EMERGING JAPANESE NATIONALISM AND ITS CORRELATIONS WITH THE COLLAPSE OF JAPAN AS A FAMILY NATION

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‘Emerging Japanese Nationalism and Its Correlations with the Collapse of Japan as a Family Nation’
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Abstract
This article attempts to manifest future of Japanese nationalism through the traditional Shinto nationalism and the decades-long concept of ‘family nation’. The both are products of contemporary Shintoism hence mutually intertwined. In recent years, Japanese nationalists succeeded to integrate the family nation concept with their Shinto agenda. Through Professor Aiji Tanaka’s ‘Three Dimensional Coordinates Model (TDCM), it was found that the Shinto nationalists are less likely to repeat the historical mistakes of the pre-war State Shinto, however more prone to increase tensions, even wars, with neighbouring states than other ideologies.

Literature Review
Sato (2015) analysed the ‘national polity’ of Japan (Kokutai) based on the pre-war nationalist literature called the ‘True Meaning of National Polity’ (Kokutai no Hongi) written in 1939 by a group of Japanese scholars embraced by the Ministry of Education. He stressed the difference between the Western individualistic values ever since the enlightenment and traditional Japanese Shintoistic value. The former concept was named ‘Atom-like value’ (Atom-teki Sekaikan) by himself which means each individuals are isolated and freedom of the individuals must be prioritized. On the other hand, Japanese society was named ‘Ritual-based community’ (Saishi Kyodotai) where all Japanese are natural-born practitioners of Shinto and it has more flexibilities to adopt other religious values and intertwined thoughtfulness among the practitioners in comparison with the Western Atom values.

According to him, the pre-war Japanese nationalism was not ‘fascism’ but rather re-recognition or reconfirmation of the ‘Shinto myths’ to deny communism, fascism and Nazism. (Sato, 2015, p.159-60). And, that was main purpose of the ‘True Meaning of National Polity’ which attempted to encourage Japanese to remember their old traditions instead of installing the new ideologies. In the same context, from his perspective, revival of the ritual-based community and its values is necessary to confront economic neo-liberalism which is currently infiltrating among Japanese and has potential to destroy Japanese society itself through its radical individualism. (p.59-60). Meanwhile, Sato’s theory definitely lacks rationality in terms of ethics and it is less realistic to be implemented in today’s Japanese society. Thus, in this article, the revival of Saishi Kyodotai, what Sato had put his emphasis on, will be examined through theoretical framework of Professor Aiji Tanaka’s ‘Three Dimensional Coordinates Model’ (TDCM).
Introduction

In recent years, emergence of nationalism in Japan has caught attentions of the world. Street demonstrations of extreme right-wingers in big cities, LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan)’s proposal of April 2012 which aimed to revise the decades-old Article 9 (Peace clause) of the Constitution and enables the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to form themselves as the nation’s official military forces and the official visits of the government officials to ‘controversial’ Yasukuni Shrine ever since the return of LDP to central power in December 2012. Such radical ‘rightward shift’ (Ukeika) has long been restrained by strong antimilitarism of the post-war Japanese society, but the situation is rapidly changing in these days. With regard to the radical political shift, Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon analysed Japan had entered a transformational age of its diplomacy ever since 2005 which is summed up as “a gradual consolidation of Japan’s emerging role as a global ordinary power on the UK model.” (as cited in Soeya, Tadokoro & Welch, 2011, p.20). However, even if Japan is seeking for ‘normalization’ in terms of diplomacy and security, current rise of nationalism, especially Shinto nationalism and neo-nationalism, is big concern to let Japan to be the ‘global ordinary power’ which possess capability to “use forces beyond strictly defensive purposes.” (Inoguchi & Bacon, 2006, p.5).

The enactment of the new security-related bills (Anpo Houan) in Summer 2015 enabled Japan to officially dispatch SDF troops overseas for the first time without the U.N. Security Council resolutions and allowed the force to conduct spontaneous operations on foreign soils e.g. rescue missions of Japanese nationals from conflict zones. The characteristics of the new law is very different from those of past SDF overseas deployments such as stationing JGSDF in Iraq for humanitarian missions and sending JMSDF vessels to the coast of Somalia as a part of international anti-piracy mission. Furthermore, recent political situation surrounding Japan is ‘flammable’ from the perspective of International Relations. Antipathies among three East Asian states (China, Japan and South Korea) has been record-high for recent years (The Genron NPO, 2015, p.21) and amid emergence of nationalisms, Japan’s ‘normalization’ would result in either intensification of the conflicts with its neighbours or the repetition of the history. Thus, in this article, we take up two questions: 1) What are definitions of ‘nationalism’ and ‘family nation’ in Japan these days? and 2) Are the strategic goals of Japanese nationalists possible to be achieved from the perspective of Professor Aiji Tanaka’s TDCM model?
Theory: Three-Dimensional Coordinates Model (TDCM)

Until the end of the cold war, categorization of political movements in Japan was rather easier than that of today as they were based on clear ‘ideologies’. Right-wings, sometimes interpreted as ‘conservatives’ (Hoshu) in Japan, were mouthpieces of the United States and LDP whereas the leftists, also referred as ‘liberals’ (Kakushin) occasionally, believed in Marxism and most of them were spokesmen of either the Soviet Union, North Korea or People’s Democratic Republic of China. In the aftermath of the cold war, the bipolarity was lost due to the collapse of the Socialist bloc and alongside the end of the bubble economy, circumstances surrounding Japan became complicated and diversified hence the simplified ideological categorization lost supremacy in analyses of Japanese political movements.

In 2003, Aiji Tanaka, Japanese scholar of Politics, released a method named ‘Three-Dimensional Coordinates Model’ (TDCM, Sanjigen Zahyo model). In this model, ‘Political inclination of a nation’ can be analysed multidimensionally through three axes (Economic, political and cultural/social regulations). States can generally be categorized into four groups: authoritarianism, conservatism, progressivism, and libertarianism and the post-war Japan had long been remained inbetween conservatism and progressivism. (Asawa, 2006, p.220). This two-dimentional picture represented Japanese politics during the cold war period. Tanaka developed the model through the addition of the third axis ‘cultural/social regulations’ to comprehend the post-cold war Japanese politics. The cultural/social regulations stand on “traditional religions, values, moral sense, and professional ethics” (Asawa, 2006, p.221). Indeed, while the two-dimentional model remained in the realm of ideological struggles, the three-dimentional model emphasizes the value of traditional social values instead of the weakened ideological premises. According to Tanaka, unlike the rest of regulations, the cultural/social regulations are influenced by small entities such as regions and religions, not the government, and the government will tolerate the situation if the regulations increase its influences in their favour: toward stronger regulations in all dimensions.

Definitions of ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Family Nation’

Among many social phenomena, ‘Nationalism’ is probably one of the most complicated ones. Despite its long history, nationalism still lacks a clear definition while new types of nationalism such as neo-nationalism recently emerges. The complexity of nationalism may results from the absence of ‘grand thinkers’, if we borrow the word of Benedict Anderson. However, it is also due to a lack of ‘grand theory’ which has certain models to analyse
different kinds of nationalism. Still, many scholars has been attempted to generalize ‘nationalism’ for centuries. For instance, Frederick Hertz focused on the formation process of human empathy with one’s own birthplaces and nations. According to him, the former is a spontaneous emotion organically grows in one’s own mind while the latter is an artificial product. (Hertz, 1944, p.151, as cited in Hashigawa, 2015, p. 27). If Hertz’s ‘national feeling’, which is equivalent to nationalism, is manipulated by ‘nation’, it is well to ask how they do so in its structural framework. Shimizu (2013) found there is a distinctive gap between what a nation requires its citizens and the citizens will provide to the nation. In his theory, every nation stands on premise that it will ultimately require renunciation of life to its citizens. A nation will achieve it through two ways: 1) fulfilment of citizen’s desires in order to gain supports toward a nation or 2) manipulation by education. (p.43). While the former is less realistic, the purpose of the latter is to “let citizens to overcome circumstances among them and instead, share common feeling, interest, and order as members of a nation.” (p.45). Lately, Shimizu’s concept of history education has been a centre of arguments in Japan with regard to ‘historical revisionism’. In 2000, Fuso-sha, one of the group companies of right-wing newspaper Sankei, issued a new history text book under the cooperation with Japan Society for Historical Textbook Reform (JSHT, *Atarashi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru Kai*). The book soon became a magnet for controversy as it showed the revisionist tendency e.g. stating the ‘Great East Asia War’ and the ‘Pacific War’ side by side. The intention of JSHT surrounding the history textbook incident is clearly stated on their website: “…the post-war education of history has been ignored cultural traditions (inherited from ancestors) and moreover forced Japanese to dishonour themselves.“ (Japan Society for Historical Textbook Reform, 1997). According to Uchida (2009), such logic of current Japanese nationalists is called ‘victimhood consciousness’ (*Higaisha-Ishiki*). In the case of the history textbook, the ‘aggressor’ was the Western great powers which cunningly forced Japan to go into war with them and altered the Japanese traditions during the occupation period in the aftermath of the war. In more recent years, the nationalists see China and South Korea in the same position as the Western great powers in pre-war period. For instance, Japan Conference (*Nihon Kaigi*), recently growing nationalist organization, claimed as follows: “…as been already aware, both China and South Korea putting diplomatic pressures onto our nation, demanding an apology for one-sided invasions throughout our modern history…furthermore, the Great East Asia War was a defensive war against economic blockades of Great Britain and the United States, in which the fact General MacArthur himself admitted.” (Japan Conference, 2015, August 6).
Regardless of ideological (or even religious) differences, the cognition of the memories which a nation of Japan has been treated unfairly in both domestic and international scenes (‘Masochistic historical perspective’, Jigyaku-teki Rekishikan) supports the constitution of their nationalistic identity. Furthermore, from their perspective, the Constitution and famous Article 9 (Peace clause) enacted in 1946 are also products of compromise under the same circumstance. The ‘Constitution under the occupation’ (Senryo Kenpou) is a commonly used phrase among Japanese nationalists and the Article 9 which prohibits possession of armed forces and the use of force as a solution to international conflicts are both designed to “hobble Japan’s international status permanently.” (Soeya, Tadokoro & Welch, 2011, p.38). Thus, it is rational for Japanese nationalists to seek for the Constitutional revision and unite for the purpose. As of Summer 2016, the most influential nationalist organization in terms of the Constitutional revision is the aforementioned Japan Conference. The organization has 38,000 members in total and moreover, 60% of House of Representatives and 50% of House of Councillors members belongs to its ‘informal gathering of Diet members’. (Asahi Shimbun, 2016, March 23). Moreover, in November 2015, 11,000 supporters of the Constitution revision were gathered up in Nippon Budokan in the heart of Tokyo (McNeill, 2015) by the efforts of the JC and several other notable nationalist organizations. Alongside the fact current Prime Minister Abe has been in a position of the special adviser of the informal gathering, its connections and the influences to Japanese politics cannot be compared to other nationalist organizations. Thus, in this article, the JC is treated as a ‘representative’ of Japanese nationalist organizations.

Now, the biggest question is ‘how’ and ‘when’ nationalism was constituted. With regard to the issue, Leifer (2000) referred to the discussions among historians and found the debaters are split by two concepts: ‘Primordialism’ and ‘Modernism’. The former sees nationalism as a product of ‘nation’ as a primordial authority whereas the latter emphasizes the concepts of nationalism were developed only after enlightenment, establishment of ‘nation states’ and industrial revolution. In terms of Japanese nationalism, modernist concept of nationalism would only address to the development of modern nationalism after the Meiji restoration in 1865, but not the pre-modern nationalism which constitutes the essential parts of Japanese nationalism. The reason why the pre-modern Japanese nationalism is more important than the modern nationalism is that the former is mutually intertwined with the nucleus of Japanese society, in other word, ‘religions’. And, among the religions, ‘Shintoism’ is indispensable
from the origin of Japanese nationalism. The special status of Shintoism in relation to Japanese nationalism starts from the founding of a nation of Japan. In *Kojiki* (Japan’s oldest historical record compiled in 712 A.D.), ‘Eight islands of Japan’ (*Yashima*) were given birth by the two Shinto gods named *Izanagi* and *Izanami*. In the pre-war and wartime periods, the myth was taught as a true historical fact at schools and the Imperial family, as the descendants of the two gods and the only prolonging Imperial family of unbroken line in the world, were mythicized in attempts to justify the independency of the Japanese military forces from the government under the supreme command authority of the Emperor and furthermore, following Japanese aggressions over the Asia-Pacific on the pretext of ‘*Hakkou Ichiu*’, also known as an ‘universal bloodhood’ policy which promised equal treatment of different races (in the occupied lands) under the reign of the Japanese Imperial family. Thus, the Shintoistic recognition of Japanese history should considered as “a religious-philosophical justification for the sovereignty of the Imperial family.” (Kasulis, 2004, p. 85).

This ‘State Shinto’ (*Kokka Shinto*) came to an end upon the Japanese surrender in the Second World War and the Allied occupation of Japan. The special position of Shinto in Japanese religions was deprived by the U.S. occupation forces and moreover, to disestablish the wartime State Shinto, they issued an order known as the ‘Shinto Directive’ in December 1945 which banned the state sponsorship of particular religion, possession of the Shinto God-shelves (*Kami-dana*) in public spaces and the visits to Shinto shrines by educational institution. (Floyd, 1965, p.53-54). However, ever since the re-independence of Japan in 1952, Shinto regained an equal status as other religions such as Buddhism and Christianity.

Meanwhile, the concept of ‘Family Nation’ dates back to 1946 when a publication of Ruth Benedict’s ‘The Chrysanthemum and the Sword’ (*Kiku-to-Katana*) took place. As being an American cultural anthropologist, she summed up notable characteristics of Japanese and its society based on her own researches during the war. Despite many racist criticisms against her in these days, she succeeded to sum up the basic concepts of Japanese society such as ‘Filial piety’ and ‘Family nation’ hence enlightened the post-war Western academia in terms of Japanology. In fact, many scholars attempted to sophisticate her concepts later. Elie Kedourie was one such scholar in 1970s. Regarding the concept of family nation, Kedourie mentioned it as follows: “Our country (Japan) is a great family nation, and the Imperial Household is the head family of the subjects and the nucleus of national life.” (1970, p.328). Thus, both current Japanese nationalism and the conceptual ‘family nation’ has mutual ties
The root of contemporary State Shinto (Kokka Shinto) dates back to the Meiji restoration in 1865. The new Meiji government was originally formed under the reign of the Imperial family and on the pretext of restoring Imperial rule, it successfully toppled the feudal Tokugawa regime. However, contradictions between their religious and political policies soon brought a note of discord into Japanese society.

The first priority of the Meiji government was ‘modernization’ of Japan, if not ‘Westernization’, in order to revise unequal treaties concluded with the Western great powers by the Tokugawa regime hence introduction of the Western-style social systems and technologies to Japan accelerated throughout the period. And, amid the rapid Westernization of Japanese society, Christianity which had been severely oppressed by Tokugawa for almost two hundred years began to flourish. In early days of the Meiji period, underground Catholic Christians on the island of Kyushu who survived the oppression made their first public appearance near Nagasaki (Ross, 1965, p.134). The Meiji government concerned the situation since the reason of the Tokugawa-era oppression was political influences of the Christianity. It was not only because of the priests sent by Spain and Portugal to spread the religion in Japan which were seen as acts of political interference by Tokugawa, but also the Christian rebellion of Shimabara in 1637. As the Meiji government themselves forcefully toppled the feudal regime, it was rational for them to think in the sense the Christians will do the same with the help of the Western great powers. And, it was necessary to defend the reign of the Imperial family at any costs to present meaning of the existence of the new government. And, Shinto was chosen by them to be an ‘excuse’ to emphasize the importance of the Imperial family.

According to the traditional Shinto myths of Kojiki (712 A.D.) and Nihon Shoki (720 A.D.), the Japanese Emperor is a descendant of Amaterasu, founder of the nation, Japan. It is famous the Emperor himself was mythicized as ‘Arahito-Gami’ (Living God) in early Showa era, yet in the Meiji period, the Emperor was merely a ‘chief priest’ (representative) of all Shinto shrines. Movements toward making Shinto a ‘national religion’ of Japan accelerated among the government officials. On 15th May 1868, new governmental proclamation regarding the relations between Shinto and Christianity was released. According to the
proclamation, Christian leaders had no choices other than swearing allegiance before the Shinto ‘Kami’ (God) and they would have either beheaded or sent to labour camps in distant regions in case of refusal. (Ross, 1965, p. 135). Such radical policy just caused a backrush from the Western great powers and eventually, the Meiji government had to give up making Shinto national religion. Still, all Shinto shrines were put under the governmental protection by some laws and placed the highest among other religions in Japan such as Buddhism and Christianity.

Some scholars, for example Floyd (1965), analysed the attempt of the Meiji government was actually a farewell to the old traditional neo-Confucianism and introduction of new interpretation of Shintoism. He found that the governmental policies were largely affected by theories of Shinto scholars such as Motoori Norinaga and Hirata Atsutane. (p.133). Their ideas were simple, claiming the difference between Chinese and Japanese imperial systems from religious and philosophical perspectives that the Japanese Imperial systems are superior to that of Chinese dynasties due to an unbroken line of the Emperors and rule of the direct descendants of Shinto Kami (God) while definition of ‘Mandate of Heaven’ kept changing through the transition of the dynasties in China and the country remained in turmoil. It appears as a ridiculous and simplified analysis from today’s viewpoint, however, from this example, we can see the effort of the Meiji government to emphasize the Imperial reign. In most of the Western studies on Shinto, they usually referred to State Shinto during the war period as one typical example of Shinto. The State Shinto caught attentions of the world because of its ‘peculiarities’ from the Western perspective during the war and its aftermath. Ruth Benedict’s best seller ‘The Chrysanthemum and the Sword’ issued in 1946 highlighted two-facedness of Japanese, one face in peaceful nature and the other on the utmost loyalty to authorities. It seems the U.S. military authority occupied Japan had shared the same idea and their fears against re-unification of Japan under the reign of the Emperor and Shinto led them to ban State Shinto.

The wartime State Shinto had very simplified dogma that the Japanese Emperor is a descendant of Amaterasu, founder of Japan and all the Shinto myths e.g. the birth of Japan by Izanagi were taught as ‘historical facts’ at schools. And, already mentioned in the previous part of this article, the Meiji government also attempted to put Shinto into special position. Shinto is not the only religion in the world which went through the historical changes but also many others such as Christianity and Islam. Their dogma changes in the flow of time.
However, in case of Shinto, there are so many interpretations of its dogma. This is largely due to its absence of ‘code of law’. Floyd (1965) found Shinto ethics are ‘situational ethic’ which relies on conceptual ‘Makoto’, being honest and trustful against the Kami (p.108).

Instead of the written ethics, Shinto believers must respect four spirits such as Ara-mi-tama and Nigi-mi-tama. The former means ‘rule with authority’ and the latter is ‘harmony and union’. These concepts are still really vague compared to Christianity or any major religions.

Apparently, unlike the Western religions, there is no ‘ultimate truth’ handed down from the Gods and thus, in terms of Shinto, human has to find their own ways, somehow mentally, to get closer to the reign of the Kami. Thus, historically, the Japanese authorities succeeded to introduce new ‘interpretations’ of Shinto to the society rather smoothly. And, current SPL and Japan Conference are no exception. Moreover, what made Shinto special in Japanese politics was the existence of the Shinto principle called ‘Saisei-Icchi’ (‘theocracy’, the unity of Shinto shrines and state). In early establishment, Shinto emphasized the use of Makoto spirit to real life of human, to be precise, politics. The word, Sai (祭) and Sei (政) means ‘festivals’ and ‘politics’ hence one has to be serious and honest in either Shinto festivals or political situation as if they are acting in front of Kami himself. In 1867, the Meiji government enforced the Tokugawa to return ‘sovereignty’ of Japan to the Imperial family (Taisei-Houkan) and it was a rational action from the perspective of Shinto as to turn the tide to the old tradition of Saisei-Icchi. As stated before, the Emperor at that time was a head priest of all Shinto shrines hence he had to rule Japan as a representative of Shinto, or a messenger of Kami.

The Correlations between Japan Conference and Shinto Nationalism

Japan Conference, referred as Nihon Kaigi in Japanese, was established in 1997 as a result of the merger of several nationalist organizations such as the ‘National conference to defend Japan’ (Nihon wo Mamoru Kokumin-Kaigi). (Asahi Shimbun, 2016, March 23). The organization was deeply involved in the enactment of the Law regarding the National Flag and Anthem in 1999 and the revision of the Basic Education Law in 2006. In the latter case, they collected 3.6 million signatures demanding the revision of the BEL making ‘patriotic education’ compulsory at schools. (McNaill, 2015). Like as many other nationalist organizations, they pursue the revival of the reign of the Imperial family, Constitution
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revision and the protection of Japan’s national interests. However, what differentiates themselves from others are their influences in Japanese politics and ‘Shinto’ background. McNaill (2015) mentioned the nationalistic religious cult called House of Growth (Seicho-no-Ie) as a ‘key tributary’ of the JC. Still, when we look at the official list of the JC’s board members, three out of five top advisers, one of four vice chairmen, and 5 of 41 representative committee members belong to either the Association of Shinto Shrines (ASS, Jinja Honcho), ASS’s political organization ‘Shinto Political League’ (SPL) or Japan’s representative Shrines e.g. Ise and Atsuta. And, the revival of the reign of the Imperial family is actually a very Shintoistic concept after all although it is widely shared among Japanese nationalists. Yet their actual thoughts behind their strong supports toward the Constitutional revision is clear, the revival of Saishi Kyodotai, ritual-based community centred on the reign of the Imperial family, should be considered as their strategic goal.

Conclusion: Application of Three-Dimentional Coordinates Model (TDCM)

Now, we can apply Professor Tanaka’s TDCM model to examine the possibility of the Shintoistic ‘normalization’ of Japan. The strategic goals of the Shinto nationalists, especially Japan Conference and its followers, are the Constitutional revision to enable Japan to officialise its Self-Defense Forces as the nation’s formal military forces.

1) Economic regulation

In this section, we should consider ‘Downfall of existing industries’ as a domestic factor and ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (TPP) as that of external factor affecting the economic regulation of Japanese society.

The former, downfall of major industries, has long been discussed ever since the collapse of the Bubble economy in early 1990s while China and several other Asia-Pacific states achieved high economic growths during the ‘lost two decades’ of Japan. ‘Reforms without allowing a sanctuary’ (Seiiki Naki Kouzou Kaikaku) under the Koizumi administrations of 2000s implemented (economic) neo-liberalistic reformations in Japanese economy such as deregulation of temporary employment and privatization of public corporations. Meanwhile, in 2010, China’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) finally surpassed that of Japan and it gained the position of the world’s second biggest economy after the United States. (McCurry and Kollewe, 2011). The second Abe administration inaugurated in December 2012 advocated new economic policy named ‘Abenomics’ which based on three ‘allows’ (pillars): 1)
quantitative easing to fight deflation, 2) using government spending or taxation to improve economic conditions, and 3) structural overhaul of key sectors including agriculture, healthcare and energy. (Nath, 2015). In comparison with the Koizumi’s reformation, the Abenomics are rather conservative in the sense restoring the government’s strong controls over the economy. And, the external factor, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is actually intertwined with the ‘Abenomics’. Eliminations of taxes and promotion of free trade in circum-Pacific region seems controversial to the Abe’s rather conservative economic policy. However, elimination of tariffs of major exporting products of both Japan and the United States has postponed to 2020-2040s and in that sense, it shall not affect Abenomics. Thus, economic regulations shall be considered ‘high’ at this point.

2) Political regulation
Regarding the revival of Saishi Kyodotai, Shinto nationalists, especially Japan Conference, puts emphasis on the Constitutional revision, which in their sense, restricted Japan for several decades. As the symbol of the U.S. ‘implicit’ rule over the post-war Japan from the perspective of Japanese nationalists, the Constitution needs to be revised in the way restoring the reign of the Imperial family and allowing Japan to officialise its Self-Defense Forces as the nation’s military forces. Still, the post-war Japan’s democracy has never altered and learning from the general election Summer 2009, the position of LDP is not immortal as the opposition alliance formed among nongovernment parties such as DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) and JCP (Japan Communist Party) is building mutual ties with SEALDs, student organization against the new security-related bills which has gained public supports through the anti-Abe demonstrations during Summer 2015.

Back to the nationalist issue, the Imperial House Law (IHL), enacted in 1947, defined the Imperial family as a ‘symbol of the nation of Japan’ which does not possess any politically decision-making capabilities alongside the Article 1 of the Constitution. Likewise, JSDF’s status has also been merely remained as the nation’s ‘capability to defend itself’ by the Peace clause, in which political status is very ambiguous. Thus, the Constitutional revision is necessary in order to achieve the two goals. The draft of the revised Constitution released by LDP in 2012 manifested the Emperor as a ‘sovereign’ instead of ‘symbol’. However, in upcoming general election in Summer 2016, the revision of the Peace clause has only been focused by media and also the Abe administration hence the Article 1 is left behind the argument. Eventually, Shinto nationalists are playing ‘one-man stage’ in terms of the revival
For officialising SDF, like as previously mentioned, pacifism had been dominant over nationalism. However, the situation had overturned in recent years due to the JSDF’s proactive contributions to the post-disaster activities of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. Indeed, “A January 2012 cabinet poll found that 97.7 percent of the Japanese appreciated the SDF operation in Tohoku.” (Samuels, 2013, p.80) and the image of SDF has dramatically been improving in more recent years. However, we have to consider that throughout 2015, Japanese leftists successfully organized demonstrations against the new security-related bills. Number varies, still majority of Japanese opposes to the law and the extension of the role of SDF in its overseas missions. On the other hand, 95% of Japanese thinks SDF should be officialised as the nation’s own military forces (Sankei Shimbun, January 23rd 2013). Thus, political regulation on the revision of the Article 1 is ‘high’ (as it has not yet even been focused) whereas that of the Peace clause (Article 9) is ‘medium’.

3) Cultural/Social regulations
Among the three regulations, cultural/social regulations are the most complicated to be precisely defined. In this article, we take up two social phenomena as the factors: 1) Growing antipathy against neighbouring states such as China and South Korea, and 2) Emergence of new social class named ‘Mild Yankees’ which is considered equivalent to ‘Red Necks’ in the United States.

As defined in earlier part of this article, the cultural/social regulations are influenced by society not the government. The former is basically a rejection of recognition of the fact Japan has mutual economic interdependence with its neighbours, especially China. Although some serious incidents e.g. the visits of Japanese government officials to Yasukuni during the Koizumi administrations and the Senkaku boat collision incident in 2010 under the LDP administration, Japan has had maintained good relations with China, the region’s most economically potential state, in economy and diplomacy. One of the reasons why the Sino-Japanese relations did not face crisis in last two decades despite the cases of the diplomatic confrontation was economic interdependence. In 2013, Richard Katz, of Foreign Affairs, literally named the Sino-Japanese economic interdependence ‘Mutual Assured Production’. China needs to import Japanese-made electronic parts for Apple products as much as Japan needs China as a market. In that sense, Japanese societal antipathy against China would
restrict Japan’s diplomatic choices in near future and even, it would lead to further confrontation. And, the latter, the new social class a newly defined concept by Dentsu, Japan’s largest advertising agency. In recent years, young generations tend to stay in their rural hometowns rather than moving into big cities such as Tokyo and Osaka. And, they have a tendency in showing strong support to ‘conservatism’ in which purpose is to defend their hometowns from changing its characteristics. Taking stand against mass immigration of foreigners and denying urbanistic and many other values outside their own communities are examples of their new life style.

According to the result of the TDCM model application, the Shinto nationalists are considered as an entity of ‘state socialism’ which is equivalent to Nazism. Based on mutual connections with the Abe administration, it is rational that the Prime Minister put emphasis on economic revival of Japan as first priority but alongside seeking for the Constitutional revision as if the Nazi regime in 1930s. At the end of this article, I would stress that State Shinto which current Shinto nationalists pursues are the revival of the pre-war order in the society everything is far changed compared to the era. It is not only seen in current Japan but also in many developed countries including the United States. Looking back at the past glory in the age of globalization and economic interdependence would cost us more than the past pursuits of nationalism. If each nations seek for their own interests, it will break down the pillars of the post-war International community and shall bring a chaos once again like in 1930s. It is unpredictable whether if Japan could regain the Shinto order unilaterally amid the collapse of the International society, rather it is possible to presume the nation would be torn by any of expected armed conflicts in the region.
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