is key to understanding the impact of a rational, disciplinary, and civilized society on the human psyche.

Disciplining children within a family has long been a part of human culture. Discipline in the workplace appeared late in history but is now the most widespread phenomenon of socialization and social control. In theoretical studies, the link between market power and wage structure is usually construed in terms of disciplining the work force (DiPrete 1990). In practice, disciplining workers comes from both directions: teaching them skills, rules, and regulations; and spanking them if they step out of line.

Western administrative discipline takes place in both governmental and professional contexts. Disciplining the police provides a good illustration for what is done in governmental agencies. In a large U.S. city, for exam-

ple, the police department is required to release its disciplinary action reports regularly to the public and mass media. In a recent report, two disciplinary actions involved a twenty-day suspension. One was for a civil employee who falsified an arrest record in order to protect his friend, a state representative, from being reported to the public by the media. The other was for an officer who confronted a group of people in a tourist center with a gun in his hand while being off-duty. The two disciplinary actions were reportedly based upon an investigation made by the internal affairs division of the police department and approved by the chief. In addition, criminal investigations were conducted within the police department for both incidents, with results to be handed over to city prosecutors to determine if any criminal charges were warranted (McMurray 1993).

In a professional context, disciplining doctors provides a typical example. A survey was recently conducted in five U.S. midwestern states about medical boards, which usually act as a disciplining authority over doctors. It found that doctor misconduct and malpractice are not responsively handled due to the board's financial inability to hire sufficient investigators and attorneys. When sanctions are ordered, they are often too lenient (Kinkel and Josef 1991). In another study, the career of a U.S. obstetrician who practiced a dangerous method of childbirth was examined. It showed that the medical establishment has difficulty in disciplining its unorthodox members, especially when they have good education, devoted clientele, and high social standing (Bullough and Groeger 1982).

Administrative disciplining in Chinese work units consists of rules, regulations, professional ethics, and prescribed punishments for rule-breaking behavior. Work unit rules and regulations constitute a complex system. There are formal laws and rules promulgated by the central, provincial, and municipal governments, which are applied to individuals by the work unit. For instance, the work unit is empowered to detect and punish early marriage, having more than one child, and other rule-breaking acts specified by the marriage law and family planning program. There are also regulations, measures, and ethics established by the work unit for various categories of activity. To the employees, the work unit has discretionary power to define inappropriate or deviant acts and prescribe corresponding penalties. Whereas informal penalties, such as loss of benefits and public shame, are assumedly delivered through civil reward and penalty on a routine basis, formal punishments for organizational rule-breaking are systematically carried out under the name of administrative disciplining. The officially established punishments include public warning, demerit recording into the dossier, deprivation of benefits or honors, demotion, off-duty observation, suspension, transfer, and expul-

sion from the work unit. Plea-bargaining is not an officially acknowledged procedure. But according to the interview, good attitudes, guilty pleas, and repentance can earn the person concerned no or reduced punishment. As some respondents pointed out, the practice is an application of Mao's teaching "leniency to those who confess their crime" to administrative disciplining in the civil settings of work units.

STRUCTURE

Like control through civil reward and penalty, the authority of administrative disciplining lies in the power apparatus of work units (see Figure 8.1). Laws, rules, regulations, and policies (either from the upper governmental agencies or recommended by a functional division about a particular matter within the unit) are usually made known to unit members and brought into action by the central administration of the work unit. They are numbered, printed in a uniform format, stamped with the unit seal, and distributed to division or section leaders or directly to unit members. The uniform format features a capitalized, red-inked document title underlined by thick red lines broken in the middle by five-pointed red stars. The format earns all official documents the nickname "red-titled document" in the public. It is interesting that almost all interviewees used it to refer to their work units' official circulars.

Division of labor is also in place. According to the interview respondents, it is usually each functional department that receives related laws, rules, or assignments from its corresponding upper agency; drafts by-laws, provisions, or suggestions of its expertise; and submits them to the central authority of the work unit for approval, promulgation, and implementation. During implementation, the appropriate department takes charge to detect problems, substandard practices, and rule-breaking acts; and it makes recommendations to the unit leaders as to what punishments are appropriate to deliver and how. Within a department, rules may be made and punishments may be meted out locally for deviant or troublesome acts. However, all local rules or punishments are cautiously made, and a duplicate must be sent to the central leadership of the work unit for on-file documentation.

One unique aspect of administrative disciplining is that the party has an independent organizational setup to investigate and discipline party members and officials. It is led by the control committee in the party committee, with control members deployed at divisional or sectional levels of the unit. The control committee takes complaints from the masses or party members against individual sections, divisions, officials, or party

Figure 8.1
Administrative Disciplining

members; investigates matters or persons involved; and makes recommendations to the party standing committee of the work unit for punishments. The control committee usually does not announce or carry out a disciplining or penal action. Rather, it stays behind the standing committee as its intelligence or investigation agency. In other words, it is the party standing committee that makes final decisions about disciplining and punishment.

The relatively centralized structure for disciplining and punishment arises from the fact that lower divisional or sectional leaders are wary of the liabilities they bear in delivering a penal measure to their subordinates. Also, there are multiple implications in a disciplining or penal decision. For example, if the case involves criminal allegations, the authority to deal with it has to be yielded to the criminal justice system, from which a civil work unit prefers to distance itself. Finally, as illustrated by the Chinese maxim "easy to praise and hard to punish," punishing takes time and caution to deliberate and decide. Administrative disciplining as a form of punishment needs a powerful and trustworthy authority for its application in the civil, organizational contexts of work units. Obviously, centralization in administrative disciplining helps prevent abuses at lower levels against the controlled.

PROCESS

Rules or regulations are a due part of modern organizational life. Non-compliance, under-compliance, defiance, and rule-breaking bring about disciplining or punishments, making the organizational process full of dramaturgical rhetoric (Goffman 1959).

In the interview, all respondents reported that their work units have general and specific rules, regulations, or task-related instructions for subunits and unit members. Different divisions even have their own policies, provisions, and measures within the premises of the general rules made at the unit level. Rules or measures can come in various forms, such as provisions for workers' welfare, production safety provisions, measures for the security of documents, work responsibility provisions, staff handbooks, student handbooks, faculty handbooks, and on-duty rules. Each set of rules can cover a wide range of issues, with each rule made specific to a possible occasion. For instance, in student or faculty handbooks, students may be prohibited from having love affairs with faculty members. Faculty themselves may be required to set an example for students and given instructions about how to dress in class, how to make class preparation, and what principles to follow in grading examinations. A staff handbook usually sets requirements for work, life, and daily

behavior. It may include the following advice or commands: politically follow current situations, financially keep a clear record, be serious with work, and have harmonious relations with co-workers. Rules for on-duty responsibilities may define and prescribe punishments for irregular work attendance, coming late or leaving early, without-application absence, and other violations. According to the interview respondents, punishments under the work unit's on-duty responsibility rules may include: loss of half a month's bonuses for three days of absence, deduction of two-day bonuses for one day of absence, loss of one-month bonuses for more than three days of absence, expulsion for one month of absence, public warnings after frequent absences, and leaders' criticism for coming late to and leaving early from work.

Formation and revision of unit-wide rules are conducted in a "democratic" way. The management puts forth proposals, distributes them to divisions for open discussion, and collects grass-roots opinions from the masses as a source of inputs. A final draft takes shape after several exchanges. The established rule-set may be evaluated after a period of implementation.

Compliance with rules and regulations by unit members is examined annually through self-evaluations, mass evaluations, and leaders' evaluations. Along with job performance, individual members are generally graded at three levels: inadequate, adequate, and excellent. The result is recorded in the dossier, with impacts on future promotions. A few advanced employees who have emerged from the masses are recognized and rewarded in the work unit's summing-up meeting at the year's end.

In the interview, many violations and disciplining actions were reported. They illustrate the variety of rule-breaking acts and their organizational settlements in Chinese work units.

Violations by Students

There were fifteen reports about student violations. Rule-breaking acts or events involved fraudulent practices in major examinations, fights, illegal activities, sex affairs, playing officially forbidden mahjongg or gambling games, prostitution, hooliganism, stealing, burglarizing, and participation in political protests. Poor academic performance is also punished formally through the procedure of administrative disciplining.

The most frequently used disciplining for student violations is public warning. This can be given at different organizational levels such as class, department, and university; and in different degrees of severity such as ordinary, serious, and extraordinarily serious. Among cases reportedly

handled through public warnings were cheating on major examinations such as the national examination for medical students, fighting with fellow students or campus workers, playing mahjongg with classmates or junior faculty, and engaging in sex affairs with young faculty members or fellow students. One respondent reported a public announcement from his university president's office about three public warning cases. The first case was about a mass fight in a dining hall on campus. The two students most involved were each given a public warning. The rest received lecture or criticism by name. The second case involved a female student who was engaged in a love affair with a faculty member. The student was warned to stop the love affair in its "talk" stage. The faculty member was said to be disciplined by other authorities concerned. The third case involved a student who was absent from class frequently, hung around with high school drop-outs, and failed two courses in one semester.

Disciplining procedures that are more serious than public warning but less serious than expulsion include: recording demerit into the dossier, on-campus observation, removal from the youth league, loss of party membership, and suspension. Cases reported include: fighting, drinking alcohol, seeking sex outside the campus, cheating on the graduation examination, and participating in public demonstrations. One respondent provided information about his university's treatment of participants in the country-wide student protest in 1989. He said: "Two students were formally disciplined on our campus. One was removed from the party. The other was initially decided for expulsion. However, since he played a major role in a competition with Taiwan and contributed to its victory, he was reinstalled and put under on-campus observation, with direct approval from the Mayor."

The most serious disciplining treatment is dismissal. Cases involve stealing, burglarizing, hooliganism, prostitution, marriage during study, unusual sexual activity, and poor academic performance. One respondent's account of student sex was unusual: "A female student went to a male student's bedroom shared by five others and slept with him for a number of nights. Complaints were made by the roommates to the university authority. Both students were removed from the university." Another respondent talked about his university's general disciplining policy toward poor academic performance: "Poor academic performances may result in dismissal. According to the student handbook, students who fail more than three courses in one semester or six courses cumulatively in four years are automatically dropped from the program and sent home."

Basic Requirements

There are basic requirements to be met by work unit members. Areas covered by the interview include: work attendance, work assignment, and conflict of interest. Regarding attendance, some work units (especially production and service units) require employees to sign in and out in an attendance booklet. Regarding work assignment, most work units demand on-time completion. Failure is generally not tolerated. Some respondents said they must work extra hours to complete an assigned task by the deadline. Others said they may ask their leaders to help if they feel they can not complete the work on time. Regarding conflict of interest, one interviewee from a central governmental agency said that the state personnel policy does not allow direct relatives to work together in the same governmental agency. His account was confirmed by other interviewees working for the government.

Failure to observe rules leads to various disciplining actions. Public warning comes first. Reported cases include: workers leaving the work unit without an application for absence, faculty reporting to class late and administering an examination improperly, and soldiers failing to return after the approved term of home visit. One interviewee recalled: "An on-duty doctorate faculty member did not teach his class twice. Student evaluations of his class performance were also not good. He was reprimanded by the department of instruction in an announcement broadcast by radio and posted throughout the campus. It definitely had an impact on his future wage raise and rank promotion."

Disciplining procedures more serious than public warning are applicable. For instance, one interviewee reported that a storage attendant in her work unit was given a demerit of dereliction because he did not report a safety-threatening situation when he was on duty. Another reported that a colleague in his work unit was put under off-duty observation when he worked for a private employer without a formal application for absence from the unit.

Loss of employment is also possible. One interviewee from a state farm cited one of his unit's responsibility rules: three months of absence or idleness automatically lead to removal from the farm. Another from a joint venture stated: "There are no talks or criticisms from leaders. If you fail to do your due work, you are fired. One of our staff was fired because of his incapability."

On the part of individual unit members, some tactics may be used to avoid a formal disciplining action, especially when the matter is pardonable. One senior respondent stated: "Leaders show tolerance for minor

problems. Self-criticism and admission to incapacity or wrongdoing can help you avoid a formal penalty."

Sex Scandals

Ten cases were reported about sex scandals. Five were said to have been disciplined through public warning. They were: a faculty member having sex with a staff member of a neighboring work unit; a staff member having sex with a woman from another work unit who had sex with a number of men; a married teacher sleeping with his colleague; a junior researcher making his girlfriend pregnant before marriage; and an official luring a young female employee into having sex with him. One official from a research organization admitted that CCP members implicated in sex scandals are often disciplined within the party through inner-party warnings. One respondent reported: "A female graduate from a secondary school was assigned to our county. She was lured into sexual relations by the head of the county bureau of hydraulic engineering. The scandal surfaced when the girl was engaged in love affairs with another young cadre. As a result, the nearly 60 year-old head was given an inner-party warning. The county also issued him a public warning."

Demotion and transfer are also possible in sex scandals. Four cases were reportedly given such treatments. The first one involved a section head having sex with a woman under his supervision in a governmental agency. He was demoted to an ordinary cadre. The second case was about a young faculty member using a telescope to watch female students bathing. He was transferred to the library and not allowed to teach any more. The third was also about a university faculty member. The respondent described: "One of my colleagues went back to his home in the countryside to prepare his graduate admission exam. He slept with a peasant girl who hoped to marry him and move to the big city. Since he had no such intention, the girl took the case to the university. As a result, he was transferred from our unit in the provincial capital to his home county seat in a small town." The fourth case occurred in a factory. The respondent stated:

A female orphan was arranged to work in our factory. She was under 18 and lured to have sex with eighteen workers and leaders. I participated in the handling of the case. Differential punishments were given: workers paying a fine, cadres demoted to become a worker, party members removed from the party or given a serious inside-party warning. The girl was only educated because she was an orphan. The unit gave her support and introduced her to a

reliable man for marriage when she was 22. I wrote a report to the municipal daily and *China Youth*, making it well known across the city.

In some cases, work unit leaders may have the intention to keep the secret for an implicated member. One respondent described such a case with interesting background information:

A professor in our department, while on a business travel, had sex with his former girlfriend. It was during his probation of party membership. He was so loyal that he reported it to the party. The university party committee decided not to penalize him and keep it as a secret. But not long after, his girlfriend's husband took the case formally to the university. As a result, his probationary party membership was terminated. The professor used to be the secretary of the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union. In 1956, he wrote to the CCP Central Committee that China should not follow the Soviet Union too closely and should instead develop relations with the United States. He was hence seen as a reactionary and sent to prison. In prison, he worked hard, behaved perfectly, and earned an early release through a general pardon. Out of prison, he reported prison conditions and agitated for correctional reform. He was thus reclassified as a reactionary and sent to prison again in 1962. In 1965, he was transferred to education through labor in a rural area and married to his peasant wife there. He was redressed in 1979 and assigned to our university. Despite years of suffering, he remains loyal to communism and wants to join the party. His two sons are now in the United States. When the older one told him of his intention to reside permanently in the United States, he threatened to cease relations with him.

Power Abuses

There were sixteen reports about power abuse. One case was handled through public warning. The interviewee said: "An official at the deputy prefectural level abused power to get his daughter admitted to a college. He disputed with other leaders and did not perform well for his jurisdiction. He was disciplined by the CCP provincial committee's organization department through a public warning distributed across the provincial party bureaucracy."

Another case involved demerit recording. It was given to an ordinary cadre who embezzled several thousand Yuan from the work unit.

Six cases led to demotion or transfer. Violations and the corresponding disciplinary treatments for the first three cases were: an associate professor disclosing question items prior to a national examination and being demoted to lecture; a faculty member stealing software from the university for the municipal developmental zone for personal benefits and being

transferred to another division; and a divisional official taking a bribe of one hundred Yuan and being transferred to another division. Another three cases were detailed by the reporting interviewees. The first interviewee said: "A lecturer serving as personnel secretary in our department helped a professor write a false document for his daughter, saying that she was a student with the department. After it was uncovered, he was transferred to another division doing ordinary work, not teaching. The professor was demoted to the associate rank."

The second was from a central ministry. He described: "One division head was removed from his position because of gift-taking. People from his hometown went to his home and sent a golden ring to his wife. He did not return it to the unit. Neither did he give any favorable treatment to the senders. The gift senders became angry and wrote a letter to the unit. He was transferred to another division to become an ordinary cadre."

The third was from a factory. She reported: "A female official in charge of sales took bribes and bought poor-quality timbers as our factory's packaging materials. She was fined 1,000 Yuan and transferred from the sales department to a workshop. In addition, her wage was decreased for one level and prohibited from increase for three years. She was also barred from competition for excellent employees and other honors."

Removal is applied in serious cases. But sometimes a compromise may be worked out to give the punished person a way to earn a living for his or her family. One respondent said: "A petty official from the construction department received a big amount of bribe and was removed from the work unit. He was later employed back by the work unit as an ordinary staff because he had a family to support."

In recent years of economic reform, some power abuse cases have involved significant economic interests and therefore warranted criminal charges. There were seven such cases reported by the interview. The first four cases were: a factory head stealing factory properties worth 100,000 Yuan and being formally indicted by people's procuratorate; a director for international exchanges receiving multiple bribes and being put in jail; an administrative official using his power over personnel to secretly transfer several persons to the work unit and being sentenced to a two-year prison term; and a class counselor embezzling student fellowships and stealing timbers from the university and being sentenced to three years in prison. The remaining three cases were detailed by the reporting interviewees. The first interviewee described: "A subcompany manager received bribes from foreign business partners. He gave big discounts to them and sent his children abroad through them. For some reasons, foreign partners reported

it later to the Chinese authority. The manager was put in custody for investigation, during which he committed suicide. There were several similar cases in our company that resulted in transfer or imprisonment."

The second reported: "One deputy bureau head borrowed \$15,000 in foreign currency from a subordinate work unit for his son to study abroad. He did not return it for three years. The creditor unit was afraid of asking it back. But it surfaced in a system-wide audit. He was removed from his position and given a prison term of twelve years. He is now on an early probation because of his poor health."

The third interviewee recalled: "One official in our bureau leaked our base price to foreign partners in a business negotiation, which resulted in a substantial loss on our side. He was removed from our work unit and sentenced to prison for ten years."

Power abuse and corruption are officially acknowledged and often attacked by national campaigns. The effect is limited. A respondent from a central governmental agency commented: "After the 1989 Tiananmen event, corruption is checked and punished more harshly. In dealings with foreign interests, policies are better upheld. But in matters like housing, corruption still exists. In those units where housing is in sufficient supply, there are still leaders who occupy more than one apartment."

Dereliction

Dereliction often causes property damages and business losses. Five cases were reported from the interview. Two were disciplined through public warning. In one case, the reporting interviewee said: "A translator was arranged to accompany the Governor of the People's Bank to go abroad. They went to the airport and waited to board the flight. Suddenly, she found her passport was not with her, which prevented her from boarding the scheduled flight. She received a serious public warning."

In the other case, the respondent stated: "A driver in our work unit hit and injured a person outside, which incurred a considerable expense to the unit. He was given a public warning and disallowed to receive his monthly bonuses for half a year."

Bonuses and salaries may be deducted or stopped, or fines collected, to nominally compensate the loss brought about by the derelict to the work unit. The remaining three dereliction cases were all handled in such a manner. They were: an operator leaving his work, resulting in serious damage to a generator and having to pay a compensation from his salary; a researcher causing fire in the laboratory and being penalized through a deduction from his monthly bonuses; and a laboratory staff member

forgetting to turn off the tap water and being fined from her monthly bonuses.

Breaking the Rules

Thirteen reported cases fall in this category. Minor and moderate incidents include: a staff member engaged in fighting; group fighting in a work unit gathering; a young employee driving the work unit's car for fun without securing approval from the authority; a doctor providing false proof for an alleged patient; two workers fighting each other in the workshop, with one being internally injured; and a worker in the electronic instrument workshop taking home wires when leaving the night shift. Disciplining involved criticism, public warning, demerit-recording, fines, deduction of salaries or bonuses, on-duty observation, or a combination, depending on the degree of severity. According to one interviewee, workers stealing raw products were not only publicly criticized but also asked to return them and denied wage raises.

Rule-breaking within the work unit may become so serious that administrative disciplining is not enough and the justice system has to be called for criminal charges. When a conviction is made, dismissal automatically takes effect in administrative disciplining. There were five such cases from the interview. The first three were: an accountant convicted of embezzlement and automatically expelled from the work unit; an employee imprisoned for arson and automatically dismissed; and a soldier stealing weapons and jailed for investigation. The other two cases were detailed by the interviewees. One stated: "One colleague used the work unit's experimental facility to produce a solvent for opium distillation. He took the solvent to Yunnan and sold it there. He was sentenced to ten years in prison." The other recalled: "One bank staff member in a sub-branch took a large amount of cash from the coffer and was caught by a sudden overnight audit. He later said he intended to borrow the money for just one night and would bring it back the next day. He was sentenced to education through labor. After it, he was sent to work in the unit's reception room."

Rule-breaking acts sometimes go undetected or escape disciplining actions due to management lapses. One respondent reported: "Some of our employees used the company telephones to make private international calls." Another related: "One of my colleagues was absent for one full day. She came next day and provided a false reason to avoid a deduction of her bonuses."

Political Problems

Some administrative disciplining actions have political overtones. One senior respondent recalled: "During Mao's years, problems in political thought often took a person to re-education in the countryside." Another said: "When I worked in the Northeast, our factory's deputy head was the former CCP provincial secretary. He was demoted to the position because of his connection with Gao Gong, who was removed by Mao."

Other Strategies

Disciplining actions are taken when problematic events are severe. In daily management, however, if leaders do not feel something is right, they may choose to use other strategies for a correction. One strategy is concession. A respondent said: "Leaders often perform self-criticism and hope to win employees' compliance and support." Another strategy involves suggestive hints. In one respondent's words: "Leaders usually avoid criticizing employees publicly. They prefer instead to make hints and suggestions that somebody should improve his or her work or not do something."

In all, a wide range of problematic or deviant incidents are covered by administrative disciplining in Chinese work organizations. Resolution is not solely determined by the type of violation. Other relevant factors include severity of offense, frequency of violation, and the implicated party's history, public image, guilt-admission attitude, and determination to correct a wrongdoing. There are also variations among work units in different regions and lines of business.

NATURE

Administrative disciplining is a double-edged control. On the one hand, it teaches, guides, and regulates subjects to follow an assumedly proper track to achieve a specific goal. On the other hand, it prevents, punishes, and corrects deviations and deviants through the essential interests an organizational authority holds over the subjects through work and other ties. The main features of administrative disciplining in Chinese work units are unique.

First, although it is enforced at the workplace, administrative disciplining in Chinese work units does not solely center on work. Of course, some issues do involve work attendance, job performance, abuse of position, negligence of duty, and other employment-related acts of non-compliance or rule-breaking. But also under scrutiny and treatment are

daily behavior, personal ethics, lifestyle problems, and political acts or thoughts. This feature, in terms of division of labor and rationalization, can be characterized as all-inclusive, lacking differentiation, and doomed to low efficiency. From a historical point of view, it signifies that the work unit network has replaced the traditional family and kinship system as an ethic site in contemporary China.

Second, although the incidents handled are often of a general and social nature, disciplining measures appeal exclusively to work and work-related interests. Loss of bonuses, reduction in salaries, and freezing of benefits are built around the paycheck. Demotion, transfer, and removal target the work assignment and job mobility. Even public warning, circulated within the work unit, is directed at the general perception of fellow employees about the blamed. It may be legitimate to generalize that Chinese social disciplining is now based upon work-related practical interests.

Third, administrative disciplining is directed at the soul. It punishes the blameworthy by attacking their valued symbols, desired goals, motivation system, and environmental support. For instance, public warning is most frequently used. Its effect lies in its ability to change individual perceptions of self and others. In other words, it diminishes self-motivation by placing the blamed in a degrading perspective. It undermines peer support by damaging public opinions and impressions, which are critically important in the closely knit setting of Chinese work units.

Fourth, there exists a subtle distinction between manifest and latent types of administrative disciplining. The manifest disciplining is what is publicly announced and executed, such as public warning, demerit-recording, transfer, demotion, and removal. The latent disciplining, on the other hand, is not written on the official list. It refers to unfavorable impression, cold treatment, no upward mobility, no opportunity, or no entry to favored groups. Compared to its manifest counterpart, latent disciplining may be broader in scope. Most interview respondents agreed that non-compliance is not punished immediately. But what poses an even greater threat to their work and career are lack of trust and poor impressions among leaders and colleagues. One respondent said: "The cruelest penalty to us is not to lecture or batter us but to bar us from participating in a project, leading a research team, attending a meeting, entering a competition, or being considered for a promotion."

CHANGE

Administrative disciplining is a phenomenon that emerged after the rise of modern bureaucratic and production systems (Weber 1968). In China,

throughout the lengthy history of dynasties, each ruling authority developed its own disciplining procedure that was often directed exclusively to aristocrats and officials. From 1840 to 1949, a half-feudal and half-colonial interregnum, Western-style businesses, factories, and governing bureaucracies were established in fits and starts. Modern disciplining developed concomitantly in managing and administrative arenas. But because Western establishments were mostly located in a few urban centers, their disciplining practices remained insignificant to the majority of ordinary Chinese workers.

It is under the communist reign that modern-style administrative disciplining affects ordinary citizens across the population. For the first time, a governmental bureaucracy is systematically set up from the center to the lowest level, reaching each citizen. State-owned factories, companies, farms, hospitals, schools, research institutions, and other service or production facilities are established in cities and rural regions across the country. Unprecedented numbers of people are recruited from various backgrounds to serve the state as officials, professionals, office staff, workers, or ordinary laborers. Disciplining procedures in work and life are formally articulated and implemented in state-operated establishments, universally influencing a significant segment of the population.

Administrative disciplining under Mao leaned to the spiritual side through public labeling, collective shame, and personal humiliation. Practical interests were used, but seldom on monetary matters. Involved mostly were cancellation of honors, denial or removal of status, and prohibition from special treatments. For instance, a corrupt official was usually removed from the position or expelled from the party. The disciplining treatment was made publicly known, sometimes through a mass meeting in which the person was forced to kneel on the stage wearing a white and black triangular hat in front of the audience. His family, relatives, and colleagues were shamed. Distance, gap, and obstacle were thus built up, removing the blamed person from the collective mainstream.

Under Deng, the spectacle of disciplining and punishment is less used. Political shame and other humiliating rhetoric, in general, are no longer intentionally performed. Disciplining procedures are simplified. Measures focus on practical interests such as bonuses, salaries, and other tangible benefits. Demotion, transfer, freeze of job mobility, suspension of work assignment, and withholding of job privilege are put in frequent use. For instance, a corrupt official may not only be removed from his or her position but also made to pay a fine. The penalty may only be announced in work unit circulars, with no significant public shaming and personal humiliation. But in his or her backyard, the disciplined is likely to suffer

from reduced salary, no work income, or special savings for payment of fines. He or she may also face disadvantaged situations at work.

In general, Chinese administrative discipline is composed of state rules, organizational by-laws, work requirements, professional ethics, and punishments for rule-breaking incidents. The power of administrative disciplining is distributed according to the institutional layout of the work unit. Formal actions include public warning, demerit-recording, demotion, transfer, off-duty observation, suspension, and expulsion. They can be directed at such problems as failure to meet requirements, dereliction, sex scandals, violations, abuse of power, and political wrongdoing.

The implementation of Chinese administrative disciplining is effective because work units have systematic rules to specify rule-breaking incidents, formal divisions to carry out investigations, and explicit procedures to direct disciplining actions. Most important, Chinese work units as disciplining authorities are able to draw upon state power and resources in executing any work and administrative disciplining decision within their enclaves. Finally, Chinese work units stand in the same line with the state and its justice system. When disciplining actions are not enough or criminal allegations are involved, additional investigations and actions can be easily made along with or based upon work units' disciplining treatments.

Control through Quasi-Justice

Justice in the workplace draws attention from both theory and practice. The study of work justice began with Stouffer's (1949) classic research on American soldiers. Theoretical concepts such as frame of reference, relative deprivation, distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice have been articulated to address various aspects of justice in employment organizations (Cropanzano and Randall 1993).

In practice, attention is mainly paid to the grievance system, the labor dispute forum, and other mechanisms to achieve work justice. In the United States, the Wagner Act provides that any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employers. The union, on behalf of employees, plays an important role in presentation, negotiation, and resolution of grievances and disputes to and with the management. A Supreme Court verdict issued in 1944 prompts the articulation of the Duty of Fair Representation, which obligates the union to provide procedural justice when handling workers' grievances (Gordon and Fryxell 1993). In addition to the union, informal interest groups may help resolve internal problems among organizational members. For instance, one way for fraternities on university campuses to forge and sustain interpersonal bonds is through successful resolution of internal friction among their members.

Conflicts over division of labor, claim disputes, or general policy debates among different departments within an employment organization usually involve trustees, management executives, or other rank-and-file officers for settlement. For instance, board of trustees hearings have to be conducted when an organizational reform proposed by the management is

not agreed upon by the main constituencies. Unions may spearhead an opposition against the management in such policy debates as in collective bargaining.

Although most disputes are handled through normal organizational devices or processes, some *ad hoc* justice bodies can be established permanently or temporarily for dispute resolution. For instance, in American and Canadian construction contracts, a dispute review board is usually established at the start of construction. Its task is to mediate claims and disputes between and among contractor, employer, engineers, and field workers (Severn 1991).

A higher authority may be appealed for intervention when differences among interests are not resolved by the judicial resources available within an organization. This is especially true in collective bargaining. In the United States, a presidential emergency board may be created to render a decision to two confronting parties in a large corporation whose service has a significant impact upon public well-being or convenience. For instance, the 1993 flight attendants' strike at American Airlines was brought to an end at the request of the President (*Honolulu Advertiser* 1993).

In China, control through quasi-justice enables all styles, forms, modes, or types of control to find their applications. Quasi-justice refers to not only mediation and other conflict management mechanisms but also to the penetrating, investigative, and cross-checking work routines and lifestyles in Chinese work organizations. It is labeled "quasi" in relation to the formal justice system of people's procuratorates and people's courts.

STRUCTURE

Specialized divisions administer quasi-justice in Chinese work units (see Figure 9.1). In addition, the unit leadership can mobilize and coordinate needed resources and authority to reinforce various quasi-justice devices.

Three functional organs are deployed inside the work unit to carry out quasi-justice. One is the party control committee. Although it operates under the unit party standing committee, the control committee receives most guidelines from its direct upper level regarding what complaints to take, how to conduct investigations, and what penalties to recommend to the unit standing committee for delivery. The upper level encompasses the party control committees in the work unit's supervising agency, in the municipal party committee, and in the provincial party committee. They are further connected, directly or through a higher level, to the CCP

Figure 9.1
Quasi-Justice

central control committee in Beijing. Thus, the party control network is a relatively self-sufficient, autonomous, top-down system. Directives, guidelines, and precedents circulated throughout the system may be different from promulgated laws but remain effective for all party members and officials. In the work unit, the control committee and its by-laws or decisions are often made relevant to cadres and even ordinary employees.

The second is a dispute resolution group in the employees' union. Physically positioned in the union, it has connections from both within and without. Within the union system, it may receive policy guidelines from the upper levels and case references from other similar entities. Employee disputes have characteristic features. Experiences or general rules regarding their resolution can be exchanged throughout the union system, topped by the All-China Federation of Workers' Unions. Outside the union, the dispute resolution group is required to register with the district people's court and government, and it receives supervision from judges in the court and judicial assistants in the government. Its clients are all unit members. Its cases include all work-related disputes and problems.

The third is the mediation committee in the residential committee. Because the residential committee is under administrative jurisdiction of the district government, the mediation committee not only is entitled to routine advice from the district people's court and government but also is given access to relevant resources within the district. For instance, the district government or its street office may provide appropriate institutional conditions for the mediation committee to network with and learn from other similar entities in the same district or across the entire city. Residential mediation is available to residents living in the work unit's housing facilities. The cases it handles are mostly about housing, family, children, and neighborhood matters.

The functional divisions of quasi-justice, while maintaining connections with external governmental or professional agencies and being specialized in their respective business area, are also under the leadership of the work unit's central authority. Main initiatives need to be approved by unit leaders. Implementation depends upon what resources and authority are allocated from the work unit.

Moreover, the unit administrative apparatus, from the center to various branches, can take over regular functions assumed by a specialized quasi-justice division. Leaders at each level, if they are willing, may take any complaint, dispute, or problem; investigate or mediate it; make a decision about it; and execute their decision according to the resources and authority they hold. At the center, unit leaders can pursue a problem wholly by themselves or call upon the control or mediation committee to

deal with matters on their behalf. If they put a functional division or committee into such use, they can ask it to report its handling step by step and advise it as to what measures to take and how. For cases that enter a functional division of quasi-justice first, if the parties involved are not happy with the division's resolution or if the division is unable to work out a decent deal, the upper unit leaders are often pleaded as the legitimate authority for a final decision.

In the interview, most respondents reported that main employee disputes are settled by direct division leaders rather than the union's mediation committee. They agreed that the mediation committee is virtually a tool for unit leaders. Mediators collect firsthand information, handle trouble scenes, and propose tentative measures. But often it is unit leaders who make final decisions on complex disputes or problems.

PROCESS

With a control committee in the party, a conflict management team in the union, a mediation committee in the residential compound, and a penetrative unit leadership overseeing every episode of business operations, nothing problematic can occur without a formal or informal treatment. According to the interview respondents, not only do various disputes in work, family, neighborhood, and daily routines fall under the domain of quasi-justice, but also a full range of business or management issues are caught for resolution by its mighty power within the work unit.

Case Variety

Cases handled by the residential and employee union's mediation committees are variable, depending upon the nature of the matter involved, the character of the person implicated, and relevant environmental factors. There are ordinary civil disputes and minor criminal cases among spouses, family members, neighbors, workers, and residents. Issues involved include: divorce, domestic quarrel, neighborhood disturbance, juvenile problem with school, administrative dispute, property damage, economic squabble, small claims, and minor theft (Bureau of People's Mediation 1983). For example, intra-family conflicts may involve instances such as: a husband is sexually inept or demanding, a wife does not do housework or has not been pregnant long after marriage, a brother leaves home and takes no responsibility for family affairs, a sister fights for her dowry, a father does not approve his son's job choice or his

daughter's husband-to-be, and a mother argues her daughter-in-law over housework and her grandchild's care.

Disputes over substantive interests such as administrative disciplining, transfer, and promotion between and among unit members and lower-rank leaders are usually sent to direct unit or division leaders for a mediating adjudication. The procedure is called administrative mediation. Falling under its domain are also economic interests and division-of-labor conflicts among functional departments. Since most work units are not willing to let internal disputes go to the court for judicial mediation or formal adjudication, administrative mediation takes a considerable weight in the work unit's overall management routine.

In the interview, two disputes between ordinary members and their direct leaders were reportedly resolved by administrative mediation. The first one was related by a respondent about a colleague:

One of our colleagues had been with our unit for ten years. He failed to get a promotion in a unit-wide rank adjustment. He blamed our division leader for the failure and cursed him face to face in the division office. The incident was calmed down by the colleagues at the scene but took unit leaders' involvement for a formal settlement. The division leader was investigated and cleared from any wrongdoing. The colleague was given a public warning for his disturbing behavior against the divisional leadership.

Another respondent told how he appealed to a reliable authority within the work unit and was cleared from an improper disciplining imposed against him by his direct leader:

My section head demanded us to be punctual coming to and leaving work. I did a very good job but was not able to meet his demand and got criticized. Last year, when I was busy with a project, I did not attend political studies four times. As a result, I received a public warning publicized throughout the sub-academy. My project head felt angry about it. He and I appealed to the director of our Institute, the director of personnel, and even the vice-president for research. To counteract the disciplining action substantiated by our section head, my project head provided a proof to the department of personnel, explaining why I was absent. I was vindicated finally. The public warning was not written into my dossier and did not affect my application to go abroad.

Principle

Residential and employee union's mediation in the work unit is usually known as people's mediation. Principles by which these two types of mediation are conducted are stipulated by the Civil Procedure Code

(National People's Congress 1991) and the Organizational Regulation on People's Mediation Committees (State Council 1989). Administrative mediation draws reference from both but is also guided by other administrative directives. There are four general principles for mediation: (1) it is based upon laws, regulations, policies, and socially acknowledged ethics; (2) it is principled and grounded in facts; (3) it is non-coercive, with full willingness of disputing parties on an equal basis; and (4) litigation rights of disputants are honored. Mediation does not block formal adjudication at any time.

In reality, not all principles are exactly followed. Mediators are patient, penetrative, and unyielding. Unit leaders are often involved. In many disputes, unit leaders are first notified. They then call upon mediation committees and direct mediators to work out concrete measures for a peaceful resolution. Generally, once a dispute catches the attention of unit leaders and mediators, it is not easy to escape from their assistance until a final settlement is reached.

Inhibition

Both residential and employee union's mediators live in the work unit community and are often implicated in local interactions and conflicts. To ensure the dignity and fairness of mediation, mediators are officially inhibited from: (1) favoritism and fraudulence; (2) harassment, attack, and retaliation on disputants; (3) insult and punishment on disputants; (4) disclosure of the secrets of disputants; and (5) acceptance of gifts or invitations to dinners (State Council 1989).

In the interview, most respondents attested that mediation is observed by community members and reviewed regularly by the work unit leadership as well as the district people's court and government. As such, rule-breaking is rarely observed.

Strategy and Tactic

In residential, employee union's, and even administrative mediation, the basic method of response and intervention from mediators or leaders is talk and persuasion. It is officially required that mediators resort to the investigation of facts, logic of reasoning, and patience of education and persuasion to overcome misunderstanding and hostility for conciliation (State Council 1989).

In a study of ninety-seven community mediators in Nanjing, Wall and Blum (1991) identified twenty-seven mediation techniques and classified

them into four clusters of strategies. First is an assistance strategy in which mediators (or through a third party) provide resources or services to disputants for the return of peace. As assistance is rendered, they often feel it unnecessary to state the other side's point of view or persuade disputants with logic. Second, a procedural strategy entitles conciliators to set the agenda for each particular hearing or the general course of mediation. As relevant information is gathered and moral principles are cited in a controlled manner, they do not have to educate or argue with disputants by logic. Third is an education strategy by which mediators advise both parties how to behave toward each other and let them know each other's position. Mutual forgiveness usually follows. Mediators thus do not need to resort to logical argument for specific concessions. Fourth, an external reliance strategy calls for laws or third parties to criticize or educate disputants. The effect is that conciliators become less dependent upon their own inputs to win cooperation from disputants.

Reports from the interview suggested that techniques used in mediation situations in Chinese work units are diverse, although they may be meaningfully lumped into major types.

Procedure

Approaches to various cases differ. Nevertheless, a standard procedure is generalizable from mediation conducted by both residential and employee union's mediation committees in the work unit. Commonly, five steps are undertaken. First, disputes are taken for mediation. There are two ways to take a case. One is through a voluntary application for mediation from one or both disputing parties. The other is to have mediators visit the site of disputes and offer mediation, even without an application from any of the parties involved. According to the interview, disputes are often first reported to unit leaders, who then dispatch mediators to resolve them. The mediation committee is also obligated to watch out for possible targets and catch cases right away. The approach is officially affirmed as a positive experience to nip a dispute in the bud. But by the principle of voluntarism, uninvited or imposed mediation deprives disputants of their right of self-decision on conflict resolution.

Second, investigation of disputes is undertaken to uncover all related facts through various channels. Observation is carefully conducted on the scene. Direct disputants are questioned. Their relatives and friends are interviewed. Mass informants are urged to provide witness reports or useful clues. Mediators may even go to disputants' hometowns and former

work units to further the investigation. Documentary proofs may also be obtained from related official agencies.

Third, disputants are made cognizant of related laws, rules, policies, facts, mass opinions, and possible negative consequences through a series of private and public talks, meetings, and hearings. Public hearings are attended by conflicting parties, mediators, neighbors, fellow workers, and sometimes an official or legal advisor from the local people's government or court. Patience, persuasion, and education skills are particularly needed from mediators in this stage to avoid unprincipled compromise and overcome any deadlock for conciliation (Bureau of People's Mediation 1983; Sun 1988).

Fourth, disputants are brought together for formal conciliation. Settlements may include self-criticism, offer of apology, assurance of self-correction, return of disputed objects, offer of labor services, and monetary compensation. Agreements can be oral for minor cases or written for major disputes when the parties concerned request formal records. Official regulations require the registration and written records on the mediation process for all cases (State Council 1989).

The final step is the execution of mediated settlements. By law, mediation settlements do not take any legal effect. No individuals or agencies can enforce them beyond the willingness of disputants to abide by the agreement (State Council 1989; National People's Congress 1991). However, as the work unit and local government are required to support mediation resolutions and the mediation committee itself oversees the process of implementation, pressure falls on disputants to fulfill their promised obligations in a mediation agreement.

NATURE

Quasi-justice in Chinese work units has unique features in terms of ideological base, political and economical function, and public attitude.

Maoism

Quasi-justice in Chinese work units is based upon the communist ideology. According to Mao, socialist construction is a mass movement. To increase production, all working people need to be aroused, educated, and organized. To organize the working people, contradictions among them need to be settled. Viewing this as a reflection of internal and external contradictions, Mao argued that people's thought first be changed

through criticism, education, and other reform methods for a resolution of their differences.

Thus, mediators ought to take a dispute as an opportunity to propagandize the masses about CCP policies, change their attitudes, and help them adopt correct methods for viewing and approaching various matters. Mao also formulated the well-known principle of "dividing one into two" and insisted that there are always two sides of an issue. By this principle, mediators need to take into account the perspectives of both disputing parties. It is wrong to simply blame one for the other or seek a compromise by asking each party to give in half-way.

Political and Economic Function

Quasi-justice in Chinese work units is not merely a mass mechanism by which unit members apply available resources to settle disputes among each other. It also assumes important social control functions for the unit authority. Politically, quasi-justice serves as a surveillance mechanism and strengthens local order within the work unit. As officially recognized, civil disputes exist universally and need to be managed constantly. Quasi-justice deploys politically reliable mediators among unit residents and employees. They propagandize party policies and watch out for early signs of violation and rule-breaking behavior. They resolve civil disputes in a timely and local way and prevent them from developing into vicious crimes that may inflict serious property damages and endanger human life. In short, quasi-justice is key to maintaining normative order and the collective solidarity required by the socialist relationship of production in Chinese work organizations.

Economically, quasi-justice avoids or reduces damages and losses, saves expenses, increases the efficiency of manpower, and therefore facilitates the production and business activity of the work unit. On a concrete level it first relieves disputants from conflicts and helps them concentrate on their work. Second, it is free and locally available, saving disputants time and money. Third, it insulates the unit management from civil conflicts and focuses it on production and business affairs. Fourth, for disputes directly over production and business matters, settlements prevent reduction of productive activities. Finally, mediation helps keep order and improve morality; it therefore contributes to the unity and stability of the work unit, which can be translated into economic productivity and business efficiency.

Public Attitude

According to the interview, "saving face" is still important among the populace. Unit members tend to have their disputes settled by the nearest support possible. They find it convenient that their disputes can be locally resolved through residential, employee union's, and administrative mediation within the work unit. They are also happy that they may freely expose their inner feelings to their mediators or direct leaders.

Among the interview respondents themselves, most saw quasi-justice (particularly mediation) as beneficial to the maintenance and promotion of mutual trust, friendly relations, and reciprocal business interactions. A few raised concerns that mediation may block unit members from executing their legal rights.

CHANGE

Local justice is a Chinese tradition. Mediation, as a mode of conflict resolution of civil disputes, can be traced to the early stage of Chinese civilization. In primitive times, disputes were brought to clan and tribal leaders for settlements. Official mediators were formally installed by the Western Zhou Dynasty (1122-770 B.C.) for "solving disputes among people and harmonizing their relations" (Bureau of People's Mediation 1983:2). During the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), mediation was standardized to encompass three elders, one farmer, one handicraftsman, and one businessman. The Code of Da Ming provided for Disputes Handling Pavilions at the levels of county and prefecture. The nationalist years featured the institutionalization of a formal Western-style justice system. But mediation was not abandoned. The Code of Civil Disputes was promulgated to provide organizational and procedural guidelines for mediation in neighborhoods, villages, and townships (Bureau of People's Mediation 1983).

Communist quasi-justice in work units and communities is a continuation of local justice. During Mao's era, quasi-justice in work units and residential compounds involved significant political symbolism. Civil disputes, work conflicts, and daily life problems were handled through political persuasion and education. Some were suppressed if they could not be politicized to generate enough value for mass education and mobilization. Political offenses, on the other hand, tended to be dramatized and highlighted. Mass tribunals were set up to deliver justice in the first and final instances. Civil rights and legal procedures were often over-ridden by the political need for mass mobilization and class vigilance against reactionary sabotage (Leng and Chiu 1985).

Deng's economic reform and legal construction does not overshadow quasi-justice in work units and communities. In fact, with emphasis shifted to the efficiency of production and quality of life, civil disputes are frequently generated among and between persons, families, and workplaces, often involving money and practical interests (Gan 1989). Unit members, following the period of spiritual relaxation, are no longer reluctant to expose their problems and disputes to unit leaders or mediating mechanisms for solution and resolution. Quasi-justice is kept in frequent use.

In recent years, new rules and regulations have been publicly promulgated to guide mediation organizations and quasi-justice practices for procedural explicitness and legality. Old measures, however, are also utilized for practical and political gains. For instance, persuasion and education are reiterated. Mediators are asked to persuade disputants with party and governmental policies. They are also required to educate the general public about laws, rules, regulations, and other official measures. Persuasion and education in this form help raise people's legal consciousness and moral standard (Gan 1989).

In summary, quasi-justice in Chinese work units is a universal operation among multiple entities: the party control committee for party members and officials, the union conflict resolution group for employees, and the residential mediation committee for residents. Unit leaders in all sections, divisions, and at the top are also authorities who can deliver justice for their respective jurisdictions. Mediation cases include divorce, domestic quarrel, neighborhood disturbance, juvenile problem with school and work, administrative dispute, property damage, economic squabble, small claims, and minor theft. Approaches to those various cases involve strategies of assistance, procedural control, education, and external reliance. A standard mediation procedure involves case taking, investigation, education, persuasion and conciliation, agreement, and implementation.

Quasi-justice, in essence, is a unique form of justice and conflict resolution in civil work and life settings. It is formal because it is guided by laws, operated within state-operated work units, and supported by the government and justice system. It is informal because it operates outside the state bureaucracy and is pursued by ordinary working people according to their own needs for peace and harmony. Quasi-justice bridges laws with human relations. It also strikes a balance between procedural fairness and the practical need for quick resolution of substantive issues and conflicts.

Control through Para-Security

Work safety and security in the capitalist contexts involve both body and soul. Employees are concerned for their physical safety in production lines, transportation vehicles, or retail stores. But they also worry about the security of their jobs as a means to survive and develop a professional career. In physical security and safety, possible dangers may come not only from the work process itself but also from increasing thefts of business property and aggravated assaults against a particular type of profession. According to a recent report from the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety, murder was a leading cause of workplace deaths during the 1980s in Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, South Carolina, and Washington D.C. Taxi drivers, police officers, and retailers are the most likely victims of murder while at work (*Honolulu Advertiser* 1993).

Theoretical studies of work safety and security are pursued in both physical and psychological dimensions. Social science research focuses mostly on the security to maintain a job, psychological perceptions of possible layoffs, and social consequences of job insecurity. Engineering and interdisciplinary efforts, on the other hand, are engaged in inventing, installing, maintaining, and understanding practical procedures and instruments for production safety and workplace security (Erikson and Vallas 1990).

To protect employees and business properties from hazards, dangers, or robberies, Western retail stores, office buildings, and production workshops are usually outfitted with security systems or safety monitoring devices. As workplace safety and security are dominated by advanced

tools and equipment supplied by modern technologies, use of manpower is often reduced. But there are exceptions. On farms, tourist facilities, or any workplace of large open space, manpower remains significant. In major U.S. universities, for example, there is usually a special security force. Guards or officers patrol in small vehicles or on foot. Linked to each other and to the central office by an advanced communication system, the guards can be made available to an emergency or incident immediately. On some campuses, phones with automatic dialing are installed at major locations, allowing those in need of help to directly access a 24-hour security service by just hanging on the handset. The security service, although aided by material devices, is provided by on-duty officers who are ready to stop violence and render help in any situation.

Job security is basically left to the force of the free market. Although legislative acts provide legal protection for employment contracts and the government responds to those unemployed and laid-off people who have social benefits, it is the overall economic situation that sets the tone for social perception and job insecurity.

In the socialist context of a planned economy, Chinese work unit employees do not have to worry about losing their jobs, at least until their "iron rice bowl" is crushed by further economic reform. Work security and safety by now mean a safe, clean, and orderly working and living environment. The institutional mechanism that affords this is para-security in work units. Like quasi-justice, para-security is named in relation to the formal buildup of the state police, military, and other security forces. In Chinese work units, there are regular committees and departments carrying out para-security. Moreover, the penetrating, cross-checking, and vigilant styles of work and life also are important in guarding the work unit collective against disruptive incidents.

STRUCTURE

Para-security in Chinese work units involves a division of labor between party and administration (see Figure 10.1). On the party side, there is a special department of the armed force that corresponds to the CCP's central military committee in Beijing. In the setting of a civil organization such as the work unit, the department has two major tasks: (1) to give unit members basic knowledge about national defense and elementary training for military exercises; and (2) to organize people's militia, train them regularly, and deploy them strategically to para-military defense positions in the local community. According to the interview respondents, however, these two tasks are not always fully completed.

Figure 10.1
Para-Security

Military training is actually not given to all unit members. People's militia receive some training but are not strictly organized for any constant duty. One exception is on university campuses, where all newly admitted students are required to receive one month of military training.

On the administrative side, para-security is carried out by two organizational bodies. The relatively informal one is the united defense and security committee under the residential committee. Its responsibility is to patrol the living compound, guard public housing and private household properties, and report irregular incidents to the local police station and unit security department, from which it receives advice, policy guidelines, and task assignments.

The formal organ is the security department. It is in charge of both production or other task-related safety and civil or criminal security. To the outside, it has connections with the district, municipal, or provincial bureaus of safety, public security, secrecy maintenance, and foreign affairs. If the work unit's supervising agency has the same department, it is also subject to that department's advice and direction. Within the work unit, the security department is under the central unit leadership, which may authorize it to formally or informally designate an agent or representative or establish a station in each unit division or section. Residential united defense and security committees are counted as its stations in the work unit's living compounds.

All interviews respondents reported that their work units have a security department or section. Nine said their work units are so large that the city government establishes a police station within the unit's enclave and concedes it to the unit leadership. The station is housed under the same roof with the unit security department, sharing security officers and other staff. In official language, the coexistence is called "one batch of people and two pieces of plates."

The size of the security department depends upon the scale of the work unit. The smallest has only one person with other business responsibilities as well. The largest has reportedly up to thirty staff members, including gate-watching guards, office clerks, patrolling officers, and policy-makers. Security leaders are generally former military officers. Patrolling officers can be recruited from former servicemen or other sources. Guards are usually contracted workers from rural or suburban areas. Several respondents said their work units are assigned by the upper authorities to help a county or a rural region. The security guards in their work units are peasants from those counties or regions under the help of their work units.

In addition to the functional divisions of safety and security, the work unit's bureaucratic authority has a stake in para-security. It holds the

power to approve the main initiatives of security divisions and controls the allocation of resources for effective implementation of any approved measure. Moreover, unit leaders, from lower branches to the top, can intervene in any security problem and take over the regular duties of a specialized para-security division. In fact, unit leaders are often pleaded as the last legitimate authority within the work unit to settle security problems.

PROCESS

Para-security covers a wide range of areas. On the basis of documentary records, interview reports, and my own observations, four major types of responsibilities can be identified for all security or defense departments or committees. The first is to take preventive measures: patrolling the unit compound, watching out for theft and fire, guarding the gate, protecting public properties, checking whether faculty and students wear the university badge, checking workers when they leave the factory, assigning guards to nightly duties, taking precautions during political movements, installing anti-theft glass, operating the security system with video equipment installed in the unit's office building, and maintaining security during conventions, foreigners' visits, holidays and festivals, and anniversaries of politically sensitive events.

The second is to pass along state security policies and handle related procedural formalities: security proofs for going abroad, proofs for household registration, certificates for foods and oil supply, passport applications, permits to the special economic zone, briefing new unit members about the rules for dealing with foreigners, giving a lecture on security to those who are about to leave for a foreign country, organizing military training for students and people's militia, and so on.

The third is to guard the work unit as a state institution and implement business-related safety measures: guarding the governmental agency, protecting the production facility, company security, workers' physical safety, protection measures against high-voltage electricity, guarding computers and instruments, security of technology and equipment, transportation safety, fire hazards, potential trouble or danger in the workplace, procedural safeguards for transferring, dispatching, and destroying classified documents, protection of maps, documents, and state secrets, and advising unit members to rent a berth in a sleeping car if they travel with important maps or documents. Respondents from the central ministries said that state agencies in Beijing are classified into different levels of security protection. Those of second-class security are not

guarded by the state armed police but by para-military guards contracted from municipal security companies in Beijing.

The fourth is to deal with problematic incidents: control of fights, injuries after scuffles, catching thieves, lost and found, law-breaking behavior, traffic violations, and accidents. According to the interview respondents from production units, thefts, fights, and scuffles are frequent among workers or farmers. Some fights involving unit members take place outside the work unit. Because of the unit's preoccupation with production or business affairs, minor matters are often put aside. Even for serious thefts, since it is hard to find the true culprit and too much money and time have to be spent on investigation, the work unit usually puts it aside and looks forward with more cautious measures of prevention.

Cases under the jurisdiction of para-security can be reported directly to a department or committee by the persons involved or by-standers on the scene. Security committees or departments are also obligated to patrol the work unit, approach possible targets, and solve cases in the first instance. Sometimes unit leaders are first notified of a possible or on-going problem. They may call upon a security division, bring major security persons with them, or dispatch them to the site to bring the situation under control. Regarding the connection between para-security and unit leaders, one respondent said: "We turn most problems to unit leaders, who sometimes pass them to the security department." Another explained: "The security division is under the unit leadership. Its duty is to collect information and contact the city police when unit leaders decide to do so."

In the interview, various para-security cases were reported. The cases can be lumped into several main types.

Unit Authority Mobilized

There were eight cases in which unit leaders were mobilized to handle a problematic incident. Reasons for unit leaders to intervene vary. One factor is the size and working style of the work unit. In work units of a manageable size, unit leaders may have close contacts with all their members. Division of labor is often unclear. One respondent from a small research institute described an incident: "One colleague lost his bike in a public parking lot outside the work unit. One day he accidentally found it was parked within our unit's compound. It was obvious that someone from our unit had stolen the bike. The matter was reported to unit leaders and was resolved by them."

Another factor is the political sensitivity and implication of the case involved. One respondent told a story about the disappearance of a

package of classified documents leading a county government to form a security task force for special investigation. Another reported that her unit leaders were shocked by political leaflets found in a mail package from abroad and ordered the unit security department to send it to the upper authority for further action. Yet another story was related by a former university faculty member: "One of our students went with a foreign missionary to spread religion across the country. He was caught in Hebei. The local authority called the university to take him back. As his class counselor, I was ordered by the university to go with a security officer to return him. The student was given a serious demerit-recording and put on on-campus observation for one year."

Serious cases with significant economic implications or involving a large number of unit members also require the involvement of unit leaders. One respondent recalled: "In our bank, once a large amount of money was not found in balance. Unit leaders immediately ordered all on-duty employees not to leave and answer questions from unit security officers. The municipal police were also called. Several suspects were taken away for further investigation. The person in charge of cash deposit later admitted to have taken the money. He was asked to return the money and transferred to another work within the unit."

Sometimes, the persons victimized may feel only unit leaders have the legitimate authority to render justice. One respondent reported: "A young teaching assistant was assaulted by the children of two professors. He took his case directly to the President, who then ordered the security department head to handle the matter. The result was that the professors were criticized for failing to discipline their children and ordered to offer a formal apology to and pay medical expenses for him."

When unit leaders are mobilized to make decisions, they may apply their discretionary power inherent in the unit authority. One respondent stated: "Our company was burglarized. Several bolts of cloth disappeared. The inside investigation by the unit security found that it was done by an old employee. The general manager saw his contributions in the past and decided not to report him to the police. He was ordered to return the objects and pay a fine."

Regular Duty

Twenty-seven cases were reported about para-security departments or committees carrying out regular security duty in the work unit. For thefts, burglaries, losses, and similar incidents, the unit security department is usually the first notified. Officers run to the scene to collect information.

But often they do not prove helpful to recover losses. There were eight reports of so-called "unsolved" cases for which no result is heard from para-security. They were: the next room in our dormitory was burglarized; my home was burglarized; one of our unit members lost money from his office; a computer was stolen from our laboratory; a neighbor's television and video recorder disappeared; our unit lost a tape recorder; one of our roommates' meal tickets were stolen from our dormitory bedroom; and a television in our unit's public entertainment room disappeared.

If serious efforts are made, especially when significant economic interests are involved, para-security in the work unit can do a good job. There were five cases in which lost items were reportedly recovered or the offenders were brought to justice. Three of them were independently done by the work unit security: one unit family's television stolen and found by the security department; one unit member's bike stolen and found with help from security guards; and steel from the unit's construction site stolen and recovered by the security force. The remaining two were solved with help from the municipal police. The first respondent recalled: "Ten kilograms of our products were stolen. The unit security investigated the case and reported it formally to the city police. The case was solved in Henan after three months of police investigation. The unit security played an important role in the process, especially in uncovering the chief thief's agent in our factory." The other respondent reported: "One of our employees' motorcycle was stolen. The case was reported to the unit security. Officers investigated the incident and determined that the motorcycle was taken out not through the guarded gate but over the unit's wall. They thus reasoned that it involved more than one person. The case was later reported to the city police. The theft group was caught in another case and the motorcycle was found among the group's confiscated properties."

In dealing with fights, disorder, taking or damaging unit properties, and other problematic incidents, unit para-security may take various strategies. For students, a lecture is usually given. Serious cases may be turned over to the university authority for a disciplining action. Reported incidents include: students involved in a bedroom fight were lectured by security officers; two students fighting in a campus dining hall received a lecture in the security department; security officers were called to deal with fights and sex scandals among students when violence was identified; and several minority students running into the girls' dormitory while drunk were caught by security and expelled from the campus by the university authority.

Among formal employees or their adult family members, reported disruptive incidents included: a unit worker stealing the factory's working

clothes and selling them in free markets; workers stealing the factory's products and raw materials; and female farm workers fighting each other with upper clothes stripped off in front of male farmers. For these problems, unit para-security may take both preventive and punitive actions. One respondent reported: "There are workers stealing nutritional medicine produced by our factory. Sometimes, it becomes so serious, body search is conducted by the unit security despite strong protests from workers." Another said: "Workers often take valuable parts out of the factory. Fighting during work also takes place. The unit security has a lot to deliver. Treatments include: return of stolen items, fines, custody, and expulsion." In serious cases, unit security may call the municipal police for a formal treatment or sanction. One respondent made a general remark: "When a criminal event occurs within the work unit, the security department rushes to protect and record the spot while waiting for the municipal police." Another related: "An old worker's son worked temporarily in our factory. He forced people to pay his meals in local restaurants and beat those who refused to do so. After several times, the unit security was notified. He was taken to the local police. Because of other offenses, he was sent to an education-through-labor program."

Finally, an important duty of unit para-security is to guard the work unit and protect the interests of the work unit and unit members in conflicts with the outside. In fact, many preventive measures are directed at the outside. There were three reports illustrating this point. The first was offered by a former state farmer: "Thefts, burglaries, fights, sex affairs, and disputes with peasants nearby were handled by the farm security. One time, a wolf dog from our farm bit a peasant's female pig to death. It was handled by the security department." The second report was made by a nurse about a hospital: "The hospital is walled. All gates are guarded by the security. When problems happen, the security is immediately notified. The security also pays routine visits to each section and checks whether equipment is in safe condition and doors are properly locked." The last one was made by a university faculty member: "The students run a little bar on campus. One day, they ran into a dispute with several workers from the outside. The dispute escalated to a fight, which led to the injuries of several students. The workers ran from the scene. The campus security caught them and ordered them to pay medical expenses for the injured students."

Security Education

Unit para-security is responsible to inform unit members of related security policies. Several respondents said they were given an official briefing by the unit security department before leaving China to come to the United States. One of them described: "Before leaving China, I was asked to visit the security department to receive a formal lecture from two security officers. The content of the security lesson is basically that we love our country and do not do anything against the motherland."

Additional Prevention Taken after an Incident

Preventive measures are often suggested and implemented by unit para-security after an incident. There were three reports about this: a faculty member's looted home leading to the security department's decision to install an iron door for all unit residents; a burglarized building provoking the residential united defense and security committee to tighten prevention and lobby the unit department of general services to install an iron gate for each housing unit and an iron door for each family; and a series of residential burglaries causing the security department to install an iron door with security lock for each household.

An incident may also put the unit security department on alert. One respondent told a story: "One night, a girl student went to the toilet and found a man watching her from a corner. She screamed for help, which brought all students out from their bedrooms. The man ran away. The campus security tightened the patrol. One week later, the girl accidentally saw the man and grabbed him on spot. He confessed he often came to the girls' dormitory to watch and steal their panties and brassieres."

Disciplining Action against Security Personnel

Security guards or officers may be held accountable for security failures or disciplined for improper actions. Three cases were reported about such incidents. The first was told by a respondent from a university: "Something from our department's storage was stolen during a holiday. The deputy chairperson designated for security was criticized." The second was about a dispute between security guards and a unit employee in a research academy. The respondent stated: "One of our researchers took his camera and video recorder out of the unit. Guards at the gate asked him to provide a proof. He refused and quarreled with them. The patrol guards took him away and gave him a beating. He took his case to unit leaders and prevailed. The patrol guards' supervisor was removed

from his position." The last case occurred in a governmental agency where the respondent worked as a rank-and-file official:

Our unit was looted on a rainy night. The thief entered nine offices, opened all cabinets and drawers, and took away cash and valuables worth 30,000 Yuan. The burglary was discovered next morning when the staff came to work. The unit security rushed to protect the spot for the municipal police. The thief was later caught in another theft that occurred in Liaoning. The security guard on duty that night was suspended from work for one year. He came back to the unit after one year with his salary dropped one level. The stolen cash and items were not recovered. The unit and individuals took their respective shares of the loss. One staff member put money in his office he just borrowed from the unit for a business travel. Since the unit has policy to instruct staff not to put money in office, he was asked to pay the stolen money back to the unit.

NATURE

The existence of a para-security system in Chinese work units reflects the nature of employment organizations in the socialist context. The Chinese work unit plays a dual role. On the one hand, it is a localized unit where ordinary working people organize themselves for business affairs, life routines, and related security and safety. On the other hand, it is a governmental agency that creates, delivers, or imposes the official version of security and order upon common citizens.

According to the communist ideology, people from working classes are entitled to security and safety in their workplaces and living communities, where they become their own masters (*Qiusi* 1990). The ideal fits with the grass-roots philosophy that individual citizens empower themselves to protect local interests through the security mechanism within their work units. But in the perspective of social control, it is essentially about the design of social order and the allocation of social power. If the ruling authority perceives its power as based upon mass support, it is natural for it to build up social order locally through grass-roots efforts. Or, if it perceives its power as omnipresent, it is also natural for it to extend control to every social unit. The end is the same. That is, individual social cells or work units are organized and controlled to secure general order and legitimate the ruling authority.

Theoretically, para-security in Chinese work units provides a site where major control prototypes can be identified. In terms of mode of intervention, para-security involves action control (Czarniawska-Joerges 1989). Incidents are identified by observable acts and handled with effective countermeasures. With regard to the style of control, para-

security actions often lead to penal or coercive control (Horwitz 1990). Offenders are usually forced to surrender and can be put into custody against their will. Vicarious and referential control (Gibbs 1981) are also applied when security officers warn ordinary unit members, lecture troublemakers, interrogate suspects, and forcibly persuade offenders into admission of wrongdoing and acceptance of self-correction.

Finally, control through para-security is partial, reactive, and problem-specific. Its effect lies in both environmental and institutional support. According to the interview respondents, there exists in the work unit an all-inclusive control network over individuals. Contributing to this is not only the para-security buildup, but also the entire power hierarchy, daily routine, and lifestyle of the work unit. Unit members are habituated or often feel obligated to expose their own and dig into others' personal life in daily activities with friends, neighbors, and co-workers. They tend to keep an eye, ear, mouth, interest, or concern over each other's acts, habits, words, gains, and losses in work and life, thereby creating pervasive gossip, surveillance, and human-relations pressure. In other words, pervasive surveillance and gossip also work like a para-security system and help hold people in the mainstream of a close-knit community life.

CHANGE

A widely known saying throughout Chinese history is: "Heaven is high and the emperor is distant." During the long feudal dynastic period, local officials, landlords, bandits, or mountain masters each held on to their territories and practiced their own versions of law and order like tyrants. Ordinary people felt helpless and had to align themselves with one of the tyrants for basic protection. In relation to the central government, various strongholds controlled by local stakeholders were essentially grass-roots security mechanisms organized by the common people to protect their interests. Indeed, the pattern contributed to the tradition of local security in Chinese civilization.

Contemporary para-security in work units and communities may be seen as an extension of local security in history. But there is a tremendous difference. Work units and other local groups under communism are organized, connected to, and supported by the ruling authority. It is not a force used by defiant local elites to resist the government. Instead, it is a grass-roots tool for the communist party to implement its policy lines to every localized corner and keep social order unit by unit across the entire society.

Para-security under Mao featured mass mobilization and class vigilance against reactionary sabotage. In work units, priority was given to political purity, on-time completion of official assignments, and collective struggles against class enemies. Violation, failure to follow orders, and disruptive incidents were identified in the perspective of class enemies and their possible intentions of political sabotage. Unit members were made conscious of security and safety needs in terms of class struggles. During the night, collective patrolling was conducted by people's militia within and around the enclave of the work unit.

Under Deng, para-security in work units continues but takes a different orientation. First, the requirement from the authority changes from a sole emphasis on political loyalty to a general call for local order. Needs of unit members change from class consciousness to practical concerns. As political pressure is lifted, unit members are no longer educated to worry about the abstract danger of class enemies. But along with economic reform, most unit members become increasingly concerned with their physical and property safety and security in concrete terms. They begin to demand proper protection not only in workplaces but also in public and residential settings.

Second, the way in which para-security is organized has changed. Generally, human power is no longer particularly stressed. Rather, installation of security techniques and tools is emphasized. According to the interview respondents, foot patrolling continues in work units but with less manpower because of the units' preoccupation with business affairs. There are efforts to modernize security methods and equipment. For instance, a number of respondents reported that their work units' office buildings are equipped with security devices. This enables more effective control to be maintained even without the presence of guards.

Control through para-security in Chinese work units is built jointly upon the party department of armed force, people's militia, the administrative department of security and safety, and the residential united defense and security committee. Security and safety responsibilities generally encompass preventive measures, security policies and formalities, business-related safety, control of problematic incidents, military training, and community defense.

The unique aspect of Chinese para-security is that it is universally set up in work organizations and systematically connected to the state security machinery. As few legislative rules are set to guide its operation, it becomes a convenient procedure for a localized work unit authority to

keep order under its wings. Also, as it is practiced by and among the ordinary people, a significant amount of manpower is involved.

Control through Mass Vigilance and Inclusion

Vigilantism, in its classic sense, refers to organized extralegal movements whose members take the law into their own hands. In the United States, vigilantism arose during the eighteenth century in the absence of effective law and order in the frontier region. According to Brown (1975), vigilante groups were variably named as "regulators," "committees of safety," "vigilance committees," or "mobs." They had two main characteristics: (1) regular organization and (2) existence for a definite period of time. In modern times, although the legal system extends to every possible jurisdiction, vigilance is still practiced in traditional or modified forms. For instance, the Watergate event exemplifies a vigilante mentality in its former sense: burglary and other felonies being justified in the interest of national security, or taking the law into one's own hands for the public good (Brown 1975). The neighborhood watch or vigilance committee, on the other hand, represents a modified version of vigilance that contributes to local order and complements the formal justice system. Lack of adequate legal protection is another reason for local vigilance. In communities across the United States, local residents often form some kind of vigilant watch effort after the police fail to remove an alleged drug operation or released rapists or felons from the neighborhood.

Inclusion became theoretically connected to control first through the micro study of group development when Schutz (1958) found that group process follows a staged cycle of inclusion, control, and affection. In macro social dynamics, the dilemma of inclusion and exclusion has long been a central issue for national integration and control. The United States provides an exemplary case with its history of slavery, liberation of

slaves, residential and school segregation and desegregation, and civil rights movements, as well as its current debates over racism, abortion, and gay and lesbian recruits in the military. According to Shklar (1991), American citizenship is a quest for inclusion.

Control through collective vigilance and mass inclusion is a landmark heritage of communist mass movements. It signifies how the CCP relates itself and its policy programs to the general populace.

Collective vigilance is aroused by defining a confrontation with either a threat or a task and speculating an imaginative debacle in security or honor if the threat goes unchallenged or the task is unfulfilled. Referential or prelusive control (Gibbs 1981) is usually activated in this manipulation or mode of intervention. For instance, in a legal education campaign or during the security month, references are made to cases of legal ignorance or security negligence in order to raise consciousness among all participants. Unit activists are encouraged to report feelings and situations that represent the entire population of the work unit and indicate the need for collective action. The purpose is to manipulate the behavior of unit members and keep them on the track of intended programs or goals.

Control through inclusion involves a human relations approach that enhances members' personal commitment to or identification with the organization and hence increases the total amount of control (Tannenbaum 1968). In Chinese work units, in addition to the human relations approach, inclusion is facilitated by various contextual elements including the CCP's ideological advocacy for people's governance, the work unit's public ownership, and the unit population's cosmopolitan composition. It is customary that work units co-opt their influential figures as employee representatives into the high leadership echelon. Noted unit members are also recommended by the work unit to the municipal or provincial people's congress and political consultative conference. At the divisional level, common interests and collective honors are often stressed for assigned tasks. The strategy, along with the ideology of mass governance and obligation, is intensively followed by the whole work unit when it is swept into a movement called by the upper authority.

STRUCTURE

Control through collective vigilance and mass inclusion is ingrained in the communist ideology, policy, and strategy on mass mobilization for political campaigns and practical programs (see Figure 11.1). In official jargon, it is political-thought work. The institutional structure by which political-thought work is carried out is called the political-thought troop.

Figure 11.1
Mass Inclusion and Vigilance

In work units, no organizational setup exists specifically to execute political-thought work. Often it is the entire unit party and administration network that oversees such control.

The CCP system, in a sense, is an exclusive mechanism for control through mass vigilance and inclusion. In its Constitution, the CCP defines its mission as to propagandize, educate, inspire, and unite the people with party policy lines, enabling them to become conscientious participants in the implementation of party programs (Chinese Communist Party 1992). In work units, the CCP system takes a full organizational and operational scale in mass mobilization, just as it does at a level of government. The propaganda department keeps unit members informed of party policies. Negative factors are often singled out to arouse mass vigilance against them. The organization department requires party members to network with ordinary people, identify activists and passive elements, and work on them accordingly. The department for united-front affairs unites intellectuals, repatriated individuals, former national or petty capitalists, and other revolution targets all to the cause of the party. Affiliated associations including the youth league, women's federation, and employees' union all reach out to their subpopulations and bring their constituents in line with party policies.

Whereas mass inclusion for political actions and collective vigilance against reactionary subversions are carried out by the party, mobilization of unit members in vigilant prevention of business-related accidents, fires, thefts, burglaries, or sabotage is the responsibility of the work unit administration. In general, all unit leaders are made responsible for problems and incidents under their jurisdictions. In particular, the residential committee and its subcommittee for united defense and security is in charge of residential areas. The security department, while coordinating all safety and security operations within the unit, is responsible for vigilant and preventive measures in workshops, offices, and other unit business establishments.

PROCESS

Collective vigilance and mass inclusion are first reflected in the daily administrative rhetoric. Unit leaders always attempt to win their subordinates' support and dedication to policies and programs. Real and potential impacts from a failure, and necessary measures of prevention or vigilance, are habitually made explicit to all work unit members in order to keep them in line.

Collective vigilance is highlighted especially during political movements or task-related campaigns. According to the interview respondents, it begins with a flash of propaganda in which the importance of the campaign is stressed, likely sabotages are predicted, and failures and dishonors are cited. All unit members are thus made serious about the campaign task. During the program implementation, appropriate attitudes, methods, and procedures are emphasized to make all participants conscientiously vigilant against any possible wrongdoing. For instance, during the safe production month, unit bulletins or blackboards are filled with drawings, photos, and other highlights about safety operation, safety ignorance and negligence, accidents and their vicious consequences, and preventive measures. Unit leaders intensify their on-site inspection with a particular emphasis on the safety and security aspect of work. As a result, all unit members are made vigilant against unsafe or insecure possibilities.

Mass inclusion is achieved through both institutional practice and exigent measure. Included in the former are rewards, promotions, co-optation, and recommendations to the upper authority for special honor. Rewards and promotions elicit dedication from unit members, especially the awarded, to collective actions. Co-optation integrates influential unit members into the governing body or process of the work unit. It makes unit members feel their voices are heard and their interests are represented. The recommendation is to send extraordinarily outstanding unit members to the upper authority for consideration for a higher award, appointment, or use as a mass representative. It gives people a sense of personal accomplishment and social prestige.

Across all work units, there are generally three official channels for mass participation. One is the employee union, where different lines of unit members are proportionally present to push for common welfare interests. Another is the convention of employee representatives, where mass inputs are expressed about the main policy initiatives of the work unit. The third is the unit administration, where mass representatives are invited to sit with formal officials to witness or participate in decision making. As a part of the CCP's general philosophy of mass governance, each level of government and party reserves some nominal seats for local representatives. Work units may therefore recommend their members to sit in people's congresses, political consultative conferences, party congresses, and other advisory or mass representative bodies. In the interview, one respondent admitted that he serves as a standing committee member for a municipal political consultative conference. He said: "As the chief engineer, I ride domestic cars for duty with the work unit. But when the municipal political consultative conference calls me for a meeting or

business, an exported car is dispatched to my unit to pick me up. I thus have an extra honor in front of my colleagues."

Exigent measures are activated when a special task, directive, or command is passed on to the work unit by the upper authorities. The master piece is a mass mobilization convention in which unit leaders or even the upper officials come to announce the task, explain its importance, articulate the work unit's plan to accomplish it, and give concrete requirements for unit members. In addition to the convention, propaganda is set into motion. Political-thought officers are designated in each division and dispatched to individual unit members for spiritual arousal. They also help unit or division leaders direct individual actions in task accomplishment. It is apparent that these strategies for mass inclusion and dedication induce collective vigilance.

NATURE

Control through vigilance and inclusion is preventive, inductive, and implicit. Its effect or value as a form of control lies in that sabotage, victimization, and other rule-breaking scenes or consequences can be avoided or minimized, if all members follow the positive pursuits of the collective and are made vigilant against any possible mishap.

Inclusion has two layers of meaning in Chinese work organizations. First, all unit members are physically brought together with important representatives co-opted to the leading center. This not only strengthens the positive force but also reduces the chance for organized resistance and individualized deviance. In other words, the cost for controlling rule-breaking incidents is spared. Second, physically included unit members are made spiritually devoted to the collective pursuits. This continues to double the positive force and save the cost of task completion. It also decreases functional failures and unintentional mistakes. As the collective cause builds up successfully with devotion from enthusiastic participants, a few deserters or deviants can become further isolated from the mainstream and overshadowed by the collective atmosphere.

Vigilance invests in prevention. Its gains and losses are often speculative. It loses or wastes the invested resources in the sense that the incidents it attempts to prevent are fabricated and do not exist at all. For instance, class vigilance in the years of class struggle has proven to be more a political ploy than a practical necessity. The return of vigilance supposedly emphasizes two things: (1) savings from the treatments that have to be delivered if a disturbing or rule-breaking incident is not prevented, and (2) direct losses that have to be suffered in an unstopped

criminal victimization. The justification for vigilance is that the more mindful work unit members become in their business operations, the less likely it is that production mishaps will take place. Or, in public order and property protection, the more preventive work unit members become toward possible or suspicious happenings, the less likely it is that they will suffer from an explosion of disorderly events or a significant loss of valuables.

Public vigilance also serves as an energizing mechanism. Usually when people are made vigilant, they not only become mindful, careful, and conscious of all negative possibilities but also become active, conscientious, and committed to perfecting a state of affairs or accomplishing a desired goal. In fact, collective vigilance and inclusion are actually interconnected. One respondent said: "The state of spirit is subtle. When I am included in a mass movement, I always feel that I should be mindful about my acts and speeches and stay vigilant against any harmful idea or lure. But from the opposite side, I find that I am vigilant against internal and external negatives because I stay collectively with the masses in the movement." From an objective point of view, it can be said that the CCP has mastered the truism of human psychology and can apply it skillfully to mobilize the masses through collective inclusion and vigilance for its various social action programs.

CHANGE

There are differences between Mao and Deng in the use of mass inclusion and vigilance. Under Mao, mass inclusion was used in contrast to exclusion. In work units, members of good class backgrounds were included in the management or administration. Intellectuals, former petty capitalists, and traditional elites with class problems were often excluded from political or economic arenas, even the due area of their expertise. During the Cultural Revolution, a revolutionary committee was set up in each work unit to replace the old-style administrative body. The committee was composed of first-line workers or politically advanced employees. Regular officials with formal education or experience were mostly excluded from their positions (*Qiushi* 1990).

Vigilance was aroused in the perspective of class struggle. While civil problems were made trivial, criminal events were often dramatized as reactionary sabotage against national security and socialist production. Class enemies were imagined or created. Their criminal acts, sabotage, and plots were described by official propaganda as inevitable, imminent, and of terrible consequence. All unit members were taught to be vigilant in

both their thoughts and acts. Class enemies were an epidemic. Everybody was vulnerable and needed to be armed against plots and threats (Yue and Wakesman 1985).

For both inclusion and vigilance, a salient feature of Mao's era was the exclusive focus on spirit. Inclusion was primarily an ideological unity with the party. One mind and one virtue were expected from all social units and citizens. One way to reach this unity was to make the masses spiritually vigilant, safeguarding their minds against decadent, dissolute bourgeois and revisionist thoughts and lifestyles. Mao instructed in a publicized slogan, "Fight self-interest and attack revisionism."

Deng's period continues the practice of collective inclusion and vigilance for social control. However, the meaning of and approach toward the practice are changing. Inclusion becomes differential and discriminatory. Social elites are co-opted into the governing echelon. The general masses are included in the process only as instrumental agents for goal attainment. Vigilance is still grass-roots but no longer prompted by class struggle. Instead, it is guided by practical needs or substantive interests. For instance, increasing crimes against person and property raise the level of civil vigilance against possible attacks or robberies among unit members in the residential compounds. In workplaces, as the link of personal gains to the work unit's overall economic efficiency is made direct and clear through responsibility reform, unit members also become mindful about safety operation procedures. Vigilance against job negligence or dereliction is increased as well. One respondent said: "We are very careful to avoid accidents and defective products, because we all recognize that they will make us suffer in the end. On the other hand, if we are just a little more careful, we can soon see the pay-off."

Control through mass vigilance and collective inclusion is a leadership strategy employed by the entire unit party system and administration, as well as all major unit leaders at different levels. Vigilance is officially aroused from the top to single out socially identified targets such as class enemies or criminals, and to highlight collectively pursued programs such as political campaigns or special assignments. The utility of vigilance is to guard against reactionary sabotage, criminal incidents, job accidents, or work failures.

Inclusion is, on the other hand, designed for both physical presence and spiritual dedication of individual members in social action programs. In the socialist context, Chinese mass inclusion is not based upon ethnic line, personal identity, or social wealth. It is rather a matter of political participation in social programs. The implication of mass inclusion is

multiple. It signifies the sacred nature of a program and the honor of the program sponsor among the populace. It demonstrates individual dedication to the collective cause. It also serves to isolate a few deserters or deviants, and it highlights the importance of loyalty to the authority that rallies people around its social programs.

Collective vigilance and mass inclusion are two sides of one coin. That is, vigilance signifies who are included and who are excluded from a program. Inclusion draws the line by which those included are made vigilant against sabotage from those excluded.

Interrelations of Different Forms of Social Control

It is apparent that different forms of social control in Chinese work units are interconnected. Interactions among them in the real world display general features or patterns.

GENERAL FEATURES

Several contrasts can be identified among different forms of social control in Chinese work units. These contrasts denote general social control features with theoretical significance.

Regional versus Universal Control

Regional control is confined to a specific issue, area, or segment of population in the work unit. Universal control, in contrast, is applicable to all occasions and all unit members. Among the different forms of social control instituted in Chinese work units, residential control is regional because it is exercised among residents living on unit housing facilities. Ideological control, control through confidential records, and control through mass vigilance and inclusion are universal because they are applied to all unit members. Control through civil reward and penalty, administrative disciplining, control through quasi-justice, and control through para-security can be seen as regional when they target particular unit members and handle specific incidents. But at the same time, they are universally installed and affect all unit members.

Community-Based versus Bureaucracy-Based Control

Community-based control occurs because people live and work together and have close ties among each other. Bureaucracy-based control, on the other hand, occurs where people are organized and disciplined to perform a specific task. By this distinction, residential control is obviously community-based, whereas control through confidential records, control through civil reward or penalty, and administrative disciplining are bureaucracy-based. Ideological control, control through mass vigilance and inclusion, control through quasi-justice, and control through para-security are mixed, because they not only draw from community-based resources but also rely upon the work unit bureaucracy for support and coordination.

Soul-Oriented versus Body-Oriented Control

Soul-oriented control is directed at spirit, thought, and speech. Body-oriented control is focused on an observable act or behavior. Ideological control is apparently a clear-cut type of soul-oriented control. Control through confidential records and control through mass vigilance and inclusion make use of the power and subservience of human spirit. But oftentimes, what are recorded in dossiers, prevented by vigilance, or intended through inclusion are, respectively, objective deeds, disruptive incidents, or collective actions. In other words, they are mixed. Residential control, control through civil reward or penalty, administrative disciplining, control through quasi-justice, and control through para-security all deal with behaviors or events. They are body-oriented but not of such a clear-cut type, because they also stress the importance of attitude and education.

Positive versus Negative Control

Positive control refers to the use of inclusive, indicative, stimulative, and integrative measures to make people physically and spiritually committed to the collective cause of an organization. Negative control, on the other hand, mobilizes preventive, corrective, punitive, or coercive tools to deter, contain, and control rule-breaking tendencies or behaviors and to deliver punishments to offenders. By this contrast, ideological control, control through civil rewards, and control through mass inclusion are positive. Control through punishments, administrative disciplining, and control through para-security are negative. Residential control, control through collective vigilance, control through quasi-justice, and control

through confidential records are not clear-cut. They all involve both positive and negative elements. For instance, control through quasi-justice hands out punitive or corrective treatments in a settlement but also features conciliation and integration in its effort to bring disputants into a peaceful agreement. Likewise, control through confidential records keeps track of positive deeds, giving people a sense of pride and accomplishment. It also records negative behaviors, making people scared and regretful.

In addition to these four contrasts, other perspectives or criteria can be used to distinguish different forms of social control in Chinese work units. For example, ideological control and control through mass vigilance and inclusion can be said to be communism-specific. Others are non-communism specific.

MUTUAL CONNECTIONS

Individually, each form of social control interacts with or penetrates into other forms. Its identity is defined in the overall organizational and control dynamics of Chinese work units.

Ideological Control

Ideological control is universal and diffusive. In residential control, one task of the neighborhood committee is to distribute party and governmental policies among residents no matter whether they have already been briefed in workplaces or on other occasions. Dossier records cover political thoughts, speeches, and attitudes. Control through civil reward or penalty stresses the propaganda rhetoric of reward or penalty. Administrative disciplining begins with educational propaganda of basic principles and rules. Self-criticism, lecture from leaders, and public warning are not very different from ideological sessions. The basic method for quasi-justice is persuasion or talk in reference to the official ideology. In para-security, incidents are often understood in terms of their ideological value. Responses are worked out accordingly. Mass vigilance and collective inclusion are entirely buttressed by ideology. Spiritual instigation is present from beginning to end as a tool or stimulant. In short, ideological control penetrates all other forms of social control.

Residential Control

Although residential control is regional, its sites, target incidents, or results can be used for or transferred to those of other forms of social control across the work unit. For instance, ideological control and control through vigilance and inclusion see residential compounds as an important front and tend to add their forces to residential control. Good deeds or serious violations in residential compounds may surface in the civil reward and penalty system, catch the attention of administrative disciplining, or be entered into personal dossiers. Most salient, residential control overlaps with quasi-justice through mediation and para-security through united defense and security.

Control through Confidential Records

The dossier is a depository of any eligible deed and treatment from all forms of control. Civil rewards can be written down. Civil penalties and administrative disciplining decisions must be entered. Good or bad performances in all action programs of ideological control, residential control, quasi-justice, para-security, mass vigilance, and collective inclusion can be summarized in annual evaluations and reflected in dossiers. For instance, "closely follows the current situation" in an evaluation-by-leader may indicate that the person concerned does well in political studies and other areas of ideological control.

Control through Civil Reward or Penalty

Compared to administrative disciplining, control through civil reward or penalty involves praising, awarding, and encouraging good behavior and excellent performance. Its penalty sector is role-oriented, confined to self-shame and public embarrassment. Administrative disciplining, in contrast, is formal, resorting to the administrative stake the organization has over its members' interests. With all other forms of control, control through civil reward or penalty can be first applied to the area covered by every other form of control. For instance, an activist may be praised for political study in ideological control. A model may be awarded in the patriotic health movement through residential control. On the other hand, each of the other controls may supply a candidate to the civil reward or penalty system for a unit-wide recognition or upper-level contests. For example, a model mediator, a reliable dossier staff member, a brave security officer, a safety-minded employee, or a program activist may all enter into the unit-wide contest for advanced employees.

Control through Administrative Disciplining

Administrative disciplining, as one of the highest control procedures, can be applied to any area within the work unit. Targets or malpractitioners from ideological and residential control, as well as from control through confidential records, civil reward or penalty, quasi-justice, para-security, vigilance, and collective inclusion, can all be treated by administrative disciplining. For instance, a habitual absentee from political studies and a security officer who abuses power for personal revenge may be similarly disciplined through administrative procedure.

Administrative disciplining draws upon dossier records. Civil rewards may be redeemed for lesser disciplining actions. Quasi-justice and para-security treatments are also taken into consideration. In fact, when quasi-justice takes a person to court or para-security puts a person under criminal investigation, administrative disciplining made by the work unit may have to be overturned or modified. For instance, dismissal is automatic for any unit member who becomes a convicted prisoner.

Control through Quasi-Justice

Problems and disputes that occur in an area covered by a form of social control can be (1) resolved by leaders within that form of control, or (2) turned to a standard quasi-justice forum for settlement. In other words, control through quasi-justice is both diffusive across every other form of control and autonomous as a self-claim entity. For example, the security department can settle disputes among guards or between guards and unit members. But sometimes, a security measure or treatment may cause so much dissatisfaction among unit members that unit leaders have to designate the union or residential mediation committee to resolve the problem or do it by themselves.

Control through quasi-justice crosscuts with residential control through the residential mediation committee and with control through para-security because of the shared goal of bringing incidents under control. When unit leaders are engaged to hammer out justice through administrative mediation, disputes from administrative disciplining and division of labor can also be addressed.

Control through Para-Security

Unless they are minor problems, incidents occurring in a jurisdiction of a form of control are generally turned over to a para-security department or committee for treatment. Except for top unit leaders, lower-level

leaders tend to distance themselves from security scenes. For instance, dossier officials may be able to resolve the misplacement of documents by themselves. But loss of confidential records definitely warrants a call for intervention from para-security.

In fact, all other forms of control count more or less on para-security for orderly execution of control. In ideological control, important studies or conventions are usually guarded by para-security. In residential control, the united defense and security committee acts as a formal para-security station in neighborhoods. Protection of confidential records is a para-security concern. Important awarding ceremonies or disciplining occasions have the presence of para-security guards. Highly publicized awardees or disciplined persons may even have to be carefully watched by para-security. In quasi-justice, para-security may act as an enforcement authority for an agreement. Para-security often leads the charge in mass vigilance and inclusion.

Control through Mass Vigilance and Inclusion

Mass vigilance is internally connected to collective inclusion. Vigilance signifies who are included and who are excluded from a program. Inclusion draws the line by which those included are made vigilant against sabotage from those excluded. With other forms of control, vigilance and inclusion are obviously present in ideological and residential control. For instance, working-class people are officially ideologized as the masters of their society. Residents are often made vigilant against neighborhood thefts and crimes. In control through confidential records, people are warned to be careful of their acts and thoughts. Control through rewards induces mass inclusion and commitment, whereas penalty and disciplining distance those excluded and educate those included not to do so. Vigilance is used as a conventional instrument for prevention of disputes and security problems. The essence of quasi-justice and para-security is mass inclusion through conciliatory and corrective return of community order and solidarity.

In all, different forms of social control in Chinese work units are interconnected. They form a network of social control that provides maximum prevention and treatment of all possible problems, deviations, disruptions, or failures in a work organization. For individual unit members, from workplaces to residential compounds, from soul to body, every possible chain of thoughts and acts is guarded, guided, and taken care of in the normal course of collective actions.

It ought to be pointed out, however, that such a seemingly inescapable network of social control is not a perfect system that is capable of solving or uprooting all possible problems and imposing a desired order permanently. There are loopholes, lapses, mistakes, and failures, as well as human conflicts, complaints, avoidances, and resistances. In fact, the very existence of the network signifies that problems are constantly produced and reproduced and that responses and treatments are always needed to deal with them effectively.

THE NATURE OF CHINESE WORK ORGANIZATIONS

The institution of various forms of social control in Chinese work units leads to a fundamental question: What is the nature of the Chinese work organization?

It is obvious that none of the forms of social control is specific, limited, or confined to any particular locale, time, and work unit. They are universally instituted and standardized in all work organizations, and uniformly linked to and coordinated by the communist party system and state governmental bureaucracy across the country. First, ideological control is based upon the communist ideology and implemented by a political-economic machinery controlled by the communist party. Political studies of party policy lines and state laws are openly claimed as an unshirkable obligation of all work units and individual citizens.

Second, residential control is a country-wide practice constraining individual movement from place to place. The residential committee, and its subcommittees for mediation and united defense and security, are required for establishment and operation in urban communities by the state Constitution. The living services and subsistence materials provided are an essential feature of socialist state planning and rationing.

Third, control through confidential records is applicable to all public employees. Format, content, annual evaluation, access, management, and use of dossiers are standardized nationally. No matter where individuals work and live, dossiers always accompany them from the first day of schooling until death. Work units develop and keep the dossier. Individuals are never allowed access to it.

Fourth, control through civil reward or penalty is a standard organizational exercise for all unit managements. Formal rewards and penalties are often selected and delivered by the government beyond individual work organizations. The procedure for selecting an awardee or identifying a backward person is usually formalized at a level of government or across a region or line of business.

Fifth, administrative disciplining is guided by law and connected to the party state system. A standard disciplining package consists of state rules, organizational by-laws, work requirements, professional ethics, and punishments for rule-breaking. Formal punitive actions include public warning, demerit-recording, demotion, transfer, off-duty observation, suspension, and expulsion.

Sixth, quasi-justice is a uniform operation across all work units. Intervention of leaders in employee disputes is a standard management routine. Conflict resolution forum is required by the state in all employee unions and residential compounds. Mediation cases, approaches, principles, inhibitions, and procedures are stipulated by law or governmental directives.

Seventh, control through para-security is universally set up in all work units and systematically connected to the state security machinery. Common security and safety responsibilities include preventive measures, security policies and formalities, business-related safety, control of incidents, military training, and community defense. Use of manpower is a salient feature in all local para-security operations to maintain work and community order.

Eighth, control through mass vigilance and collective inclusion is a characteristic communist strategy in mass movements. Inclusion induces individual commitment and dedication, both physically and spiritually, for social action programs. Vigilance guards against reactionary sabotage, criminal incidents, accidents, or work failures. They both are widely employed across Chinese work units.

Linking these universal, uniform, and stable social control practices to the general structure and process of Chinese work organizations, it is clear that the Chinese work unit is not merely a workplace where a group of people are employed to carry out a line of business under socialist state planning. It is primarily a local party branch that recruits, disciplines, and manages party members and implements party policies. It is also a basic governmental agency that ensures that a group of social members are properly fed, employed, and managed, and that local order is maintained within the enclave of a social unit.

The essential nature of Chinese work units sets, generally, a basic theme for this book. In particular, it sets a stage for discussion of the political, economic, and cultural underpinnings of various forms of social control in Chinese work units.

Part III

THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORK UNITS

The foundation of control has not been properly and sufficiently addressed in academic studies. Making the assumption that the criminal justice system is set to fight crime and keep order and that organization is geared to perform tasks and attain goals, control literature focuses mainly on what types of control are put in place and how they are practiced. Although Marxist and neo-Marxist criminologists attempt to relate punishment to social structure and modes of production (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939; Garland 1990), control studies in general fail to examine the political, economic, and cultural context of control structures and processes in a society or organization.

The study of control foundations, evidently, is an area where sociological theories can be applied to generate substantive interests. Radical social theory and conflict perspective feature the confrontation between ruling and ruled classes in an imperatively coordinated association or society (Dahrendorf 1959); these approaches can be utilized to highlight political legitimization by the authority for its implementation of control practices or by the controllees for their organized or individualized resistance to those practices. Functionalism specifies social structure and institution in terms of their functions for the maintenance of a larger social system (Parsons 1951), and it may help to explain why a form of control contributes to organizational order and how organizational order contributes to overall social stability. The exchange perspective points to the importance of reciprocity or compensation

(Homans 1961) and should be able to provide a plausible interpretation of the underpinnings of the welfare system for social control. It may also throw light on the applicability of paternalism and patriarchy. For instance, the underlying moral justification for Chinese leaders to lecture their subordinates is that they also take care of them. Finally, interactionist theorizing draws interests to symbolic role-taking processes (Blumer 1969), and it may explain why work unit leaders or members volunteer to pay keen attention to each other in a closely knit community or organization.

In this book, it is not enough to explain (1) that there is a party system and a managing or administrative apparatus in the Chinese work unit, and (2) that they are connected to governmental agencies and are capable of putting different means of control into action. To gain substantive insights on Chinese social control and the leverage of Chinese work units, it is necessary to draw upon theoretical contributions in the sociological literature and delve into the political, economic, and cultural reality of socialist China.

Political Legitimization

The communist power system carries the CCP's military heritage of setting up the CCP organization at even the most basic unit. Although the Constitution under Deng subjects CCP members to law and denies any political organization the privilege of transcending or paralleling the government, the CCP still maintains its level-by-level, unit-by-unit leadership throughout the governing bureaucracy and across the society (National People's Congress 1990). The CCP committees are established at all levels of government and social units. They control who is to do what, and how, by passing on CCP policies, setting local priorities, appointing officials for administration, and making important decisions on all major issues under a jurisdiction.

In work units, such an insertion of the party system makes business affairs politically charged, fluctuating with political swings. To individual members, the work unit is not purely a place for employment. It is both a forum to participate in and an institution to be anchored, disciplined, and controlled, for whatever political state and social order are desired by the omnipresent authority of the communist party.

RULING AND RULED

The CCP's theory of state and power is based upon the Marxist and Leninist visions of proletarian dictatorship. Its central idea is that the state machinery is a tool for one class to rule another (Lenin 1966). The goal of proletarian revolution in China is thus to overthrow the feudal, imperialist, and capitalist power apparatuses through armed struggles and to build a

people's democratic dictatorship. In the new framework of people's democratic dictatorship, the CCP takes leadership to unite all laboring class people (the majority) to apply dictatorship against all former exploiting class enemies (the minority) from the old society.

Ruling has long been an exclusive privilege for a few power-holders. According to the CCP theory, however, socialist ruling becomes the people's business, or a matter of the majority over the minority. In socialist society, since the ruled minority (including former landlords, capitalists, and bureaucrats) are annihilated or significantly weakened during the revolution, ruling shifts from confrontation between rulers and the ruled to power distribution among the ruling majority. The CCP claims to be the representative of the people. It assumes national power and holds all ruling privileges in its hand; it therefore becomes the *de facto* ruling segment. The masses, nominally in the ruling majority, are virtually left with no executive power. They are instead organized by the CCP for the demonstration of its ruling strength and the maintenance of social order. In other words, ruling under socialism is, essentially, still a minority prerogative for the communist party.

There are two basic distinctions. One is between the ruled minority and the ruling majority. The other is between those who hold power and those who are united around the center of power as a part of the ruling majority. The interests of these groups are obviously different and, indeed, in conflict. As the power-holder, the CCP needs to suppress its identified class enemies and minimize their resistance. More important, it needs to mobilize, organize, and energize ordinary people in the ruling class for its desired social programs, goals, and order. The ruled minority is weak but struggles to survive physically and even to advance its values, ideas, and ethics. Laboring people are diverse in terms of needs and wants. They distinguish themselves from the ruled minority and hope to meet their needs by following CCP policy lines. On the other hand, as they recognize that they provide legitimacy for the CCP's rule and remain a *de facto* force indispensable to the CCP's political success, they also dare to stay inactive or even stage protests to voice their resistance, demonstrate their strength, and win their own cause.

Where are these three groups positioned? The power-holder CCP has its own party system and occupies the governmental bureaucracy, both of which constitute its institutional network of ruling power. The ruled minority is put under the state dictatorship or sent to the laboring people for re-education and supervision. Laboring people in the ruling class are distributed across work units, where they are organized to rule themselves, answer the CCP's call, and apply people's democratic dictatorship to a few

reactionary elements. The work unit is thus an extension of the governing machinery to and among the masses. It bears three responsibilities: (1) for the CCP and state, the work unit is a basic organization to put people in place and make good use of them; (2) to laboring people, it is where they act as their own master and feel that they belong to the ruling class; (3) to the ruled, it is a place to be monitored, supervised, and re-socialized.

In such a political context, it is understandable why various social control practices are institutionalized in the work unit. For instance, the security department of work units is virtually an extension of the police and armed force. It acts as a police station and has the responsibility to pass on and execute all security-related directives and tasks from the party and government. For work unit members or the working-class people, para-security is a tool to safeguard their public and private properties. It is also a form of ruling and power through which they assume democratic dictatorship against reactionary elements. Similarly, the mediation mechanism, as an extension of the state justice system, provides the laboring people a form of self-rule and a procedure to resolve problems among themselves.

In all, if the state is seen as a coercive, formal machinery of class rule, then the work unit is seen as a civilized, informalized form of people's governance. Given the fact that work unit members are united around and controlled by the party, the Chinese work unit is essentially a governing mechanism in the ultimate interest of the power-holders.

MAO: WORK UNITS AS A BASIC TOOL OF PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

As a governing mechanism, work units have elementary control setups and practices similar to those instituted in a local government. The control system, while staying structurally stable with regard to its external connection and internal layout, fluctuates and swings processually along with national political climates.

Mao saw the work unit as a basic tool of proletarian dictatorship. In his vision, there are three dimensions along which a work unit is evaluated in terms of its control effectiveness. One is the degree to which a unit is connected to the center of the proletarian dictatorship and the speed with which it responds to his great calls. Another is the scale and depth of proletarian participation in the management of business affairs in the work unit. If laboring people are kept out by a few elites in the unit management, what is the point of the proletarian dictatorship? The third is the extent to which reactionary elements (e.g., former capitalists and new

revisionists) are suppressed, controlled, and disabled from staging resistance and sabotage against the order of the proletarian dictatorship.

Mao's use of work units as a tool of proletarian dictatorship is well illustrated in the organization of people's militia. There is a formal armed force under the CCP as the sacred protector of its power. This force is somehow exclusive. For laboring people to engage in the protection of the motherland and general social order, people's militia must be organized in workplaces and communities. They exist locally as a safeguard against sabotage from class enemies. For the upper authorities, they can be easily mobilized and used against imperialist aggression and other enemy targets. People's militia are thus not only an extension of the armed force to the civil areas but also an opportunity for laboring people to take part in the proletarian dictatorship.

Also relevant is Mao's frequent use of the class struggle strategy, a classical case for the functional perspective of social conflicts. Mao's conflict approach features a selective struggle against a handful of class enemies. Its ultimate goal is to serve Mao's political movements. In work units, for instance, it first puts the unit control system on constant alert, making it ready to answer calls from the center of power. Second, it creates a sense of participation, control, and governance among laboring people and therefore motivates them to make devoted contributions to the CCP crusade of socialist revolution and construction. Third, it directs people's attention from their daily well-being and saves for the controlling authority the economic cost of social control. Finally, as emphasized by conflict functionalism (Coser 1956), conflict can be used to unite people, clarify group identity, and strengthen collective solidarity. In the interview, those respondents who worked during Mao's era unanimously agreed that the rhetoric of class struggles was a constant reminder not to drift away from the collective of the work unit. In fact, they had a deeper feeling of being a part of their work units in those days than after Deng's economic reform.

DENG: WORK UNITS AS A BASIC UNIT FOR SOCIALIST PRODUCTION

Like Mao, Deng claims to be a revolutionary. But his approach toward revolution is different from that of Mao. As a pragmatist with a sense of elitism, Deng does not see revolution as a matter of mass mobilization and participation. Instead, he stresses that proper institutions are set up, capable people are put in charge of substantive affairs, and mass actions are managed for productive outcomes (Deng 1984). For the work unit, he

does not think it is wise to create a revolutionary focus other than that of its due business. In other words, the best way to incorporate a work unit into the CCP cause is not to revolutionize it through political campaigns but to have it concentrate on its business and production. The logic is clear: if each work unit keeps its compound in good order, has its membership under control, and turns out products or performs tasks efficiently, the overall social stability and prosperity will be guaranteed.

In pursuit of his approach, Deng stages economic reform and introduces a production responsibility system. The main initiatives of his responsibility system include: (1) division of labor to partition work responsibility among groups and individual workers; (2) economic incentives to encourage individual commitment; (3) co-opting technocrats into the party and state system by putting them in charge of professional and production affairs in work units; and (4) separating the party from the administration, with the latter granted a degree of autonomy in running business affairs in work units (Deng 1984). The goal of these measures is to increase work efficiency and raise productivity. In fact, when work units are seen as basic units for socialist construction, the primary concern is whether they are organized effectively to turn out products, deliver services, and handle business matters.

Does Deng's focus on work outcomes enfeeble the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and loosen the party's control over the work unit? This is exactly what Mao worried about. The point is that if people need to be led, is it less effective to be led by technocrats than by their own activists? If mass revolutionary enthusiasm needs to be channeled, is it less productive to be channeled to socialist construction than to class struggle? On the surface, when the masses are made to concentrate on task-related activities, they become less hyperactive in obvious revolutionary actions. But in essence, when people are put in place to make substantial contributions to socialist construction, which in turn helps increase the real strength of the center, the party indeed achieves a better control over the population.

EXTRA STABILITY: ALL GOOD PARTS MAKE AN EVEN BETTER SYSTEM

The central proposition of general systems theory is that the total of a system is greater than the simple sum of its parts (Miller 1978). From an institutional point of view, this means that it takes organizational efforts to coordinate various organic parts and integrate them into a functionable system. According to the philosophy of Chinese leadership, however,

when the coordination mechanism is taken for granted, what seems important is that each individual part be made good, strong, and suitable for integration. In other words, the fundamental proposition of general systems theory is reversed by Chinese leaders as: all good parts are expected to make an even better system.

The logic is natural and understandable to both Mao and Deng. For Mao, a revolutionary state dictates that each cell, unit, or individual be made spiritually conscious of revolutionary needs and demands, and physically committed to revolutionary causes. In other words, if each social unit or member is revolutionized, the entire society will automatically be in the same condition. Mao believed in the power of the masses (Mao 1978). Despite the fact that he stayed on the top, he always stressed the importance of grass-roots groupings for the revolutionary cause. The approach, officially called the mass line, worked well for him. Under his reign, people were made active on every one of his great calls. Work units served as battlefields for his revolutionary programs. The entire society became a wonderland of communist idealism.

Deng's expectation for social prosperity and personal wealth follows the same reasoning. He believes that social prosperity is built upon personal wealth. If each individual, family, and work unit is made self-sufficient, productive, and wealthy, the entire society will automatically become stable, strong, and prosperous. As a pragmatist, Deng recognizes that the road toward wealth is uneven; he concedes that a portion of the population will benefit from his reform first and become rich ahead of the rest (Deng 1984). The concession serves Deng as a double excuse. Theoretically, he clears himself from Mao's concern of social egalitarianism. In practice, he does not have to stage system-wide mobilization campaigns to push each social element into his reform program. In fact, he needs only to grant possibilities. It is up to each social unit to explore the granted possibilities for its own fortunes. It ought to be pointed out, however, that although the idea of a minority accumulating wealth early on may be strategically workable in the beginning, Deng's envisioned social prosperity will not occur until the majority of social units and members become wealthy and maintain some balance among themselves.

By the philosophy of Chinese leadership, then, social order, revolutionary states, productivity, or wealth are all rooted in basic social units. This explains why work units are used as building blocks to achieve designated goals in various social programs under various political orientations.

The Economic Foundation

Economically, the socialist mode of production is based upon people's, or public, ownership. The state is bestowed with the power of allocation over all resources and means of production. Lower levels of government need higher levels for approvals, appropriations, and policy lines in important economic activities. Enterprises, work units, and all other organizations depend upon their respective governing agencies for inputs, throughputs, and outputs regarding tasks and functions. Individuals have to turn to work units for housing, medical care, and survival needs; individuals rely upon them for a legal status of citizenship, an opportunity for employment and career development, and a proof of capacity to support a family. In a university, for example, faculty members need letters of introduction and documentary proof to register with the local police and receive foods, oil, gas, and tickets for groceries and other subsistence items. They also depend upon the university's stimulating environment and academic legitimacy for a proof of intellectuality and a hope of self-realization. The university as a whole depends upon central, provincial, and municipal governments for allocation of monetary and material resources. Without securing appropriate quotas, it would not be able to maintain its scale, develop new programs, and provide proper levels of housing, medical care, books and equipment, and other services for students and faculty. The authority it holds over its various departments and individual employees would be in serious question.

In all, the economic system of resource allocation grants differential stakes to the original and relay authorities over lower relay stations and ultimate recipients. As far as the work unit is concerned, it is first subject

to differential control from central, provincial, and municipal governments in proportion to its dependence upon them for needed resources. The control it holds over unit components is also shaped by the substantive stake it has in their economic life or interest-related matters.

A NEW VERSION OF EXCHANGE THEORY

Although the economic dependence of work units upon the state and of individuals upon work units is an underpinning for substantive social control, it is irrefutable that there is also a sense of exchange between the state and work units and between work units and individuals in terms of commitment and subordination. In commercial terms, economic resources allocated from state authorities constitute a sort of mortgage for work units to be an agent of social control for the state. The all-inclusive support provided by the work unit constitutes a sort of loan guarantee for its employees to obey its imposed discipline and follow its favored order. In other words, by providing tangible welfare support, "the CCP has not only consolidated its 'proletarian dictatorship' but also facilitated its control over deviant social and political behavior" (Dixon 1981:7).

Caution needs to be taken, however, in drawing upon exchange theory. Indeed, the central theme of exchange theory is that human interactions are guided by the exchangeable values the interacting subjects are able to offer each other (Homans 1961; Blau 1964). Its validity lies assumedly in that the two sides in an exchange stand on an equal footing and that the values of the objects they offer for exchange are comparable and convertible. More restrictively, it is assumed that exchanging sides be independent from each other and have their own legally justifiable statuses.

The Chinese case poses a challenge to exchange theory in its original or orthodox form. On the one hand, there is an obvious, sufficient sense of exchange, mainly in the conscious calculations of the two sides involved in social control. The controllers, either the state or work unit leadership, know clearly that an orderly, stable political situation is warranted by the tangible benefits they can offer to their subordinates. They first have to provide a basic level of support that recipients take for granted as necessary. Below the basic level, they are likely to face complaints, resistance, and undermined authority. Above it, they may experience some degree of mass satisfaction, public support, and strengthened leadership. Several respondents in leadership positions indicated that their work units' leverage over employees is too much derived from interest-related matters even though work units literally "own" those people and attempt to inculcate them with "proletarian conscientiousness." Following economic

reform, material incentives seem to be the only effective way to keep people moving in workplaces. Unit members become all too smart about what they want, how to make demands, what to pay back, and how to keep their needs and their controllers' demands in balance through institutional order. A number of interviewees directly said that their relationship with the work unit is one of exchange in the final analysis. People do not like being lectured, monitored, restricted, and controlled. But they live with it, because the work unit is the only place from which they can obtain what is needed to support their family and develop their career.

On the other hand, the relationship of exchange between the state and work units and between work units and their members is not one of a standard pair of partners who are on equal footing and possess clearly value-convertible objects for exchange. The state legally owns work units. Work units are not independent entities. Individual working people are not free laborers for sale in the market. They are assigned to the work units because they as the masters of their country have the right to work, rather than being the possessors of a labor force who have the capacity to create values. The exchange relationship among them is not conventional in terms of their respective statuses. Moreover, a work unit is designed to perform a particular task for the state, which is in turn obligated to provide it with infrastructure, resources, and other services. Individuals are assigned to a work unit where they can display their talents, tap their potentials, and have their working and living needs systematically met. By definition, these relational flows of inputs and outputs are not a matter of exchange but a new pattern of social relationships derived from the socialist revolution. In fact, elements in the relational flows among the state, work units, and unit members are not quantifiable, exchangeable, or even comparable. From individual units and members, what the state and work units need are devotion, loyalty, and commitment. From the state and work units, what individual units and unit members want are caring, nurturing, and concern. Between caring and devotion, nurturing and loyalty, and concern and commitment, there might exist a loose causal relationship. But how much caring, nurturing, or concern could result in a measurable amount of devotion, loyalty, or commitment? It is obviously not a matter of mathematical calculation. The sense of exchange in people's minds represents a displaced mentality when the noble design of socialism becomes operational and is contaminated by reality.

In all, the sense of exchange raised by Chinese unit members in their dealings with work units can be expressed by the exchange perspective. But the application calls for a modification of the exchange theory,

because exchange partners on the Chinese site are not relatively independent and the objects they have for or expect from exchange are not exactly convertible in value. In the following discussion, I examine the main economic resources the state provides for work units and the major benefits work units have for their members. One important point is that resources and benefits justify and legitimize, explicitly or implicitly, various normative values and control practices the benefactors impose upon their beneficiaries.

BETWEEN THE STATE AND WORK UNITS

The essential economic interests exercised by the state over work units, as far as social control is concerned, relate to rank, size, and area of business (see Table 14.1).

First, rank is the political, legal, and economic status the state grants to a work unit. It determines what level of governmental agencies the work unit can reach for direction and supervision, how much power it has over the working people assigned to it, and to what extent a control apparatus can be installed in its managing system. On the one pole, a work unit may be granted no rank. As a result, the unit serves only as a workplace for several people to earn a living, without cross-cutting internal and external connections to hold members in line. The exemplary case is a small workshop or factory under a street office of a municipal government. It is a workplace for local residents. Since the street office and residential committee are readily available, the work unit leaves to them its own political assignments and social control responsibilities. On the other pole, a work unit may be elevated to a rank that is higher than several levels of government; rank can be as high as that of a prefectural, even a provincial government. In this case, work units possess the full power to hear policy lines from the center, design their own governing and control mechanism, and implement commands, orders, and programs on their own. Sometimes its control can go beyond its confines to influence a segment of the general population. As one respondent said of his work unit, a leading media agency, "Whatever information comes to us, or in your terms, whatever form of ideological control befalls us, our charge is to deliver it to all other country fellows."

Second, size is not merely a matter of how many people are assigned to a work unit. It also impacts different positions, titles, and professions; and it forms the basis for calculation of how much is allocated to the unit in terms of wages, resources, or supplies. In relation to social control, size is a key factor because it determines how many people are put under the unit

Table 14.1
The State's Stake in Social Control

State to Work Unit	Unit Variable	Control Variable
Conferment	Rank	Control Authority
Authorization	Size	Control Quantity Control Quality
Designation	Area of Business	Control Target Means of Control

control, how the unit's control system is differentiated, and whether the quality of control is affected by the quantity of those under control. In this regard there are some paradoxes. For instance, larger size brings about more resource allocation from the state, which may result in more effective control a work unit has over its members. Larger size may also create greater management difficulty, which may cause the loosening of control within the confines of a work unit. A number of respondents from large work units concurred that their sizable units receive more attention, monitoring, and auditing from the state. But inside the unit, individuals seem to have much more room to escape from the eyes of their leaders, who are often beleaguered by various other business duties and problems.

Third, work units are established to do business in an area. There are three types of business areas at the most general level. First, production units consist of farms, factories, and other enterprises that consume state-rationed resources to turn out quota products for the state. Second, service units include hotels, department stores, restaurants, and other facilities that provide services or sell merchandise directly to customers. Third, institutional units are governmental agencies; educational, medical, and research organizations; and other establishments that administer governing or professional activities, deliver related outcomes to, or collect feedback from the population. In all business areas, what modes of social control are applied to what kinds of people? In institutional units, ideologies, ethics, party commands, organizational rules, career-related interests, or psychological rewards or penalties are the main instruments in disciplining or controlling employees. In production or service units, in contrast, control is likely to involve the use of physical or material means such as

finances, losses of bonuses, and even some forms of physical suffering such as a short term of custody.

In sum, rank, size, and business area are decided by the upper state authorities for a work unit. This affects almost all aspects of social control applied by a work unit to its employees. Since these three key factors signify the inseparable relationship between the state and work units, they strengthen and affirm the state's control over work units and the work unit's control over a segment of the population on behalf of the state. In fact, in terms of the extent to which the work unit is politically, economically, and socially dependent upon and inseparable from the state, it is fair to say that the state owns the work unit and the work unit is a part of the state machinery. Furthermore, insofar as the work unit administers the state control to its employee population, it can be legitimately called a state agent for social control.

BETWEEN WORK UNITS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES

As the owner relationship of the state to work units extends to working people, it generates two additional owner relationships. That is, individual working people are owned by both the state and their direct work units.

In the interview, concrete benefits working people receive from their work units were explored. Generally, few benefits are directly associated with or specific to a particular work unit. Almost all the benefits reported are state-mandated or state-approved. The variabilities among work units relate only to the scale or amount of benefits delivered. For example, housing is a state-allowed benefit, but not all work units have the same capacity to provide adequate housing for their employees. In general, the basic employee benefits regularized by the state across all work units fall into seven categories: disposable income, material benefits, transportation, medical care, child care and schooling, recreation and vacation, and special assistance and other services (see Table 14.2).

Disposable Income

Disposable income includes regular salary; monthly, seasonal, and yearly bonuses; subsidies; allowances; and other fringe benefits. Salary is determined by the state for different lines of businesses, regions, ranks, and positions, and is delivered from the state treasury through work units to individual working people. There are two main wage systems. One is for workers; the other is for cadres, including officials and professionals. Salary is basically the same for any given category of wage earners across

Table 14.2
The Economic Stake in Social Control

Benefit	Content
Disposable Income	Salary, Bonus, Allowance, Subsidy
Material Benefits	Housing, Foods, Fruits, Coal, Coal-Gas, Other Living Needs
Transportation	Pick-Up, Drop-Off, Bus Pass, Subsidy
Medical Care	Doctor Visit, Medicine, Surgery, Hospital Stay, Vaccine, Special Treatment
Children	Paid Leave for Childbearing, Day Care, Primary, High, & Secondary Schools
Recreation	Recreation Facility, Library, Garden, Sports, Entertainment
Vacation	Paid Vacation and Recuperation
Services	Store, Supply Stand
Special Assistance	Welfare for the Elderly, Sick, & Disabled

the country. Only a few floating increases or decreases are granted by the state for special units and districts. For example, an interview respondent from one of the state's leading universities reported that the State Education Commission awards his unit two levels of salary along the regular wage scale.

Bonuses are state-approved items that may be delivered by the work unit to its employees. In the early stage, the state set a ceiling for the maximum amount of bonuses a unit could distribute among its employees. But as reform progresses, the state gradually leaves its hands off the matter. It is now up to the work unit to decide how much and how frequently it gives its employees in monthly, seasonal, and yearly bonuses. Interview respondents from production and service units reported that bonuses are directly associated with the volume of sales or production and are determined through independent accounting within each subunit. The

base amount of bonuses for cadres in factories is determined by that awarded to workers. Usually, cadres take the average amount of bonuses received by workers across different workshops. In universities, bonuses for faculty are reportedly calculated by such measures as the number of test sheets graded. In research organizations, bonuses are used to compensate for sea explorations and other expeditions. In press units, correspondents are encouraged to write and report by a fixed bonus for each broadcast item or a set of columns accepted for formal publication.

Other disposable income consists of small allowances or subsidies for housing, haircuts, non-staple food, transportation, heating, cooling, and other state-approved items, as well as fringe benefits for people taking special positions or working in hazardous environments. In reality, cash payments delivered to unit members can take several forms. According to the interview, cash deliveries may include compensation for newspaper subscriptions, courses taught, student exercises graded, and research done; or payments for having only one child, a record of full attendance, and milk subscriptions for children. Universities and research institutions can hold a part of research funding as extra benefits or awards for participating members. Production and service units may also deduct benefits from the profit scheduled for the state.

Material Benefits

The main item of material benefit is housing. Depending upon the type and nature of work units, housing for unit employees may be spacious, tight, or nonexistent. The variation is evident from city to city, even within a district in a city. In some situations, no housing is provided for ordinary workers or temporary sleeping beds are shared by workers on nightly shifts. New employees are usually crowded in dormitories or guest houses with two, three, or up to five persons sharing a room. A few seniors, on the other hand, may live comfortably in a three-bedroom or larger apartment. In between, there are studio, one-bedroom, two-bedroom, one room and a half, and other housing arrangements for a married couple, a nuclear family, and even an extended family. Along with economic reform, some work units encourage their employees, through substantial financial support, to buy unit housing or other public housing for owner occupancy (Gao 1993).

Material benefits can also include fruits, vegetables, meats, eggs, coal, coal gas, non-staple foods, and other staples. They are bought from special sources at a low price and distributed among unit employees either free or for a nominal fee. The giveaway spree occurs mostly on holidays.

Transportation

Most work units have their own transportation team. As far as employee welfare is concerned, the team provides such transportation services as picking up employees for work and sending them home; taking patients to the hospital and bringing them home; transporting business travelers to and from the airport, train or bus stations, and the harbor; holiday and weekend shopping transport to and from the city center; and household moving. For those members who ride bikes, take the public bus, or even walk to and from work, a transportation subsidy or monthly pass is provided by the work unit as compensation. Transportation subsidies can be also granted by the government for work units located some distance from the city center; this reduces inconvenience for their employees or enables the unit to develop a better transportation team. For instance, the university where I taught is about 15 kilometers from the city center. Thus, a transportation subsidy (2 Yuan a month in 1989) was added to the unit members' paychecks. The unit also has a good transportation team. When I was there, it had a van for the unit clinic and three buses for transporting employees living outside to and from work and for holiday or weekend shopping. As far as my wife and I can remember, my family benefited from the unit transportation service at least five times: (1) for moving me into the unit, (2) for bringing our newly born child from hospital to home, (3) for bringing home my wife from the hospital, (4) for sending me to the train station when I left for the United States, and (5) for my wife to leave for reunion with me in the United States.

Medical Care

Key features of Chinese medical care include doctor visits, clinic or hospital services, medicine, surgery, hospitalization, immunization for children, and special treatment for job-related accident or sickness, at no or nominal fees for work unit employees. In recent years, attention has been drawn to the waste and inefficiency of such a public medical care system. Various reform measures are being developed and tested across the country (Gao 1993). According to the interview respondents, a number of reform measures are under way in work units. For instance, some work units pay medical expenses for their employees after a 10% deductible across the board, 10-20% depending upon years of service, 20% if outside the work unit's medical facility, and 20% for their children. In other work units, an amount of money is given monthly or yearly to employees to take care of basic medical expenses themselves. The larger medical bill, however, is still left to the work unit. One reported measure is that each

employee is given 10 Yuan a month for routine medical care and allowed a 90% reimbursement for any medical bill over 120 Yuan.

Childbearing Benefits and Day Care or School for Children

Mothers are given paid leave prior to and after childbirth. The officially allowed paid leave ranges from two to three months. But several respondents said they stayed home longer with fully or partially paid salary. For example, one respondent said she was paid the full salary for a ten-month stay with her baby. Another said she received 60% of her salary for more than three years with no influence on her promotion.

In connection with paid childbearing leave, most work units have adequately equipped day care facilities for children. Some unit facilities are staffed with graduates from formal early-education schools, are able to take newborns at the end of the mothers' paid leave, and provide full care for older children from Monday morning through Saturday afternoon. One respondent reported that her work unit's childcare facility is designated as one of the United Nations-assisted preschool education centers in China.

After day care, many unit employees can send their children to their units' primary school, junior or senior high school, and even the unit itself for advanced education. A general pattern is as follows: most medium-sized work units have day care and primary school; large ones have high school, secondary school, vocational training center, television university, and other educational facilities for employees and their children. In universities, childcare, formal education, and training opportunities for employees and their children extend to the level of advanced education.

Vacations and Entertainment

Vacations and entertainment are a part of the state-approved welfare benefit for all working people. It is required that work units have recreational facilities such as reading rooms, libraries, sport fields or tools, amateur performance teams, regular troupes, gardens, and playgrounds. According to my observation and the interview respondents, resting and relaxing amenities are almost universally established across work units. Activities include: amateur art performance, sport contest, chess contest, excursion, and calligraphy exhibition. These are routinely organized for unit members by the union, youth league, women's federation, party propaganda department, or other divisions. They not only facilitate relaxa-

tion but also provide an atmosphere of organizational cohesion and collective solidarity.

Vacations were originally designed for employees who have hazardous duties, make special contributions, or spend a long time in service. Places are in most cases nationally or locally known resorts or tourist destinations. Vacations can last for two weeks or as long as required by special treatment or recuperation programs. All cost is paid by the work unit. Besides, vacationers continue to receive regular paychecks. It ought to be pointed out that vacation leave has expanded in scope over the years. Nowadays, more and more work units send their ordinary members for vacations as they can afford. In the interview, 56% of respondents said they had at least one paid vacation from their work units. I personally remember that my wife and I took a summer vacation for two weeks in a mountain resort built by Germans in the early twentieth century. It was not long after we both entered our work unit.

Special Assistance and Other Services

Other welfare-style services include convenience stores, postal service, supply stands, labor service companies, hot water, dining facilities, and guest houses. They provide services to employees at a non-profit price. Subsidies are in most cases given by the work units to ensure the quality and low price of those services.

Welfare assistance in the form of materials and cash is also delivered through work units to unit members and their families. It comes from the state welfare agencies for those individuals and families who need special help because of fire, accidents, thefts, crime victimization, sickness, child-bearing, old age, handicap, unemployment, and other causes. For widowed, childless senior citizens, there is a publicly known five-protection welfare program. For newly married, low-salaried entering employees, assistance may be arranged upon their direct leaders' proposals. For instance, I personally received such assistance during my first year with the university where I taught. My department head came to my office and asked me whether my new family needed any help. I said I was fine. But the leader gave me 50 Yuan, saying: "We all know you have difficulty in organizing your new family, and the departmental leadership has applied from the state this amount of welfare assistance for you to have a happy Spring Festival."

Chinese work units embrace practically all aspects of their employees' working and living needs. In fact, they are ideologically designed to provide complete, systematic, attentive, and satisfactory care; this creates

a sense among the working people that they are masters of their work units and societies, and shall feel no alienation when they work devotedly for the common cause of their units and state. In an exchange perspective, however, this arrangement is likely to breed, originally and continually, both economic and institutional dependence of individual employees upon their work units. The dependence is likely to predispose unit members to work loyally, live comfortably, and behave docilely under the political, normative, and economic order of their work units. In other words, economic benefits justify unit employees' conscious acceptance of the work unit order. As they see various forms of social control under that order as reasonable, flexible, non-repressive, and giving them room for personal development and possible change, the direct cost of social control is automatically reduced and saved.

The Cultural Underpinnings

Culturally, core values provide explanations for what types of and how much control and order are favored, and even what political institutions and economic practices are sustained in a particular society. In reference to Chinese culture, questions have been raised about how it relates to the emergence of the communist party state, planned economy, and totalitarian control in contemporary China (Pye 1992). For control in particular, various cultural elements seem explicitly or implicitly to legitimate or render direct support to hierarchical and organizational control in Chinese society. In this chapter, I begin with the general nature of contemporary Chinese culture and then focus on three cultural elements as variables for explaining social control practices in Chinese work units.

WHAT IS CHINESE CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA?

It is difficult to present a full picture of contemporary Chinese culture. Obviously, the current Chinese culture is not equal to the official ideology. Nor is it an equivalent of the civil mentality. In scholarly debates, confusion arises when Confucianism is seen as a legitimate representative of Chinese culture, being capable explaining political and economic behavior in the communist era. Recently, some scholars even speculate that Confucianism unites with Islam to undermine the dominant Western civilization (Huntington 1993). However, Confucianism has never been hostile to Western civilization. In fact, one can cite Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other Asian regions or countries as successful examples that have incorporated Western culture into mainstay Confucian

thinking (Deyo 1987; Tai 1989). Ironically, Confucianism is no longer dominant in its homeland, China. The official culture in China is a derivative of Western civilization, that is, communism. It is thus pointless to mystify China with Confucianism and to present China in the name of Confucianism as a threat, like the Islamic League, to the advanced capitalist economies.

There are at least three major components in the present Chinese culture: (1) officially imposed communist ideology, (2) Western thoughts honored and popularized by intellectuals, and (3) civilly transmitted Chinese mentality mixed with Confucianism, Buddhism, and feudalism. The communist ideology was imported from the West, having developed out of a rational critique of Western capitalism (Marx 1967). But by agitating a radical countermeasure to the bourgeois establishment, it becomes an unsuccessful counterculture in the mainstream Western civilization. Ironically, while it is suppressed by the dominant capitalist culture in the West, it is promoted by the same (or at least a similar) force, Western imperialism, for diffusion into Third World countries. China, after its first failed confrontation with the West in 1840, began to turn to the West for answers to salvage its age-old civilization. Through years of painful exploration, reflection, and hesitation, more and more Chinese intellectuals realized that the Chinese tradition had to be revolutionized, giving way to new thoughts, methods, and culture from the West (*Qiushi* 1990). This was the slogan of the well-known May 4th Movement, after which the development of Chinese culture headed in two directions. In one direction, the Kuomintang (KMT) and its later government attempted to unite the country and modernize it with the mainstream Western political, economic, and cultural means and institutions. In the other direction, the CCP learned from Marxist communism, a Western counterculture, and hoped to use it to revolutionize the Chinese people and bring about a universal liberation. In 1949, the prevailing CCP established its government on the Mainland. Communism and its various derivatives have since become an important element of the Chinese culture.

The spiritual inspirations provided by the mainstream Western culture among intellectuals, however, never died out under the communist reign. Even during the years of high revolutionary tide and total isolation from the West, some intellectuals spoke against the country's dominant policy lines and proposed a new alliance with the West (This was evidenced by the story told by one interview respondent about his colleague in a sex scandal handled through administrative discipline). Entering the United Nations and establishing diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States in the early 1970s, China began to open its doors to Western tech-

nology and material achievements in association with technological advance. Intellectuals and youth seized the chance to pursue their interests in mainstream Western arts, philosophy, and culture. Under Deng's reform, Western thoughts and culture have actually become the most popular ideology among well-informed young people and liberal intellectuals.

Of course, the traditional Chinese culture featuring Confucianism, Buddhism, and even feudalism does not yet lose ground on its homeland. Across the general population, if the CCP members, governmental officials, and mass activists are regarded as apostles and disciples of the communist ideology, and youth and intellectuals are considered to be under the influence of Western culture, there are still ordinary peasants, workers, merchants, and other civilians in the constituency of the deeply rooted Chinese culture. This is by far the largest segment of the population. Also, it ought to be pointed out that the other two groups, while being legitimately in the camp of either the communist ideology or mainstream Western culture, are never free from the influence of Chinese culture in its original sense. For instance, Mao claimed to be a communist revolutionary. But it is widely agreed that he read more books about Chinese culture than about communism. He thought and behaved basically as a Chinese. The same is true for all those who claim to be liberal intellectuals and have worked abroad to advance democracy in China. Chinese are always Chinese. Although their thoughts may now contain some totally alien elements, they still think and behave in a manner that signifies the ingrained influence of Chinese blood, habit, and culture.

On the basis of this assumption, it is possible to sort out common cultural elements shared by all Chinese no matter what cultural influences they may experience. I identify three cultural elements and believe that they bear direct causal relations to the modal control practices in Chinese work units.

PEACE AND ORDER

Order and peace are core cultural values highly honored by the Chinese. They are used to judge whether a reign has achieved its moral standard and therefore retains the legitimacy to continue its rule. For the sake of peace and order, it is morally legitimate and worthwhile for individual citizens to bear inconvenience, suffering, and various controls of authority, tradition, and seniority (Confucius 1971).

Order and peace have understandably different meanings within Confucianism, communism, and liberal intellectual thought inspired by Western

ideology. In Confucianism, order represents a hierarchical relationship between the emperor and his court officials, the father and his sons, and the husband and his wife. Peace is ensured by the former's forbearance to the latter and the latter's subordination to the former (Confucius 1971). In communism, absolute peace is not possible until all forms of exploitative relationship are abolished. However, relative peace is attainable in a new social order that features public ownership, social egalitarianism, mass participation, and proletarian dictatorship under the CCP leadership (Chinese Communist Party 1992). Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and other turbulent campaigns. Yet his ultimate goal was "to achieve great order through great chaos on the land under heaven" (*Qiushi* 1990). The great order so obtained, in his vision, warrants a lasting peace that might approach *Utopia*, the absolute peace speculated by the communist theory. Deng began his new program by appealing to "stability and unity" (Deng 1984). Order and control have become his justification for a number of unpopular measures, such as resistance to democratic reform, and even the Tiananmen Square crackdown.

To liberal intellectuals who revere Western freedom and democracy, order and peace constitute a kind of political, economic, and social arrangement that accommodates individual free will for personal innovation, creativity, and development. Since most of them have learned from their own experiences or contemporary history, they no longer believe that such an arrangement can be brought about through disruptive revolutionary measures. Instead, they believe that only institutional reform and reasonable political pressure can lead to a gradual change for social and individual betterment. As such, they, like ordinary Chinese, see order as a reconciliation of personal needs with social constraints. Especially in terms of their own life, they tend to let peace of mind override their ego-driven ambitions. Respect for tradition, seniority, and authority, from this viewpoint, often become indispensable to a self-sufficient and self-satisfying lifestyle.

Despite their different perspectives, peace and order are stressed by all three main philosophical, ideological, and cultural themes that influence modern Chinese mentality. In fact, peace and order are actually a focal point for various modes of Chinese thinking, reasoning, and acting. In recent years, as basic living needs become better served, more and more people tend to favor maintaining the current order (*Qiushi* 1990). This even applies to the cultural employees or intellectual community on university campuses and in research institutions. As pointed out by most respondents in the interview, even though they are inspired with demo-

cratic changes and make complaints and protests, the majority of intellectuals follow the current order and favor a kind of evolutionary progress. When chaotic episodes occur, they can be easily convinced for control and order.

INTERPERSONAL HARMONY

Interpersonal harmony is highly regarded by the Chinese in their collective groupings as another key cultural value. Harmony does not mean a static, non-problematic weak tie among individuals. It refers to a rapport among a group of people through intensive, reciprocal interactions. In this interpersonal rapport, it is required that all concerning participants understand their roles, assume those roles appropriately, and pay special attention to mutual cooperation with each other.

Confucianism is known for its doctrine of the mean, which advises people to yield, compromise, and give up their rights for harmony among each other (Confucius 1971). The communist revolution is customarily seen to be a damaging factor for interpersonal harmony. But in its advocacy of mass participation and group activity it increases the level of interpersonal interaction, which in turn makes harmony an ever more salient concern. Western-minded intellectuals often criticize the doctrine of the mean for suppressing free will and obstructing personal creativity. But when coming back to their community, nobody other than a few idealists dares to disregard interpersonal harmony.

In the setting of Chinese work units, intensive interpersonal interaction is a basic feature. Because of their primary concern for a positive "face" among colleagues and neighbors, unit members have to show interest in each other's work, life, and daily chores and thus be able to deliver concern, support, or gossip when necessary. This interactional pattern, on the one hand, leads directly to frequent and intense human contacts, which in turn leads to increased interpersonal conflicts. Interestingly, it is not easy to avoid conflicts by simple withdrawal. Instead, the parties involved have to resort to careful and patient future interactions and communication to resolve past conflicts. In other words, conflicts and interactions are reciprocally reinforced when interpersonal harmony is highlighted as a primary individual concern. On the other hand, the interactional pattern among unit members results in the formation of an informal network that subjects individual members to mutual surveillance and offers no escape. Even more significant, the informal network provides fertile soil for residential control and is an environmental underpinning for unit leaders to probe into their subordinates' private affairs.

As informed by the interview, most work units have concentrated residential areas where their members live together. In the residential area, unit members use the same free market, grain shop, grocery store, postal office, mess hall, and other services. They even observe the same daily routines, such as going to the free market in the early morning and taking a walk around the living compound in the evening. Leaders live among unit members. They feel free to ask their subordinates questions on personal issues in an aggressive manner. As several respondents pointed out, involving parties' concern for interpersonal harmony can make interaction an endless process. Problems in daily routines, which would vanish if left alone, often take a long series of back-and-forth interactions because nobody wants to hurt his or her "face" as well as his or her counterpart's.

In short, harmony and interaction reinforce each other, making the individuals involved susceptible to mutual and top-down surveillance and control.

MORALISM

Moralism is the third key cultural element with which the Chinese are deeply concerned. It therefore has an extraordinary impact on Chinese social life. In essence, moralism consists of a set of moral values that dictate people's fundamental attitude toward and daily dealings with the world. Concretely, it is a mental tendency or process to moralize all beings or acts, simplify their interconnections by a seemingly sound chain of causality, and spell out what and how to think and act toward them. For instance, the Buddhist concept of *karma* is widely respected among the Chinese. It speculates that if a person obtains what does not belong to him, he will lose it someday in some form. If he obtains it forcibly at the expense of others, he will be duly punished by a universal justice.

Like the regard for peace, order, and interpersonal harmony, moralism is a shared cultural feature among all Chinese who may otherwise claim to reflect different aspects of Chinese culture. Confucians believe in moral redemption through self-examination. Communists, especially Mao, appeal to norms to regulate society and maintain a faith in the capacity of exemplary revolutionary virtue to educate deviants and criminals (Cohen 1968). For ordinary Chinese, good and bad, right and wrong represent a fundamental contrast among things and persons in social life. Children are taught what is good, bad, right, or wrong in their mother's embrace and learn to frame the world accordingly. Through schools and in work units, a similar moral theme is repeatedly intensified by a series of oral advice

and factual events. For instance, during the years of class struggle, the pet phrase from teachers and leaders was always the same: "You must distinguish true from false, right from wrong, and friends from enemies."

In the interview, a number of respondents pointed out that they are made cognizant of their tendency to characterize the world by a simple moral contrast of good and bad when interacting with people of different ethnic and national backgrounds in the United States. It is seemingly true that the strong moralism of right and wrong reflected in the Chinese worldview is a cultural landmark that distinguishes the Chinese from those of other cultures. However, the best place to test the cultural characteristic of Chinese moralism is in China. As I personally observed, creeping into a crowd of movie-viewers just leaving a Chinese cinema would afford an observer a simple quasi-experimental condition for testing: Chinese movie-viewers focus most of their post-movie talks on identifying good and bad figures in the feature film and often become frustrated if the story is ambiguous.

The tendency to moralize social life and dramatize complex situations into right-wrong confrontations has multiple implications for the Chinese. As far as social control is concerned, it helps to justify the authority, tradition, and dominant order, because they are often seen as a base or last resort by which to judge what is right and wrong. It also helps to sort out deviant individuals from the contexts and perpetuate their error with hard-to-clear stigmas. Finally, it negates wrongdoers in their entirety and aids the dominant control agency in fighting against them. As reported by interview respondents who arrived recently in the United States, the CCP political-thought work after the 1989 Tiananmen Square event attempted to convince the population about the necessity of crackdown through a right-wrong perspective. In work units, since some unit members were morally sided with the students during the demonstration, unit authorities had to re-direct the moral focus from political democracy versus resistance to reform, to order versus unrest. Through various study sessions, the moral focus was re-oriented to the right to keep order and the wrong to engage in unrest. Student demonstration was then gradually negated, along with its plea for democratic change. Obviously, the right-wrong mentality in Chinese moralism gives the authority an easy hand to manipulate the masses and mobilize control.

Chinese culture and communist political economy (1) explain why and how control setups and practices are instituted and operated in Chinese work units, and (2) constitute a general foundation for the organization of power, work, life, social control, and social order in contemporary China.

Part IV

THE CONTROLLEES' REACTION TOWARD SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORK UNITS

The study of social control faces two major issues. The first involves who is the controller, what forms of control are put into action, and how. The second involves who is controlled, what aspects of their life are directly influenced, and how they react toward the practice of control. In this book, I have so far described and analyzed the Chinese work unit, the controller, and its various forms of social control in relation to political, economic, and cultural foundations. It is now time to consider how unit members, the controllees, react to and think of their work unit and the different control practices within its confines.

Reactions from controllees are theoretically variable. There can be public or collective protest, denunciation, and resistance on the one extreme; submission, obedience, and ingratiation on the other. In between, there may be passive resistance, intentional negligence, quiet disregard, complaint, apathetic order-taking, ritualistic duty-performing, drifting with the tide, or following the mainstream blindly.

In the setting of Chinese work units, reactions of unit members as controllees toward their unit and its control practices are not clear-cut. According to the communist ideology, unit members are the masters of their work unit. The various forms of social control in place are largely civilized, non-confrontational, and based on the rational requirements of work. As such, the unit members' sense of being controlled is often faint or totally unrecognized. Yet unit members are confined to their unit and have to abide by a multitude

Resistance and Specific Reactions to Different Forms of Social Control in Chinese Work Units

Resistance is inherently associated with control or any requirement to obey an authority. In Chinese society, despite the Confucian tradition of submission and the communist ideology of collectivism, resistance from the populace to the power hierarchy and its social control practices occurs both locally and across the country. In this chapter, I attempt to identify general causes and modes of Chinese resistance to the communist power system, and then I examine specific reactions to various forms of social control within Chinese work units.

CAUSES OF RESISTANCE

Why do people choose resistance as a form of reaction to a particular rule, order, or control practice? In terms of resistance, people may misunderstand a situation, be incapable of following requirements, fail to adjust to social change, or just overreact. In terms of control, some system factors and their unusual presence may be blamed for individual non-compliance and resistance. In this section, I explore several general system and control variables that are likely to serve as the major causes for Chinese resistance to social control.

Too Widespread: The Overall Social Control System

In a society assumed to be well differentiated in terms of division of labor and rationalization, there is a relatively clear distinction between public sphere and private space. Individuals know what rights and obliga-

tions they have, under what circumstances, and to what extent. The state is well structured to make rules and keep order. Family, friendship, partnership, peer group, interest club, employment organization, professional association, and community are all formed on a voluntary basis to provide individuals with interactions, togetherness, and a sense of belonging. The entire society is run with limited downward control from the state to individuals and minimal mutual constraint among citizens.

In China, over its long feudal history, the central government symbolized by the emperor remained generally remote to ordinary citizens. The unregulated space from the state, however, was not left to individual discretion. Confucianism applied the relationship between court officials and the emperor to civilian societies and demanded that wife be subject to husband, son be subject to father, and all be subject to the Heaven (Liang 1987). Males, seniors, family, kinship, and local networks were given the privileges to assume an unquestionable authority between the state and people. Individual rights and interests were forfeited for the solidarity and welfare of kinships and local collectives as well as the favored social order of the emperor. Control was spread to all areas of individual life. It suppressed individual initiatives yet remained a source of resistance and rebellion. For instance, peasant uprisings and changes of dynasties illustrated that the feudal system was not able to accommodate progressive elements in a positive way and therefore, had to be destroyed so that an inevitable change could take place.

The communist government has altered all ground rules of social organization and order. It displays great ambition in developing a new network of social control. Although the influence of family is limited and the kinship is denied, mediating social organizations (e.g., villagers' committees, residential committees, work units, workers' unions, youth associations, women's organizations, and other social groupings) are widely established and utilized on an unprecedented scale. The party and state also reach out to individual citizens, mobilize them, and rally them under one flag. Individuals are thus not only made closely attached to their work units or community, but also incorporated generally into the state system. Downward control is strong and omnipresent. Mutual surveillance and constraint are significant and widespread. The main aspects of individual life and work are all exposed to neighbors, colleagues, and leaders, as well as intervention from work units, residential organizations, and the state.

It is apparent that such widespread control constrains individual initiatives and may even cultivate passive compliance. In fact, the omnipresence of control itself serves as a deterrence to manifest opposi-

tion. When it occurs, any open resistance can be easily targeted and contained by the overreaching control system.

However, resistance can develop and build when control is too widespread. Before they break out destructively, the sentiment of opposition and the force of resistance may "leak out" in various forms. Passive compliance itself is a latent form of resistance. People may follow rituals but may not put any enthusiasm and creativity into the process of work and life. This underlies the low productivity of Chinese enterprises and work units. Bargaining and friction occur too often among functional divisions of Chinese work units and between Chinese leaders and their subordinates. The phenomenon is another form of resistance targeted at the excessive presence of one force within another, a symptom of mutual penetration, supervision, and control. There are many other forms of resistance as well. But most important, widespread control practices and an overreaching control system may lead to a total breakdown or its overthrow by a revolutionary force. This was demonstrated by the frequent changes of feudal dynasties in Chinese history. For now, the communist state seems to retreat from some over-controlled areas, leaving the Chinese people with space for their economic initiatives at least if not yet political freedom. The government may have not to change in the new era.

Too Tight a Particular Control

Resistance may occur if a particular control is set too tight. In China the control system involves the state, work units, community, and other available forces; thus, not only is every possible area of individual life and work put under control, but control of a particular area or activity can be also made intensive and tight. Two dimensions are involved in the tightening of control: time and space. In terms of time, a control can intensify during a short interval or over a long period. For instance, ideological control is always put in high gear when the communist party conducts major congresses or makes important policy changes. Spatially, a control may be directed to a particular place or made applicable all over the country. For example, residential control is enforced in all cities and townships, whereas dossier and administrative controls are exercised within organizations and bureaucracies.

In the midst of an overall widespread control of all areas of life and work, a number of controls generate direct individual concern on the part of Chinese people. For example, the general residential control breaks down into specific controls of marriage, childbirth, day care and school

for children, transfer of family members for reunion, domestic movement, overseas travel, material supply, and other living needs. Under the state family planning program, control of marriage certificates and childbirth permits is particularly tight. It obviously causes complaints and resistance from the populace, especially from young people, newlywed couples, and old-fashioned parents who want to embrace their grandchildren early. In the area of work, elements such as study, training, promotion, transfer, entry to the party, political appointment, awards, honors, and other interests are tightly controlled by the work unit system and leaders. Competition is keen. Candidacy is selective. When people fail to obtain what they expect, they usually blame the system or their leaders for exerting too much control over those valuable items. Opposition and resistance thus develop toward leaders and other control agents.

Expressions of resistance to a particular control can be direct and specific. Dislike of political study usually leads to absenteeism. Resistance to birth control results in early marriage or violation of the one-child-only rule. Dissatisfaction over the allocation of work-related opportunities may cause implicit or hidden forms of resistance. For instance, officials who fail to obtain an expected promotion may become sick and ask for an indefinite stay in a resort or convalescent hospital. Ordinary employees who are denied training or travel opportunities may become unenthusiastic about their jobs and intentionally withdraw from certain collective activities for which volunteers are needed. Too tight control may even invite collective actions. For example, body searches after shifts may cause widespread complaints and opposition in a factory. A group of outspoken employees can act together at the gate to resist body searches by guards or walk to the head office and demand an immediate halt to the practice.

Unreasonable Control

When control is widespread, it is likely that some controls are seen as unreasonable and remain a source for complaint, opposition, and resistance. In the setting of Chinese work units, there are at least two possibilities for a control to become unreasonable in the eyes of controllees. First, top-down or external intervention or control may be considered unnecessary and objectionable. Second, in cases where control of an entire area has been a custom, control of a particular matter may still be seen as questionable and unwarranted. For instance, more and more young Chinese are not happy that their private life (including dating, making friends, getting married, starting a family, having a baby, and raising

children) is still subject to the control of both their parents and the government. They hope to keep all external control out of their personal space. In the workplace, although it is generally agreed that attendance is regulated, most work unit members do not like their units and leaders to be too meticulous about reporting to and leaving from work. This is especially true for intellectuals and officials. They maintain that the focus of control should be on the task to be completed. Control of their schedule may distract their attention and affect their concentration on work during the time when their creativity can be most effectively tapped. In other words, keeping time for employees is likely to generate dissatisfaction and opposition in universities, research institutes, and governmental agencies.

An unreasonable control may also lead to reactions and resistance on a collective basis. In the four work units I served, attempts were occasionally made to formulate and implement universal rules on work attendance to create the image of a well-organized institution synchronized at the same pace. But all attempts were rejected either in the stage of public debates or during initial implementation, due to overwhelming public opposition. As control is collectively felt as unreasonable, individual reactions to it can be blunt and straightforward. Some may resist it, without any fear of punishment. Others may just ignore it and do what they usually do. The situation also makes leaders feel that they do not have the necessary ground and strength to justify the control, so they give up fighting back against the opposition.

Unfairly Enforced Control

The Chinese people feel strongly that rules be equally and fairly enforced. To some degree, the Chinese care less about (1) being subject to control along with others than about (2) whether someone is given special immunity from a rule. In a work unit, it is common to hear people complaining that somebody is getting away from a rule or regulation. After all, we can all accept something on the same basis but cannot see how it makes a difference for one person who is just like us. Public dissatisfaction over favoritism and corruption has grown into an epidemic across China. It stems primarily from the fact that people are not tolerant of the exceptions made for a few who use their influence, network, money, and other valuables to gain unwarranted access to resources and opportunities, bypass laws or rules, and avoid punishments. In other words, unfair enforcement of rules or controls along with unequal distribution of resources and opportunities breeds disenchantment, resentment, resistance, and rebellion.

There are four possible ways that control can be unequally and unfairly enforced. First, exemptions are made for some areas or individuals under the jurisdiction of a rule or regulation. The exemptions make people think that the rule is discriminatory and that resistance to it is somehow justifiable. In the four work units I served, unit members are all required to attend political study on Thursday or Saturday afternoon. But members who are involved in important research projects or called to some functions by the upper authority can be legitimately absent. The exception often causes complaints from those who have no good reason to get away and have to attend political studies routinely.

Second, leaders and other control enforcers are not always consistent in upholding a rule. Consciously or unconsciously, they may relax a rule for those who are close to them and have their trust. For example, access to dossiers is subject to a complicated procedure. But in practice, the procedure may be ignored and related rules may be intentionally violated. Dossier staff may grant illegitimate access to dossier documents to their close friends and those whom they trust. They may bow to the power of leaders on a higher rank and let them read some individual dossiers, even though such access is not warranted. They may also let some people open and read their own dossiers if they believe those people have non-controversial records and are not likely to overreact to their dossiers. In all these situations, the majority feel that they are discriminated against in not being able to learn about their "other" identities created by the authority. A public interest may be spurred to speculate on the mysterious nature of dossier records. Questions may be raised as to whether it is unfair to keep people in the dark about their dossier identities. Suspicion, fear, and opposition may build up among the employees toward the dossier-writing and -keeping practice as a whole.

Third, punishments are not always consistent. Handling of rule-breaking incidents is too often affected by political climate, social atmosphere, and situational dynamics. There is no clear prescription of penalties in the book. Nor does much comparability of punishment exist among similar cases over time and across space. For instance, a prior incident in one department of cursing a leader may be harshly denounced in a public meeting and the offender given a demerit record in his or her dossier. But a recent fight against a superior in another division may be tolerated by the divisional leadership. The offender may be reprimanded and bear no serious consequence for his or her action. The variability and inconsistency certainly make people feel that a rule or the general control is not equally enforced. The sense of unfairness prompts people to boycott the rule or resist the general control as a whole.

Fourth, rule-breaking behavior among leaders and other special figures is often kept secret from the public and protected from punishments by the control authority. There is always such suspicion in the general public. Once a particular incident is uncovered, it touches off public fury. For instance, it is not uncommon to hear employees talking about unit leaders and their possible misconduct and corruption. When hard evidence is leaked or released from the unit authority, unit members may become emotionally charged. Reflecting on their own obedient work and life routines, most people begin to experience a sense of injustice and alienation. Such individual feelings may not only turn directly into passive or active resistance but also justify a general sentiment of distrust, dissatisfaction, hostility, and opposition toward the authority.

In all, there are many reasons for individual and collective resistance. Generally, an overreaching control system and a pattern of partial or biased enforcement can cause negative reactions. Specific controls, when they are seen as unreasonable, excessive, and unnecessarily restrictive, may also cause resistance by the controllees.

MODES OF RESISTANCE

The form of resistance is determined by both the nature of resistance and the characteristics of all sides in a confrontation. Relevant factors may include when and where resistance occurs, how it begins and proceeds, who is engaged, in what sequence and manner, and the consequence for both participants and their shared environment and interest. In Chinese work units, seven modes of resistance are common in individual or collective reactions to the practices of social control.

Silence

Silence, as a form of resistance, is likely to be mistaken as a quiet acceptance of or a passive submission to control. Silent resistance is obviously not easy to identify and confirm. But in specific situations, when expectations are clear, people can figure out what is meant by silence. In unit meetings, for instance, it is common for leaders to ask participants to voice their opinions on particular matters. One respondent from a research unit related a typical episode: "In our last year's summing-up meeting, our department leader proposed one of our colleagues be named the model employee and asked for our reactions. He pressed the audience three times but did not get any reaction. We all remained silent.

As a result, he had to drop his proposal and turned to other matters on the agenda."

Silence can serve the purpose of resistance for those who are subordinates in a power relationship. Silence is non-provocative; it does not involve open confrontation. But it can transmit the idea of refusal and resistance in a clear and persistent way. Because of this, silence also has the potential to embarrass its receiving party and therefore cause angry reactions.

Avoidance

Avoidance is another form of non-confrontational resistance. But unlike silence, avoidance involves a chain of dynamic actions. Controllees do not just sit there in silent inaction. They run away from the scene of control, with or without an excuse.

Avoidance occurs most frequently in mass meetings and political study. A direct form involves making excuses and not showing up. For example, unit members may say they do not feel well or have to take care of a child or sick person, go for important work-related business, or rush a project for the work unit. An indirect form involves being physically present but mentally absent. It is common to observe in public meetings that unit members concentrate on novels, magazines, newspapers, weaving materials, or other handwork while they pretend to carefully listen to their leaders on the stage.

Avoidance may also take place in a complicated way in the area of substantive interests. In financial management, the state has a system of rules and guidelines for work units. Some expenses are not allowed. In order to reimburse work-related expenses and increase personal gains, both unit leaders and ordinary members may choose to avoid one set of rules in a law-abiding manner. For instance, in the early 1980s the state imposed a mandatory ceiling for cash bonuses a work unit was allowed to distribute to its employees. To follow this rule but not lose a penny of practical interest, many work units chose to give extra bonuses to their members in the form of materials or housing improvements. Currently, all governmental agencies are prohibited from purchasing imported luxury cars. To publicly observe this injunction but still keep the privilege of riding in luxury cars, many governmental agencies choose to relax the control of automobile purchases by enterprises under their supervision. It is now common to see governmental officials riding in imported luxury cars loaned from their subordinate work units.

Avoidance as a form of resistance can be costly to the controller because it reduces or negates the effect of control. For the controlled, as open confrontation is avoided in the process of resistance, controllees can still keep a facade of non-violation or non-resistance in protecting their unjustified interests and realizing their goals prohibited by the control authority.

Complaining

Complaining involves voicing resentment toward a rule or criticizing a control practice publicly among people concerned. Complainants face their target directly. They may bring their complaints to the authority. But mostly, they tend to just make their grievances and objections heard by their neighbors, co-workers, and people in similar situations. In this way, complainants do not worry about confronting and possibly annoying any leaders. In fact, as the awareness of a problem is raised among a considerable number of people and complaints against it become well known, it is likely that leaders look into the matter and take necessary actions.

Informal complaints are common among Chinese work unit members. In offices, residential compounds, and dining halls, it is not strange to see a couple of members hanging around together to comment on and complain against a particular leader or the general practice of the work unit. When an outsider comes in, they either stop their "hard" critiques entirely or shift to some "soft" talk. The ritual serves to justify a public mentality of suspicion and non-compliance. Complainants are sometimes regarded by their fellows as a source of innovative ideas and a symbol of justified resistance. For the unit management, informal complaining may function as a safety valve to release potentially destructive tension and keep people in line in the long run. But its effect of reducing the original strength of a control practice in the work unit cannot be underestimated.

Innovation

Innovation is one of the four deviant adaptations in anomie theory. According to Merton (1938), when there is a disjuncture between culturally inspired goals and socially approved means, people may apply or innovate illegitimate means to achieve their goals. In Chinese work units, innovation occurs as a form of resistance to various rules and controls.

There are three ways in which innovation is applied to resist control practices. One way is to innovate contrasting initiatives to undo or replace a control measure. As the innovator has to take a great risk, such

resistance occurs mostly between a supervising agency and one of its work units or between a work unit and one of its rebellious divisions. In the work unit where I taught, the central administration always emphasizes academic performance and political correctness as the primary guide for all different departments. Some departments, especially those specialized in planning and design, choose instead to build their strength through commercial services. As money is made and benefits are distributed to their members, leaders of those departments feel they are on a solid ground to stand with their innovative resistance to the central administration's demand for academic and political compliance.

The second way is to resort to other means or channels to achieve similar goals. For instance, to break residential control and reunite with family members in cities, unit members may turn to other sources outside their work units. One respondent said he sought help from his relative in the provincial government and had his son transferred to another work unit in the provincial capital. He was relieved that he did not plead his work unit and go through the slow procedure of transfer under the normal situation. He felt that he had successfully resisted the residential control by making a detour around it.

The third way is to get rid of the obstacles erected by a practice or to minimize the effect of a control. The innovative means used may include bribes, flattery, offer of services, and other lures to control agents. Once a pass or shortcut is found, innovators can quickly get through the system. As they reach their destinations, they feel they have won a battle of resistance without a fight. For example, when unit members need personal records from their dossiers for external applications, they usually plead dossier staff with a small gift or service. In this way, they can easily get a copy of their original documents without causing attention from their leaders.

Work Slow-Down

Work slow-down as a form of resistance occurs on both individual and collective levels. Individually, a unit member may not come to work, fail to meet a deadline, or fall below the average level of productivity. Reasons for work slow-down are mostly due to personal failures in promotion, salary increase, and competition for reward; denial of a request; disapproval of a motion; or negative decision upon an application. Young unit members who are denied professional training are likely to play on the job. Senior employees who fail to obtain expected promotions or wage raises obviously cannot keep up an unabated enthusiasm for their work.

Unit members who live separately from their loved ones for years have no interest in being devoted employees of their work units.

Individual work slow-down can be easily identified and targeted by the authority. Persons involved are likely to be reprimanded and punished. Once it is known that work slow-down comes individually as a reaction to a particular control practice, controllers may voluntarily make corrections to reduce or eliminate resistance from their controllees.

Collective work slow-down poses a great challenge to the work unit authority. Economically, it may cause systematic damages or losses. In terms of investigation, it takes time to uncover a collective slow-down and positively identify it as a form of collective resistance to a particular control or any general system problem. It is also difficult to charge perpetrators and hold them responsible. As a result, the unit authority often has to simply back off from a demand or change a general practice.

It is interesting to note that work slow-down may occur not only as a form of resistance to but also as a direct result of a control practice. For example, when a control or system-wide activity contributes to the overall poor performance in a work unit, resistance can build up to limit or eliminate such control or activity. Political campaigns take attention from unit leaders. Ideological control distracts the unit population from substantive business. As work is slowed down, criticism of and resistance to those control-related activities can arise from both management and employees. In my own experience, I always found it difficult to keep my class schedule when the university was engaged in an intensive study of official documents or a mass campaign. Citing the importance of learning, I sometimes spoke out to challenge the legitimacy of those academically irrelevant activities.

Work slow-down is obviously a type of sabotage. It causes damage and obstructs goal attainment. A similar form of resistance involves destroying the equipment of a work unit. This occasionally occurs in production units but not to a significant degree because of potential criminal charges.

Confrontation

Confrontation features open conflict and direct argument or fighting between leaders and unit members. It happens mostly to field officers or first-line supervisors who are in face-to-face contact with ordinary employees and have to make decisions in the public eye. Also, lower-rank leaders have only limited authority. Defiant employees do not have to

worry about possible loss of significant interests because of an open confrontation with them.

Confrontation breaks out mostly over attendance, work styles, job performance, and work requirements. Leaders' judgments regarding employee disputes, evaluations, rewards, and promotions may also trigger confrontation. In production units, young workers, especially those who get their jobs through relations with the upper leaders within and outside the work unit, pose a serious challenge to the first-line supervisors. They may come late to work, play the radio or talk to others on job, ignore specific requirements, violate basic rules, and fail to meet assigned work quotas. But they do not back off a bit and want even more when it comes to evaluations and distributions of honors and benefits on the basis of performance. They generally pay no attention to their supervisors' intervention, except sometimes to react to it with open defiance and confrontation. In a few cases, they may even attack their direct leaders with threats and fists.

The way in which confrontation occurs differs in terms of person, event, place, and time. Between production workers and their supervisors, forces and tools may be used, resulting in physical injuries and property damage. In academic settings and bureaucracies, confrontation in most cases is an exchange of arguments, accusations, or personal smears. For instance, an employee may run to a leader's office and demand an explanation for something he feels unfairly disposed of by that leader. If the leader does not budge, the situation is likely to escalate into a confrontation. Sometimes, an employee's open justification of his or her position may be considered as confrontational to leaders' criticism and demands. In the university where I taught, all new faculty are required to give a test lecture before they are formally assigned to teach a course. In my test lecture, I spent a great deal of time talking about non-Marxist schools of philosophy. This shift of focus caused strong criticism from the section head. As a new member waiting for approval and acceptance, I was supposed to listen to his comments and pledge to make all necessary corrections. However, I did not follow the ground rule. I fought back and refuted his criticism point by point. He looked embarrassed. All colleagues present sensed a strong smell of fire.

The consequence of confrontation varies. It may invite intervention from the upper authority. It may also lead to settlement of the dispute. But the occurrence of confrontation itself causes damage to both parties. The defiant unit members may leave an unpleasant impression on the unit public and leadership because of their non-compliance, poor performance,

and open defiance. The leaders may become known as lacking leadership skills and therefore have less authority over their subordinates.

Exit

Exit is a departure, withdrawal, or escape from the work unit and its control practice. It is a form of resistance in the sense that the exiting unit member terminates his or her service and subordination to the work unit and makes unit leaders feel their authority is limited and can be evaded. Exit may signal an especially strong form of resistance because Chinese leaders consider it a glory when people come under their umbrella and consider it a loss of face when their subordinates run away from them.

Reasons for exit can differ. One obvious reason is open confrontations with leaders. When defiant members feel a confrontation has caused irreparable damage to their reputation and relationship with the work unit, they are likely to opt for exit. Lower-rank leaders in a confrontation may also choose to exit if they feel they are not supported by the upper unit leadership and people concerned. The most common reason for exit, however, is the gradually accumulated dissatisfaction and resentment with unit leaders and the work unit as a whole. The triggering event may be a failure in promotion, competition, or evaluation. The university where I taught was a new unit when I was there. Through my conversations, I learned that many of my colleagues had moved out of their previous work units with a sense of disenchantment and opposition. Some complained they could not obtain decent housing after years of service with their past work units. Others were unhappy with their past units for lack of upward mobility. Some had even "broken face" with their former leaders. In our university, most of these people were given the housing and promotions they expected. As a result, they felt they had vented their spleen and successfully resisted their past.

It ought to be pointed out that exit is not an easy option available to all. Under the Chinese system, it is difficult to run away from one work unit and move into another. First, it takes serious efforts and delicate human relations skills to find a receiving work unit. Second, formalities of transfer have to be properly handled. If approvals from the past work unit are officially required but the person does not want to alarm past foes, he or she has to work out a shortcut or detour toward the final goal. Third, transfer is costly and time-consuming. An exiting person has to be patient and prepared to pay for it. Finally, the person has to cope with all resultant psychological side-effects. He or she obviously has to make adjustments to the new work unit. He or she may also have to face

suspicion from new colleagues while still receiving gossip about past foes and folks.

SPECIFIC REACTIONS TO DIFFERENT FORMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Silence, avoidance, complaining, innovation, work slow-down, confrontation, and exit, as major modes of resistance, signify all possible reactions to the general system and overall social control of Chinese work units. Reactions to each particular form of social control are usually specific and complicated. It is not always clear whether one mode of resistance dominates a situation or joins other modes to form a concerted reaction.

Control through Ideology

All the main modes of resistance except exit are possible toward ideological control. For most people, ideological propaganda is like a puff of wind passing the ear. They take official brochures and put them on shelves. They sit in public meetings and look as if they listen to the messages. But in fact, they may just let the message go in one ear and out the other. This reaction appears to be a silence. It may also be an avoidance, if people who are in the midst of ideological rhetoric do virtually think something else. This is especially true when people in a mass conference chat privately with each other, do handwork, and read novels or magazines. Sometimes, people may even take advantage of political study and ideological campaigns as an excuse for work slow-down and poor performance.

Complaints are vented when unit leaders put excessive emphasis on political study. Justifications are made mostly on the basis of the importance of work. Depending upon the overall climate, complainants have to be careful and make sure their criticism is voiced in a politically correct manner. For instance, they are not supposed to criticize the content of ideological control, such as official documents and policies. They can only challenge the format, frequency, time, and other technicalities of political studies.

Innovation is an interesting form of reaction to ideological control. It usually involves a type of conspiracy between unit members and lower-rank leaders. For instance, a department leader may ask each section to conduct its own political study. Meetings at the section level may then turn into an occasion of chatting, gossiping, and complaining. When the

section head and individual members are asked how their meeting is conducted, they just say it runs well with the expected effect.

Confrontation is possible but rare. It seldom occurs between leaders and unit members because ideological activities are good reasons for people to get away from the normal requirements of work. But among departments and leaders of different functions and ranks, conflict of interests may develop into a confrontation. For example, between party and administration, a party secretary can easily become angry when he or she confronts a strong administrative counterpart who is not so interested in ideological issues.

Control through Residency

Reactions to residential control depend upon areas involved. First, due to the restriction on movement and household registration, unit members who are separate from their spouses and children have to go through a complicated procedure to transfer their loved ones to their work unit or another unit closeby. Silence and avoidance obviously do not help to accomplish this tremendous job. Complaint may generate positive pressure on unit leaders and, therefore, facilitate the process. But it may also annoy leaders and make it more difficult to go about all necessary formalities. Innovation works for a few lucky and smart people who have strong relations with important officials and know how to use those relations to realize their goals. But for those who have to place their hope on the system and wait in line year after year for their family reunion, it is no surprise that they have low morale, work slowly, and even run into confrontation with the establishment. Exit remains the last option. A few disappointed unit members may be able to turn to other work units for help. They leave their old unit and have their family reunited in a new unit. It is obvious, however, that exit from a work unit is not an exit from the system of residential control. There is actually no escape from the system. Ironically, all forms of resistance to residential control in family movement and household registration are centered on an essential compliance with it.

Second, regarding housing and its assignment, complaints are commonplace in almost all Chinese work units. Because of limited supply, people tend to try everything to obtain housing. Corruption becomes epidemic in housing assignments. It causes more complaints and may even lead to confrontation between unit leaders and members when obvious discrepancy and unfairness are made known to the public. Poor housing and biased practices in housing distribution can be an easy excuse for

work slow-down. There are also cases where people move out of their work unit due to inadequate housing. In the university where I taught, one colleague came from a top university where he had a promising career. I asked why he had made such a downward move. He simply said he could not cram his four-member family in an old one-room cottage for one more day.

Third, for those rules and activities promoted by the residential committee, individual households can choose to lock their doors to ignore or avoid. For instance, residents who have animals at home may keep their doors closed and pretend they do not know any rule against raising animals in the residential compound. Residents who do not want to be on duty to guard their building or participate in cleaning their compound may intentionally leave home early or come home late and pretend they are preoccupied with their work. Complaining is also a way to resist rules enforced or activities initiated by the residential committee. If no party backs off, a simple complaint may escalate into a confrontation, which in turn may draw attention from the upper authority and somehow affect the job performance of those persons involved and the regular business of the work unit. An elderly respondent reported:

The residential committee checks residents' homes regularly, sometimes by themselves, sometimes with police officers and other officials. One evening, the committee chair accompanied a city policeman to check household registrations. In the building we lived, our next-door Chen family was preparing a getting-together dinner. When the residential chair and police officer knocked his door, Chen came out in anger and complained that they disturbed his getting-together dinner. The residential chair did not apologize and just said it is their duty to do the job. She and the accompanying policeman demanded Chen hand out his household booklet for a check. Chen searched around inside the house and could not find it. He came out to the door and wanted to send them away. The residential chair and police officer did not budge, however. The situation then developed into an argument. Chen's division leader lived on the upper floor. He came down and lectured Chen to comply. Chen felt a loss of face and did not go to work for two days.

Finally, it is rare that disgruntled households exit a residential compound in protest against their residential committee.

The last element in residential control is family. This layer of control is applied to individual household members from within the family and, therefore, remains totally different from control exerted upon the family by the state, work unit, and residential committee. Similar strategies (e.g., silence, avoidance, complaint, neglect of family responsibility, confronta-

tion, and exit) can be used by family members in reaction to different demands and controls of their family.

Control through Confidential Records

Dossiers are inaccessible to unit members most of the time. They come to attention only when evaluation, selection, promotion, transfer, or recommendation is conducted or requested. During the annual evaluation, most people tend to be quiet and silent, showing they do not care about the evaluation or have nothing to worry about for the period to be evaluated. For those unit members who have mistakes to hide, silence can help them avoid attention from leaders and colleagues. Complaints can be heard from the floor when mass opinions are voiced in public meetings or if leaders' written comments are leaked to the persons concerned. Lower-rank officials may be personally confronted in their offices to explain remarks they have unfavorably made to complainants. Disgruntled unit members may even direct their unhappiness toward work and do a poor job in revenge. The rationale is that "You all see me as inadequate in this area; now let me show you how inadequate I am." The Chinese call it "blowing off steam."

Since no serious charges can be maliciously entered into a person's dossier without some form of collective decision and procedure, it is rare that people opt for exit as a reasonable reaction to a few unfavorable or damaging remarks made by unit leaders in their personnel records. Ordinarily, people choose renovation to minimize or undo negative evaluations. For instance, they may ask upper leaders to present another point of view or make efforts to influence the way a negative remark is interpreted. According to my observation, people in Chinese work units, especially those in the higher echelon, are adept at hiding or embellishing their acts through language. When a person involved in a job accident feels obligated to mention the incident in his or her self-evaluation, he or she may simply pledge to be more careful in his or her work. In order to protect themselves or their subordinates or to avoid controversy, lower-rank officials may juggle with terms in a similar manner. Bad things are said in good words. A person who is negligent at work is warned by such words as "more attention to the procedure of work operations." Poor performance is alluded to in sentences such as "I hope you will make a bigger progress."

Control through Civil Reward and Penalty

Because reward and penalty are an important part of organizational life in Chinese work units, the majority of unit members seem to know exactly what it takes to earn a reward or avoid a penalty. Silence and avoidance are helpful most of the time. They can show both modesty toward personal achievement and repentance for making mistakes. For instance, unit members who have done something wrong may avoid criticism or penalty by remaining silent. People who have performed a job well may also expect to be nominated for an award by being quiet and modest. The key is that if you want something, you pretend to have no interest in it. Speaking out causes trouble. Pushing for yourself backfires. Maintaining a quiet, non-controversial face is the best way to achieve a favorable impression from colleagues and leaders.

But some people are straightforward and outspoken in Chinese work units. They complain publicly if they are not rewarded for their good deeds or if they are penalized for unfavorable behavior. They may orally charge their leaders with unfairness and favoritism. They may spill their dissatisfaction over to work and cut short their job performance. They may knock on their leader's door and confront them with an argument or even fists. A few people may even choose to leave their work units because of a severe penalty or substantial loss of valued honor, and the ensuing rift with their leaders. A number of interview respondents admitted that they personally had one or two unhappy experiences with their work units' civil reward and penalty system. One respondent reported:

In 1992, our department recommended an old lecturer and me as our departmental candidates for university-wide advanced employees of the year. One of our old colleagues was unhappy that he was not on the list. He thought he had done a better job than the selected lecturer and complained informally among our department members. The complaints went quickly to our department head. He asked the complainant to come to his office and speak out his unhappiness. The department head's gesture, however, did not generate good results. The meeting turned into an open argument that took patient and skillful intervention of a couple of our colleagues to bring it to a halt. After the confrontation, the complaining colleague came to talk to me, explaining that he did not intend to ruin my candidacy. But he pledged that he would take the case to the upper authority and formally accuse our department head of unfairness and incompetence. He even speculated that he would leave our work unit if he failed to prevail on his case. Fortunately, he never carried out his threatened action.

Innovation is also used. To earn a favorable impression from the upper authority, a work unit or division of the unit may take steps to decorate or rearrange itself in a positive way. Individual members, in order to avoid a reprimand or penalty for inappropriate behavior or a mistake in one area, may make good gestures and attempts in other areas. There are even rule-breaking instances where unit members play tricks to obtain a reward or resort to illegal means to win a competition.

Control through Administrative Disciplining

Administrative discipline provokes resistance in two ways. One is toward the general rules, regulations, and disciplining procedures instituted within the work unit system. The other is toward specific disciplining actions taken by the unit authority to rule-breaking unit members.

Silence, avoidance, complaints, and innovation are common reactions toward the general rules and procedures of administrative discipline. Most unit members assume that they know what to do and how to operate in their positions. In silence, they may unintentionally ignore inconvenient procedures or intentionally avoid unfavorable requirements. Outspoken unit members may choose to question those procedures or requirements among their colleagues and make complaints directly in front of their leaders. In doing so, they expect to bring public attention to the issue and make unit leaders do something about it. In fact, when consensus is reached among the majority of a division that a rule or practice is unreasonable or unnecessary, innovative measures may be collectively taken to bypass the rule or muddle through the practice, especially when it is imposed upon the division by the upper authorities.

In universities, for instance, students and faculty are not allowed to make marks on library books. But some do. People violate the rule in silence. Library hours and return of loaned materials are officially set. But they can be changed for the convenience of the public if similar requests or complaints are received from a considerable number of users. A few students and faculty members may even exploit their relationship with a library clerk to gain access to restricted areas, check out controlled materials, or avoid payment of fines for late return or damages. It is interesting to recall that I personally benefited from my relationships with library clerks in both universities where I stayed. When I was a student, one of my friends was a library clerk. When I was a faculty member, my next-door neighbor's wife worked in the library. Because of these relationships, I often checked out more books and kept them longer than officially allowed.

Reactions toward disciplining actions are varied. In cases of warning and criticism, people may remain silent as if nothing had happened. They may also avoid touching upon the matter if it makes them feel uncomfortable, unhappy, or shameful. Intensive reactions may ensue when substantive interests are involved, such as payment of fines, deduction of salary, demerit-recording, or demotion. Complaining among fellow members is a useful strategy to arouse public sympathy and draw attention from the leadership. If it does not help, a few assertive persons may take their cases to the upper authorities. Confrontation may break out if the leaders uphold the existing decisions but are unable to convince the disciplined that they deserve the prescribed punishments. When their relationship with leaders is damaged and unfavorable publicity appears insurmountable, the rebellious unit members may choose to leave the work unit forever. Other people may express their unhappiness or resistance through daily work and life routines. They may intentionally slow down their work or show no enthusiasm for it. Such reaction may die down by itself when the pain of discipline wanes and the conscience of duty builds up. But in a few cases, a bad situation may become even worse when the disciplined unit members overstep their negative reactions toward work. For instance, they may intentionally damage equipment, keep turning out poor-quality products, and lag significantly behind the official schedule. Exit from the work unit may then remain the only option for them.

In the interview, most respondents agreed that complaining, confrontation, and work slow-down are risky and, therefore, not common reactions of unit members toward the disciplining actions imposed by their work units. The majority of unit members who are disciplined take the road of repentance and corrections. It is an easy way out because the disciplined can pay farewell to their past and move forward to new challenges.

Control through Quasi-Justice

Work unit members do not always respect mediation and its settlement brokered by the residential or union mediation committees. They may ignore such services or remain silent, passive, and uncooperative when mediators intervene and attempt a settlement. If they feel mediators are too pushy and fail to act impartially, they may complain informally among neighbors and co-workers or formally to the mediation committee and its supervising office. Confrontation is likely to occur in the course of mediation if mediators are overly eager to quell an explosive incident or overly opinionated in lecturing a disputing party face to face. It is

interesting to note that both sides of a dispute may share a similar view of and approach toward mediation. For instance, when they both consider mediation an unpleasant penetration into their private affairs, they may work cooperatively to avoid the intervention of mediators. In such a case, they may pretend that nothing has happened when a mediator is present and then go back to their argument when nobody is around.

Reactions are different if mediation is ordered, monitored, and supported by the unit leadership or if a dispute is directly mediated by unit leaders. Unlike mediators' non-binding solutions, judgment made by leaders is equal to a formal administrative decision. People may resist their leaders' decision through silence, avoidance, or innovative measures. But complaining, work slow-down, and confrontation can inflict irreparable damages on their relationship with the work unit. If damage control is not properly managed, a unit member may finally feel no options are available other than exit from the work unit.

Control through Para-Security

Like quasi-justice, para-security is not always seriously received by unit members. Routine safety rules and security checks may be ignored through silence or avoidance. Some unit members raise animals privately or keep visitors for months without reporting to the security department. People coming back late at night from the outside are likely to avoid the guarded gates and jump stealthily over the wall into the unit. It is also not strange for unit members to complain about a security practice and have an open confrontation with security staff on duty. In factories, most workers complain if body searches are conducted by security guards. New members in a large unit may argue with security guards if they are treated at the gate as strangers. Innovation is also possible in reaction to a security measure. For instance, people may play games to hide their unsafe practices and avoid normal security requirements. To my knowledge, there are unit members who borrow unit badges from their fellows and take their guests from the outside freely through the guarded gates or even to restricted areas.

In important safety and security campaigns directly administered by the unit leadership, people who resist or attempt to avoid a safety and security requirement through silence and avoidance may be easily detected and ordered to follow. Those who voice opposition or confront the authority run the risk of being publicly rebuked or formally punished. In covert confrontation, unit members may direct their dissatisfaction over safety and security to work. But work slow-downs are hardly justified as a

proper reaction even to an unreasonable requirement. They backfire and may cause people involved to either bear more severe punishment or exit from the work unit. One respondent said:

A technician in our work unit sold the formula and technological process of one of our products to a factory. He thought he developed the product and had the right to do it. But our leaders did not think that way. They ruled he violated our company's security regulations and decided that he was given a public warning and ordered to pay a fine. Unhappy with this treatment, he ran into an argument with unit leaders. The confrontation torn off his face with the leadership and made him feel he could not work as hard as before. Several months after the incident, he left our company and was received by the factory that had benefited from his product.

Control through Mass Inclusion and Vigilance

Although they are an inherent part of Chinese organizational life, mass inclusion and vigilance for political campaigns and other important events cause disruption in the regular work and life of the work unit. People with professional aspirations obviously do not like being frequently disturbed. People who are not enthusiastic about political programs also see mass inclusion and vigilance as an inconvenience to their normal work and life routines. Silence is a strategy that helps people stay physically with the official movement without spiritually compromising their work. They follow the general trend by attending meetings and participating in activities, while in fact they still remain fully committed to their work. Avoidance is also used, but with higher risk. Persons who avoid political campaigns have to be prepared to answer questions when they are approached by their watchful leaders. A relevant variable is the general political climate. When political activism takes precedence over professional expertise, only innovative tricks can help explain away a case of avoidance. The same holds true for complaining. When accomplishment is duly recognized by the authority, people can speak out against excessive political activity and demand its reduction and even elimination from their regular work schedule. With the implicit support of public opinions, a few may even dare to confront lower-rank officials and fight for an immediate change. Intervention from and judgment of higher-rank leaders with regard to complaint and confrontation are also shaped by the overall political climate.

For a handful of lazy, irresponsible, and cynical unit members, mass inclusion and vigilance for important political events provide an opportunity to get away from work. They feel they are given a reason for slow-

down or holiday-like vacation from work. A few unit members may even take advantage of political campaigns to confront, with unsubstantiated complaints and accusations, their job-conscientious supervisors who used to discipline them for work slow-down, negligence, or poor performance.

In general, reactions toward each form of social control are variable under different circumstances. Not only can silence, avoidance, complaining, innovation, confrontation, work slow-down, and exit be given different meanings in actual applications, but other forms of resistance are also possible.

A General Evaluation of Chinese Work Units

Reaction to social control represents only one dimension of the perception and attitudes of Chinese people toward their work units. Given the political, economic, cultural, and social control ramifications and implications of work units, what general evaluations can be expected from the Chinese about the organization where they work and live? In this chapter, I examine the overall Chinese view of work units in three aspects: how important work units are to their life and career development; what positive memories or negative feelings they have about their work units; and what their work units mean to them, as an authority of control or a source of support.

THE PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK UNIT

The importance of the work unit to the Chinese can be seen in two areas: life or the quality of life, and work or the development of a professional career (see Table 17.1).

In the interview, 29% of respondents said their work unit is very important to the quality of their personal and family life, 49% fairly important, 22% not too important, and none not at all important. The result is not related to individual characteristics such as age, sex, and education. Nor is it associated with unit features such as line of business, location, supervising agency, and size. The only correlation is with the rank of work units. Respondents from work units of higher rank tended to acknowledge higher importance of their units to the quality of their personal and family life. For instance, whereas 71% of respondents from

Table 17.1**The Perceived Importance of Chinese Work Units**

Degree of Importance	Quality of Life	Development of Career
Very Important	29%	44%
Fairly Important	49%	46%
Not Too Important	22%	10%

work units at the provincial or ministerial level indicated that their work units are very important to the quality of their life, only 10% of those from work units of sectional rank said so. In fact, 40% of them viewed their sectional work units as not too important to the quality of their personal and family life.

Overall, three-fourths of respondents acknowledged their work unit's importance to the quality of their personal and family life. Such a majority is legitimate proof of the substantive weight of Chinese work units in the area of individual life.

With regard to work, 44% of respondents said their work unit is very important to the development of their professional careers, 46% fairly important, 10% not too important, and none not at all important. There were no variations between younger and older, male and female, or well-educated and poorly educated respondents. Line of business, location, size, and the supervising agency of work units did not make a difference either. The only relationship found was with the rank of work units. Like the importance of work units to the quality of life, respondents from higher-ranking work units see greater importance of their units in shaping their careers and professional development. The correlation is reasonable, because work units of higher rank are obviously able to offer their members not only a larger forum in which to play their roles but also a closer link to the socio-economic hierarchy to get the feel of career achievements in Chinese society.

When the first two categories are combined, an absolute majority (90%) of respondents viewed the work unit as important to the development of their professional career. This provides solid evidence regarding the overwhelming effect of Chinese work units in the career development of their employees. Moreover, most respondents acknowledged that they themselves represented unit members who work wholeheartedly on a foreign language and put all their hope on studying abroad, and therefore tend to overlook the importance of the units to their career development.

In other words, the majority of unit members (especially those who are supported by the funding, working, and living conditions of their work units for all their professional work) may have a higher view of the role of their work units in their career pursuits.

Between quality of life and development of career, the work unit was clearly given more importance in shaping professional career than in influencing individual life (90% vs. 78%). It is understandable that the work unit, as a place to work, involves its members more in work than in life.

POSITIVE MEMORIES

The complex and all-inclusive nature of the Chinese work unit determines that the Chinese have both positive and negative reactions, views, or feelings about the organization where they work and live. Generally, do they like their work unit? If they could leave their work unit, would they do it? If they have already left their work unit, are they happy for having done it?

In the interview, 59% of respondents said that they like their work unit and have favorable feelings toward it. One-fifth admitted that they do not like their unit. The rest could not clearly say whether or not they like their work unit. The response is not related to age, sex, or education of unit members, nor to line of business, location, rank, supervising agency, and size of work units. The length of leave from the unit is not relevant either.

There were 64% of interviewees admitting either that they are happy for having left their work unit or that they would leave it if they could. Among them, 68% said that their decision or intention has nothing to do with their unit or their feelings about it. Rather, leaving would be or has proved to be a positive choice in their personal development. The remaining 32% agreed that their choice or intention of leaving reflected their unfavorable feelings toward the work unit. Several respondents cited their bickering with the work unit as proof of their dissatisfaction with it. For example, one respondent stated that his unit leaders required him to pay back 4,000 Yuan to the work unit before letting him leave for the United States. The reason was that his graduate study had been paid directly by the work unit, and under that arrangement he was supposed to serve the unit for at least five years. The requirement was legally reasonable, yet he felt emotionally alienated from his unit and unit leadership.

Specifically, positive memories and negative feelings toward work units reflect substantive interests or practical concerns of work and life. On the positive side, do work unit members react favorably to the working

environment, lifestyle, colleagues, leaders, and welfare of their work organization? Table 17.2 summarizes the interview respondents' answers.

With regard to the working environment, 63% of respondents agreed that it is good or even excellent in their work unit. The response is related to age and sex of unit members. Whereas younger and female members tend to be critical, most of their senior and male counterparts said they are happy with the working condition of their work unit. It is seemingly easier for senior and male unit members to enter the core of their work unit and enjoy its institutional support. The rank of work units also makes a difference. People from work units of higher rank tend to have higher satisfaction with their working environment. It is understandable that work units of higher rank are closer to the allocative authority of economic resources and, therefore, able to secure all needed materials to create a better working environment for their employees. There are no obvious effects of educational level of unit members, nor line of business, location, size, and supervising agency of the work units.

As far as the physical facility is concerned, a number of respondents from leading universities and research institutes proudly mentioned that their work unit is well equipped or even designated as the important state laboratory or production site. Several interviewees compared their work units with American universities or research institutions where they had stayed. They said their Chinese work units have better computing and experimenting facilities than their current American sponsors.

Regarding lifestyle, 43% of respondents thought living in their work unit is leisurely, comfortable, and full of human interest. The reaction was not significantly correlated with sex or educational level of unit members, nor with line of business, location, size, or supervising agency of their units. But it was related to age: older unit members think more favorably of their unit lifestyle. For instance, 52% of respondents above age 35 were satisfied with the way they live in their work unit, whereas only 20% of those under age 36 said they favor their unit lifestyle. In fact, all those under age 26 acknowledged that they do not like their work unit lifestyle at all.

It is interesting to note that those who do not favor their unit lifestyle did not deny the comfort of life in their work unit. They admitted that they are critical of or back away from their unit lifestyle, because it fosters idleness and accounts for the low business efficiency in their work unit.

Toward their unit colleagues, 92% of respondents said their feelings are positive. The overwhelming response in one direction leaves little variation that might otherwise be explained by the main characteristics of the work unit and its members. The only identifiable pattern is with educa-

Table 17.2
The Chinese Work Unit: Positive Memories

Variables	Satisfied	No Comment or Dissatisfied
Working Environment	63%	37%
Lifestyle	43%	57%
Colleagues	92%	8%
Leaders	45%	55%
Welfare	42%	58%

tion. All "no" responses came from those with graduate education. One plausible explanation is that people with more education are relatively more concerned with personal achievement. As they compete for limited recognition and promotion, they are more likely to be in conflict with and develop unfavorable feelings toward their colleagues. Among those who feel good about their unit colleagues, many reported that they still maintain contact with close colleagues in their units. Apparently, inter-employee relationships in Chinese work units are overall friendly and affectionate.

About their unit leaders, 45% of respondents said that they are good and work conscientiously for the well-being of the work unit and its employees. The response is not influenced by age, sex, and education of unit members, nor by line of business, location, and supervising agency of the work units. There are, however, moderate effects from unit rank and size. People from work units of higher rank and smaller size tend to have more favorable feelings toward their leaders.

A number of respondents said good things about their work unit leaders, showing personal understanding of the leadership. One admitted: "They try every possibility to bring about more benefits to us." Another sympathized: "They have to set an example in every aspect for us members." Still another sighed as if she herself were a leader: "It is not easy to be a leader." One respondent from a production unit, however, vented anger toward her unit leaders. She accused them of taking bribes, giving no say to workers, and being unreasonable in policy decisions.

Finally, regarding welfare, 42% of respondents agreed that their work unit takes care of and offers adequate benefits to employees. Sex and education of unit members are relevant factors. Female members are more satisfied with the welfare of their work units than are their male counterparts. People of more education tend to be more critical of welfare in their

work units. Work units' line of business also makes a difference. Members of service units, research institutes, and universities seem to have greater dissatisfaction with the welfare of their work units than those from commercial establishments, governments, and production enterprises. There are no obvious effects from age of unit members and location, rank, size, or supervising agency of the units.

It ought to be pointed out that when the Chinese talk about the welfare of their work units, they mean the quality and quantity of all state-designated benefits such as housing, bonuses, material deliveries, and so on. In general, they take for granted that they deserve all state-approved benefit items and feel satisfied only when most of those items are delivered above a publicly perceived basic level in both quality and quantity.

NEGATIVE FEELINGS

Surveillance, control, human relations, and upward mobility are the main areas in which the Chinese are likely to develop dissatisfaction with their work units (see Table 17.3).

With respect to surveillance, 58% of respondents complained that mutual surveillance is prevalent in their work units. The response is not affected by age, sex, and education of unit members, nor by location, rank, and supervising agency of their units. But across different lines of business, people of production, commerce, and service units tend to have a higher feeling of mutual surveillance than those from governmental agencies, research organizations, and universities. Members of small work units are also likely to bear a higher degree of mutual surveillance than members of larger ones.

Mutual surveillance is related to the overall work arrangement, architectural design, and lifestyle of Chinese work units. Unit members are given housing units with doors next to and windows against each other. Working colleagues are also neighbors. Leaders live among ordinary unit members. They all have a similar life routine, such as taking a walk after dinner, opening their house for casual chats during nighttime, or gossiping with each other at a central place. Unit members are interested in each other's work and life details. Mutual surveillance, therefore, becomes prevalent. As it is natural and prevalent, some unit members are even unaware of the effect of mutual surveillance. Others may feel it is not necessary to keep their own privacy. This is especially true of female members. Although they do not seem to sense a higher level of mutual surveillance among themselves, their male counterparts pointed-

Table 17.3
The Chinese Work Unit: Negative Feelings

Variables	Dissatisfied	No Comment or Satisfied
Mutual Surveillance	58%	42%
Control	55%	45%
Human Relations	88%	12%
Upward Opportunity	40%	60%

ly said that mutual surveillance is intensive among female members who like going to each other's house to chat and gossip.

Regarding control, 55% of respondents thought they bear too much control from the institutional establishment in their work units. There are no variations among people of different age, sex, and education. But all main unit characteristics except supervising agency show their effects. By line of business, members of production, service, and commerce units seem to experience a higher level of control than those from government, research, and advanced education. Across geographical areas, work units in the East tend to give their members a lesser sense of control than those in the West. Between the South and North, the effect of control seems more salient in the former than in the latter. In terms of rank and size, people from work units of lower rank and smaller size experience more control in their work and life.

Among those who remained uncritical of the level or intensity of control in their work units, some admitted they may be used to the control environment of their work units and, therefore, become unconscious of it over time. Others argued that control in work units is immersed in regular work, life, and organizational requirements and is, by their judgment, reasonable and acceptable. One respondent said: "Yes, there is control in the work unit. But there is also a lack of control, sometimes even an anarchy."

Regarding human relations, 88% of respondents complained that human relations in their work units are too complicated, taking too much time and energy from them and their unit leadership. Variations are found among individual variables such as age and education, and among work unit characteristics such as size and location. Younger people seem to be more sensitive than their older counterparts to the complexity of human relations in their work units. People with more education tend to feel a lower pressure of human relations than those of less education. Geogra-

phically, while unit members from the West experience more complicated human relations than those from the East, human relations seem to be more significantly felt among members in northern than southern work units. With regard to size, smaller work units tend to create a higher intensity of human relations among their members.

Human relations are historically known as an important aspect of Chinese life. Even Western visitors are impressed that the Chinese are so willing and patient to take care of their relations with each other (Butterfield 1990). According to the interview respondents, the collective complexity of human relations in work units is directly related to the extent to which unit members are motivated to move up to the higher echelon of their organization. As generalized by some respondents, if unit members want to take official positions and move up quickly and smoothly, they have to pay special attention to human relations around them. On the other hand, if they just want to follow the routine in an ordinary manner, they may still feel fine even if they do not care enough to deal with complicated human relations.

Finally, with regard to upward opportunity, 40% of respondents complained that their work unit offers too little upward opportunity to its employees. The reaction does not correlate significantly with age and education of unit members, nor with supervising agency, rank, and size of the work units. But by sex, male unit members tend to see more upward mobility than their female counterparts. Across different lines of business, people from commerce, production, and service units seem less likely to complain about upward opportunity than those from governmental agencies, research institutes, and universities. In terms of location, work units in the North seem to have more upward mobility for their members than those in the South, whereas work unit members in the West appear to enjoy less upward opportunity than their counterparts in the East.

In mass media and reform debates, lack of proper incentives (mainly upward mobility) is often criticized as a major problem in the work unit (Gao 1993). In the interview, however, more than half of the respondents did not actually admit that upward mobility is a problem for themselves and generally for all unit members. Some even approvingly commented on the upward mobility of their units. In their words, the system is basically equitable. Good work and acts are recognized and given credit.

Overall, among all sources of negative feelings or dissatisfaction of unit members toward the work unit, human relations were seen as too complicated by most respondents. Mutual surveillance came in second place; a little more than a half of the respondents reported that it is prevalent in their work organization. It is interesting to note that these two

factors are more connected to Chinese culture or civil lifestyle than the political or organizational arrangement in Chinese work units. On the other hand, control or upward mobility, which is assumedly more associated with the institutional establishment, does not seem to be a serious problem for roughly half of the respondents. This reaction awaits further explanations.

AN AUTHORITY OF CONTROL VERSUS A SOURCE OF SUPPORT

In the final analysis, how do the Chinese people see their work unit as a whole? Do they see it as an authority of control? Or as a source of support?

In the interview, 55% of respondents claimed that their work unit is a source of support, 22% thought it exists as an authority of control, and 23% said it is hard to make such a critical distinction. The response is related to sex of unit members. Whereas female members are more likely than their male counterparts to see their work unit as a source of support, males are more likely than females to view it as an authority of control. Other individual and all unit variables do not seem to make any significant difference.

The Work Unit as a Source of Support

Respondents who regarded their work units as a source of support provided their supporting proofs in six areas.

First, good leaders give unit members a strong sense that they have support from their work units. Good leaders mentioned are mostly direct leaders who supervise unit members through face-to-face contact, including: project head, section head, divisional director, departmental officials, laboratory director, manager, and unit leaders in general. They are considered good because they are concerned with their subordinates and help them with their vital interests in concrete ways. Various commendable leadership deeds include: being wise and open-minded, being supportive, being always ready to help unit members solve problems, training all new young employees for formal entrance to work, being clear on reward and punishment, providing reagents and materials as needed for laboratory work, and supporting employees to seek external training or opportunities for study abroad.

Some interview accounts were illustrative. One respondent from a university said gratefully: "We are free to directly ask our departmental

officials for funding and working conditions. They try to meet our need if it is reasonable. I myself, because of support from my leaders, was awarded 500 Yuan in 1991 as one of the ten excellent faculty members on our campus." Another from a research institute admitted: "We can report, anytime, to our leaders any needs in academic research. They are always ready to help us solve problems." Still another from a commerce unit proudly claimed: "Our general manager is fair and straightforward. He puts all important rewards and punishments at his disposal and displays a great deal of fairness. He keeps his promises. Every word of his counts." The last one from a production unit said: "Our leaders want to help us, but they are often not able to help due to the poor physical and financial conditions of our work unit."

Second, justice and the existence of a justice procedure make unit members feel that they can rely upon their work units for support. Justice is first reflected over whether assignment is fair and whether reward and promotion are based upon individual capacity and accomplishment. Two respondents consider their units dependable as a source of support because they feel what they are assigned to do is fair and what they have done is recognized.

Another aspect of justice is related to whether a dispute can be justly resolved or a reasonable claim can be duly addressed. Having a procedure to attain justice also gives unit members a sense of support. One respondent affirmed: "If you have problems with your direct leaders, you can always take your case to an upper leader and get help from there." Another claimed: "If you are right, you can always get help and prevail eventually."

Third, availability of opportunities within the work unit is a direct measure of how much support unit members may feel from their unit. Two respondents acknowledged that their units are able to provide members with a wide range of research opportunities and make various praises, awards, and honors available for all outstanding achievements.

Another dimension of support that involves opportunity is whether the unit authority encourages members to seek opportunities outside the work unit; and whether it gives them approvals and additional support when external opportunities are secured by members. Two respondents attested that members in their work units have full support from the unit authority in seeking external study, training, and research opportunities. One of them said: "Numerous opportunities are available through the work unit. Grants and awards are open to all eligible members. Junior researchers are often encouraged and provided with necessary proofs and recommendations to seek additional training from other sources."

Fourth, upward mobility is directly related to the unit members' perception of how much support they have from their work units. A respondent from one of the leading universities gratefully said that his work unit provides a variety of incentives and conditions for the professional growth of its members. He reported a newly instituted promotion procedure on his campus:

In our university, if you feel you are qualified for promotion to a higher rank, you can submit a petition to the university promotion committee. The committee will organize a group of experts in your specialty for a special hearing. The hearing is publicized on campus and open to all faculty members. You present your case in the hearing and answer questions from experts and the audience. Experts cast votes right at the end of the hearing. Promotion is solely based upon their votes. In 1992, forty associate professors and thirty professors were promoted through this procedure. The youngest professor so promoted was 27 years old.

Fifth, work autonomy and freedom determine the relationship unit members have with their on-job duties and, therefore, have a direct bearing on whether they perceive their work unit as a source of support. Work autonomy has different manifestations in different work units. In research institutes, it is the autonomy to choose research topics on the basis of individual interests and talents. In universities, it is about being free from unreasonable restrictions in handling teaching materials creatively and opening new courses independently. In all other work units, it is a matter of being trusted to perform important tasks, having full autonomy in assigned work, and not bearing too much control over work. One respondent from a leading state newspaper said: "I was allowed to report news, write commentaries, edit reports, and organize submission articles not long after I entered my work unit from university." Another from a research unit stated: "You do your own research. They generally do not bother to question you, except to provide you with necessary support."

Two respondents served their work units as divisional leaders. Both claimed that they have power to manage important businesses in their domains, such as dealing directly with the outside.

Another two respondents went beyond work autonomy to comment on the general freedom in their work units. One said: "In our work unit, we are all trusted to do our own work. To be honest, a lot of non-political freedom is given to unit members." The other stated: "It seems to me that there is no control at all in our work unit. In fact, you have full support

from the work unit if you work hard and do not think of transferring to other places or going abroad."

Sixth, gains from work and preferential treatment received from work units demonstrate to unit members that their work unit is behind them as a source of support. Eight respondents acknowledged that they learn a lot from work and feel grateful to their work units for a favorable working and living environment. Five agreed generally that their work units support their members, even children, in all possible aspects of work and life. Three referred particularly to preferential treatments they were given by their work units, such as full payment of salary and undergraduate tuition while being away from the work unit as a full-time student and funding for all external training and meetings in the past three years. One of them stated: "I was born into a peasant family. I was able to come abroad due to a two-year full funding granted by the state to me through my work unit. Last year, I revisited my work unit and was given a warm welcome." Another summarized: "We receive support, nurturing, encouragement from the masses and leaders in work, life, and other areas. It is like living in a big family in the work unit."

The Work Unit as an Authority of Control

Respondents who considered their work units as an authority of control expressed their sense of control or dissatisfaction in five areas. The first area is job transfer and the seeking of external training or study opportunities. Five respondents reported that they suffer from this type of control. One complained of his work unit "not allowing me to go out for job training and business travel." Another said angrily: "Working environment is not good, service is poor, and there is no way to transfer to another job and work unit." Two other respondents added, however, that unit members can struggle for their choice after they acknowledged that their work units maintain a tight control over the employees' movement. The first reported that her work unit did not let her take the Test of English as a Foreign Language but admitted later that her work unit did not make any trouble for her when she was ready to leave for the United States. The other, after criticizing control over individual movement, conceded: "They have control over your job transfer, but if you really want to go, they let you go in the end." Finally, another respondent, while being unhappy with the control of job transfer in his work unit, pointed to the other side of the coin. He said: "You bear no control at all if you do not think of transferring to another work unit or going abroad."

The second area is work. Three respondents blamed excessive control for lack of work autonomy and neglect of unit members and their talents in their work units. One said that it is hard to obtain approval from his university authority for teaching a class in English and adding new content to the course. Another two reported restrictions on work in their work units and attributed the causes not only to excessive control but also to other problems. For instance, poor living conditions and inadequate service systems were both seen as obstructing the normal progress of work. One complained: "In addition to unreasonable control practices, service support in our work unit is inadequate. We waste a lot of time in xeroxing and running non-academic chores." The other stated: "Interference from various sources adds to the poor living and working situations, rendering me no condition to conduct my research work. I am shamed to say that I have not done anything important in the past five years or so."

The third area is political life and upward mobility. Six respondents complained that their work units maintain full control over the political life of their members. Although all are required to attend political study and show support for public campaigns, only limited access is given to unit members for important policy information. Entry to the party and participation in the decision-making process are totally controlled by the unit authority. One respondent complained that his university ordered him to go with his students for military training.

Fourth, control in factory, military, and other special units is often all-inclusive, global, and therefore susceptible to abuse. One respondent from a military unit testified: "In the military, everything is under control. Political commissars and military commanders have their say over how you dress, what kinds of friends you make, and whom you are married with." Another three were from factories. One resentfully said: "It is okay to be criticized and controlled. But we workers hate that leaders execute rules unfairly. We are especially angry that they arrange their children in management offices and introduce their untrained peasant relatives to workshops." Another complained: "My workshop head acts as a household master. He likes going to us workers' home for dinner. We all have to invite him. He is greedy and exploitative." The last one reported: "Leaders have no trust in workers. Although control is tight and everywhere, workers still try every chance to slow down." It is obvious that fundamental problems exist for social control in Chinese production units.

Fifth, special control may be directed at a particular individual or group of people. One respondent said he was not allowed by his work unit to participate in the unit-wide competition for excellent employees because

of his involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration. Another reported that newly arrived employees are often discriminated against by the children of high-ranking officials in his work unit. A few respondents seemed to be able to identify and understand the nature of control or the source of dissatisfaction in their work units. One of them said that although he is objectively prevented by various unit rules from pursuing his own ideals, he still feels he is emotionally supported by most of his departmental and sectional leaders in his important pursuits. Based upon his experience, he held: "Control is from the system, not from individual leaders."

How do Chinese work unit members adapt to the overall environment and social control practices of their work organization? What general reactions and attitudes do they have toward their work unit and its control: submission, resistance, or indifference? One respondent made an illustrative comment: "Our work unit is supposed to be an authority of control. But still we all manage to disregard or defer that authority."

A Comparison with the United States

In the interview, 57% of respondents said they have work experiences in the United States. In this chapter, I draw upon the cross-national work experiences of that subsample and attempt to make a comparison between work and social control practices in China and the United States.

Based upon the subsample response, similarity is limited. There was general agreement that human relations are equally important in both Chinese work units and American employment organizations. There were also a few reports that Chinese leaders and American bosses are both accessible when work-related problems arise. It is interesting that two respondents claimed their respective Chinese work unit and American employer seem to be no different at all. One of them said: "I am pretty surprised that the research center here in the United States is almost the same to my research unit in China. I think it shows that modern production and research are standardized across the globe. The way of doing scientific research becomes comparable among different nations."

The major part of comparison, however, is taken by difference. With regard to the nature and mode of work and social control, three contrasts can be identified between China and the United States.

DIFFUSIVE VERSUS CONCENTRATED CONTROL

A clear difference between Chinese and American work establishments relates to mode of control. According to the interview, Chinese work units are not merely a place to work. Control is not limited to work. It extends to behavior, thought, and all other aspects of human life. On the other

hand, American employers pay attention only to the capacity and ability of their employees to do a job. They are generally not concerned with what their employees do outside of work or in their homes as long as they perform their duties well, efficiently, and up to the job requirements. In sociological terms, Chinese work units are community-based and less differentiated along with their business missions or tasks. American work organizations are instead a product of the modern division of labor. It meets the differentiation standard required by the capitalist society of mass production.

The mode of control is related to the efficiency of control. As affirmed by several interview accounts, the diffusive control in Chinese work units often leads to loosened control on work or even poor implementation of work disciplines. The first two respondents pointed directly to this causal connection. One said: "Chinese control is diffusive. As a result, work discipline is poorly implemented." The other stated: "Control in our Chinese work unit is put on daily behavior. Less control is actually put on work." Another two referred to the reality of lack of control in Chinese work units. One admitted: "It is easy to muddle along in our Chinese work unit." The other claimed: "In China, you can even avoid to do what your work is required."

In the United States, as work is singly focused and work control is directed only at the job, the efficiency of both work and control is warranted. One respondent said: "Unlike the all-inclusive control in Chinese work units, only a concentrated control of work is put in place in American employment organizations. The control of work is tighter and more effective in the United States." Another two respondents had the same feelings. One reported: "Bad or good work is directly monitored and judged by the American boss." The other held: "In the United States, people receive higher salaries but experience more control from work."

Likewise, a number of respondents reported that the intensity of work or the pace of work activity is high in the United States. Some pointed to the inflexibility of meeting job requirements. Others cited heavy workload and high job pressure. One respondent lamented: "We earn more money here in the United States, but we sacrifice tremendously in all other aspects. We bear too much for the money we make here."

FATHERLY VERSUS MECHANICAL CONTROL

Another significant difference between China and United States involves the nature of control. This refers to an essential dimension of social control that bears heritage from Durkheim's (1964) distinction between

organic and mechanical solidarities. Essentially, it asks whether a particular control comes from blood, kinship, closely knit community, and other forms of primary relations, or instead from division of labor, bureaucratic mandates, and other secondary cooperational needs. Because of the difference in its origin and operating environment, control may take different outlooks and have different features. For example, one form of control may be close, flexible, imprecise, associated with support or offer of care, and immersed in human relations. The other may be distant, mechanical, exact, connected to law, and responsive to the demands from division of labor.

In the interview, when they commented on work control in American employment organizations, respondents used such words or phrases as "rule by law," "money taking precedence over human relations," "distant from the boss," and "men as machine." On control in Chinese work units, respondents put forth opposite phrases such as "rule by men," "leaders acting as your parents," and "men as men." The contrast prompts a generalization that Chinese work control is organic, appealing to human relations. American work control, on the other hand, is mechanical, based upon the precise requirement of work. It thus may be legitimate to characterize the difference in the nature of work control between China and the United States as fatherly versus mechanical.

Along with this characteristic contrast is the caring aspect of Chinese control and lack of caring elements of American control. For instance, respondents described their relations with American employers in terms of "self-reliance," "self-independence," "self-centered," "no work, no pay, and no relief," "no job security," and "no support for the family." The descriptions are in contrast to what they said about their relations with the Chinese work unit: "caring," "sharing," "comfortable," and "secure." As it was humorously said by one respondent, "The Chinese work unit is a big iron rice bowl. Once you are fed, you feed permanently. Your entire family is fed along with you as well."

Also relevant are the distance and orientation of controllers from and toward controllees. Chinese leaders are not concerned with legal avoidance. They make use of public and personal sentiments and may criticize their subordinates to such an extent that they burst into tears. One respondent said: "Our Chinese leaders can lecture us very intensively and make us cry like their babies." However, the motivation is often good, fatherly, or at least non-threatening. American bosses, as described by respondents, seem the opposite. They keep a distance from their employees and understand how to manipulate interpersonal distance as the most effective way to demonstrate authority over their subordinates. American bosses are

also knowledgeable about what is legally appropriate or viable. When they use control, they direct it where the fundamental interests of their employees lie. One respondent sadly reported: "We have no right to say anything as foreigners. My boss even threatened to send me home if."

ORGANIZATIONAL VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

This comparison involves the general issue of individual right, freedom, and democracy within China and the United States. According to the interview, if "individual right" is understood as what a person may be entitled to, "freedom" as being free from undue restrictions on individual choice, and "democracy" as the opportunity to participate in policy making, then they all exist and do not lack meaning in both China and the United States. The distinction between two countries is that individual right, freedom, and democracy are practiced in different forms.

In the United States, individual right, freedom, and democracy are all specified and assured by the Constitution. Direct elections of representatives, senators, mayors, governors, and the President give individual right and democracy a primary and concrete form of institutionalization in the political arrangement and process of federal, state, and local governments. Any individual may openly criticize governmental policies and officials, vote against them, or even declare his or her own candidacy to replace them. This is by definition what American people as independent citizens may do under the American political system. It is indeed what is guaranteed by the constitutional democracy.

In reality, to practice their rights, most citizens must first work to meet their basic living needs. In employment organizations, if they do not own company assets or stocks, the only capital they have is their labor. This leads to the question of how much organizational right, freedom, or democracy individual employees could possibly have in a privately owned or publicly owned work establishment. According to the interview, it appears that right, freedom, or democracy is limited in American employment organizations. Comments of several interviewees were illustrative. One respondent said: "The American boss is right all the time." Another stated: "In U.S. employment organizations, it is unconditional to obey order." Still another realized: "Support may be expected from the American boss only if the proposed initiative is not in conflict with his or her interest."

Lack of organizational democracy may be compensated for through constitutional democracy, which grants individuals the right to change and

choose according to their will. One respondent said: "You can leave your employer if you feel uncomfortable with it." Another two interviewees also recognized this fact. One admitted: "The freedom to choose jobs can rescue you from any undue treatments by one particular employer." Another advised: "It is not necessary to care or say too much if you do not feel good about it. Just wrap up and go."

China proves to be the opposite. The Constitution presents a list of individual rights. But the actual political framework does not give citizens any right to choose local and national leaders and policies. Freedom to speak, criticize, or protest is not practically applicable to all subjects. Individuals may protest against a local leader or policy, but it is often deemed reactionary if the criticism and protest are openly directed at officially recognized revolutionary leaders, the central government, communist ideology, and the communist party. The opportunity for individual citizens to participate in the political process is available only when they go along with the mainstream. In fact, as long as they do not openly oppose the communist party and socialist system, they can find substantial leeway to meaningfully advance their interests. For example, they may even take their case to the top national leaders and insist on a positive response from them.

Obviously, constitutional democracy in China is limited in written terms. In practice, it is directional, available to individual citizens only when they remain in the mainstream politics. But how about organizational democracy in places where people work and live? As is known, people, especially working people, are all defined as the masters of their society. There is literally no private ownership, no employee-employer relationship, and no labor-wage exchange. All resources and properties are owned by the state, which in the end belongs to all working people. In work units, working people are supposed to take their initiatives in management, production, and other important affairs. Of course, reality falls somewhat short of ideological design. But as most respondents concurred, organizational right, freedom, and democracy are indeed lavishly enjoyed by Chinese working people. There are both institutional and non-institutional channels and frameworks to promote and ensure those privileges. For example, the congress of employee representatives, workers' union, youth league, women's federation, retirees' association, and various other institutional arrangements are all readily available to help address different interests and take the inputs of their respective constituency to the party and management of the work unit. In routine dealings, unit leaders can be called or stopped almost anywhere at any time by any unit members for any matters. A few respondents might have

been spoiled by the freedom available in their work units. One said: "There is no clear distinction between leaders and ordinary employees. Everyone can feel free to make trouble with his or her superior." Another boasted: "Leaders beg you to do your work. You are actually the boss. There is no pressure at all." Apparently, these comments were a little dramatized.

If it is true that the Chinese are given more organizational democracy and less constitutional democracy than Americans, exactly how much freedom or democracy is enjoyed by each of them? The interview was inconclusive. Some respondents held there is a greater amount of democracy in the United States than in China. Others thought the Chinese enjoy more freedom than their American counterparts. Some respondents said it is difficult to make a clear-cut judgment on such a general issue. However, the majority of respondents agreed that the freedom and democracy they have in their Chinese work units are more real, within their touch, and beneficial to their practical interests.

A New Theory of Social Control

It is remarkable that the Chinese work unit and various forms of social control instituted within its confines do not cause any significant criticism, opposition, or resistance from the Chinese people. On the contrary, a majority of interview respondents displayed a positive view toward their work units and unit leaders. In this chapter, I explore the nature of Chinese control and organizational experiences and propose a new theory of social control.

THE NATURE OF CHINESE SOCIAL CONTROL

From the outset, it ought to be pointed out that the general reaction to and evaluations of the Chinese work unit and its social control practices as described in this book might be biased or flawed by errors of research design or instrumentation. Interviewing former and present work unit members in the United States is methodologically legitimate but does not guarantee a precise and exact measurement of social control in Chinese work units. Several factors might contaminate the result. Psychologically, for instance, people tend to be more critical of the present than the past. Especially when their new experiences fall short of their expectations, they may "beautify" their past as a way to react against the reality they face now. Most interview respondents admitted having high expectations of the United States before they arrived. Once here, they faced language barriers and other problems. The difficult reality makes them feel homesick at least. It might further modify their views of past experiences. In other words, there is a psychological effect that may influence their responses in the interview.

Given all potential error factors, however, the fundamental views held by the Chinese about their work units and social control experiences can still be attributed to the peculiarity of Chinese social control and organizational practices. With respect to controllees' reactions, it is the nature of Chinese social control that enfeebles the coercive connotation of control and facilitates its acceptance among the Chinese.

First, Chinese social control is instituted along with the basic requirements of work and life. Control practices are often perceived as necessary, reasonable, and beneficial by the controllees. For example, administrative disciplining and control through dossiers arise from the normal process of labor management. Mediation and measures of safety and security in a neighborhood arise from the needs of local residents to resolve conflicts among themselves and guard their properties from intruders. No obvious resistance can be leveled against those practices logically or legally.

Second, Chinese social control is accompanied by delivery of materials, services, instructions, and well-intended advice. The sense of control is often shadowed by the benefits that accompany it. Obviously, it is not natural for local residents to consider their residential committee as an agency of control while they benefit from it for all life-related services. It is difficult for work unit members to treat their work organization as just a control authority when they rely upon it to develop their professional career and support their family. Moreover, all social control agents, including mediators, security guards, and unit leaders, are required by official guidelines to do good things for the people and set an example for the masses. In Mao's words, they should serve the people wholeheartedly. There is no doubt that services, benefits, and doing good things function not only as a moral underpinning for social control but also as a cooling mechanism for hostility that might arise as a result of intervention by control agents.

Third, Chinese social control is non-confrontational, non-alienative, and non-exclusive. Because positive education is an officially established theme, most practices of control are directed to the good side of an issue or situation. The focus is on advancing individual identification with the group and the group's solidarity with the central authority. In control through ideology, rewards, inclusion, and vigilance, then, reporting good news, propagandizing social achievements, eulogizing heroes and models, glorifying revolutionary leaders, giving rewards, and various other positive education measures are all designed to draw attention from the masses to the official version of reality. As the masses are shielded from any possible negative influence from the other side of the world, they are expected to closely follow the socially promoted main course and

contribute to the collective goals of their groups, work units, and communities.

Fourth, as it is associated with the normal requirements and needs of work and life and remains non-repressive, Chinese social control is internalized by its controllees. In the setting of Chinese work units, it is natural for unit members to treat the various practices of social control as a normal part of their life and work. As a result, work unit members feel minimal or no pressure and inconvenience from control practices. As in the West, when church-goers believe that it is God's call to attend worship services, they have no problem driving in the dark of night or in the rain of a storm to attend church.

Fifth, Chinese social control is universal and inclusive across social and work units. All are made a part of it. Nobody feels special about it. Moreover, Chinese social control is not based upon the law or any abstract logic. Instead, it is immersed in human relations and therefore remains flexible and negotiable. Within the confines of a Chinese work unit, when controllers feel a control practice is unreasonably stringent, they may take initiatives to fine-tune it. When controllees feel unhappy about a control practice or see a particular case as unfair, they can also take it to their work unit leadership for correction or revision. Toward those control practices imposed by the upper authorities, controllers and controllees may sometimes work together to spell out a measure that shields both of them from bearing related responsibilities or liabilities. In work units or subunit divisions where both leaders and employees do not like the weekly political study, they may act together to reduce its frequency, change its content, and make up a story for the upper authority.

A NEW THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The Chinese social control experience adds an important dimension to the study of social control. In light of the Chinese experience, social control is not only a tool to contain rule-breaking and problematic situations, but also an institution to keep social order, advance social unity and solidarity, and attain social goals. It is not only a measure to administer corrective or punitive treatments to a handful of trouble-makers or social outcasts, but also an integrative mechanism to bring together all social members and make them both physically and spiritually committed to the mainstream social ideals and activities. This broadened view of social control calls for new theorizing on the scope, nature, content, mode, style, and effectiveness of social control. It leads naturally to a new theory of social control.

Scope of Control

In the field of social control, coercive control of criminals and therapeutical control of the insane, which are customarily seen as the mainland of social control, constitute only a small part of the social control landscape. The vast domain of social control is non-dramatizing, non-escalating, and non-confrontational control of ordinary citizens. Ordinary citizens need to be controlled not only because they may otherwise deviate from the social mainstream but also because they constitute the material forces that are indispensable to the success of group or social programs and goals.

Origin of Control

Civilian control begins with customs or rules that are gradually formed or instituted in families, kinships, guilds, clubs, and other groupings of primary or secondary relations. Control is automatically achieved or practiced on a voluntary basis along with the normal requirements of daily work and life.

For instance, to entertain themselves after work, people play games. In simple games, players need to set up rules that guide their interactions and frame the flow of game activities in an orderly sequence. In complicated games and serious human endeavors, rules accumulated over time may develop into a complex system. People who want to play those games or be involved in those serious endeavors, therefore, have to go through a formal process of socialization or training. As they learn the rules, people develop a habit to observe them and become voluntarily subject to their control.

Generally, in all human endeavors, people have to agree to observe a somewhat restrictive procedure that controls their activities in terms of expected productivity or intended outcomes. This voluntary observance of restrictions provides a spiritual orientation for people to accept control.

Nature of Control

Civilian control is non-confrontational, non-repressive, non-escalating, conciliatory, and compensatory. It is non-confrontational because it does not involve fundamental differences in class interests. Between the general populace and the state, the state is symbolized as a neutral representative of all interests. People are expected to follow all state laws, rules, and directives for the common good of society. Even between (1) those who own and hire, and (2) those who do not own and are hired in an

employment organization, the underlying difference in ownership is hidden and is replaced by the "surface" interest in increasing productivity and share of profit. Employees are made to focus only on their individualized roles and the connection between job performance and gains in salary, bonuses, and other benefits.

The non-repressive nature of civilian control is obvious. As positive measures are used to keep people in the mainstream, negative tools are saved for punishing rule-breakers, deserters, and other deviants. Control of ordinary citizens is non-escalating and conciliatory because people in organizations or the main course of social actions are made aware of all related rules. If they break rules, they supposedly know how to correct their wrongdoing voluntarily. If rule-breaking is an innovative undertaking, the authority of control is also expected to accommodate it for the improvement of the current state of affairs.

Civilian control is compensatory in the sense that compliance brings about increased benefits and non-compliance results in loss of benefits. Damages inflicted by non-compliance may also be compensated by corrective actions. For instance, in work organizations, those who are not able to keep up with their work may improve their performance through a better command and observance of all job-related rules and skills.

In all, civilian control is not imposed to fight or annihilate a handful of enemies; it is oriented to achieving and amplifying a desired state of affairs among the general populace. It aims at advancing collective cohesion, solidarity, and commitment.

Mode of Control

The mode of civilian control is diverse. When it is directed at the soul, it is spiritual or ideological. In this mode, control is executed through selective provision of information, propaganda, education, self-study, positive feeling of pride, inducement, negative feeling of guilt, repentance, even brain-washing. For instance, sensitive information of a possible enemy sabotage is publicized to make people believe they have to stick together and raise their collective readiness for any disruption of their work and life.

Civilian control takes a physical mode when it acts upon the human body. Such control is achieved through bodily presence and performance during a specific period of time in a designated space. For instance, people employed in a work organization are required to be on duty during a given time period and in a fixed position. In a special group study, a roster is kept to count people who are present and absent.

In both spiritual and physical modes, control of civilians may be expressed in distant or close, abstract or concrete, complicated or simple, and unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral forms. Specifically, direction, order, and commands may come from a long distance or be given face-to-face. They may be written in abstract terms or illustrated through observable marks, signals, and gestures. As far as content is concerned, elements of control may be constructed into a complicated system or arranged in a simple way. It may be difficult to comprehend one control element or easy to grasp the meaning of another.

The setting in which control is given and received can be isolated, non-reactive, or interactive. For instance, commands for soldiers in the battlefield are given up close, in simple words, and with concrete situational reference such as eye contact, facial expressions, signals, and marks. In the modern bureaucracy, rules are instead written in abstract, complex terms or language. Bureaucrats learn rules distantly and unilaterally, although they may communicate with each other through close contacts in an interactive setting.

Change of Control

Civil control of ordinary citizens is flexible, open to negotiation, and subject to change. Apart from that which is specified by the state constitution, civil codes, and organizational by-laws, various elements of civilian control are negotiable between controllers and controllees. Styles of negotiation can be formal or informal. Formally, negotiation may be initiated by a request from either side and conducted step-by-step between the representatives of controllers and controllees. The result is likely to be a major change of the general conditions that regulate the behavior and relationship of the two sides. Informally, controllees may signal their intentions of change through routine activities. A controller may be sensitive enough to understand the meanings of different controllee responses and make changes to reduce or avoid negative reactions from and widespread conflict with its controllees.

Relationship between Controllers and Controllees

In terms of general citizen rights, controllees are legally on an equal standing with controllers in contemporary civilian control. In Western democracies, all citizens are independent individuals with inalienable human rights. According to the communist ideology, the people are the

masters of their country. Work unit members are inherently equal to their leaders.

A good illustration of how the relationship between controllers and controllees in one dimension is leveled off in another comes from academic settings, in both capitalist and socialist societies. In universities or research institutes, there are at least two dimensions by which power, control, influence, and achievements are determined. In the administrative dimension, university presidents, college deans, and department chairs have powerful positions and appear to be controllers of ordinary faculty and staff. But in the academic dimension, a senior professor may exert remarkable influence within an entire discipline and be highly regarded world-wide. In fact, when administrative controllers are judged by the academic ranking system, they may be as common as ordinary faculty members. In an academic department, the chair may even have a lower rank than his or her senior colleagues.

Similar controller-controllee interrelations are possible in other institutional, bureaucratic, or non-bureaucratic settings. This shows that relationships between controllers and controllees in modern societies are no longer simply about control and being controlled, but more about social roles and role playing.

Elasticity of Control

From a collective point of view, controllers represent only a minority, sometimes not specifically defined or designated. Controllees, in contrast, constitute the majority. They are connected to each other; it is relatively easy for them to identify common interests and take collective actions. Between the state and the general populace, for example, the state is actually an abstract entity or just a symbol or image. Yet the general populace is composed concretely of individual citizens or actors. Between the management and the employee population in a corporation, the corporate management seems more diversified and vague among stockholders, majority owners, the board of trustees, executives, managers, and technocrats. The employee population, in comparison, consists of individual employees and is often represented by a well-organized union.

The contrast in this dimension of civilian control requires that controllers understand the substantive interests of controllees and take measures to incorporate the mighty forces of controllees into the general course of corporate or social actions and goals.

Effect of Control

The effect of civilian control lies in the perception and reaction of both controllers and controllees. Controllers must understand and respect the legal rights and fundamental needs of controllees; they must be able to formulate a common goal or program that reflects those rights and needs. They must also know how to develop and use proper means and tools of control that are not only acceptable to controllees but also effective in order maintenance and goal attainment.

Controllees must perceive control as reasonable, as a natural part of their work routines and lifestyle, even as a necessary element of social order. It is also important that benefits or services be provided to controllees to lessen their feelings of control and alienation.

Failure of Control

Failure of civilian control may lead to serious social consequences. Because it is so important to induce and maintain collective commitment to the cause of a group or society, collective actions or social programs are doomed to failure if the majority of group members are not properly controlled to generate a sufficient level of support. Moreover, civil riots, rebellions, and other collectively disruptive movements are likely to break out when a civilian community is improperly coordinated, controlled, and integrated. Given that no civilian society is perfectly integrated, it is thus necessary to detect, prevent, and contain potential and actual social problems involving a large crowd of people. This is why armed police, anti-riot forces, or squads of urban riot police are established in modern industrial societies. These control forces are targeted at the general civilian population and, therefore, bridge non-confrontational control of civilians with the coercive control of criminals.

In all, civil, non-confrontational, and non-repressive control of ordinary citizens, as revealed by the Chinese experience, points to a new direction for the study of social control. Insights can be gained for a fundamental understanding of groups, group cohesion, social institutions, social integration, social disintegration, and social change. The newly found landscape of social control also provides a prime opportunity for the application of existing social thought and the development of new social theories.

Part V

THE CHALLENGE AND CHANGE FOR CHINESE SOCIAL CONTROL

It is clear, through previous descriptions and analyses, that various social control structures and processes in Chinese work units are premised on the CCP's grip on and organization of national power, the state's ownership of and responsibility for work units, the work unit's patronage of and care for working people under its wings, and the all-inclusive community style or combinational arrangement of work and life within the wall of the work unit. However, China is undergoing a tremendous social change through its policy of "opening-up" and economic reform. What impact does this sweeping social change have upon the power balance between the party and state in general, and the work unit organization and its social control functions in particular?

In this part, I draw from my recent visit to China and the latest information provided by documentary records. I first examine major reform initiatives that are under debate or implementation and their possible impacts upon social control practices in Chinese work organizations. I then delve into the general social progress of modernization and democratization and see what demands it sets for Chinese social control.

The Impact of Reform: Main Initiatives

Economic reform began in the late 1970s after the third plenary of the CCP's eleventh national congress. Various initiatives and measures have been put into debate, experimentation, and implementation over the course of reform (Gao 1993). They each not only have economic consequences but also cause political repercussions within the Chinese system.

SEPARATION OF THE PARTY FROM THE GOVERNMENT

Separation of the party from the government began after the introduction of the responsibility system into business and production units. To increase efficiency and productivity, it was proposed that production and business quotas or tasks be assigned to work units and that governmental agencies be withdrawn from the direct management or administration of work units (Qiushi 1990). The proposed initiative raised an immediate question: Who is to be put in charge of assigned quotas or tasks at the work unit or subunit level?

As we have seen, there are two control systems in each Chinese work unit. One is the party, which leads the work unit and controls all its decision-making power. The other is the management or administration, which literally takes commands from the party and executes them on behalf of the party. Division of labor between the two control systems is not always clear-cut and free of friction. Struggling for power and shirking responsibility, in fact, remain a chronic problem of the parallel institutionalization of party and management or administration in Chinese work organizations.

Under the responsibility system, if the work unit management is the legitimate authority entrusted with production quotas or business tasks, what role is left to the party? The answer prepared by reformers was that the party concentrates on the construction of the work unit party network and the political-thought work of all unit employees (Gao 1993). But when a work unit and its employees are made committed to the completion of assigned economic quotas, public interest and time can be barely partitioned to the political agenda of the party. The party is thus confronted with losing public attention on the one hand and shrinking its apparatus on the other.

Practically, in most cases, a compromise solution balances the increasing power of management and the losing influence of party brought about by the responsibility reform. The solution, on the surface, runs directly against the separation of the party from the management. That is, the party is combined with the management, which is headed by one autocrat-like person. In relation to the upper party and governmental authorities, this one person takes responsibility for both business affairs and political-thought work. Within the work unit, he or she divides time and work between the "soft" need to catch up with political rhetoric and the "hard" requirement to accomplish business assignment. The partitioning of personal time and work, of course, is not always equal. Often, it is the management side that receives more attention. Overall, the combinational approach to the parallel existence of the party system and management in Chinese work units helps downsize the party machinery in civil, non-political settings. The party is generally made more compact in size and less spectacular in activity at the work unit level.

As the responsibility reform is implemented in work units, political separation of the party from the government becomes an ideological goal in the official agenda of socio-economic reform (*Qiushi* 1990). Identifiable leadership shifts take place in the national political landscape. In the middle 1980s, separation began to take shape when Hu Yaobang became the CCP Secretary General and Zhao Ziyang assumed the Premiership. They each had a relatively clear division of labor. Hu focused on party organization and general political-thought work, and Zhao concentrated on substantive issues in economic reform. Zhao's switch to Secretary General in 1988 was a setback (Stavis 1988). Having a keen interest in economic matters, he left the newly positioned Premier Li Peng in his shadow. The reshuffle after the 1989 Tiananmen Square event brought Jiang Zemin into the position of Secretary General. Li's position was enhanced, relatively, which helped restore the balance between the party and government. But now, Jiang, as the party Secretary General, also assumes the state Presidency, which signifies another change. That is, the party is combined with the government, as happened at the work unit level after responsibility reform.

Despite the personal aspect evident at the center of national power or locally in a civil work unit, separation or combination of the party from or with the government involves a fundamental political dilemma. Separation occurs when the party has a different focus from that of the government. Combination occurs when it is evident that separating the party from the government would mean excluding the party from policy-making and governing processes and making it a figurehead. If the party leadership is not sacrificed and the goal of separation is saved in terms of reducing decision-making bickering and increasing work efficiency, a practical compromise is to combine the party with the government and make them one governing body.

The debate continues over the separation or combination of the party from or with the government (Gao 1993). Tentative reform measures are applied. With regard to the Chinese work unit and its social control practices, what does the party-versus-government separation or combination mean? First, between the party and work unit there are three possible changes of relationship: (1) that the party pulls out of the work unit entirely; (2) that the party remains with the work unit but stays away from its management process; and (3) that the party becomes incorporated with the work unit management. All three possible changes can be seen in the current reform measures under debate or in practice. For instance, in rural enterprises, party affairs are no longer administered by a parallel party setup but instead are managed by the party committee in the local government. In joint ventures, party groups or committees are formed but in general stay out of the business decision-making process. In state-owned work units, the common approach taken after responsibility reform is that the role of party secretary is assumed by the head of management or administration, who decides priorities in the overall framework of the work unit. There are also other viable options.

The actual and potential consequence of these changes is that the party decreases its operational presence in the work and life of work unit members. Impacts on social control within the confines of the work unit vary. In terms of ideological control, if official propaganda, political study, campaign rhetoric, thought work, and other control practices are eliminated with the party system, the remaining space may be immediately taken over by mass media. In fact, mass media, including newspapers, radio, and television, grow steadily through technological development. They play a significant role in spreading the dominant ideology, often with no obvious mass suspicion and hostility (Xu 1993). Compared to the face-to-face thought work in the work unit setting, remote and indirect control through mass media can be more effective. In other areas of control, as work is emphasized by an independent management free from the influence of party ideology, performance standards may be raised. Work disciplines may be tightened. Also, a control practice may be overhauled

in content to meet new needs while its form and amount or intensity remain unchanged. For instance, work unit leaders may still feel that thought work is a useful form of control to motivate workers and, therefore, ought to be kept in use at a proper intensity along with other measures of work discipline. To fit new situations, however, new contents may have to be added to thought work.

OWNERSHIP REFORM: PRIVATIZATION, STOCK, AND FOREIGN VENTURE

If it is said that separation of the party from the government reduces the presence and influence of the party in the Chinese work unit, then ownership reform is designed to keep the hand of the government out of production, business, and professional work units and, therefore, could fundamentally change the Chinese employment landscape.

The officially acknowledged ownership pattern of socialist work units was established during the socialist transformation from 1949 to 1956 and has remained stable throughout the communist rule. It is composed of three elements: all-people or state ownership, collective ownership, and private ownership (*Qiusi* 1990). Among these three types, state-owned work units take the lead in the national economy. Collectively and privately owned work units support or supplement the overall socialist ownership system.

According to the orthodox ideology, an important task of socialist revolution and construction is to transform collective work units into all-people-owned organizations and to remove all private elements from the national economy (*Qiusi* 1990). However, economic reform under Deng proves to be a total betrayal of the old-fashioned socialist ideal. The country moves in an opposite direction. Through various measures of reform, all-people-owned enterprises are closed, merged, transformed, or declared bankrupt. Even some state properties or companies are sold or contracted to private hands for profitable operation, or are privatized through stock shares. Foreign ventures are established along the coast and in the hinterlands. Private businesses mushroom in cities and rural areas. Across the country, the private sector begins to take a significant share in the economy (Gao 1993).

In 1991, for instance, official statistics showed that 1,097 state enterprises were closed, merged, or dissolved because of heavy losses in twenty-six provinces and cities. Private contracts for about 33,000 service or production units were renewed across the country. In thirty-four provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly administered by or independently budgeted under the central government, a total of 2,751 enterprises were privatized through stock-sharing among employees. Another 380 business units went private through stock-taking by other companies. In Shanghai and Shenzhen,

company stocks began to be sold out to the public, even to overseas holders (Gao 1992).

At present, in the overall ownership pie among the state, the collective, and the private, the state ownership still takes the biggest share. However, as indicated by economic reform and development, the state sector is downsizing while private businesses, joint ventures, and even wholly owned foreign companies continue to increase their share in the entire economy. This trend has great relevance to social control practices in Chinese workplaces. In private businesses, either Chinese- or foreign-owned, it is obviously not possible to implement control in the exclusive service of the party and government. Control is made primarily to meet the private business needs for work efficiency and productivity. The form or style of control may undergo an automatic change when private owners or boards of trustees decide what will facilitate the goal accomplishment and economic profitability of their businesses. In state-owned work units where the right of operation is contracted to private elements, the autonomy to run business guaranteed to or claimed by the contractors is likely to leave minimal or no leverage to the state over the intra-unit organization and operation of control and discipline. Even in state-owned and -run work organizations, as focus is primarily put on productivity and profitability, the form and content of control and discipline may also have to be fine-tuned to meet the newly defined needs. It is especially interesting to note that the nature of control and discipline over unit members by the work unit authority may have to change when company stocks are held by individual employees. The legitimacy of control and the relationship between controllers and controllees are likely to change accordingly.

DISMANTLING THE RATIONING SYSTEM

The Chinese rationing system is a key element of the socialist planned economy. It is operated as follows: the state buys or collects in the form of taxation, foods, oil, textiles, and other agricultural or non-agricultural products from peasants and other producers, and provides them by a uniform price to all urban residents and work unit employees. The rationing system works side-by-side with household registration. Its function is to keep people in the place where they are born, raised, and assigned. Obviously, it is a key to the formation of neighborhood committees, the stabilization of community lifestyles, and the effectiveness of social control in workplaces.

The call to reform the rationing system comes from two sources. One is the state. By running the rationing system, the state has to hand out a tremendous amount of subsidy. The other is recipients. Within the rationing system, people have to bear delay and discrimination in receiving material supplies for all

their needs. Supplies are often in low quality and limited variety. Rationing becomes more and more unsatisfactory after reform affords people the availability of free markets and the capacity to buy material supplies from the market. Formal reform goes through a sequence of step-by-step as well as dramatic changes. The first sign of change appeared in the early 1980s, when sufficient supplies of meats and non-staple foods in free markets made the official rationing coupons ridiculous. In the middle 1980s, a significant measure took place. The rationing tickets for clothes were officially stopped. Toward the end of the 1980s, as staple foods, meats, and other consumer goods were readily available in the market, change of the entire rationing system became a formal topic in reform debates (Gao 1993). At present, the state supply of material needs continues, but more and more people find that they live well without relying upon the rationing system.

A fundamental change of the state supply and rationing system is required. It is possible that the entire system should be totally dismantled. In that scenario, work unit employees will buy their foods, consumer goods, and all other living needs in the open market. They will no longer depend upon their work units for registration with the supply agencies of the local government. A substantive measure will thus be lost on the part of the work unit to keep its employees in line. Most significant, people will feel free to move from one place to another as long as they can make money to buy their subsistence needs from markets. The neighborhood is likely to be destabilized by the frequent in- and out-flow of residents. The community lifestyle and the social control practices based upon it (e.g., mutual surveillance and neighborhood watch) will probably lose ground. The entire society may be inundated with large groups of migrants moving in different directions. Social control authorities are likely to face an unprecedented challenge in containing social problems and keeping public order. As I personally observed during my recent trip to China, as well as reported by interview respondents who just arrived from the country, train and bus stations are now crowded with passengers leaving their homes or work units to seek better fortunes in other places, especially in the southern and coastal regions. Thefts, cheating, fights, and rapes are becoming an epidemic worry for both passengers and transportation guards.

CRUSHING THE IRON WAGE SYSTEM

The Chinese wage system was formed over years of ideological debates and revolutionary campaigns. It reflects both the Chinese tradition of social egalitarianism and the communist ideal of public ownership. The main scheme is that the state establishes a uniform wage scaling system, controls the

national total of wage distribution, and decides the overall change of wage structure and process. The underlying rationale is that unnecessary and unjustifiable differences of income distribution are prevented across professions, ranks, and regions through the uniformity of an equitable, socialist wage system (*Qiushi* 1990).

The main advantage of the official wage system is that individual salaries are comparable across the country and income disparity is minimized throughout the society. Change of wage is officially regulated and can be made uniform for all wage earners. As a sense of status equity is maintained among all working people, authorities can legitimately demand a universal allegiance from them to the officially promoted social policies and control practices. There are also disadvantages. First, the wage system does not distinguish among people of different capacity, training, and performance. It provides little incentive for those who are competent, willing to work hard, and able to accomplish more work. Second, it is rigid and resistant to change. As is publicly criticized, the Chinese wage is an iron wage. It does not reflect individual, regional, and seasonal differences. Nor does it meet the changing needs of markets or natural economic forces. Finally, the official wage system is widely blamed for fostering idleness, incompetence, and inefficiency (Gao 1993).

Reform of the wage system begins with delivery of bonuses to individual members in work units. The purpose of this measure is twofold: (1) to give work units a fair share of their profit; and (2) to let work units determine how the performance of individual members is related to the distribution of substantial benefits. The state controls only the total of bonuses that can be distributed in proportion to the overall profits or work effects of a work unit. The work unit is given full discretion to dispose of the bonuses on the basis of individual performance or other standards. In profitable work units, as bonuses may be given at a level comparable to or higher than the base salary set by the state, they are no longer a fringe benefit in addition to the standard paycheck.

Delivery of bonuses is a preliminary measure, but it opens the door for essential reform initiatives. According to the wage-floating initiative, for instance, a work unit is allowed to float its employee wage up or down one, two, or more levels along the standard wage scale set by the state. In production and business units, the wage contract scheme provides that a total monthly or yearly wage be negotiated once from the state. The work unit itself can then decide how to distribute the negotiated wage total among its employees, either by time or by piecework. In reform-oriented enterprises, especially those in coastal areas and economic zones, as new reform measures are attempted or implemented, the official iron wage scale is laid aside. Even

in governmental agencies and professional organizations, wage reform is a heated topic. Overall, the state wage system becomes less a uniform mandate and service for all work units and more a standard reference for different wage schemes across the country (Gao 1993).

Continuing reform may drive the state entirely out of the wage planning and delivery for all work units. The state is left with the regulatory power to make wage-related laws, rules, or references. If that happens, the work unit will gain a substantive control over its employees in determining the value of their labor. The socialist ideal and mentality will disappear. People will no longer feel that they work for the state, support the party, and are cared for by the party and state through work units. Instead, they will feel that they work for their work units and that only the well-being of the work units has a direct relation to their paychecks. For instance, if they work harder and accomplish more on the job, as these are closely monitored by their leaders and can be translated into economic gains for the work units, unit members may receive a larger paycheck.

As far as social control is concerned, following the party line, answering the state's call, or attending to the official politics may have to give way to meeting the practical needs of the work unit. Unit members will be tied to their work requirements. Wage will become an effective way to award or punish employees. Also, as it is guided by its concern over cost and effect, the unit management may no longer feel it necessary to demand a universally equal allegiance, devotion, or commitment to its authority and policy from the general employee population. It will only ask for what it needs and pay what it gains. In other words, unit employees will be differentially controlled or motivated in terms of the duties they have to perform for the work unit.

HOUSING REFORM

Housing is a major material benefit offered by the state to the laboring people through work units. In state economic planning, housing is included in the investment for capital construction and the depreciation fund for public assets (Xu 1993). In practical terms, housing is built along with the opening and expanding construction of work units. It is maintained by the depreciation fund, which is a standard item of the operation cost of work units.

Public housing in Chinese work units provides a physical landscape upon which various social control practices are built. Neighborhood organizations, close connections between and among unit members and their leaders, monitoring continuum from work to life, and effective coordination of security and other community affairs all derive from the fact that Chinese work unit

members live together in standard housing units and that it is easy to monitor them physically.

Housing reform has been under debate for more than a decade. Various proposals or measures have been tested and even partially implemented across the country (Xu 1993). Recently, the state has reclassified housing reform under the general reform of the social distribution system. According to the official argument, the main thrust of housing reform is to change the form of benefit distribution from object to cash (Chen 1992). Concretely, it is proposed that wage be increased to a level at which employees can afford to rent or buy housing without any subsidy or preferential treatment from the state. In other words, the state will no longer provide free housing to employees. Instead, it will give them the salary their work actually merits and let them buy or rent housing on their own.

Like other reforms, it is unclear where housing reform ends and with what outcomes. Nevertheless, some impacts of private housing ownership or rental on social control can be estimated. First, from a utilitarian point of view, termination of housing benefits to laboring people from the state through work units will weaken the state's position among the general populace. It will be more difficult for the state to uphold its requirement that people follow its policy lines and support its social programs. Second, when the state gives up its role as a universal benefactor of working people, work units may begin to play that role. If so, work units will have leverage to motivate or control individual members in the service of their own organizational goals. Third, private housing makes it difficult to maintain continuous monitoring of unit employees from work to life. Under housing reform, housing facilities in a work unit may be owned by former unit members who have already left the work unit. Newly arrived unit members may rent or own housing outside the work unit wherever they prefer. The living situation of unit employees in general will be cross-cutting, complicated, and hard to manage and control. It may, therefore, be no longer practical to organize a residential committee within the work unit boundary and count on it to reach unit employees when they are out of work. In other words, the current method of controlling people's work through their life and restricting people's life through their work will lose its effect.

Of course, not all effects of housing reform are negative to social control. Some positive effects may contribute to the group-community stability. For instance, private housing ownership in the residential compound of a work unit may help keep unit members from leaving their work unit. Former neighbors and colleagues are so used to each other that they may make an effort to maintain their co-work and co-living style and environment. Mutual

connections among unit members and their bonds with the work unit may thus be strengthened.

REPLACING LIFE EMPLOYMENT WITH SOCIAL SECURITY

Job security and life employment have long been touted as one of the main socialist advantages in the official ideology. From an individual point of view, life employment is indeed a great benefit. Once an individual is employed by a work unit, he or she is included in the state economic planning and therefore guaranteed continuous work until retirement and permanent protection until death. The vacancy left after retirement can be even filled by one's children.

Obviously, life employment lays a practical foundation for Chinese work unit members to willingly stick together and build a community lifestyle within the work unit. For the work unit authority, it provides a stable work and life environment in which it is less challenging to manage business, control people, intervene in disputes, and implement important party policies and social programs. In recent years of economic reform, however, it is also recognized that life employment nourishes idleness and promotes business inefficiency (Gao 1993).

Current reform debates and measures address life employment from two sides. On one side is the reform of the labor and personnel mechanism in work units. It proposes that cadres move up and down, employees get on and off, and salary be raised and lowered, all according to the business needs and accomplishments of a work unit (Gao 1993). In other words, it calls for a dismantling of the life employment system. On the other side is social security reform. It begins to design social protection programs for those who are waiting for their first employment opportunity and those who are driven out of their current employment because of the closure, reorganization, transformation, or bankruptcy of their work units, or because of personal incompetence. In other words, solutions are prepared for possible social problems brought about by the termination of life employment. In these two fronts of reform, the common goal or outcome is the replacement of life employment with social security.

How is social control affected when social security replaces life employment? First, the responsibility of Chinese work units to care for and control their permanent members is transferred to the hands of society. The relationship between a work unit and its employees is thus shortened in time and simplified in substance. For example, the work unit may take responsibility for its employees only when they are associated with it and only when a work-related matter is involved. Second, when the relationship of a work unit with its employees is refocused exclusively on work, certain general

social control practices currently instituted within the work unit may be deemed irrelevant and, therefore, be eliminated. In the meantime, other control measures regarded as essential to work efficiency and productivity may be installed or tightened. For instance, when employees are not treated as permanent "possessions" of the work unit, their thought and behavior may no longer be considered important to control. On the other hand, as paid "employees," whether or not they follow the official schedule and procedure of work can be legitimately questioned and controlled. Third, the relationship between controllers and controllees will become blurry if cadres are promoted or demoted on the basis of their performance. At present, leaders are always leaders. As their authority is established and unchangeable, they are often assertive in dealing with their subordinates. However, if they are aware of their liability to step down, they are likely to take a new approach to implement any control-related measure. Finally, the end of lifetime employment may reduce or even eliminate employees' dependence upon and subordination to their work units. It is likely that employees will take the initiative to resist unreasonable control from their work unit or any upper authority.

The main thrust of reform is to free the work unit from its all-inclusive responsibilities for its employees, the party, the government, and the society. The work unit is then able to focus on its own work and business affairs; implement task-related programs, decisions, and disciplines; and achieve its desired work efficiency, productivity, and profitability. As various social control functions assumed by the Chinese work unit are actually social responsibilities of the government, current reform has a direct impact upon social control in China. Although it is too early to estimate the nature and scope of the impact, it is definite that some social control practices will be taken away from the Chinese work unit and placed in the hands of appropriate governmental agencies. Control practices that remain in the work unit will have direct relevance to work and work-related disciplines. As it is freed from general social control responsibilities, the Chinese work unit can then exert its own will in setting control priorities and developing strategies to deal with all work-related control problems within its confines.

The Demands of Modernization and Democratization

From a historical and global point of view, the present socio-economic reform is only one episode in the development of Chinese society. Over the past 150 years after the Opium War (1840), various social reform schemes, national construction plans, and revolutionary campaigns have been debated and pursued to vitalize the nation. Even though they are often contradictory and bring setbacks and twists, the schemes, plans, and campaigns all drive China toward modernization and democratization.

In an absolute sense, there is no model for modernization and democratization. In a relative sense, over the past 200 years of world history, the development of Western societies has provided the dominant image of modernization and democracy. China has been known for its effort to maintain an independent character among other nations. The communist government is apparently incompatible with, sometimes in confrontation with, mainstream Western democratic economies through its alleged adherence to Marxism, a Western counterculture. However, in its drive toward modernization and democratization, China essentially follows the standard track of Western development and social progress. In this chapter, I attempt to project social configuration and its relevance to work organizations and social control practices in China in terms of the requirements and consequences of a Western model of development.

DIVISION OF LABOR AND DIFFERENTIATION

According to orthodox Marxism, socialism is a grandiose scheme to cure social problems created by capitalism. For Marx, capitalists and capitalist

enterprises employ workers from free labor markets and exploit their labor force without mercy. They produce irresponsibly, pour products continuously into consumer markets, and create cyclical production surpluses and economic crises. When an economic crisis occurs, capitalists lay off workers and drive them to the streets without taking any social responsibility (Marx 1967).

In reaction, socialism proposes a planned economy. Work units are designed not only as a place where people work but also as a living community where all human ties can be built and survival needs can be met. But in reality the socialist design does not suit the need of modern, large-scale production. Current reform in China is actually reversing the grandiose scheme of socialism back to the market mechanism of capitalism.

What is the nature of modern production? Does it require that division of labor be clearly laid out, social organizations be functionally differentiated, and human sentiments, ties, or needs be enfeebled or sacrificed? In fact, as discovered by great social theorists in the course of historical changes, the past 200 years has seen a process of continuing division of labor and deepening differentiation of social structure (Durkheim 1964; Marx 1967; Weber 1968). Rational division of labor and organizational or bureaucratic differentiation are now both a social fact and a developmental trend.

Revolution and reform have put China on this track. Through division of labor, each social unit or group is assigned a manageable task. Time and energy can be focused to accomplish the task in its entirety. Specialization generates high work efficiency and competitive products or outcomes. Likewise, if Chinese work units give up all irrelevant social responsibilities and focus on the business and tasks they are designed for, they may produce products and accomplish business goals in an effective way. What is irrelevant and needs to be phased out? Obviously, work units cannot continue to be a party station, being involved in ideological propaganda and party politics. They cannot continue to be a governmental agency, being engaged in welfare, delivery of social benefits, allocation of social responsibilities, security, and social control practices. They cannot even continue to take care of all life aspects of their employees. In short, all those political, economic, and social obligations make the labor of a work unit too general, too inclusive, and too diffusive. Division of labor must be exercised to partition most of them to social service, charity, or governmental agencies.

Division of labor leads to the functional differentiation of both the labor-performing agency and the content of labor being performed, which may result in increased efficiency. In the case of Chinese work units, when their social responsibilities are returned to the government, the government must then be differentiated institutionally and functionally to become a modern governing bureaucracy. It can no longer be only a power authority. It must provide all

rules and services as well as an orderly environment for its constituents, which means that it must develop appropriate branches or systems to accomplish its governing tasks.

Once a system is structurally established, the content of its tasks (either services or control) can be broken down. The division of system tasks can further differentiate the general system into a more sophisticated organizational complex. The process continues until work efficiency is maximized. In the case of Chinese social control, once the general social control task is concentrated in the hands of the government from work units or local communities, it may be divided into components within a unified but highly differentiated agency. Such a governmental agency, specializing only in social control, may easily follow the logic of its specialty, organize its force productively, and perform its job effectively. Likewise, when a work unit is left only with its own business interest or task, it can amplify it, divide it into manageable parts, and pursue it with full efficiency.

A STANDARD WORK ORGANIZATION

The essence of division of labor is that the task is broken down into various parts so that each part can be duly handled. Likewise, differentiation requires that society be differentiated into subsystems that specialize in a specific area and perform a specific job effectively.

By this criterion, a standard work organization should focus on the specific business it is designed to accomplish. Each work organization may rely upon other social agencies or work organizations for supporting services required in its own business operation. In other words, the existence of other organizations that provide various services is a precondition for the independence of a business establishment. However, can a society be possibly developed to such a degree that all social needs are recognized and properly addressed by corresponding agencies? In China, why do work units have to function like a self-sufficient town or district? Because Chinese society is not yet differentiated enough to provide universal supporting services to all different work units. A change in social structure and relations is needed in order for the Chinese work unit to become an employment organization that fits the image of efficient modern production.

In reference to Marx's critique of the early capitalists for their irresponsibility regarding social problems, the classical bashing of capitalists should be redirected to the society itself. Indeed, society is to blame for inattention and inaction regarding massive social problems. As it lags behind in differentiation and fails to develop proper social institutions in reaction to rapid industrialization, the society is unable to take care of the social problems created by

capitalist development. Individual capitalist enterprises, on the other hand, do not commit a crime when they produce effectively. In fact, they provide a driving force for social reform and historical change. Only in the era of advanced capitalism is the society able to stand up to its overall responsibility through a welfare state and keep pace with the changing needs created by grass-roots interests and capitalist development.

Is a standard capitalist employment organization likely in the Chinese context? It is certain that the Chinese work unit is able to focus on its business affairs and become specialized in it. It is also possible that the Chinese work unit can develop a complicated and effective discipline system to motivate or control employees for the realization of its business goals. However, given that most Chinese work units have adequate or nearly adequate services for their employees, they are unlikely to throw out those services altogether. Moreover, reform and "opening-up" policies bring different perspectives. Although it is known that a work unit cannot be productive if it attempts to meet every need of its employees, it is also recognized that employee services promote commitment and dedication and, therefore, help promote productivity. For instance, Chinese management scholars and practitioners now acknowledge that Japanese employers foster the loyalty of their employees through important employee services (Deyo 1987; Gao 1993).

A business-oriented work unit can no longer be a social control authority or social services agency. Social control must come from the appropriate governmental authority suited to implement control measures in a professional and effective way. The work unit, free from the general social control obligation, can then focus on work-related discipline and control for the achievement of its business goals. Similarly, social services ought to be returned to governmental or social agencies that specialize in the provision of services. However, it must be pointed out that provision of substantial benefits to employees by the work unit has the practical effect of facilitating its business operation and implementation of work-related control.

FREEDOM OF BELIEF, SPEECH, AND CHOICE

Democratization is another trend in Chinese development. Despite the fact that Mao's mass democracy is not institutionally constructive and Deng's economic reform does not explicitly include democratic reform of the one-party political system, the idea and practice of democracy have begun to spread throughout the population. At the center of national power, individual rights and freedom of belief, speech, and choice are clearly written into the Constitution (National People's Congress 1990). Ethnic minorities, democratic parties, overseas Chinese, and other local or special interests are included in

serious political debates or important decision-making processes through the People's Political Consultative Conference and the People's Congress. In local politics, direct election of people's representatives and lower-rank positions is formally instituted, giving people both a sense of participation in the governing process and a lesson on how to advance their own interests through institutional means (*Qiushi* 1990). In general, the Chinese political atmosphere is moving in the direction of relaxation and democracy.

Most important in this trend, however, is not what is allowed or granted from the top. It is instead what is wanted, created, or realized at the grass-roots level. For example, freedom of belief is guaranteed by the 1982 Constitution. But not until the arrival of different religions, ideologies, and thoughts through years of "opening-up" policy have people been able to make free choices according to their own beliefs. On the other hand, although people are still not allowed to speak publicly against the party, complaining, criticizing, and even cursing the party do occur in private or small-group settings. The civilian freedom of speech would not be possible if the public stayed tuned exclusively to the party ideology. Likewise, freedom of choice is still restricted by the rigid communist system. But through reform, more and more people begin to cross lines and seek their fortunes in a new landscape. In short, whether or not it is allowed by the communist system, people are beginning to explore and apply their rights and opportunities to realize their goals in work and life.

What is the consequence to social control when people begin to exercise their basic rights in belief, freedom, and choice? At present, Western thoughts are readily available in the Chinese cultural market. World events and changes are viewed by more and more ordinary Chinese through the mass media (Xu 1993). There is already a grass-roots epidemic to criticize the party and government. It is a distorted manifestation of freedom of belief and speech, but it provides rich soil for an institutional form of freedom of belief and speech to grow through mass media. Moreover, the mass movement to seek individual fortunes across different walks of life signals a strong tide for freedom of choice. When these trends become a mature freedom of belief, speech, and choice, they may usher in a new dimension of national ideology, order, and politics in Chinese society. In this new dimension, ideology will be a means of social control not because it is declared as dominant but because people consciously believe it. Order will no longer be based upon the interests of one party. It will be judged instead by the legal needs for protection of individual freedom and national security. Politics will become an open social process, involving people of all party affiliations and social backgrounds. Social control and order will be legitimated and guided by law and procedural fairness rather than the need to protect the political rule of one party and its desired state of affairs.

CIVIL LIBERTY AND PRIVACY

If it is said that Confucianism places order above human rights and subjects people to a social hierarchy, then the communist revolution contributes tremendously in publicizing the idea of equality, equity, and fairness across old and new lines of social stratification among all Chinese people. For the first time in Chinese history, women recognize that they "hold up half the sky," peasants realize that they are not inferior to urbanites, and ordinary citizens become aware that they are the masters of their society rather than the tools of their leaders. People's rights or the communist version of civil liberties are somewhat different from those acknowledged and practiced in the Western mainstream. People's rights are group-oriented rather than individually asserted. The right of personal privacy is not stressed. Instead, the right of collective participation is emphasized. In fact, it is considered a centerpiece of people's rights. Despite this difference, the communist ideal of people's rights (from a developmental point of view) is like the capitalist concept of civil liberties in Western societies as the product of modern civilization.

People's rights realized through communist revolution will affect the development or evolution of Chinese civil liberties. Indeed, a major change of focus from collectivism to individualism is needed to achieve a new Chinese version of civil liberties conceived of in terms of individual human rights. As the world standard of human rights becomes known to the Chinese through continuing reform and "opening-up" to the outside, group pressure will give way to individual privacy. People will develop the habit of thinking of themselves first. They will also seek constitutional and institutional guarantees for their basic rights and needs. Private space will be cherished and protected. Group goals will take second place. For example, under the communist idea of equality, it is appropriate to question whether or not all are equally committed to the cause of the party and government. Under the individualistic standard of civil liberties, however, the idea of equality will mean only that each individual is given equal social opportunity to pursue his or her own interests. It will be no longer legitimate for the authority to penetrate into individual life and demand equal social allegiance and commitment.

The social consequence of such reorientation of civil liberties is profound. In terms of social control, a legally justified and protected claim for individual space or privacy may prevent control agents from accessing sensitive areas to obtain crucial information and make it a challenging task to uncover a crime. Evidence collected by control agents under certain circumstances may be legally judged as biased, contaminated, or a proof of violation of individual procedural rights, and therefore inadmissible to the prosecution process. Within an organization such as the Chinese work unit, a total allegiance may no longer be indiscriminately presumed when people come to it just for work

or a line of duty. Membership may not provide any warranty that individual members are willing to give up certain constitutional rights for the collective cohesion or solidarity and goal attainment desired by the organizational authority. Even work discipline procedures may have to be evaluated to ensure that they do not injure human dignity and cause any violation of individual rights.

China is undergoing a conscious socioeconomic reform as well as a developmental trend toward modernization and democratization. Reform measures and proposed changes have both direct and indirect impacts on social control in general and on organizational control in particular. For the communist party that relies upon the work unit as a tool for proletarian dictatorship and socialist construction, all current and future changes challenge its power base. All possible consequences or outcomes are serious. At one extreme, the CCP may lose power eventually because of its gradually loosening grip on work organizations, the basic social building block. On the other extreme, fear of losing control may drive the CCP back to the old track of organizing and controlling all social units and individual unit members. In between are other options. One possible development is that the CCP will back off from private space while continuing to hold on to national power. In this scenario, the CCP would follow the basic trend of social change and switch its style of social control from all-inclusive, motivational, and spiritually oriented to legal, regulatory, and behavioral. In this way, China would become open to the outside, be integrated to the world system, and adopt relevant world standards in all substantive areas.

Outlooks for Future Chinese Social Control

The current socio-economic reform and long-term developmental trend toward modernization and democratization have tremendous consequences for social control in Chinese society and especially for organizational control in Chinese work units. The landscape of control in China will take a new shape. Thus it is appropriate to preview possible outlooks of future Chinese social control.

SOCIAL CONTROL BEING SOCIAL

A striking feature of future social control in China will be a distinction among social, local, and organizational control entities and their responsibilities. Reform calls for the autonomy and independence of businesses, enterprises, and work units. Modernization requires division of labor and organizational differentiation. Work units can no longer bear all social responsibilities and control all their employees from work to life for the party and government. The government must take back its part of social responsibility and develop an adequate social control system to provide a proper social environment for all Chinese work units.

The outcome is that social control will become social, that is, universally executed by the government for all citizens and legal entities. This requires that the police network be modernized, standardized, and strengthened to take the lead in control operations. It also requires that various control measures be designed and implemented in relative independence from all local interests.

Ideological Control

It will no longer be practical to develop a uniform national ideology and impose it through weekly political studies or other simple means of propaganda in all work units and social groupings. Use of governmental networks and mass media to pass on official policies, social programs, non-political ideas, and self-defense instructions will become the new form of ideological control. The effect of dragging people spiritually to the social mainstream will remain an issue for the social control authority.

Neighborhood Control

Local police stations are currently linked to all residential committees. This will facilitate the possible withdrawal of work units and the increasing involvement of the government. As housing reform and termination of life employment cause people to move from one place to another, the boundaries of work units will blur, the composition of residents in a neighborhood will change, and residential order will take a new shape. It may no longer be appropriate for a work unit to administer a residential committee once local residents in a housing compound become diversified in terms of work affiliations. The government may become the only legitimate authority to claim control over residential organizations. In other words, residential committees may become independent from work units. Keeping community order may no longer be part of the business functions of an organization.

Confidential Records

It is burdensome and pointless to keep a long evaluation record for each citizen. Also, the current dossier system puts an unjustified focus on the political aspect of social life and provides no help in crime and criminal control. As signified by the recent introduction of personal identification cards, the dossier system may become a records network that keeps track of essential personal information such as biological data and fingerprints. A nation-wide computerized document system may also be established to monitor criminals.

Reward and Penalty

Society-wide rewards can be made publicly to all citizens and determined by various levels of government for people under their jurisdiction. Exemplary citizen, ideal family, model work unit, excellent entrepreneur, and other possible titles or categories can be included to motivate people and keep them in line.

Penalty and punishment may be meted out from different perspectives in a broad social context. The justice system may make important punishment decisions with significant and spectacular consequences. Irregular, local, and informal forms of penalty may therefore be removed. As punishment is decided and delivered uniformly and universally, social order will be better maintained and reinforced.

Administrative Disciplining

The government may crack down on illegal acts and rule violations through administrative means. For example, evasion of taxes by businesses can be punished by revocation of their operation licenses. When it is guided by systematic and well-publicized rules and procedures, administrative disciplining can be used effectively by the government in a broad social context toward ordinary citizens and legal entities. Important controversies may be brought to the court for an analysis of the legality or constitutionality of all administrative rules and procedures involved in a disciplining action.

Justice

A formal court system will take center stage in applying law professionally, independently, and procedurally. Justice will be delivered universally to all social units as well as individual citizens. Informal grass-roots justice will continue to address local disputes. But legal guidance will be rendered to it to ensure that no law is transgressed and individual legal rights are not violated.

Public Security

Social order can be maintained by a relatively stable, independent, and professional security force. Formal police officers can act as the primary agents of social control and carry out all proactive and reactive control measures. Local interests to keep and promote safety and security can be encouraged but should be subject to supervision and coordination of formal security forces. Also, no formal social control tasks will be left to the local organizations, including a formal work unit. As individual citizens and legal entities become aware of their procedural rights, security agencies and agents will have to follow all due process restrictions under law.

Vigilance and Inclusion

Vigilance, inclusion, exclusion, and mobilization are social tactics used between the control authority and the general populace. They will continue to serve, singly or in combination, as important instruments in promoting and implementing major social programs. The way they are used, however, may change. For instance, it is likely that individual voluntarism will be honored and that law will be a primary guidance. The justice system may also intervene to question and judge the legality of any society-wide mobilization measure through vigilance and inclusion.

It will no longer be possible for the government or society as a whole to count on individual social groups or work units for promotion and implementation of the major forms of social control. Social control will not be secured for the governing authority without actual labor on its part. In fact, there will be an ample degree of social control left to the government to ensure that all social groups or work units are run in an orderly, legal, and appropriate way in a generally secure social environment.

SOCIAL CONTROL BEING LOCAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL

Even as each form of social control becomes social, standardized, and a professional operation of a specialized governmental agency, it does not rule out that individual social groups or work units continue to maintain their own control apparatus to advance local or organizational goals. To some degree, an effective control system may be indeed indispensable to the business success of a highly differentiated social group or work unit.

Ideological Control

A work unit, even if it is free from party politics, may still have its own motto, charter, flag, song, or symbol. The spirit of a work unit may be reflected in all possible aspects of membership life. Channels such as mass meetings, broadcasts, posters, and membership handbooks may continue to be used to ensure that spiritual identity and control are maintained and translated into a sense of collectivity, allegiance, and commitment.

Residential Control

Reform is designed to clear the work unit of all unjustifiable social responsibilities. But the work unit can continue to operate certain social services for its employees if it wants to or if it feels it may benefit from doing so. Within a living compound on its premises, a work unit may continue to

administer residential organizations and use them to provide protection for and maintain control over its employees. In fact, as public housing on its premises become owned by individual employees who may later cease their work relations but continue to live there, it will be especially necessary for the work unit to oversee the residential area to prevent disruptive occurrences that may negatively impact its business.

Confidential Records

Instead of keeping employee dossiers for the party and state, a work unit may want to establish a unit-wide employee records system based upon its own business needs. The records system may be indispensable to the management in implementing appropriate training, educational, and production programs and making important decisions with regard to employee appointment, reward, and promotion. It certainly helps in controlling the transfer and upper mobility of its employees.

Reward and Penalty

Reward and penalty within a work unit will be applicable to its own business needs and organizational goals. As political rhetoric and irrelevant events are laid aside, reward and penalty can be reinvented in terms of the unit's division of labor. Awarding and penalizing activities can be reoriented likewise. Every line of specialty within a work unit may be given public attention and, therefore, a boost to perfect its workmanship through reward and penalty.

Administrative Disciplining

Because it is directed solely toward work, administrative disciplining may become narrower in scope and tighter in intensity. Administrative rules may become more specific to the internal ramifications of business affairs or the requirements of work duty. Most salient, because everyone will be aware of the primary importance of task performance and work efficiency, both controllers and controllees will be serious about the regular procedures of business and work. As a result, most people will follow administrative requirements. Disciplining will need only focus on the few who go beyond the line.

Quasi-Justice

Work-related disputes and conflicts of interests are likely to increase when focus is put on work performance and business accomplishment. Settlement of disputes, resolution of conflicts, and delivery of civil justice may become part of the management activities of a work unit. Practical needs may then justify the practice of conflict resolution and the retention of a special forum within the work unit. Quasi-justice will continue within the Chinese work unit.

Para-Security

This may continue to operate in the form of a formal unit division, especially when the work unit is large or the public security system is unable to provide a socially secure environment for individual organizations. The task orientation of unit para-security is likely to be inward and specific. Not only will it be confined to the work unit compound, but it will focus on business-related safety and security procedures. Installation of advanced safety and security instruments may become widespread. Use of human power will likely decline. In short, para-security will be made to suit the practical needs of a work unit.

Vigilance and Inclusion

Mass motivation through vigilance and inclusion will occur only for the maintenance of organizational order and the attainment of substantive goals. When necessary, the work unit authority may argue that organizational membership implies a partial surrender of individual rights to the collective morality and goal. It may also use its discretionary power to take the law, at least the organizational by-law, into its own hands. In the final analysis, however, all measures of collective vigilance and mass inclusion will have to pass a legal or constitutional test that law and human rights are not violated forcibly.

In general, work organizations in a society provide a locus where social control can develop both depth and breadth. In the dimension of depth, control within a work unit is tailored to local or organizational needs and may be differentiated as far as the rational division of work and task allows. Conventional forms of local or organizational control may continue and gain new content. New forms may also emerge. In the dimension of breadth, local or organizational control in work units and other social settings presents a challenging task for social control at large. Society-wide monitoring may be needed to guard against clandestine control activities of illegal cliques and to

intervene in the routine control operation of legal work units or social organizations when the legality of control is in question.

CONTROL LESS FOR EFFECT

An important effect of the differentiation of social control into social and organizational dimensions is that each dimension is left with a respective area of focus. As the breadth of task is reduced, each dimension of control can develop a professional specialty and thereby increase its work efficiency. A catchword for this change is "control less for effect."

For social control in Chinese work units, "control less for effect" is apparent when control is focused only on work or business-related areas. The scope of control is narrowed as the control needs or requirements of the party and government are returned to their original sponsors or the overall society, the thought of employees is not controlled, and the behavior of employees is observed only during the time of work. Also, the entire control apparatus is no longer put on constant alert to prevent something that might happen. The system can thus be relaxed. Saved energy can be reinvested in work-related control activities suitable to raising productivity. In other words, organizational control can be deepened in the direction of the business task of a work unit. Its effect can be tested in the attainment process of organizational goals.

For social control at the level of society, "control less for effect" is reflected in two fronts. In relation to local or organizational control, when business-related problems are duly handled and local order is effectively kept within the confines of work units or social groups, governmental control authorities may not have to teach, advise, direct, organize, or coordinate any social units in their respective organizational or local control tasks or activities. Energy can be saved for effective social control actions in society at large. On the other hand, additional effect may occur from a reduction of unnecessary control activities and a concentration on control targets. For instance, the scope of control can be significantly focused when social control shifts from the party ideology to the state law. Generally, the party ideology calls for censorship of people's thoughts and words. It also tends to create a paranoia that something might happen if control is relaxed momentarily. Such paranoia overstretches the control system, impairing its readiness to react to real problems. In contrast, a sound state law can give clear definitions of objectively observable and measurable acts. Crimes and deviance can be specified, along with clear prescriptions of punishments. A professional and effective social control need only follow the law to carry out its duty.

In a philosophical sense, "control less for effect" requires a fundamental change in attitude and decision making. The Chinese mind is habitually suited

to a consummate mode of thinking. In terms of social control actions, the Chinese tend to overly guard against events whose probability of happening is essentially zero. "Control less for effect," in contrast, embodies an instrumental mode of thinking and acting. It assumes that ends are specified and means are applied only if they help realize the ends. In other words, social control is seen as a means. It is employed only if it is necessary and useful to the attainment of a goal or the resolution of a problem.

In all, the current and future social process of reform, modernization, and democratization will have various impacts on social control in China. Changes are possible from all directions and in all aspects. Some may be implicit, indirect, remote, and general to the overall society. Others may be explicit, direct, immediate, and particular to individual social units, especially the Chinese work unit. Various modes of social control may continue in form but are likely to be overhauled in content. There will also be a differentiation of social control along social and organizational dimensions. In society at large, social control may be concentrated in the hands of a formal, specialized, and independent state system. In work units, organizational control may wipe out all party politics, governmental requirements, and business-irrelevant activities, and be in the service of only work, business affairs, and organizational goals. The society and work unit will each be served in their respective rights and needs. Social and organizational control will each become focused in scope and effective in performance.

Conclusion

My underlying motivation is to understand the present Chinese social control system and be prepared, both theoretically and psychologically, for its transformation under the changing social conditions of reform, modernization, and democratization.

Having analyzed social control apparatuses and practices in Chinese work units, I will now address a number of pragmatic concerns. First, current Chinese social control is not exclusively community-based. It is a mixture. On the one hand, it has a formal bureaucratic structure that is modern, rational, and suitable for its functional needs. Laws, rules, by-laws, and ethics are systematically established. Implementation follows a sophisticated organizational procedure. On the other hand, traditional ties, customary codes, and mutual surveillance are not abandoned but are incorporated into the bureaucratic control system. Human relations still play a role in control operations. The mixed nature of Chinese social control indicates that its transformation under reform and development is not likely to be as extreme as what occurred in Western history when community-based control switched suddenly to a mechanical mode of law-or bureaucracy-based control. Social disorganization in China may be prevented, because the new mechanical mode of control is already partially in place and its ascendance can be balanced by a proportional descentance of organic control elements.

Second, current Chinese social control is not total, repressive, and excessive, although it is diffusive, inclusive, and demanding. In Chinese work units, individual members are indeed controlled in their beliefs, personal life, and work performance. But they also have the freedom and

right to change a line of control or question the legality of a control practice. Across the current social control system, there is no significant accumulation of anger, resistance, and explosive force. As such, it is not likely that a relaxation or change of social and organizational control at one time or in one place will cause the collapse of the entire system.

Third, reform over the past ten to fifteen years has de-dramatized any change in the Chinese social control system. Debates and theoretical explorations of various social control and organizational managing initiatives in the mass media and in the settings of work units have prepared the public for potential changes. Actual implementation of reform measures has made the public even more prepared for new social and organizational control situations. Transformation of Chinese social control, as it is introduced gradually through current socio-economic reform, can be therefore expected to progress smoothly and with minimal destructive impact.

In addition to the above projections, it is important to address this book's theoretical, methodological, and policy implications. Theoretically, I propose that social and organizational control be treated as a variable in its own right. Specifically, social and organizational control ought to be studied (1) in terms of its components, such as structure, process, nature, and change, and (2) in relation to its political, economic, cultural, and social contexts. Also, applicable social theories should be utilized to develop meaningful explanations for social and organizational control phenomena. For instance, using detailed documentation of social and organizational control in its workable forms, one can integrate conflict, exchange, and interactionist perspectives in a systematic theoretical framework that explains the dynamics of a complex social and organizational control system. Most important, I find, from the Chinese experience, that civil control of ordinary citizens constitutes the basis of social and organizational control. I formulate a new theory of social and organizational control with regard to scope, origin, goal, necessity, nature, form, effect, elasticity, controller-controllee relationship, and consequences of failure.

In terms of methodology, the use of personal recollections and interviews by individuals who are not currently participating in the social context under study (i.e., Chinese work unit members currently in the United States) may be problematic, raising questions about the best methodological options to follow in future studies. For example, participant or non-participant observations in selected Chinese work units can supply information about control operations directly on site. Survey or in-depth interviews of current unit members on the premises of Chinese work units can provide information about individual experiences of and reac-

tions to control practices immediately before the eyes of controllees. Time lag, memory loss, imaginative reconstruction, and the effect of a new culture can thereby be eliminated. There are other methodological lessons to be learned as well.

With regard to social and organizational control policies, I have three major suggestions. First, effective control begins with a rational identification of the purpose and substance of control. Why is a control necessary? What needs to be controlled? What does not need to be controlled? It is pointless to control everything. All-inclusive control overstretches the muscle of controllers, causes unnecessary resistance from controllees, deflects attention from the real control needs and targets, and increases the cost of control. Second, when control is directed where it is needed, energy can be concentrated. Appropriate strategies can be developed and administered effectively to ensure that control is duly in place. Third, for control to be convincing, stable, and lasting, it ought to be instituted along with universally recognized life and work needs or demands. Concretely, control is internalized by the controlled and deemed necessary, reasonable, and legitimate. They regard control as inseparable from their lifestyles, work routines, or even natural rhythms.

All in all, Chinese society is evolving. Social control is being differentiated into work-related discipline and government-administered control. Each line of the differentiated control is being strengthened. The legitimization process is also being depoliticized and made relevant to pragmatic needs in life, work, and social process. In other words, China is essentially following my policy advice obtained from this endeavor.

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About the Author

VICTOR N. SHAW, a postdoctoral scholar at UCLA's Social Research Center, has published widely on social organizations, mass media, economic reform, and crime control policy in China.