ANCIENT CHINA UNDER MODERN COMMUNISM:
THE COMPARATIVE MORPHOLOGY OF
PRE-COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST SOCIETY*

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The consideration of Communist China presents to Americans a compound problem for which there seldom has been adequate material either of descriptive or analytical variety. There is a tremendous literature upon the Ancient China, and a not inconsiderable literature upon the contemporary China. What has been lacking, so far, is a comparative and interpretive literature, that strains out the common denominators and the elements of true difference, and that suggests how the present Communist China can have emerged so abruptly and so completely out of the ancient China. The present discussion is not what might be termed basic research, since it sets forth little that is new to the literature of the two Chinas. It is, rather, a review of the ideas, themes, and workings of the two phases of Chinese society, in an attempt to suggest that the very recent past can be considered to have continuity in the evolution of a single stream of development. These matters are geographically significant in that both the ancient and the Communist China occupy the same landscapes of the earth, deal with the same ethnic units, climatic regimes, natural resources, and agricultural problems. This discussion, then, reviews certain basic patterns of classical society in China, remarks on a variety of cultural processes, and notes the continuities and contrasts in the Communist China of today.

Basic Culture Complexes in Classical Chinese Society

Analysts of past Chinese culture have placed their primary emphasis upon one or another of several different complexes, according to their concerns. It would appear that no single complex bears the whole weight of the structure of Chinese society or forms the single cement that holds it together. I prefer to think in terms of a number of complexes, each significant in its own way, each of which forms a building block integrally supporting the whole structure. If too large a number of complexes are enumerated the duplicative interrelations between them become complicated; if too

* This is the text of the address presented at the Annual Banquet of the California Council of Geography Teachers, Northridge, Calif., May 6, 1961.


2 Where obviously useful, references will be supplied to sources of information upon particular subjects, but not every issue in an article of this sort can be documented without the supporting material becoming unwieldy.
few are itemized, the derivative applications become numerous and abstruse. In an effort to reach a middle ground, it seems possible to establish six such complexes that became the foundation stones on which classical Chinese society was built. These are:

1. The family (meaning, in this case, the larger family, often termed the extended family or the joint family), which includes more than one biological family, the latter sometimes called the conjugal, natural, or nuclear family,
2. The compact village settlement, not precisely distinguishing between the village and the town,
3. The walled city, as distinct from the village and the town in functional terms,
4. General social organization, involving elements of structure, stratification, regionalism, and function,
5. Egocentricity of the Chinese world view, sometimes labeled ethnocentrism, involving the definition of Chinese and non-Chinese, and,
6. The agrarian orientation of life, including the concept of the harmonics of nature and the relations of man to nature.3

Many might choose to add items to this basic list, but I believe these sufficient for the purposes of this paper, for such other complexes can be derivative of one of the above.

It is necessary to do more than list the building blocks: an examination follows as to the nature of each of the suggested complexes; although it makes no attempt to demonstrate all possible functional applications or derivatives. To considerable extent we cannot conceive of these complexes as fully operative in unchanged form from ancient time to the modern day, but we can conceive of them as the basic complexes around which, and upon which, the elaborate structure of eighteenth century Chinese society was built. Their relevance to Communist China will be reserved for a later section of this paper.

1. The Family.4 We cannot even guess what kind of family group was considered optimum by Peking Man, and we can do little more than guess, so far, as to the family group normally operative in Old Stone Age time as indicated by the living sites that have been partially explored by the archaeologist. But it is clear that long before Confucius codified the concept of the family in the sixth century B.C., the Chinese extended family was a functioning unit in social, economic and political terms. Though the smaller biological family has always been present in China, the larger family has been numerous and has been effective. Essentially, the family has been the basic economic unit of organization, whether

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3 Many authors deal with this issue in variable terms. One of the best short statements is to be found in E. O. Reischauer and J. K. Fairbank, *East Asia, the Great Tradition*, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1958) pp. 23-30. Material on all the culture complexes here listed can be found in Hu, op. cit. D. Bodde, *China's Cultural Tradition, What and Whither?* (New York, Rhinehart & Co., 1957), is the best brief source for notations on the Chinese view of nature.

it be thought of as a production unit, as among the mass of the people, or as a control and management unit, as among the smaller numbers of controlling families. In classical terms the larger the family, the more effective was the economic unit. Plural wives to ensure sons, ancestor worship to strengthen family ties, wide scattering of family members in times of geographical and societal mobility, multiple patterns of economic endeavor to stabilize the economic status: these and other aspects all were features of an expanding society in times of economic and population growth. Infanticide, the disowning of family members, the giving away or selling away of children, the simple dying out of family lines, the forcible extermination of families, and the disruption of family life: all these and other aspects were features of a shrinking society in times of stress and trouble.

Both types of phenomena were recurrent throughout most of Chinese social history, dependent upon the upward or downward spiral of Chinese society at the particular time. Inasmuch as the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were periods of a downward spiral, the Occident is more familiar with such aspects as infanticide, the selling of children into "slavery," and the disruption of family structure. It is obvious that in times of stress the weakening of family strength was accompanied by features making for decimation of families, and the literature is full of the theme, for such things happened among the masses of Chinese families. It is less well known that among the ruling families, sometimes now termed the gentry, the degree of continuity and the maintenance of family strength has been very marked, and that the features of decline so commonly remarked upon for all China were operative to a minimal degree only. It would appear that, in numerical terms, hundreds of families were able to maintain themselves in secure positions for more than 2,000 years, if not much longer. The relative number of such gentry families decreased about 900 A.D., and a new level of middle class gentry families came into existence to broaden the basis of the ruling family sector. However, significant numbers of the earlier families maintained themselves until very recently, and large numbers of families measured their continuity in centuries.

The family concept lay behind the concept of government as the political state evolved, in that a good father was a good ruler and a good son was a good citizen. In point of hard fact one can carry this concept too far in applying it to the operation of the classical Chinese state, but there prevailed the general idea that the Chinese state was a government of men, not of laws, and to the degree that the concept was operative it functioned regardless of the going form of the state. The concept operated in the tribal "state," functioned in the feudal state, continued operative in the national state, and the concept certainly can be seen operative in the Communist state in which Comrade Mao is visualized as the good father of his people, The traditional Chinese political state is normally described as authoritarian, a term as descriptive of earliest China as of Communist China.

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It has been commonly asserted that the Chinese concept of the larger operative family has been both the basic building stone and the strongest bulwark of Chinese society that would withstand all forms of onslaught. There are other pertinent elements in the functioning of the family, and the author has condensed a major subject into simple terms, but the significance of the family in classical China was primary, no matter how the pattern was elaborated. The family became the key element in three other basic culture complexes in an interlocking series, namely, village settlement, general social organization, and the agrarian orientation of life.

2. The Compact Village. The compact village as the operational base of a group of families can be viewed as an organized extension of the family in that it is a larger economic grouping able to encompass a greater variety of economic production in greater volume, and in that it is a group large enough to stand alone in a regional landscape exposed to competing groups and patterns of culture. In the sense of a regional unit occupying a given sector of the landscape, it often functioned as did the family, with give and take of labor, produce, strength, resources, refuge, protection, and initiative. It often has been said that there was a high degree of cooperative democracy in Chinese village life. In that many villages in earlier times were composed of related families, there often was such democracy and cooperation, and where a village was composed of unrelated families there often was decision making in common by the elders of the families, but such democracy never approached the ideal referred to in the American town meeting of our earlier New England days.

In most portions of China the compact village was the key settlement form; only in a few regions for specific situations were other settlement forms employed. But always the village was the center of the mass of the population, from neolithic sites to modern villages, whereas the active and essential control over the life of the village was situated outside the village and apart from it. The village never had legal status in the administration of China, and political administration has been imposed from above and outside. The palace, the great house, the magistrate’s yamen, sometimes even the headman’s establishment sat apart from, and above, the compact village as a specific settlement form, and the occupants thereof lived apart from the mass of the people and rarely were truly of them. The village seldom was the place wherein originated the ideas, the technologies, the codified norms, or the ideal mores of Chinese culture, but the village was the place where these cultural norms came to rest in the stable patterns of Chinese society as we have known them historically.

The earliest villages undoubtedly held customary rights to the plant, animal, and mineral products of the land, and in time the village came to have vested customary rights to the use of land and to the local lands themselves. This is a normal case of territoriality and its evolution, but to the ruler the people went with the land as paired resources even though the

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power to separate one from the other was implicit. The evolution of the national state brought with it the concept of private ownership patterns, applicable to plants-lands and to animals, and drew sharper lines than had older customary ownership concepts. To the village population these new concepts did not alter the local regionalism of the village as related to its surrounding lands. The concept of private ownership had lesser regional implications for the upper level family in that such a family was not restricted to a single village, and in time the gentry families associated themselves to a region but were apart from any village within the region. It is here that the town and the city play their role in Chinese society. The city, particularly, was the seat of the gentry extended family, though some of its biological family units normally were distributed both in the villages and in other towns and cities. Because the gentry extended family often had biological family units engaged in all kinds of economic and political activity, it ranged widely, dependent upon villagers but not of them.

Chinese village life has often been extolled as the good life. In good times village life has been secure and adequate in terms of food, shelter, and the provision of livelihood necessities. But village life in China has been dull, intellectually barren, and less rich and satisfying than most authorities suggest, since the generalizations about Chinese culture are drawn from cities and towns. Dull and barren in the best periods, village life has been exceedingly stagnant, torpid, and stupefying in those periods when economic privation has made even simple subsistence a hazardous problem.

The reputed self sufficiency of the village, its autonomy so long as things went well, its relations to the city, its relations to territory and region, and its place in the scheme of Chinese society became stabilized in time and structure. The mass of the Chinese became villagers and China became a mass of villages, functioning cells in a steadily expanding society. In the general sense, with little exception, China spread where stable village life could spread. Even the exception is not real, for in Szechwan, Kwiechow, and Yunan villages were present, village life was operative within the same broad patterns, and the same general terms applied—it was only that a rural population lived scattered out on the landscape around their villages. In such areas as Tibet, the Mongolias, and Turkestan, the sedentary agrarian village-local regional lands complex was not possible, and here Chinese hegemony normally was dependent upon military control of territory and was, therefore, impermanent. In southern and western China the very process of becoming Chinese involved local populations giving up their regional mobility, settling in permanent villages, and adopting practices of sedentary agriculture on lands lying around the villages.

The expansion of village life was a function of an expanding society and economy. The decline of village life and the accumulation of poor, landless, and unemployed villagers was a function of a declining economy and society. The inroads of occidental manufacturing upon Chinese village handicrafts, the rise in land tenancy, and the declining level of living of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were periodic aspects of a declining spiral; their greater intensity in the last century brought the decline to a more critical state than had been the case in many earlier periods.
The sheer growth of Chinese population in recent centuries involved a greater degree of crisis than had a similar decline in earlier centuries for a lesser population.

3. The Walled City. The only real word for city, as a distinct class of settlement in China, is the word Ch'eng, meaning wall. Walls were built across-country as boundaries, and around villages in old north China, but the appropriation of the word Ch'eng for city denotes the significance of fortification for key settlements at an early date. Walled cities in North China, at least, pre-date the historic record, but the archaeologist has not yet unravelled much of the earlier story. In early historic time the city became synonymous with the following: seat of political and military power; palace-residence of the holder of power; seat of wealth and base of the regional tax collector; center for skilled handicraftsmen who depended upon the wealthy both for patronage and protection; residence seat of scholars, astrologers, priests, and administrators of the surrounding area; residence of a certain number of what may be termed "service personnel"; seat of merchant traders; the residence base of a certain population for whom no specific function can be applied at present; chief market for produce and trade goods of the surrounding countryside; center for the collection of tribute, and ultimate refuge of at least a portion of the loyal rural population of the countryside in time of invasion. Perhaps there were other functions also. As territorial expansion took place certain advance sites were built into cities, for the function of the city as the seat of political, military, administrative, and taxing power seems the dominant function once the formal designation of places as cities began to occur.

No full discussion of the city can be given here, since too little is really known about the full role of the Chinese city. We do not even know just who lived in Chinese cities in early time, how they got there, and what their status in society was. However, it is clear that once cities came into being in China they became not only the centers of political, military, and economic power, but the real functional heart of Chinese culture. It was the cities that generated the culture patterns, set the styles and the norms, prescribed the definitions, called the changes, and served as the agencies of control of the Chinese landscape, be it local county, general region, frontier zone, or nation as a whole. The significance of the city, for this paper, is in its function as originator of culture and controller of the countryside, and here it was that the ruling families had their residence and base of operations. In the decentralization of historic China, the regional city had a very real role as the center of a "little China."

4. Social Organization. The theme that the poor boy can become president, that a Henry Ford can come from a humble home, that Abraham Lincoln could learn to read by firelight in a log cabin, that you and I may acquire Cadillacs, great homes, and status in our communities is a favorite in American life. Perhaps here it has more often come to pass than elsewhere in the world, which makes it such a significant attribute of American life. Chinese culture possesses somewhat the same optimistic theme, and the leaders of China have always played upon the theme for what it has been worth. That it undoubtedly operated over the long centuries of Chinese history gave reality to the theme, but the relative frequency of the individual rise has been far less than popularly believed and far less than in American life. It certainly is true that Chinese society never developed a highly stratified social organization with inherited status patterns such as became characteristic of Hindu Indian society, but the extended family, when secure in position, gave to its younger generations status and power that were almost as effective as inherited patterns. It is true also that in developing the national political state, both formalized slavery and formalized nobility were done away with. Both these elements of social structure had died out by the start of the Christian Era among the Chinese themselves, though such alien ruling groups as the Tobas, the Mongols, and the Manchus brought to their controls of China a limited nobility structure. The abolition of slavery and nobility evolved slowly with the maturing of the legal institutions of private landownership and its patterns of transfer. Tenancy and landlordism, in a sense, in time replaced slavery and nobility as institutional elements around the land system. The gradual identification of the wielders of political power with government bureaucracy and with the landlords solidified the legal institutional framework; the opposite identification of the small landowner, the artisan, and the tenant with the peasantry was a parallel development in the slow growth of Chinese social structure. The preservation of personal “slavery” as a technique of self preservation did continue until the twentieth century, in times of famine poor families often gave away a child to people able to maintain it and sometimes “sold” the child, the price received aiding the seller in maintaining his own life. This is something quite apart from formalized slavery.

The Chinese patterns of social organization must commonly have recognized four broad classes, those of scholar, farmer, artisan, and merchant. These are essentially functional in nature, and since they involved no formal hereditary controls, this simple structuring permitted the rise and fall, or simple shift, of individual families. However, this simple consideration disguises the very nature of Chinese social structuring. A farmer was an agrarian rural peasant while a scholar was an urban resident associated with political controls. Farmers and artisans were closely related in that the extended peasant family normally contained both. In the same way merchants and scholars often were closely related in that the gentry families often included both kinds of members. The rise of merchant classes out of artisanry, with conflict in social status-making, is an old theme in Chinese history.

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8 Hu, op. cit., Lang, op. cit., Bodde, op. cit.
This coupling of agriculture and artisanry, and of scholar-official and merchant developed a bi-polar status in the broad social framework of Chinese society, the rural-agrarian and the urban-intellectual-merchant-official. These two groups now are more commonly labeled the peasantry and the gentry. The fiction, and the reality, of individual and family movement from one to the other group occurred sufficiently often that the two broad groups never became totally separated. Periods of societal decline normally were marked by the sinking of some families from the upper level into obscurity, and by the rise of new families into the upper level, whereas periods of societal expansion normally were marked by the recruitment of new individuals and new families into the upper levels. Particularly after the civil service patterns matured and China went through periodic expansions of the state, this recruitment served to maintain the ranks of the upper levels of society. It also afforded an occasional peasant boy, who by good fortune secured an education, entry into the ranks of officialdom, and in such case his whole family shared his good fortune. This statement somewhat simplifies the long social history of China, but its basic features are significantly operative. As an old Chinese proverb has it: “The ox plows the field, but the horse eats the grain.”

The Chinese have long spoken in terms of the hsiao jen, the little people of the rural agrarian scene, and the chun tzu, the gentleman who formed the urban upper classes. The whole Confucian pattern of life was framed in terms of the commoner and the aristocrat, the governed and the governing, the agrarian and the urban, the peasantry and the gentry. This bi-polarity sometimes became a dichotomy which penetrated and affected village life as well as the broad structure of society as a whole.

Early Chinese social organization utilized the clan and has never entirely lost this element of social structure. Once the national state developed, the role of the clan declined, in north China far more than in south China. As an economic unit larger than the family, however, the clan remained an operative unit in life. As a social form amenable to political action, the clan organization was frequently revived during periods of disturbance, political decline, rebellion, and the reconstruction of patterns of stability.

Less formal elements of organization, in the strict sense, were the guilds, the regional groupings, the provincial fraternity, the counting of district and county home status. Into the overall framework of social organization the scholar class eventually fitted the concept of the examinations and the civil service rankings. There were many other elements of social organization that were developed for the stabilizing of life in general and life for the individual, down to such things as the beggars’ guild. That the soldier was never given status in China perhaps was by common consent of all the established general classes—he could but prey upon the little people, tax the merchant, and deprive the scholar of power.

Throughout Chinese social organization there runs a strong pragmatic thread of utilitarianism—class patterns were developed and maintained which were mutually helpful elements to large numbers of people. There was give and take, transfer of status, rise and fall of individuals and families. Alien groups brought in new elements when rising to power, non-
Chinese became Chinese by the acceptance of general standards, Chinese initiative reduced threatening elements when it could. Chinese social structure never became totally static or fixed in immutable patterns, but its generally accepted patterns have been one of the very definitions of who was a Chinese, and, to this degree, social structure was one of the basic building blocks of Chinese society.

5. **Chinese Egocentricity.** A Chinese proverb, "Within the four seas all men are brothers," has often been quoted as a sort of peaceful ideal for world society. The proverb did not originate in an international context, and the four seas referred to cannot be equated, in reality, to oceans at the ends of the planet earth. The proverb contains an implicit egocentricity which is manifest throughout Chinese history, for its original meaning suggested that even Chinese scoundrels were Chinese. All peoples of the earth, as unit population based on some kind of grouping criteria, distinguish between “we” and “they,” and the criteria vary tremendously, often involving some element of physical human biology. Many peoples express some degree of superiority over other peoples—Americans are often disliked around the world for the superiority they exude. In Chinese terms the “we” is best equated historically with the concept “civilized,” and the “they” with the concept “barbarian.” These terms are thus not a reference to human biology in any sense, but a definition of Chineseness. Those people who think, act, feel, believe, revere, disdain, admire, dislike, and assume as Chinese do are Chinese; those who do not are barbarians. Not only is a type of reaction involved, but implicit in it is a quality reaction. To be Chinese is superior to being non-Chinese. The definition of what constitutes the accepted sum-criteria of Chineseness at any particular date in history changes, but there remains a group concept of type and quality. The earliest Chinese did not write, their ancestor worship was ill-prescribed, their agriculture was primitive, their food economy was very simple, and their domestic architecture was crude, but there was a beginning concept present even then. In the alteration of the criteria themselves in more recent centuries the elements that went into the type definition altered, but the essential quality has not altered.

Throughout Chinese history the leadership of the Chinese has striven to keep before the population an acceptable concept of what constitutes Chineseness. In that this has been accomplished, China has absorbed her conquerors—historically they all became Chinese, and few Chinese totally submerged themselves in other cultures. Within the four seas all men are brothers, are civilized, and are Chinese; outside the four seas all men are unrelated, are barbarian, and are not Chinese; this is a far more realistic interpretation of the Chinese proverb than that holding it a pacifist ideal for world society. China as the center of the civilized world has long been one of the ideas implicit in Chineseness. All non-Chinese should pay respect and homage to the Chinese; if they can be induced to admit their inferior status and pay tribute, so much the more proper.

The above attitudes have not been very fully expressed in the last two centuries during which the European world has displayed its own criteria

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9 See Hu, op. cit., pp. 502-506. This complex has seldom been described explicitly, but is implicit in many kinds of remarks by Chinese; it often has been glossed over in occidental writing.
of egocentric superiority, but they have not disappeared. In the high periods of Chinese history they clearly have been expressed. There has been a tolerance in their expression, of course, and when other peoples peacefully adopted the Chinese way they peacefully became Chinese. This has been one element in the geographical expansion of China—the peaceful expansion of China by the barbarian adoption of the Chinese way. But when the adoption of the Chinese way has been resisted by the barbarians, then something akin to manifest destiny and military and political imperialism has come to the fore among the Chinese to the end, that, during the high periods, Chinese power expressed itself in the whole of eastern Asia.

China and Chineseness could not spread where the agrarian village could not go, that is the dry or cold interior heart of Asia; it could not spread to those peoples yet too simple in culture to accept the Chinese way, the simple tribal shifting cultivators of southeast Asia; it could not succeed among those who emigrated rather than accept, such as the Thai, the Lao, the Miao, the Burmans, and others of southeast Asia. The Chinese always have recognized that there are those outer realms of the world to which the Chinese way was not fully applicable, but these must remain to some degree barbarian.

The egocentricity has been one of the things that has kept a living China operating for a longer period than any other single society on the face of our earth. It has been an intangible cement which has defined Chineseness, has altered the specifics of the definition during changing times and changing technology, but has remained essentially a unified concept throughout.

6. Agrarian Orientation. Chinese society has been one rooted in the productive soil of local regions, one given to a permanent concern for the relation of man to a specific place. It shows itself in the way in which a Chinese village farmer stays with his land if he possibly can, and is shows itself in the way in which a Chinese, removed thousands of miles and born generations later, will still refer to his homeplace as a specific locality somewhere in old China. In its most obvious phase this orientation has been that of the agricultural villager whose primary concern is the growing of crops on the good earth.

Historically the earliest Chinese crop growers were shifting cultivators who also engaged in hunting animals and birds and in fishing in local waters. The agrarian orientation became stronger, however, as sedentary village agriculture replaced shifting cultivation and mobile living, to the degree that the pastoral orientation of following animals about became an early synonym for barbarianism. This orientation grew stronger with the evolution of the legal institutions of private landownership, and it grew into an orientation that viewed agricultural land as the only economic good. The great debates at the start of the Christian Era sharpened the agrarian orientation, and relegated transportation, trade, mining, and manufacturing to a secondary position. During the whole of the Christian Era this orient-

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10 This subject has been discussed by many different authors and most of the literature dealing with Chinese economy stresses it. Cressey op. cit. deals effectively with the specifics.

11 See E. M. Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron, (Leiden, Brill. 1931).
tation remained strong, so strong that the introduction of nineteenth century alien features such as railroads, foreign-style buildings, and factories were thought to be destructive of the agrarian harmonics of the Chinese landscape.

So long as the Chinese were few in the midst of a great and extensive landscape this agrarian orientation supplied all of them most adequately with a living. During the growing periods of Chinese society there was land enough for all who came into the Chinese world. The leadership elements of Chinese society helped maintain this orientation, for it made for rural stability and prosperity. The agrarian orientation fitted the family system, the rural village system, the broad patterns of social organization, and it formed the contrast with the lesser economies of the surrounding barbarians of all kinds. The leadership elements themselves maintained relations with local rural communities and landscapes, they kept their identifications with place and with the land, and they kept the major functioning cultural elements of Chinese society in tune with an agrarian orientation. The good emperor annually offered sacrifices on behalf of agriculture at the Temple of Agriculture and officiated at the ceremonial spring plowing which opened the agricultural year. This steadfast view of the land by 1950, produced more than one hundred million families who still thought in terms of the land, the agricultural life, and the good earth on which it was founded.

THE CYCLIC PATTERNS OF CHINESE HISTORY

Though Chinese society has been continuously operative for some four thousand years, its vigor has not been sustained at the same high level during the whole period. There have been periods of decline and resurgence, of privation and prosperity, of weakness and strength, of turbulence and peace. To some the waxing and waning become inevitable and cyclic, to others they are but the repetition of events in a society long governed by a single basic set of concepts. The Communist viewpoint sees different methods of the ruler exploiting the masses, either more or less brutally, from the ancient age of primitive communism, through clan society and feudalism, into the modern era of capitalism controlled by alien interests. The non-Communist economic historian recognizes those periods of upward spiralling economic growth during which political, social, and economic institutions, and their administration, were in balance, and those periods of downward spiralling, economic decline in which institutions and their administrations were out of balance. The ascribing of causes to the various directional currents of Chinese history takes one pattern under the Communist viewpoint, whereas non-Communist scholars have not fully studied the periodicity of Chinese history with an eye to ascribing causes. The dating of cycles, the prescribing of descriptive terms for the periods, and the causes of periodicity are not the object of this section, but the recognition that there have been such periodic ups and downs is important to the balance of this paper.

From at least early Chou dynasty time, about the eleventh century B.C., down to the early nineteenth century one can suggest that the basic tenets of Chinese culture were not really altered. Many institutions of

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12 Eberhard, op. cit. Conquerors and Rulers, has reviewed Communist theories, pp. 45-51.
society have changed, and the population has grown, but the fundamental concepts of China, and Chinese culture, have remained those of the patterns suggested above in the six basic complexes. During an ascending spiral, people lived well, the area occupied by Chinese expanded, and the population increased. During a descending spiral people lived less well, sometimes the area contracted, and population stabilized or even contracted. Replacement of a deteriorated, inefficient, corrupt dynasty and its civil and military bureaucracy by a new dynasty with a reformed bureaucracy normally was accompanied by a period of turbulence, indecisive leadership, and seeming short or long term chaos. Replacement by a new dynasty which initiated a new upward spiral brought in some new institutions and technologies, but is chiefly operated to restore the efficiencies and the stable patterns of the past. The new dynasty pruned back divergent currents, re­addressed the balance, maintained the basic institutions of the past, and returned to the agrarian orientation.

Such continuity of family-operated, agrarian-orientated, village-based, city-controlled civilized Chinese society was possible so long as the agricultural landscape possessed reserves of land within the core area or upon its margins which could be utilized by the established order. It is now recognized that in the early nineteenth century the Chinese were running out of agricultural landscapes amenable to their system. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century expansion into Manchuria removed the pressure temporarily for the people of north China; the late eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century migration of southern China into southeast Asia, to lesser degree, accomplished the same thing. But by the twentieth century the cyclic rise and fall of an agrarian society was deep in its last possible decline—no governmental restoration of a dynasty, a party, a bureaucracy, or a system could restore expanding economic growth and peaceful stability to a society whose population had simply outgrown its area of operation unless major changes were to be made in the whole functional structure of society. Such changes necessarily involved altering the fundamental nature of the basic building blocks upon which Chinese culture was constructed and only a group with a truly revolutionary approach could hope to succeed in its prospective program.

This is not the place in which to argue whether the Nationalist Government, a Democratic League, or a new Emperor could have established a successful government in control of all China, for the people of China, as a sum of cultural attitudes, neither realized the need for, nor desired, a change in the basic patterns of Chinese culture. The Nationalist Government tried to work chiefly within the framework of the past; groups and factions opposed to that government advocated lesser or greater degrees of basic change. The Communist Party formulated the successful program by which the support of the masses was won for a program of reform within the patterns of the past. When support was achieved, the Communists proceeded to changes of such a drastic nature that they seemed to break totally with the past. The issue of Communists vs. Nationalists, to the Communists, has ended in terms of the old Chinese proverb: “Conquerors are Kings, the Beaten are Bandits.” The burden of this paper is that the Communists have not broken totally with the past, but that they have in-
introduced a series of new institutions which can be operated in ways practically compatible with the patterns of the past.

**The Chinese Communist Conceptual Program**

No attempt will here be made to state precisely what the Chinese Communist Party believed or to justify what they advocated or did on any precise date. Marxist philosophy as to strategy and tactics is such as to make this attempt both unprofitable and unnecessary. For all the pronouncements by the Marxian school on the nature of Chinese society and economy and the best way to revolutionize it, there are many variations and contradictions in the literature on the subject. However, it is clear that by 1945 the Chinese Communist leadership was committed to the concept that China, in a world permanently altered by the Industrial Revolution, could not remain the family-controlled, village dwelling, decentralized, agrarian-oriented society it had been. An industrial revolution in China was an urgent and absolute must, and the mobilization of economic resources to underwrite that revolution primarily had to come from within China itself. This demanded an end to the economic system wherein family investment in land still was the primary pattern of domestic economic growth; it also demanded a degree of authoritarian centralization in the administration of economic resources such as China had never had. Two major obstacles stood in the way of the whole Chinese Communist program: (1) the very traditional, localized, agrarian cultural orientation of the Chinese peasantry, and (2) the restrictive influence of non-Chinese in Chinese economic and political affairs. The Chinese Communist program, therefore, set out to destroy those aspects of traditional Chinese cultural institutions that would hinder the evolution of centralized control of economic growth along the lines of an industrial society and to destroy non-Chinese influence and power which could hinder carrying out such revolutionary program as might eventuate in the long run.

Whether or not the National Government of China could have, in the long run, produced the necessary revolution within a sufficiently short time to lift the level of Chinese living need not be argued, since they lost the support of the masses of Chinese requisite to carrying on any program. Though the Russian revolution had been born in the city and was carried to the countryside, the Chinese Communist Party eventually secured the support of the Chinese peasantry in rural areas, after which the Party could take over the cities. The Chinese Communist program, therefore, began with land reform and stayed with it, in the traditional sense, until it had achieved control of the country and the population; after this the revolution could take its originally intended course. To keep the support of the masses of the peasantry, or at least to keep them sufficiently quiet so that wholesale rebellion could not occur, the program repeatedly had to shift its orientation temporarily, even in directions that might appear to the outside world as un-Marxian.\(^\text{13}\)

The Chinese Communist Party also had to build new cultural, economic, and administrative institutions to replace those features of traditional China that were to be destroyed. So far as possible, traditional inclinations, tendencies, abilities, and habits needed to be utilized in order to make working programs appear familiar, acceptable, and Chinese. That these appeared to the outside world to involve un-Marxian trends, contradictions, reversal of direction, even idiotic activities, was of no consequence, so long as they kept the Chinese populace busy, fully occupied, and at least amenable to direction. A basic strategy, exploited tactically, was to utilize the energies and weight of “opinion” of the lower sectors of the peasantry to further the program of the Party, this weight in itself constituting the opposition to the literate, articulate, uncooperative middle and upper classes, for the lower classes could be counted upon to support demands against the groups above them as they repeatedly had done in past historic time.

The Communist Program in Operation

It is not the purpose of this article to review the whole working program of the Chinese Communist Party. Rather, the purpose is to examine that program in terms of the basic and fundamental features of Chinese culture that have been utilized by the Chinese Communist Party in its program of revolution in China. A re-examination of the previously listed six basic culture complexes is therefore required.

1. The Family. Modernization and reform of the traditional family structure began slowly around 1900 and moved forward during the first half of the present century totally unrelated to the Chinese Communist program, but the movement had achieved little real progress in the rural countryside by 1950. The Chinese Communist program has retained the biological family as a basic social institution but has worked to destroy the political, economic, and cultural patterns surrounding the traditional extended family and its subordinate kinship relations as institutions. This has meant temporary excessive freedom of divorce, temporary separation of husbands, wives, children, and relatives, the encouragement of loyalty to the party and to the state in opposition to loyalty to family members. There is historic precedent for persons to inform against relatives and the Communist Party exploited this old “duty to the state.” Sufficient cases of forceful disciplinary punishment of violation of the Marriage Law of 1950 have been carried out so that the basic institutional patterns around the traditional family have been broken, though by 1961 not every vestige of traditional tendencies has been eradicated. The courts continue to handle large numbers of cases of domestic disharmony in which traditional practices become the center of dispute, this being one of the major fields of civil litigation encouraged by the Communist Party. Catering to the position of women in society and giving them freedom equal to men has brought forth a strong degree of support from the women of China, and most of the litigation around domestic disharmony has been initiated by women.

The growing secularization of the Chinese family has had tremendous repercussions. The increase in the labor force has been notable, along with enormously increased mobility of family members as persons. The dissolution of family ties has rendered individuals and biological family units relatively easily amenable to state policy decisions since decreased loyalties and vanishing intra-family independence renders members of the family far more vulnerable than they were under older patterns. These are both religious and social residues of non-acceptance of the new patterns, and economic pressures hinder the full secularization of the family. Though the power and the strength of the traditional family has been broken, the complete disappearance of traditional elements of the complex is dependent upon the evolution of significantly new and sound ideological and social elements of family institutionalism. Here the Communist program has used such slogans as "democratic, harmonious, and united new family" involving "mutual affection and mutual respect," but the vagueness of social direction given by the Communist Party leaves the future evolution of new family institutions up to spontaneous processes and influences. By 1961 these had shown little real development in China, and the Communist Party cannot count their victory totally complete until stable new patterns evolve. Despite what happens to China in the future, however, it is clear that the full institutionalism of the traditional Chinese family will never return and that traditional family economics is a thing of the past.

2. The Village. A populous society that continues to grow in numbers but to reside within the same geographical area cannot abolish the compact grouping of residence patterns, and as dormitories or bedroom settlements, village-like and town-like settlement forms can only increase in number in China. The trend toward increased urbanization can turn old villages into towns, cities, and metropolitan areas, and this is happening at an increasing rate in China, but the village-like compact settlement form remains the most numerous feature of settlement geography in China. The introduction of the Commune is affecting the living habits of the Chinese population, in that community kitchens and dining rooms, points of population concentration during the day, work sites, centers of recreation, and centers of incarceration of recalcitrants are bringing change to the physical movement and location of persons. The reported barracks of the Commune are missing, still, from most of the twenty-odd thousand rural Commune units, but they may well increase in number, whereas relaxation in the early tightness of person-regimentation within the Commune, as a tactical maneuver, may well counter the influence of the barracks.

On the other hand, the functional operation of the traditional village has been destroyed by the Chinese Communist Party. The self-contained,
self-directed, independent cell-like autonomy of the village is gone in terms of its past operation. The centralization of administrative control, through membership in the Party, the steady transference of "cadres," the greater accessibility through transportation, and the immediacy of radio communication have destroyed both distance and time relationships for the village. The publication of disciplinary or commendatory action throughout China by the press, radio, and the "bamboo telegraph" has obliterated the isolation and independence of compact settlement groups. The incorporation of villages into integrated administrative units such as the Commune, the Agricultural Cooperative Farm, the Handicraft Cooperative, and other units under collectivization has destroyed the autonomy of village communities. It would thus seem that the Chinese Communist Party has destroyed the functionalism of another of the basic cultural complexes of Chinese society.

However, it is an old axiom that the Chinese prefer to be members of a group, and that they shun solitary living. The whole Communist program of collectivization has played hard upon this theme and upon the themes of cooperative action, democratic decision-making, and group activity. The early creation of mutual aid teams preserved the cooperative activity of the traditional village, and in the further collectivization of agriculture, handicraft, industry, and transport, every effort has been made to stress the group aspects of each form of activity. The more recent stressing of community dining rooms has made for social contact, group recreation, and group performance. The creation of a whole battery of organizations aimed at maintaining group solidarity has tried to capitalize upon the traditional pattern of close social contact. This is actually a program to marshall the labor forces into more manageable units, but it also is an effort to retain the social values of group activity inherent in Chinese society.

It would appear, therefore, that the Chinese Communist Party has tried to do two things with the traditional village community. First has been the aim of destroying the cell-like autonomy of the community which enabled one Chinese village to carry on its own little-world life unconcerned about what took place in areas round about. Second has been the aim of reorganizing the economic functioning of the village community as a group of independent families into a highly integrated, centrally controlled production unit whose resources and output could be more easily utilized and tapped and whose consumption patterns could be more efficiently controlled. To a very considerable extent the patterns of reorganization are those which, at least in theory, make for efficiency in the accumulation of capital resources and labor required in industrialization. The sheer problem of collecting production of commodities and taxes from more than 100,000,000 family units in the rural sector was too great, when the whole collecting system had been poorly developed, for centralized collection and when transportation was not effective to the same end. The similar problem of accumulating savings and other forms of capital resources to finance industrialization was equally insurmountable under the

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autonomous village system, in which the historic trends had made for well-developed techniques of avoiding centralized control. The progressive establishment of cooperative farms, fully collectivized farms, state farms, Communes, and similar economic organizations for handicrafts, transportation, and marketing, have reduced the numbers of units to be tapped from well over 100,000,000 to fewer than 100,000, of which some 24,000 were agricultural Communes. Though operating inefficiencies, apathy, passive resistance, even “capitalistic deviation” are present, the increased economic efficiency of capital accumulation and labor utilization has more than offset the deficiencies. This judgment is a net judgment of the total result and is not in contradiction to the judgment that agricultural production, as such and alone, has not tremendously increased.

Whatever may happen to the physical form, number, and size of the residence settlements of China, the economic functioning of the traditional village has been destroyed, but the group operation has been retained. In place of the village has come a changing assortment of centralized groupings whose economic functioning can be directed and controlled from above, and whose output potential can be tapped for utilization in any direction decided upon. The need to maintain the sense of group activity, cooperation, local initiative, and at least tolerance, if not good will, means that there will be waxing and waning in the degree of centralization, there will be tactical variation in the project patterns to which energy is applied, and there will be further change in organizational structure. If this whole effort succeeds at all it will be a tremendous step in the reorganization of a traditional economy. An individualistic collection of small autonomous villages will have been more highly centralized than in any other country. It may be some decades before mature organizational structure appears to stabilize its patterns, and there may be even large scale reversions to a less centralized pattern of operation.

3. The City. The Chinese city began undergoing cultural change in the late eighteenth century, when Europeans, with their own culture complexes, began to accumulate in numbers in a few coastal Chinese cities. The nineteenth century saw the process increase, and cultural change in the cities of China has been marked in the twentieth century. This, superficially, took the form of breaching or removing walls, widening and paving streets, installing light, power, water, sewage, and transportation systems, adopting European architectural traits, and developing modern warehouse and factory installations. Culturally, the city often became a curious composite of both traditional Orient and modern Occident. Functionally the city has changed hardly at all, for it still is the center of control and culture for Chinese society. In that national control was, and is, centered in a political capital, the capital has always been unique. The Chinese Communists chose to return to Peking (both the site and the name) partly because of its very aura of historic power and glory, the best known of all Chinese political capitals.

The Chinese Communist programs of economic development in the first years centered on those existing cities that were already developed as to industry, transport, and labor skills, but more recently they have begun to create new cities out of old villages, towns, or mineral resource
sites. These new centers are economically functional as regional foci, and as industry develops regional-divisional aspects some of the new cities will become very important. As cultural centers they become expressions of "politics" and the distributaries of the "mass line." To the degree that the industrial orientation grows and assumes dominance in future Chinese society, the city will share that dominance. There is little evidence, so far, that the total role of the city is being changed from that of earlier time, so the city may remain the residence of the social, economic, and political elite and such other people as can somehow gain entry. Cities are growing both larger in population and in area. Peking by 1958 had been expanded to 6,552 square miles, including most of the mine sites and industrial plants around it. But the tendency to drive the peasantry back to the rural countryside and to demote urban functionaries to periods of service in rural areas preserves the classical distinctions between rural and urban residence.

4. Social Organization. Communist restructuring of the social organization of China is still in process, and a final or stable pattern has yet to emerge. However, in broad terms the goal can be stated as the complete recasting of social structure upon economic-political lines compatible with the political goals of the Communist state. This has so far promoted tremendous social mobility, in respect to status and position within the framework, by liquidating or reducing to a low level the former upper classes and by elevating cooperative individuals, chiefly the former lower classes, to a higher status. In a sense the result has been similar to that of earlier traditional periods of turbulence associated with dynastic shifts, in which the most objectionable members of the upper classes were stripped of their positions, wealth, power, and status, the debt pattern was rearranged, and some new additions were made to the upper classes. Many of the same historic techniques have been used which have won the support of the lower sectors of society, who see in the procedure an opportunity to wipe the old slate clean and to advance to a higher level and status.

In the early years of the Communist regime official pronouncement arbitrarily divided the population into five classes: landlords and big merchants, national bourgeoisie (traders, merchants, factory owners, town and city dwellers with investments in productive economic patterns), petty bourgeoisie (the rich and middle peasant landowners, master craftsmen, business and industrial clerical personnel, professional classes, lower government functionaries, and the like), semiproletariat (tenants, poor peasants, handicraft workers, shop assistants, peddlers), and proletariat (the landless rural peasantry, town and urban manual labor, the rank and file lower segment of the population low in wealth, skill, and status, but high in "political consciousness" and therefore willing to support any political program that would improve their status). This classification of social structure is an obvious but very purposeful and arbitrary arrangement of groups of people for economic and political ends. It cut through the traditional social structure of scholar, farmer, artisan, and merchant in terms of wealth, power, and status, placing in the landlord-big merchant and na-
tional bourgeoisie groups all those persons whose vested interests would make them object to the Communist Revolution. By 1960 the first two classes (landlord-merchant and national bourgeoisie) had been liquidated, eliminated, reoriented, brainwashed, driven out of China, or driven underground, and control of China lay in the hands of a new segment of the population, who have been busy erecting the elements of a new social structure around themselves. Social structuring under the new regime is taking political and economic directions, as could be expected, and upward mobility of formerly low-placed persons and biological family units is taking place.

An interesting speculation, as an aside about the workings of the program, concerns the question of what has happened, and what will happen, to many of the former great and leading families. Liquidation of many of these families took place, but was it so efficient as to wipe out all able members? The switching of loyalty, “getting on the bandwagon,” and “joining the opposition” have been frequent, and it would be strange indeed if numerous former high-ranking members of society had not been able to maintain themselves and their own biological family units under the new regime. However, the constant re-examination of loyalty to the Communist Party continues to turn out “traitors,” “rightists,” “imperialists,” “deviationists,” and others, some of whom may well be status opportunists who too quickly abused their new status, but others of whom may be members of old families.

At the very top of the new structural hierarchy are the veteran leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, among whom there have been singularly few liquidations. Grouped below the top echelon are several ranks of party members, their status dependent upon their years of service, outright ability, and patterns of unswerving loyalty. The Party membership of some thirteen million constitutes the elite social group, a group considerably larger than the elite of the classical China. Ranked below them are the new industrial workers, members of the trade unions, and the more skilled of the handicraftsmen. Fringe benefits and status symbolization are bringing position in the social hierarchy to this group which, in 1960, numbered in the vicinity of twelve to fifteen millions. The “cadre” membership, the group of activists who carry out party policy at all levels, slowly is achieving a third-ranking status level. Some of these are new or low-placed party members, but others are village opportunists who are willing to carry out party chores in return for status and fringe benefits of a simple type.

The professional, scholarly, and scientific groups in Communist China currently are not faring well, and often find themselves somewhat shoved aside in the new structuring of social patterns. During 1959-1960 the strong emphasis upon “people’s research,” as opposed to scientific research by a scholarly class, indicated that the scholarly and professional classes were not making a significant place for themselves. Many such indivi-

20 See Hu, op. cit., pp. 150-156, for specific comment. Since the whole matter of class emergence and reconstruction of social organization is so volatile and current, there is little firm data on the subject, and these paragraphs obviously are tentatively written.
duals have given but lip service to the Party as such, and it is clear that social status is to be earned more by Party loyalty, following the "Mass Line," and practical accomplishment than by purely scholarly achievement.

The army also stands in a position somewhat aside from the main structural patterns of social organization. In classical tradition good men seldom belonged to the army, except in times of crisis, and to a considerable extent this remains true in Communist China. The special position of the early revolutionary army and the political status of its leaders gives the army stronger position and higher status than in earlier China, but it would appear that status is derived from political loyalty rather than military existence, as such.

In general “the people” remain the “little people” as in earlier time, and leadership is confined to the aristocratic elite, though of a new type. The frequent use of linguistic terms for peasantry by highly placed party members implies a distinction between the new elite and the commoner. The destruction of the old class patterns primarily had economic and political objectives. The development of new class patterns is not yet mature, and Communist Party membership does not carry those privately owned, hereditary and vested interest elements characteristic of the scholar-landlord Confucianist class. However, the replacement of Confucian dogma by Marxian and Mao dogma finds the same cultural processes at work, and slowly the Communist Party membership is acquiring the status and prerequisites of the former time. It is notable that the early pictures of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, and others of the ranking leaders showed them wearing wadded cotton clothing of a common sort, living in poor housing like that of the “people,” and eating in poor surroundings. Recent pictures of ranking leaders show entirely different conditions. The too rapid acquisition of prerequisites by middle-ranked leaders lays them open to attack by opportunistic lower-ranked persons seeking their own patterns of increasing status.

Though traditional Chinese social organization was not extremely highly developed in class terms, there was clear distinction between the “little people” and the “aristocrats”; power and wealth lay in the hands of the latter group, who recruited enough new members to keep their ranks full. The accumulation of a landless tenancy was economic rather than social, but is provided the sheer weight of pressure which the Communists could utilize to destroy the control of the former aristocratic sector. The modern development of international trade and industry in the coastal cities of China gave rise to a banking, business, industrial, trading group which economically was closely related to the old aristocratic sector, and often inter-related to them by family ties. The destruction of these two groups wiped out the economic control of Chinese society, and socially left the Chinese population in a relatively cohesive and socially unstratified state which made relatively easy the introduction of the new social patterns based upon the Party, industrial union labor, and affiliated organizational elements. Thus the Communist program has remained fairly close to the traditional pattern of loose social organization without sharp stratification, containing sufficient fluidity that dissentient persons can be dropped down-scale and solidly loyal ones can be moved up-scale.
5. **Chinese Egocentricity.**\(^{21}\) It is clear that Chinese ego is being more strongly expressed in recent years and that the psychological and cultural attitude of the Chinese has not changed at all. The feeling that “the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind,” that all imperialists are paper tigers (fierce-looking but empty inside), and that Maoism is constructively reorienting Marxism philosophy, runs throughout the policy line of the Chinese Communist Party, and is the attitude reflected by the people of China. The active and aggressive position taken by the Chinese with regard to the Asian-African spread of Communism is ample indication that merely a new version of “we, the civilized,” is on the rise. The “peaceful acceptance” of Chinese Communist culture cannot be expected among the barbarians today because of the “evil machination of the imperialists,” and the sense of manifest destiny and political imperialism is returning to the Chinese in an emphatic way. The tactical patterns of operation have been sharpened by Communist strategy, national minorities within China are being made into Chinese at an increasing rate, and the extension of the attitude abroad is precisely the attitude that brought earlier Chinese emperors tribute from surrounding peoples in earlier time. Here Chinese reference does turn to history and reminds Chinese that, though former emperors were “feudalists and imperialists,” the former high status of China was well deserved and proper.

6. **Agrarian Orientation.** There is no question but that Chinese Communist policy has tried to destroy the full completeness of the earlier agrarian orientation of the people of China. Here the effort has been not to destroy totally such an orientation but to reshape it in such a way that a major industrial orientation may be erected within Chinese economy. An agrarian orientation that viewed too much mining of minerals or too many railroads and factories as disturbing to the harmonics of the landscape, an orientation that declined to utilize natural resources other than soil, an orientation that declined to use machines when human labor could accomplish the task, had completely stifled the growth of Chinese economy. The Free World has sought the same ends in preaching industrialization to the underdeveloped peoples of the earth.

There is indication that, in the effort to break the agrarian orientation of the Chinese populace, the program went too far, put too little into agrarian investment, and neglected the agricultural sector of the economy in favor of the industrial sector. The 1960 corrections of agricultural production figures brought home the realization that the agrarian orientation could not be neglected.\(^{22}\) However, the steady drive to improve agriculture, the industrial output designed for agriculture, the driving of populations back to the farms, and the emphasis given to “people’s research” on agricultural problems demonstrates clearly that total destruction of an agricultural orientation was at no point a primary aim. The utilization of

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\(^{21}\) There is little literature dealing with the specific issue. The point is implicit in much political maneuvering of recent years, reflected in newspaper and magazine reporting. It also is implicit throughout such a study as H. A. Steiner, “Communist China in the World Community,” *International Conciliation,* No. 533, May, 1961, pp. 389-454.

\(^{22}\) W. K., “Communist China’s Agricultural Calamities,” *The China Quarterly,* No. 6, April-June, 1961, pp. 64-75.
all known historic techniques in matters of agricultural endeavor has been notable, and the attempt to improve agriculture is very real.23

RECAPITULATION

If the above interpretive analysis has merit, the following points stand out in regard to the six suggested basic culture complexes of Chinese society. Communist strategy has been to destroy the old patterns that kept China stably organized as:

1. A collection of large and somewhat intra-dependent families, a few of whom held the reins of control for Chinese society;
2. A collection of almost autonomous village communities, in the economic sense, with decentralized but authoritarian national controls;
3. A loosely structured society in which an aristocratic element perpetuated its controls by taking in sufficient recruits to maintain power;
4. A society kept so oriented to agriculture life that an industrial revolution could hardly take place.

The strategy has been to:

1. To bring to dominance the always present biologic family unit but to strip it of its power resources;
2. To centralize authoritarian controls of persons and groups in such a way as to secure total control but to foster the traditional urge to group activity among the mass of the population;
3. To retain the city as the regional center of power in a more direct line in the chain of command from the national capital;
4. To retain the loose social structuring of the past but to replace the elements of societal control by a new group of persons conceiving of control in new terms;
5. To restore to vitality the egocentricity of the populace in order to enhance internal development as well as the position of China in world society;
6. To retain the agrarian orientation and its traditional practices to the degree necessary to feed the total populace while reforming it along modern productive lines, but with land control totally removed from the hands of families or persons;

C. Chung, "Agricultural Science in New China," Peking Review, Vol. 3, No. 47, Nov. 22, 1960, pp. 21-24, spells out a program labelled The Eight Point Charter. These eight points are: deep plowing and soil working, water conservancy, seed selection, closer planting, plant protection (insect and pest control), field management, and tool reform. In addition to listing the new charter, Chung says on page 22: “The considerable achievements gained in agricultural research have demonstrated the importance of the following basic experience. First and foremost is the placing of politics in command, the following of the mass line and the vigorous development of mass movements... An excellent feature of the way the mass line has been applied in agricultural research is the close cooperation developed between cadres, scientific and technical personnel, and the masses... Secondly this basic experience tells us that research must serve agricultural production and that the theoretical level of research must be raised by summing up mass experience in getting high yields. Thirdly, the policy of 'walking on two legs' has proved to be an important guarantee for the rapid growth of agricultural science... a major application of this policy is the integration of specialized research with the scientific activities of the masses. Fourthly, this basic experience tells us that greater numbers of research bases must be set up and varied methods employed simultaneously to attack urgent or complex problems.” 'Walking on two legs' is a current slogan referring to the combining of modern science and indigenous-traditional practices.
7. To graft into the basic set of complexes a new industrial culture complex which would produce an industrial revolution;

This latter culture-complex has not been discussed so far, and it needs some descriptive elaboration, for it represents, in some respects, a major reshaping of traditional Chinese culture.

7. **Industrial Orientation.** Though handicraft manufacturing is as old as Chinese culture itself, cultural policy has been to maintain it as handicraft manufacturing, pruning back those developmental features by which it could have evolved into an industrial manufacturing culture complex which could threaten the agrarian orientation of Chinese society. Changing attitudes in these matters were taking place in China between 1890 and 1950, but at such a slow rate of movement and so hampered by traditional restrictions that they could hardly be termed revolutionary. Under Chinese Communist control the industrial orientation has evolved a multi-pronged program, set in motion and stimulated by governmental control over the whole resources of Chinese society. Its primary programmatic phases have been:

1. Ultimate confiscation of all foreign-owned industrial properties, concessions, and activities;
2. Initiation of a totally new attitude toward natural resources, their survey, location, and exploitation involving a new concept of the harmonics of the landscape;
3. Development of a totally new orientation toward mechanics, mechanical inventiveness, the use of tools and machines, and their role in economy;
4. Development of a new orientation toward physical labor and labor with machines among all levels of society, in which physical labor is not looked down upon as it was in traditional China;
5. Development of a new educational framework concentrating on technical, practical, trade, and mechanical schools which can turn out persons willing to do skilled and mechanical labor; and
6. The formal initiation of all forms of industrial activity, including transportation development, on a geographically regionalized basis, involving the investment of most of the nation's economic resources in the program.

Industrialization programs began with an accent on urbanized heavy industry fairly well divorced from rural, economic, and cultural realities. Bottlenecks quickly developed, such as the disinclination to engage in physical labor, producing such interesting phenomena as widely distributed popular educational propaganda photos of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai working on roads, in factories, and on new buildings. Such bottlenecks led to programmatic patterns four and five above. The sheer need for greater volumes of natural resources led to pattern two, in which low-grade training in geology and minerology has set thousands of people to combing the hills of greater China for mineral deposits. This was something that never could have taken place in Confucian, agrarian China. The curious pattern of encouraging back-yard blast furnaces for the production of pig iron, and the following spree of building “local railroads” during 1959-60 may be eco-

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nomic idiocy in the strict production sense, but they derived from production and distribution bottlenecks and they also are related to phases two and three of the program. Such beginning and amateurish efforts as back-yard blast furnaces and local railroads may be scoffed at, as production engineering, but they must be viewed also as matters of culture-process development—the initiation of cultural attitudes and willingnesses toward industrialization among a people heretofore committed to an agrarian society. That millions of people are put to work at hand labor at vast programs, which cannot yet be tackled with big machines, is wasteful, but until that population is willing and able to make and use the machines, Communist policy has ordained that they are best kept busy, exhausted, and quiet.

The new culture complex, industrial orientation, is still young and far from maturity in Chinese society. There is considerable grumbling among the rural populace about deprivation because of the new monster, and there undoubtedly is lingering preference for the quiet rural, agrarian orientation which will die slowly. The industrial orientation will continue to grow, however, for its programmatic features are now sufficiently comprehensive as to promote the whole of an industrial revolution. There are a few signs, even, that a sector of the population is beginning to appreciate the possibilities, though their actual participation in the results still lies chiefly in the future. So long as the Chinese Communist Party remains in power the industrial orientation will grow, for the simple reason that the Chinese Communist Party is more fully committed to industrialization than is the Free World committed to the improvement of underdeveloped lands. It seems almost certain that if the Communist Party should lose control of China in the near future, a happening for which there is no realistic expectation whatever, the industrial orientation of Chinese society would continue to mature into full-fledged industrial revolution under any pattern of control. It would appear that a totally new culture complex has been grafted into Chinese society, however brutally this has been accomplished.

**Conclusion**

Whether those of us in the Free World like it or not, it appears that the Chinese Communist program in China has permanently altered the basic culture of Chinese society in wholesale fashion. Though Chinese society has been a steadily changing society during the 4,000 years of its continuous existence there have been only a very few cases of wholesale change which compare with what is in process today in China. It might be possible to argue that the coming of the Chou into China, about 1100 B.C., initiated such a period of change, though we know too little of the details to be certain about the amount and nature of such change. There is fairly ample evidence that the Ch'in, in the third century B.C., set in motion a wholesale pattern of change that matured in the succeeding two centuries. The cultural experience of the last four centuries prepared the ground for another pattern of wholesale change, and the last century has been a period of cultural, as well as economic and political, turbulence which brought to crisis state the issue of change. The Chinese have outgrown their landscape and their basic culture complexes. Unfortunately for the Chinese themselves, and for much of the rest of the world, the Communist seized the initiative and the controls at a time when such wholesale change could
be made. The Chinese Communist Party has retained certain basic cultural
tendencies, modes, and complexes traditionally Chinese, but have destroy­
ed the former functions of many other culture complexes in order to en­
large the total culture of China and reorient it in such a way as to more
fully utilize the resources of the geographical territory that has been the
traditional home of the Chinese. Communist control of China appears to
be firm, but cultural change will continue at a rapid rate, remaining essen­
tially Chinese in nature for all of the alien inspiration is has received. In
this last characteristic the present era resembles the two other eras of pro­
found cultural change in China.