WITHIN AND WITHOUT NATIONAL BORDERS:
CRIMES AND DEVIANCE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

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ABSTRACT

This paper studies cross-border crimes and deviance in Asia and the Pacific. It focuses on social disorganization crime, opportunity crime, corporate crime, bureaucratic crime, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and organized crime that take place characteristically within and without national or territorial borders in the region. To attempt a systematic understanding, the paper explores changing dynamics between major social forces, including capitalism and socialism, Eastern civilizations and Western development, democratic forms of government and patriarchal leadership, citizen initiatives and state authorities, formalism and informalism, procedural fairness and control effectiveness, and their possible impacts on crime, deviance, and their control in Asia and the Pacific.

Introduction

Asia and the Pacific encompass a large part of the world. Most of the world population live in this vast area. There are economic superpowers, newly industrializing hopefuls, as well as underdeveloped societies in the region. Canada, Japan, and the United States are G-8 members. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have gained a reputation for their miraculous economic growth as the “four little dragons” (Xu 1996; Biggart and Mauro 1999). China has recently scored the highest GNP increase in the world. On the other hand, North Korea is close to an economic collapse. Aboriginal societies in isolated Asian hinterlands and Pacific islands lag far behind in economic and social developments. So do war-infected countries, such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka.

The twenty-first century will be the century of Asia and the Pacific. All possible changes of the world are expected to be on display in this

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region (Andersson and Gunnarsson 2003; Rigg 2003; Sievers 2003). Politically, there will be transitions from socialism and capitalism to social pluralism, and from authoritarianism and totalitarian dictatorship to the democratic form of government (Shaw 1996; Ware and Kisriev 2001). Economically, there will be transformations of state planning, corporate monopoly, and public intervention into market rationality and individual entrepreneurship (Xu 1996; Kohli, Moon, and Sorensen 2003). Socially, there will be a rise of the middle-class, public opinion, and civil society, as well as a switch of social solidarity from the mechanical to the organic (Durkheim 1964; Morley 1993). Social networking and everyday life for people in Asia and the Pacific will be shaped more and more by the division of labor, bureaucratic arrangement, and professional associations rather than family mandates, group belonging, and community togetherness (Durkheim 1964; Weber 1968; Beeson 2002).

The above changes are obvious as all the major remaining socialist countries, China, North Korea, and Vietnam, settle in the region. They are either voluntarily undertaking reform or being pressured to change their economic and political systems (Shaw 1996; Zhou 2000). There are also traditional societies, such as Asian mountainous tribes and Pacific island communities. They begin to look up to the West or their more advanced neighbors for aspirations and models of modernization and development. With all these forces converging for social change, Asia and the Pacific will definitely be the most dynamic region in the world in the new century.

**Crimes and Deviance in Asia and the Pacific:**
**Types, Patterns, and Characteristics**

Economic reform, industrialization, and urbanization can improve material conditions and the quality of life. But they also increase opportunities for deviance and criminal behavior. As conventional crimes climb up, various unconventional deviance and crimes are making their debut as well. In rapidly developing countries across Asia and the Pacific, it is no surprise to see an outgrowth in both the volume of conventional crimes and the type of new criminal activities (Xu 1995; Zvekic 1995; Newman 1999; Goddard 2001; Schiray 2001; Oldenburg 2002).
**Social Disorganization Crime**

Social disorganization is a social condition that appeared during the early stage of Western industrialization (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1924). As rapid change occurs in a short period of time and rural people flock to urban centers to seek economic fortunes, a large portion of the population become spiritually disoriented. Whereas they see that the old values, lifestyles, and community relations they bring with them no longer serve their needs for belonging and togetherness, they also feel that it is difficult to acquire new rules, norms, and ways of living in the current environment. They feel that anything goes but nothing works. This attitude facilitates a drift to deviance and crimes.

In the new era of Asian and Pacific industrialization, social disorganization takes both domestic and international forms (Jayasuriya and Sang 1991). Migrants not only move from rural villages to urban areas, but also cross national borders from the Philippines to Saudi Arabia, from Thailand to Japan, or from central Asia to Northwestern China. They face not only contrasts between rural and urban communities, but also language barriers, developmental gaps, and cultural differences across countries. Social disorganization deviance and crimes, therefore, become diversified. Among migrants, being away from home causes loneliness, depression, and disposition to abuse alcohol and even illicit drugs. Being desperate to find a job makes them easy victims of prostitution and slavery. A loss of belongings and failure to make a fortune can push them into despair and lead them further to suicide. While they are victimized most of the time, migrants also take advantage of their migrant status and prey on local residents in the community on their pathway or of their sojourn. The most common crimes committed by migrants are thefts, burglaries, shoplifting, and other property offenses. But there are also assaults, rapes, and other violent crimes. In some migration corridor and destination cities, migrants even pose a threat to public order. Wuhan, an all-way transportation hub city in central China, harbors about 340,000 formally registered migrants. Migrants account for 51.5 percent of criminal suspects in custody and 60.5 percent of prostitution offenses handled by the municipal authority (Chen and Deng 1999). Shenzhen, a major migration destination city due to its well-known economic developmental zone across Hong Kong, traces 97 percent of its crimes to migrants (Cao 1997; Lao 2001).
For those who are left behind by migrants, worry, fear, and longing for the safe return of loved ones are major elements in their personal feelings and sentiments (Interview). The absence of male adults weakens defense in villages. Intruders step in. They prey on senile villagers for monetary and property gains. They target young, married women, luring them into inappropriate sexual relationships, sexually assaulting them, or forcibly raping them. Family plots are left idle. Raising children becomes problematic. Stressful wives and parents turn to alcohol to alleviate their loneliness and pain. In hinterland China, an adult exodus to cities and coastal regions leave children, women, and the elderly in emotional and economic struggles across rural villages. Family ties are loosened. Community interdependence is in a shaky position. Separation between married couples causes emotional tension and sexual stress. Husbands seek temporary sex relief with prostitutes while in migration. Wives commit adultery or are forcibly raped without their husbands’ presence and protection. Returning adults bring venereal diseases back to their otherwise pristine homeland. They may even commit serious crimes to avenge their loved ones’ betrayal and victimization. In a mountainous county of China, a returning husband killed his wife, her adulterer, and his mother in law who remained acquiescent to the affair because of the money received from her daughter’s extramarital lover, in an overnight rampage across three villages (Fieldwork).

**Opportunity Crime**

As the value of achievement is stressed and success is simplified into one dimension of material gain, more and more people are drawn into tight competition and hence constant conflict for economic recognition and dominance. They are willing to attempt everything, legal or illegal, to seize opportunities that emerge from economic reform and development but are oftentimes unequally distributed across the population.

Opportunity and its unequal distribution have multiple social implications and consequences as far as crimes and deviance are concerned (Merton 1957). First, when opportunity takes the center stage of public attention, it creates an opportunity mentality that de-emphasizes diligence, honesty, law, and conventional practices. In many industrializing Asian and Pacific societies, economic reform and development have indeed increased
opportunities for wealth accumulation and non-material gains. However, since newly unleashed opportunities pour favorably into the hands of the socially privileged and enable them to build their economic fortunes and luxurious lifestyles in a short period of time, a social impression is created that opportunities are widely available for people to benefit quickly and easily. People actively look for opportunities within and without the social system, which provides a fertile social soil for deviations and deviance from conventional wisdom and normal ways of thinking and acting.

Second, people who are in advantaged positions to seize and benefit from opportunities can be drawn into deviance and illegal activities in different ways. As they avail themselves of an opportunity, they may actually engage in a form of deviance or law violation. For example, when the children of government officials use their parents' power and influences to secure their personal benefits, they undoubtedly make a de facto invasion upon social order and public interests. Moreover, as they gain benefits easily, opportunity beneficiaries are likely to dispose of their material or nonmaterial gains in unconventional ways: buying luxury goods, maintaining followers, frequenting brothels, entertaining mistresses, gambling, using drugs, or engaging in criminal activities (Fieldwork). Taking on a fortune-driven lifestyle, they sooner or later become real opportunists who pay no regard for normative social order but take great enjoyment in running against formal laws as well as rules of convention (Frisby 1998).

Third, people who fail repeatedly to obtain a share of social opportunity may become an innovator, a retreatist, a dependent, a criticizer, and a rebel, or even commit suicide (Durkheim 1951; Merton 1957). In other words, opportunity crimes and deviance occur both in the course of seeking opportunities and as a result of failure to grasp an opportunity. In China, economic reform has pushed the entire country into a race for wealth. The increased gap between a few upstarts and the majority makes local riots and robberies a major public safety hazard across vast rural regions. In a hinterland Province, the motorcade of the Provincial Party Secretary was even attacked by local mobs who prey on passing travelers and vehicles (Fieldwork). In Hong Kong, residents no longer feel shocked when they watch evening news about armed robberies against jewelry stores, banks, and other commercial establishments (Interview). In Taiwan, ransom has reached a plateau where only an "astronomical" figure seems to catch public attention as people are long fed up with news reports about abductions (Moore 1997; Faison 1998).
However, what makes it a regional problem is money laundering from developing to developed, from socialist to capitalist countries across Asia and the Pacific (Williams 1999). From impoverished Philippines, millions of national treasures were transferred to personal accounts in Western banks under the regime of Ferdinand Marcos. From China, billions of state investments into overseas businesses disappear in the name of operational loss, lawsuit, and bankruptcy. In southern California, real estate agents are habituated to ask their Asian clients if they pay cash for a luxury home. Among those cash-paying home buyers, many are connected to high-ranking officials and large-scale state enterprises in China (Fieldwork). One Russian scholar estimated that the so-publicized Western aid to Russia constitutes only a tiny tip compared to the huge amount of money transferred out of Russia (Interview).

The United States is a prime destination in this cross-border cash drainage from economically backward and politically troubled countries. The directional flow of cash is due to the inequality of the world political economy. It makes the poor poorer and the rich richer. The sad, immoral, and irrational process adds a new dimension to development and political democratization in developing countries. As far as crimes and deviance are concerned, conspicuous consumption by those who make their fortune through opportunities serves to motivate people to turn to socially illegitimate means to achieve their material success. Opportunity crimes and deviance seem to feedback on themselves in the context of economic development across Asia and the Pacific.

**Corporate Crime**

Corporate deviance and crimes increase as domestic enterprises proliferate, foreign investments grow, and multinational corporations expand to Asia and the Pacific (Ermann and Lundman 2002; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2002). Among domestic businesses, common offenses include tax frauds, patent thefts, safety violations, environment pollution, defect and counterfeit products, bribery, and labor abuses. There are underground factories that churn out name-brand consumer goods. Some fake audio/video products are dumped into the market even before their real version is officially released in the country of origin (Fieldwork).
Foreign investments, especially small-scale whole-owned ventures by overseas nationals, tend to take advantage of local governments' intent to attract foreign capital. They sometimes run their business to the detriment of environment and at the expense of workers' welfare. For example, they produce a product they would not be allowed to produce under a stringent environmental protection law in their home country. Or they engage in a production that would bring them only a marginal profit should they do it under the minimum wage and labor rights legislation in their home territory. In the fast growing Pearl Delta area of southern China, many factories are built by overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan like a fortress. Child labor is used. Workers are required to surrender their ID card and make a deposit at the time of hiring. They are forced to labor long hours, without freedom of movement on and off work. Salaries are not paid on time, sometimes by months. Harsh punishment is used. In some cases, workers are forced to knee for hours under the scorching sunlight by their boss (Fieldwork).

Multinational corporations expand to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific not much because they want to conquer or cover that part of the world with their business, rather because they face tough regulations, business maturation, profit stagnation in their developed base countries and because they want to take advantage of a lax legal system, a vast consumer population, and cheap labor in developing countries. Among irresponsible, unethical, or illegal conducts by multinational corporations in Asia and the Pacific, there are price fixing or gouging, market domination, contract exploitations of small businesses, shipments of industrial wastes, dumping of expired products, environment pollution, funneling of profits back to their home country, and inappropriate influence on local and even national policies (Fieldwork; Interview).

**Bureaucratic Crime**

As the government and bureaucrats have a great say in economic activities in many Asian and Pacific countries, corruption becomes an inevitable element in the process of economic development. In Japan, boards of directors in various business entities seem to be a natural retirement or post-political career destination for powerful government officials (Xu 1996). American corporations and non-profit organizations are always
fond of enlisting big-name celebrities, including lawmakers and political appointees, in their governing body. Although there is not always an identifiable connection, expectation for a post-political career settlement on the part of office-holders can profoundly influence overall decision-making processes and outcomes toward business by the government. The issue of conflict of interest, as it is in this subtle latent form, can legitimately sneak from the purview of legal regulations.

In newly adopted democracies, from South Korea to Taiwan, from the Philippines to Pakistan, political parties are immersed in economic activities. National leaders emerge from or ally themselves with military strongmen and business tycoons in the political landscape. Using slush funds, coercing voters, buying votes, and making illegal campaign contributions are standard vocabularies on local and national news reports. Former presidents are convicted, existing premiers are charged, and political hopefuls on campaign trails are investigated for power abuse, misuse of election funds, and various inappropriate or illegal behaviors.

In socialist countries, as major industries and services are still directly run by the government and the government maintains a generally tight control over land, utilities, licensing, social resources, and business opportunities, many public and private enterprises are exploited and victimized in the hands of greedy government officials. In China, high-ranking officials allow their children and relatives to use their influence to gain economic benefits. As exposed by a number of high-profile cases, some of them engage in large-scale smuggling operations, causing the state tremendous tariff and tax losses on automobiles, tobacco, and luxury consumer goods. Local governments pass their transportation, administration, and various other costs on to the business organizations under their jurisdiction. For example, they borrow-order (Jiediao) cars from local enterprises without any compensation; they hold banquets in local hotels or restaurants without any payment; and they directly ask businesses to support a holiday bonus allocation for officials and staff. Individual officials also take every opportunity to receive and even actively solicit benefits from business owners. As a township head in central China honestly admits, he does not have to buy anything for his whole family of six and can comfortably support five of his relatives’ families for most of their needs if he just takes what is sent to him by local businesses in town. A professor in a provincial party school that trains ranking officials said
she can have all the city bus coupons, all the tickets to parks and museums, and some vacation costs for her family reimbursed by her students (Fieldwork; Interview).

A cross-border violation that involves both businesses and bureaucrats often emerges from the latter's approvals of the former's applications for joint ventures. Developing countries in Asia and the Pacific, in their effort to attract foreign investments, have implemented various preferential treatments for joint ventures. The system of preferential treatment provides an opportunity of abuse by both domestic and foreign businesses. In China, for instance, joint ventures are approved by bribe-taking government officials for nominal establishment with no actual investment from abroad. Tax breaks are given to those bogus joint enterprises at the expense of state revenues (Fieldwork).

**Drug Smuggling**

Drug smuggling is another salient problem in Asia and the Pacific (Schiray 2001; United Nations 2001). The three major drug production bases and the largest drug consumer market in the world are all located in the region. Poppies, opium, heroin, and other narcotic drugs grown and produced in the Golden Triangle, a border region among upper Burma, upper Laos, and northern Thailand controlled mainly by the militarized Kunsha Group, are shipped through southeast China or directly to such relay stations as Hong Kong, Macau, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madagascar toward their final destinations in Europe and North America (Renard 1996; Zhao 1997). Narcotics originated from the Golden Crescent among Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan travel through Turkey, Cyprus, Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece to Western Europe and North America. In the mid-1980s, about half of the U.S. heroin supply came from southwest Asia (Ray and Ksir 1996). Coca plants grow only in central and south Americas on the eastern side of the Pacific. Cocaine produced in the Silver Triangle among Bolivia, Peru, and Columbia reaches Florida and other parts of the United States through Mexico, the Caribbean, and central American nations such as Guatemala and Panama. Besides cocaine productions, Columbia is also the largest producer of marijuana, followed by Mexico, Jamaica, and the United States. The notorious Cali and Medellin cartels both operate in Columbia.
The United States is the largest drug consumer in the world. More than half of illicit substances produced across the globe are sold to the United States. In 1996, the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System showed a total seizure of 115.3 metric tons of cocaine, 1,532.3 kilograms of heroin, and 663.6 metric tons of cannabis (Office of National Drug Control Policy 1998). According to the 1998 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 13.6 million Americans use illicit drugs. Among them, 1.7 million are current cocaine users, 11.0 million current marijuana users, and 2.4 million lifetime heroin users (Office of Applied Studies 1998). A report prepared by Abt Associates for the Office of National Drug Control Policy reveals that American drug users, in 1988, spent a total of 91.4 billion dollars on illicit drugs, including 61.2 billion on cocaine, 17.7 billion on heroin, and 9.1 billion on marijuana. Although drug user expenditures had continuously decreased over time, they were still as high as 7.0 billion dollars for marijuana, 9.6 billion for heroin, 38.0 billion for cocaine, and 57.3 billion for all illicit drugs in 1995 (Office of National Drug Control Policy 1998). The general social cost caused by illicit drug use is even higher. Drug offenders account for about 60.0 percent of inmates in federal prisons over most of the 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999). The federal government spends billions of dollars each year on drug interdiction, drug abuse research, and drug abuse treatment. From Washington, DC, to state capitals, to city halls, officials are overwhelmed with various drug-related welfare services, law enforcement, and social reactions.

**Human Trafficking**

Uneven economic development, natural disasters, political volatility, military uprising, cultural clashes, and social instability among countries in Asia and the Pacific make human trafficking and illegal immigration a serious issue (Hodgson 1995; Leuchtag 1995; Schiray 2001). Vietnamese “boat people” clustered in Hong Kong following the Vietnam War. They were not completely expatriated until the former British colony’s return to China in 1997. Illegal Filipino maids suffer abuses from their hosts and hostesses on foreign lands hundreds of miles away from home, as far as in Saudi Arabia. Wealthy men from oil-rich countries in the Middle East buy under-age brides from poor villages in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Young women are recruited from Thailand, Australia, and the
Philippines and sold to brothel-keepers in various Japanese provinces to become their main income earners (Tokyo Correspondent 1989). Russian prostitutes are active in hotels, beauty saloons, and saunas in Northeastern China. Thousands of North Korea refugees flock to the same Chinese territory from the South. As expatriation of refugees back to North Korea often causes uproars of anger and protest from Korean communities across Asia and the Pacific, China begins to use a third country in its handling of some of the most dramatic defections by North Koreans (Demick and Chu 2002).

On the eastern side of the Pacific Rim, combined figures from U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Labor indicate that “more than 100,000 people—many of them smuggled into this country—are being forced to work in appalling conditions for little or no pay, often under threat of physical violence and death” in the United State (Gordy 2000:4). Cases of abuse continuously surface from U.S. courts, including a 1993 guilt-plea to conspiring to hold migrant workers in peonage, a 1998 conviction of reckless manslaughter involving a Filipino maid, a 1999 guilty plea to conspiring to enslave 14 Mexican women as prostitutes, and a 4-million out of court settlement for Thai immigrants who were forced to work and live in an apartment complex surrounded by razor wire (Gordy 2000). More lively as shown by pictures on national news, border-crossing Mexicans pose a challenge to motorists on U.S. highways. The State of California has been complaining against the tremendous burden of caring illegal immigrants and their children. Some state officials fear that the state may be financially drained by such a continuously growing charge.

The biggest potential threat in human trafficking across Asia and the Pacific, however, lies in China and the Chinese. China borders most countries by land. It also has the longest coastline in the region. The largest population in the world live in China. China is a socialist country. The communist government practices family planning and maintains various controls over society. Economy is developing but is far from developed. The Chinese have a long tradition of emigration. Overseas Chinese live and prosper in almost every corner of the world. There is a worldwide Chinese network to receive emigrants from China. Chinese people are diligent, intelligent, and persistent. They are especially capable of bearing hardship and enduring hard labor. All these national conditions and individual characteristics converge to make human trafficking from China a great threat across Asia and the Pacific. In the past decades, thanks to the tight border
control by the communist authority, millions of Chinese who are so eager to plunge into Western-style democracy, freedom, and prosperity are still kept home. Now as the country develops its economy and opens up to the outside world, more and more people seem to be motivated by the prospect of a better life on other lands. Most important, more and more stowaways seem to be able to pay for the usurping passage fee, as high as 50,000 US dollars, charged by their “snakeheads.” The Chinese government is staging a national campaign to “forcefully smash human smuggling evil wind” (Ni 2000). Despite the national campaign, harsh punishment, repatriation by the foreign government, and numerous reports about death and abuse faced by stowaways overseas, many Chinese in the coastal areas do not seem budged and deterred from their attempt to sneak out of their motherland into a foreign territory for greater economic fortunes (Fieldwork).

**Organized Crime**

Drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal immigration in Asia and the Pacific are related to organized criminal groups and gang activities in the region (Frisby 1998; Newman 1999). While the mass media throw most of the limelight on well-armed, well-equipped, and well-organized crime groups, such as Medellin Cartel, Cali Cartel, Kunsha Group, and Mafias, various ethnic and local gangs start to attract serious attention from law enforcement as well (Soothill 1996). In origination countries, local gangs recruit prospective emigrants, gather and transport raw materials and drugs in small amounts, prepare equipment, offer information, and provide various services for the larger international crime group. In destination countries, ethnic gangs, based on their ethnic enclaves, collect money from illegal immigrants who are placed into different jobs, sell drugs to users and street dealers, run prostitution rings, operate gambling houses, intervene in business disputes for economic gains, and extort business establishments in the name of protection. Taking advantage of modern communications and transportation, various gang groups are now able to broaden their network and diversify their operation across regional and national borders. For instance, gang leaders in Hong Kong may dispatch their members to Mainland China or give words to their followers in San Francisco and Los Angeles (Fieldwork).
In recent years, due to dramatic changes in their home territories, Chinese crime groups begin to spread across Asia and the Pacific. Chinese crime groups are historically highly localized individual organizations. There are secret societies, self-help associations, and street gangs (Chin 1999). The most feared secret societies or triads are actively involved in a wide range of illegal activities, including human trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, loansharking, prostitution, gambling, and extortion within and across Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. In alien smuggling and heroin trafficking destinations, they work with self-help associations among Chinese immigrants or tongs and street gangs in Chinatown, forming a self-protection shield often impermeable to law enforcement. Although they are not as scaled, coordinated, and threatening as international Mafias, Chinese crime groups are each well-organized with clear objectives of profit and well-thought plans for operation. They persist just like individual entrepreneurship flourishing in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mainland China, and various Chinese enclaves in North America (Fieldwork; Interview).

**Crimes and Deviance in Asia and the Pacific: Causes, Impacts, and Social Contexts**

As trade, the mass media, communications, and advanced means of transportation bring people and nations closer and closer to one another, crimes, deviance, and their control become more and more an issue that intertwines with important economic, political, cultural, and social forces within and without national borders throughout Asia and the Pacific (Shaw 1996; Marx 1997; Newman 1999; Andersson and Gunnarsson 2003; Terrill 2003).

**Capitalism and Socialism**

As systems of political economy, capitalism is advancing and socialism is retreating in both national and international levels. At the international level, the Soviet Union collapsed. All of its socialist republics in Asia have changed into market or quasi-market economies (Shlapentokh 1997; Ware and Kisriev 2001; Sievers 2003). Countries that still adhere to socialism, including China and Vietnam, have begun systematic reform to adapt to the
world political economy dominated by capitalism. Multinational corporations and individual investors from advanced capitalist societies, such as Japan and the United States, have made a sweeping invasion into developing countries, spreading capitalist symbols, consumer goods, modes of production, and lifestyles to almost every corner of Asia and the Pacific. At the national level, existing socialist countries are witnessing a growing private sector led by small businesses and foreign investments and a declining public economy represented by state and collective enterprises. Even the seemingly staunchest socialist North Korea has started to receive economic aids from capitalist sources in its search for relief from natural disasters. In capitalist economies, socialist or quasi-socialist elements, such as public enterprises and state interventions, have also diminished in response to domestic calls for market rationality and international pressures for trade liberalization.

As far as crimes and deviance are concerned, capitalist advance goes hand in hand with socialist retreat, leading to broadened social gap, weakened control by the state and tradition, increased mobility for individuals, heightened public attention on material gains, and increased flow of consumer goods across society. People's properties fall into the hands of a few stakeholders and opportunists when former socialist countries switch overnight from public to market economies. Public funds and resources funnel into the coffers of a minority of upstart private businesses when existing socialist countries loosen state control over economic sectors (Lotspeich 1995; Frisby 1998; Ware and Kisriev 2001). As private enterprises and foreign investments grow and expand, some of them engage in unethical or illegal practices: bullying local residents and small businesses, bribing public officials for preferential treatments, avoiding taxes, exploiting workers, polluting environment, and transferring unreported profits overseas or into personal accounts. At the individual level, urban residents who become unemployed from defunct state enterprises join peasants who leave their increasingly marginalized rural community. They form a large army of migrants in search of economic fortunes for a better life. Since opportunities are limited and competition is keen, some of them turn to illegal pursuits or take on an unproductive lifestyle, pickpocketing in public places, burglarizing private houses, robbing banks and commercial establishments, disrupting public order, looting and rioting, cheating and swindling, dealing drugs, gambling, prostituting, or becoming drug
addicts, alcoholics, or homeless beggars (Fieldwork). Also, as socialism persists as a social system in existing socialist states and as economic elements in capitalist countries, it will continue to produce and sustain problems associated with its existence: corruption, abuse of power, wasting of public resources, unwarranted state intervention, and penetration into private life.

*Eastern Civilizations and Western Development*

The core value system in East civilizations is Confucianism. Confucianism features a profound admiration for nature, tradition, and authority and an exclusionary emphasis on family, community, education, diligence, conscience, and meritocracy. The age-old philosophy of life is deeply rooted in Eastern culture, serving as a state ideology, a civil religion, and a people's behavioral guide in many Asian countries. Following immigrants and through academic studies, Confucianism has even established a noticeable presence in the general culture in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Western development, on the other hand, has long been characterized by a breakaway from tradition, a conquest of nature, and a sweeping industrialization, urbanization, specialization, and differentiation throughout society. Beginning in Europe and North America, Western development has sent human beings into outer space and created an unprecedented presence of bureaucracy, transportation networks, communication devices, material artifacts, and consumer goods on and above the surface of the earth. Armed with the power of capital and the lure of material affluence, Western development is now rapidly expanding to Asia and the Pacific, becoming a model for many developing and undeveloped countries in their drive for modernization (Evans and Rauch 1999; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Goddard 2001; Schiray 2001; Andersson and Gunnarsson 2003; Rigg 2003).

Regarding crimes and deviance, emphasis on human relations and community interdependence in Eastern civilizations serves as a collective surveillance over individual behaviors and a public deterrence against deviance and crimes. When conflicts and victimization occur, people embedded in their close-knit community tend to resolve disputes and carry out a compensation plan by themselves (Xu 1994). Toward offenders, they are more interested in reforming them with positive thoughts and useful skills than casting them further out into criminality by sheer punishment.
Western development, in contrast, has led to declining family and community, growing individualism and alienation, rising social tension and conflict, and increasing deviance and crimes. The adversary legal system pits offenders against morality, authority, and establishment. The prison serves more as a school for training career criminals than as a correctional facility for bringing inmates back to the mainstream society. Although professional groupings and the middle class have emerged to mediate between the remote state and ego-oriented individuals, there are still people caught in between without proper group attachment and social regulation.

While they each face and foster specific deviance and crimes, Eastern civilizations and Western development also share common concerns and challenges. For instance, Eastern emphasis on education combined with Western standardization of educational process may put young people under peer pressure for some group favored but socially illegitimate behavior in school (Fieldwork). In the mutually fusing and penetrating dynamics between Eastern civilizations and Western development across Asia and the Pacific, it is most inspiring to see how developing societies in Eastern civilizations keep their cultural heritages to curb rising deviance and crimes in their pursuit of a Western-style development, as well as how developed countries in Western traditions apply characteristic Eastern social control ideas and measures to contain challenging social problems in their continuing drive toward material prosperity (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; White 1996; Shaw 1998; Rountree and Warner 1999).

**Democratic Forms of Government and Patriarchal Leadership**

There are a wide variety of governments and leadership styles in Asia and the Pacific. Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States are long established democracies. Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and former Soviet republics in central Asia have just recently installed a democratic form of government on their respective territory. China and Vietnam are socialist states. There are even family or tribe-based totalitarian regimes or dictatorships, such as North Korea and some small kingdoms in the Pacific (Durutalo 1992). The style of leadership is even more diverse, crossing lines between one-party dictatorship and multi-party democracy, socialist state and capitalist government, and modern administration and traditional kingdom. For instance, socialist China practices collective leadership within its one-party dictatorship whereas capitalist Singapore
exhibits traces of patriarchal leadership in its democratic form of government, especially under the reign of Lee Kuan-Yew (Seow 1990).

The form of government and the style of leadership not only affect social reactions to deviance and crimes, but also influence social conditions in which deviance and crimes occur. In countries with a democratic form of government, increased individual freedom, growing private initiatives in economic and political arenas, loosened state control, and diversified social regulations may create more personal motivation as well as social opportunity for deviance and crimes. For example, the democratic form of policing may give offenders more legal leeway to avoid arrest or prosecution and, therefore, inadvertently motivate people to deviate from the general social norm or commit crimes. On the other hand, while widespread surveillance, tight control, tough laws, and patriarchal practices in some countries may serve as a deterrence to deviance and crimes, they may also spawn human rights abuses and civil liberties violations, a common form of crime by the government against citizenry. Moreover, they may lead to civil disobedience, public riots, and social rebellion, such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare. For instance, caning juveniles for their delinquent behavior, prohibiting chewing gums and cokes in public places, and implementing other old-fashioned social control practices in Singapore have caused criticism from human rights watch groups around the world and even prompted diplomatic intervention from foreign dignitaries (Fieldwork). Underlying media rhetoric and diplomatic overtures, however, Singapore demonstrates that some Eastern forms of control and patriarchal practices can go hand in hand with Western styles of democracy and development.

Another interesting observation is that countries with a non-democratic form of government may have an indecisive leadership process or style, providing structural loopholes for deviance and criminality by individual opportunists. In China, for instance, collective leadership and mass participation within the communist party's one-party framework not only hamper general political decision-making processes, but also hamstring social reactions to deviance and crimes. Corporate and bureaucratic crimes take place within a supposedly tightly controlled system. Many opportunity crimes go undetected and untreated at the expense of victims and the state (Fieldwork).
Citizen Initiatives and State Authorities

Citizen initiatives and community actions may take different forms in crimes, deviance, and their control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Alvazzi del Frate 1997). Citizens take precaution against and the community remains alert on criminal victimization in the first place. When conflict arises and crimes occur, citizens take the initiative in, and the community provides support for, dispute resolution, victim compensation, and offender rehabilitation (Xu 1994). State authorities, on the other hand, are mainly reflected upon law making, law enforcement, and administration of justice for all in society. Between citizenry and the state, a weak state is likely to result in the resurgence of local tyrants and bandits. An unjust and corruptive state is likely to spawn mass vigilance, self-help, and local justice. The state may also install community and grassroots institutions for citizens to play a role in conflict resolution and crime prevention. It may use group activities to limit individual initiatives. It may even manipulate community actions and grassroots efforts in the service of its favored social order.

Across Asia and the Pacific, there are undeveloped and developing societies where villagers guard their vital interests, resolve their daily disputes, and administer their age-old justice without any interference from the remote state. There are developed and developing countries where the state maintains a universal presence in every corner of society and citizens may have to expose every aspect of their private life, including domestic affairs and bedroom secrets, to legal scrutiny. There are socialist states that organize individual residents into neighborhood committees and mass campaigns to build a united defense against deviance and crimes (Shaw 1996). There are capitalist corporations that advocate for self-regulation as well as individualistic citizens who strive for private space and civil liberties.

Despite the apparent diversity, most Asian and Pacific societies embrace a mixture of citizen initiatives, community actions, and state interventions in crime and social control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Dorfman 1997; Geiss 2001). In China, while the state-coordinated network of neighborhood committees is being loosened amid increasing social mobility, there appears a resurgence of local tyrants, mountain bandits, and clan-based justice in vast rural areas under the seemingly omnipresent communist authority (Fieldwork). In the United States, middle-level
community actions, such as neighborhood watch, seldom gain popularity and momentum due to a lack of interests from citizens and a lack of incentives by the state. There are, however, two strong sides to the relatively inactive and ineffective community. American citizens stay vigilant and are long-habituated to self-help while various levels of American government remain alert and are well equipped to enforce the law in every corner of society. Gun control measures stall repeatedly in federal, state, and local legislatures because gun ownership is endogenously related to the deep-rooted tradition and sentiment of self-help (Kopel and Little 1999). The passage of a sweeping crime bill by the Congress, on the other hand, provides strong evidence to the outgrowth of the capitalist state in the crime and justice arena (Kramer and Michalowski 1995).

**Formalism and Informalism**

Formalism as a social control philosophy emphasizes the importance of the state in making, interpreting, and enforcing laws as well as dealing with the breaking of laws fairly and equally across the general population. Informalism, on the other hand, acknowledges the influence of non-state institutions, such as families, kinships, and voluntary groupings, in preventing crimes, resolving disputes, and maintaining local peace (Abel 1982; Xu 1994; Rountree and Warner 1999; Geiss 2001). While formalism and informalism may ideally coexist as complementary approaches to crimes and deviance, they each oftentimes need to be strengthened, restrained, and fine-tuned in relation to the other.

Across Asia and the Pacific, there are traditional societies, small kingdoms, war-inflicted territories, mass-based revolutionary states, and socialist countries. The state is either too weak in comparison with kinships, chiefdoms, warlords, and mass campaigns or too strong in the hands of the king, the charismatic leader, the strongman, and the dictator. There is either an absence of written legal codes or a lack of universal enforcement of the law. Rules are sometimes established within a territory and are interpreted at the will of whoever dominates the territory. The situation even occurs in large countries, such as China where the law, the justice system, and the whole justice profession were suspended for years during the Great Cultural Revolution. To establish a proper position for formalism in the region, multi-level work needs to be done. First, the rule
of law can be achieved only when a society is unified under a central state and is freed from tradition, mass activism, or dictatorship. Second, it takes a rational division of labor among formal social control agencies to enforce and implement the law across society. Third, professional proficiency by formal social control agents is key to proving the effectiveness and utility of formalism in everyday life. In China, the introduction of criminal codes led to an immediate installation of the criminal justice system. It now hinges upon the professionalization of criminal justice personnel to demonstrate that formalism takes root in Chinese society and works for the vast majority of Chinese people.

Informalism faces salient challenges as well in Asia and the Pacific. In developed countries, the state has long been a primary, if not always exclusionary, force in crimes and social control. While non-state institutions take blame for rising crimes, they are never entrusted with power and social resources to play an active role in crime prevention and intervention. In the United States, for example, it has become a well-institutionalized practice that family problems, such as child disciplining and spousal disputes, when they take a violent or abusive form as defined by the authority, are not handled by the family but the state. In developing societies, although formalism does not fully reign in, informalism does not play a sweepingly dominant role either. Modernist critics attack traditional institutions and practices as harmful hindrances to the rule of law. Conservatives lament a decaying civil tradition and declining family and community networks for widespread social dislocation, deviance, and crimes. Informalism is weakened with blames, suspicions, and distrusts from both sides of the cultural mainstream.

As developing societies join developed countries by installing a democratic form of government and undergoing other social transformations, formalism will eventually take a dominant position in crimes and social control across Asia and the Pacific. Informalism will also remain active as an important supplement to universal state control and justice on specific issues.

Procedural Fairness and Control Effectiveness

Procedural fairness begins with the assumption of innocence about a criminal suspect before his or her conviction (Barlow 2000). It ensures that he
or she is respected for his or her basic human rights, evidence against him or her is properly collected, stored, examined, and presented to the court, and he or she is afforded adequate legal and physical protection within the criminal justice system. Control effectiveness stresses that criminal offenders are apprehended and punished, crimes are deterred and contained, and the general interests of society are protected and promoted. There are obviously various theoretical contradictions and practical conflicts between the two value orientations in crimes and social control. Theoretically, harsh punishment mandated by control effectiveness may necessitate deprivations of certain human rights. Practically, in order to timely apprehend a criminal suspect, the police may have to take some extralegal actions, which may result in the inadmissibility of evidence in the court and further the dismissal or acquittal of a real criminal from punishment.

Among societies in Asia and the Pacific, differences regarding legal systems and human rights standards are tremendous. There are common law versus civil law systems. There are inquisitorial versus procedural court traditions (Terrill 2003). In human rights, whereas the United States and various democratic countries uphold the principles of privacy, civil liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of movement, China and many developing societies argue that most important human rights for their billions of common citizens are survival rights, that is, whether they are socially afforded with foods, drinks, clothes, and shelters to live their life in basic human decency and dignity. With regard to criminal justice in particular, the United States and China, along with their respective allies, seem to practice diametrically opposing philosophies. As pointed out by some U.S.-China comparative scholars, the United States would rather let free one hundred murderers than kill one innocent person, whereas China would rather kill one hundred innocent people than let free one murderer (Interview). Besides differences in human rights, legal systems, and punishment philosophy, population density, social resources, and public mentality are also major issues behind these two contrasting criminal justice approaches. In a country where a large population lives on limited resources, people simply cannot understand why they have to spend public funds to defend and feed a criminal convict for years before his or her execution.

Reflected in cross-cultural communications, while people are generally able to perceive of the rationality inherent in their own legal
systems, value standards, and social contexts, they naturally tend to misunderstand and express surprise, contempt, and even anger for justice and social control practices by citizens in other societies. For instance, Americans are shocked by the use of flogging and hanging in punishment by Singapore, Malaysia, and other Asian and Pacific societies. It is inconceivable that a person caught in possession of a few ounces of a controlled substance at the airport is hanged to death or subjected to other harsh punishment (Shenon 1994). Some American activists are so disturbed or infuriated by what they consider as unusual punishments in other countries that they organize public demonstrations to protest or lobby their elected officials to intervene. Similarly, many people in Asian countries have difficulty understanding why serial killers and heinous murderers are acquitted, why judges dismiss some serious cases while sentencing other rather minor offenders to long-term imprisonment, and why convicted killers on death roll are given unlimited appeals for over twenty years in the United States. They naturally assume and firmly believe that serious offenders should be put to death or behind bars as soon as possible, without any question or excuse. To an average Chinese, it is simply ridiculous to dismiss a case on the basis of procedural inappropriateness. As some Chinese students argue in a legal seminar, evidence is evidence. It may be collected or stored incorrectly. But it can be entered in court as valid records as long as it contains real, relevant, unfaked, and unframed facts (Fieldwork; Interview).

Conclusion

Crimes and deviance in Asia and the Pacific are issues of a vast region and the whole world. The study of crimes and deviance in Asia and the Pacific, correspondingly, has the significance of a vast region and the whole world. Within the region, people are brought closer to one another, both physically and spiritually, by economic development, political liberalization, media penetration, cultural diffusion, tourism, and advanced means of communications and transportation. Countries and territories are integrated more into a common market, block, or union through trade, diplomacy, political agreement, military cooperation, and cultural exchange. Crimes follow the flows of people and materials, taking place within as well as across national borders. Reactions to crimes, including prevention and intervention, therefore, have to be made, prepared, and reinforced through both national and international social control forces.
For the whole world, Asia and the Pacific will be the center stage of the new century. They provide a vast test ground where Eastern civilizations meet with Western development, socialism with capitalism, authoritarianism with democracy, tradition with modernity, community with organization, patriarchal dominance with bureaucratic authority, and collectivism with individualism. As these and many other apparently opposing forces come to face each other, they may not only establish their respective state of affairs, such as a complete bureaucratic state or a representative capitalist system, but also create new social situations, such as a market economy with a socialist flavor or a democratic government with an authoritarian leadership. Crimes and deviance take place in response to social change. While conventional crimes tend to increase in number and severity, unconventional crimes are likely to break out in a wide variety of features and flavors. To mount a comprehensive, systematic, and effective offense against crimes and deviance, social control in Asia and the Pacific will have to combine and fuse formalism with informalism, state authorities with community resources, traditional restraints with modern control technologies, Western forms with Eastern content, and moral education with market incentives.

Obviously, crimes, deviance, and their control in Asia and the Pacific provide both challenges and opportunities for academic research. Studying crimes, deviance, and their control in the context of country-to-country, system-to-system, ideology-to-ideology, and civilization-to-civilization interactions in Asia and the Pacific will not only generate important insights about crimes and social control in the contemporary era, but also enhance general understandings of human adaptation, survival, and evolution across the globe.

NOTES

1 Fieldwork. This study started in 1996. In the past eight years, the author collected data on various aspects of crimes and deviance through his extensive personal and professional network in Asia and the Pacific. First, the author sought assistance from officials and scholars in Asia and the Pacific in obtaining statistics, documents, reports, and case stories. Second, the author visited countries and territories in Asia and the Pacific to collect first-hand
information. He observed border-crossings in Hong Kong, explored drug trafficking routes near the Golden Triangle, visited villages in hinterland China, sat in criminology classes in Chinese universities, conducted formal groups with Chinese officials and scholars, talked to Asian pimps and prostitutes in Australia, and met with former drug addicts from Southeast Asia and former communist leaders from China throughout California, from San Joaquin Valley to San Francisco Bay to Southern California. Third, the author read Chinese newspapers, watched Chinese television news, and listened to Chinese radio operated by Chinese Americans in the United States on a daily basis. He continually gathers news items on crimes and deviance. Most important, he remains on top of major developments in societies across Asia and the Pacific.

Interview. The author conducted both casual talks and formal interviews with officials, scholars, and research subjects regarding crimes and deviance in Asia and the Pacific. First, the author discussed the issues with concerned scholars in major international conferences in Germany, Puerto Rico, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Israel, and the United States. Second, the author verified with friends and colleagues in Asia and the Pacific over the phone about some stories and reported incidents. Third, the author interviewed officials, experts, organized crime leaders, drug dealers, drug users, cross-border offenders, and ordinary victims in various fieldwork trips to Asia and the Pacific.

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