SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS:
TYRANNICIDE AND VIOLENCE AS POLITICAL TOOLS IN REPUBLICAN ROME

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of Master of Arts in History

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DEDICATION

For my mother and father, who brought me to this country at the age of three and have provided me with love and guidance ever since. From the bottom of my heart, I want to thank you for all the sacrifices that you have made to help me fulfill my dreams.
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ABSTRACT
SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS: TYRANNICIDE AND VIOLENCE AS POLITICAL TOOLS IN REPUBLICAN ROME

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Ancient Greek and Roman historians have argued that the Gracchi were the first populists to be killed as “would-be tyrants” in the history of the Roman Republic. However, the killing of supposed tyrants during the Late Roman Republic, starting with the assassination of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C.E., was not a cultural anomaly, but was in fact connected to an earlier tradition of tyrannicide that started in the Early Republic. Since many acts of tyrannicide followed that of the Gracchi, including the murder of Julius Caesar eighty-nine years later, modern historians, such as Mary Beard, Ernst Badian, and H. H. Scullard, see the year 133 B.C.E. as a justifiable terminus post quem for the era in Roman history known as the Late Republic. Though this thesis does not set out to call into question the justification of Tiberius Gracchus’ death as a terminus post quem for the Late Republic, it does set out to question the assumption that Tiberius Gracchus’ death was a complete anomaly in the history of Rome as the Ancient Romans knew it. In so doing, this thesis argues that the way in which Tiberius Gracchus met his end led subsequent ancient historians to begin reinterpreting the stories of “populist leaders” from the first hundred years of the Republic in light of Tiberius Gracchus’ demise. Furthermore, it seeks to demonstrate how each act of tyrannicide that followed in the wake of Tiberius Gracchus’ death in 133 B.C.E. was seen by both the perpetrators of tyrannicide themselves and the ancient historians as being sanctioned by the conviction that killing “would-be tyrants” in the name of restoring order was an inherently Roman tradition.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Thesis Statement

The assassination of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C.E. came to be seen by later historians, both ancient and modern, as a watershed moment in the history of Rome’s Republic for two reasons. First, it was thought to have been the first instance of bloodshed in the “Struggle of the Orders” that had existed between the patricians and the plebeians since the early days of the Republic. Second, Tiberius Gracchus’ public “execution” at the hands of senators and the Pontifex Maximus did not have the desired effect that the optimates had wished. Rather than deter any future tribunes from defying the authority of the Senate in an attempt to gain the support of the plebeians, Tiberius’ death only galvanized those politically ambitious men who sympathized with Gracchus and the plebs. Consequently, Tiberius Gracchus’ death was seen as starting the tradition of political violence, specifically tyrannicide, in Republican Rome.

However, the members of the Roman elite (from which all Roman historians and biographers sprang forth) had a predilection towards honoring the examples of their ancestors as timeless models of moral excellence. They believed that all “social ills” were derived from the actions of individuals who refused to emulate those ancestral models. As such, in this thesis I intend to demonstrate: a) that the way in which Tiberius Gracchus met his end, led subsequent ancient historians to begin reinterpreting the stories of “populist leaders” from the Early Republic in light of Tiberius Gracchus’ demise; and b) how each act of tyrannicide that followed, in the wake of Tiberius Gracchus’ death, in 133 B.C.E., was seen by both the tyrannicides themselves and the ancient historians as being sanctioned by the conviction that killing “would-be tyrants” in the name of restoring order was an inherently Roman tradition.
1.2 Historiography

To paraphrase historian A. N. Sherwin-White, it is almost impossible to speak of Roman politics in the Late Republic without “touching on violence.”\(^1\) Nonetheless, the only two monographs written in the twentieth century whose titles have specifically addressed the issue of political violence in the Roman Republic were John Wesley Heaton’s *Mob Violence in the Late Roman Republic*, which was published in 1939, and Andrew Lintott’s *Violence in Republican Rome*, published in 1968. Heaton viewed the violence prevalent during the Late Republic as being caused by a combination of two factors. The first of these was the “increase of citizens of alien stock,” from the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, who proceeded to raise the “standard of revolt” under the “guise of social justice.” This then combined with the second factor which was the Gracchi’s appeal to the masses, in “true demagogic fashion,” through the first “attempted redistribution of wealth.”\(^2\) Lintott, however, thought otherwise. In both his groundbreaking monograph on political violence in Rome, and in his 1970 article on the tradition of violence in the Early Republic, he argued that the origin of violence in Roman politics lies buried in the earliest traditions of the Roman Republic itself. Not only did Rome lack any form of police force until the emperor Augustus created the *vigiles*, or “watchmen,”\(^3\) but the Romans themselves also placed a great deal of emphasis on “self-help,” due to the aristocracy’s delusion that even as the city of Rome grew and its empire expanded, both could still be governed through the use of city-state politics.\(^4\)

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3 These were comprised of volunteers who served as a combination “neighborhood watch” and fire brigade.
Although A. E. Astin would hint at the tradition of violence in the Early Roman Republic in his 1967 monograph on Scipio Aemilianus by mentioning that Tiberius Gracchus’ assassin may well have thought of Servilius Ahala’s example, it was not until 1970 that Lintott wrote a controversial article titled “The Tradition of Violence in the Annals of the Early Roman Republic.” In it, he made the case, through textual analysis of the extant sources on the Early Republic, that although the stories of violence in the Early Roman Republic, in particular those about Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius (and his executioner Servilius Ahala), and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus, have certainly been embellished by later historians (i.e. Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus) with details pertaining to late republican politics, the basic plot of those stories can be found in the histories of Rome written by the early annalists. As such, due to Cicero’s frequent references to traditional figures (like Servilius Ahala) in his writings, as well as the occasional source citations found in Dionysius’ histories and the writings of Pliny the Elder, it is necessary to re-evaluate the importance of these Early Republican stories when it comes to explaining the violence of the Late Republic.

Though it was not until the appearance of Heaton and Lintott’s monographs that both the source and nature of violence in Roman politics was discussed, it is still worth mentioning that from 1850 to 1950 the study of Republican Roman history had undergone some significant changes. These, said Sherwin-White, came in the form of three major schools of thought, which ultimately helped set the tone for this present discussion on political violence. The first of these “schools” consisted of historians who followed in the footsteps of the German historian Theodor Mommsen (1817 – 1903) who published a three volume history of Rome, titled

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Römisches Geschichte (Roman History), from 1854 to 1856, as well as volumes on Roman constitutional and criminal law (Römisches Staatsrecht, 1871-1888 and Römisches Strafrecht, 1899, respectively).

This first group of historians tended to view the factional conflicts of the late Republic, between the optimates and the populares, in the same way they viewed the 19th century parliamentary struggles between the Conservative and Liberal parties. As such, they sided accordingly with either Cicero and the optimates, or the Gracchi and the populares, so that the populares came to be viewed as “radicals” by the conservative historians and “democrats” by the more liberal historians. One of the more important works of this period was Eduard Meyer’s 1894 monograph, titled Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gracchen (An Inquiry into the History of the Gracchi), which saw the “bulk” of the laws proposed by Gaius Gracchus (i.e., the younger of the two Gracchi) as being purely political in their aim, and envisioned Gaius Gracchus himself as a “social revolutionist.”

La République Romaine: les conflits politiques et sociaux (The Roman Republic: the Political and Social Conflicts), published in 1919, by the French historian Gustave Bloch, was yet another important work that reflected the historical preoccupations of this first school of thought. But unlike Meyer, Bloch saw the Gracchi in a more positive light.

At some point in the late 1910s, and the beginning of the 1920s, a second school of thought emerged that, according to Sherwin-White, placed less emphasis on the factional conflicts of the optimates and the populares, and more on the generals, or imperatores (such as Marius, Sulla, Pompey the Great, Julius Caesar) and the statesman, orator and primary source writer Marcus

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Tullius Cicero. The reason for this shift in scholarly emphasis is two-fold. First, historians were beginning to see “the terminology of parliamentary democracy” as being “anachronistic,” and ergo “unsuitable.” Second, they were also coming to the conclusion that the events of the Late Republic were “an inevitable procession of great imperatores, each foreshadowing the next,” that were ultimately leading Rome away from the oligarchical rule of the Senate towards the monarchical rule of Augustus, Rome’s first emperor. As such, these historians came to see the populares as the hapless tools of the imperatores who formed temporary alliances with them in order to further their own careers. A prominent work that was published during this time, which Sherwin-White saw as emblematic of this second school of thought, is the 1918 monograph Caesars Monarchie und Das Principate Des Pompejus (Caesar’s Monarchy and Pompey’s Principate) by the aforementioned German historian, Eduard Meyer (1855-1930).8

Other works that were produced at this time, and which placed a greater emphasis on the “great men” of the Late Roman Republic, were: Matthias Gelzer’s 1921 biography of Julius Caesar, titled Caesar, der Politiker und Staatsmann (Caesar: Politician and Statesman); Harold Bennett’s 1923 dissertation on Marius’ ally Lucius Cornelius Cinna, titled Cinna and His Times; Jerome Carcopino’s 1931 monograph, Sylla ou la Monarchie Manquée (Sulla, or the Missing Monarchy); and Carolina Lanzani’s 1936 monograph Lucio Cornelio Silla dittatore, storia di Roma negli anni 82-78 a.C. (Lucius Cornelius Sulla, Dictator: the story of Rome in the years 82 to 78 B.C.). Also, in the last two years of the 1920s, the French historian Jérôme Carcopino (1881-1970) took up the work of the late Gustave Bloch (1848-1923) and tried to make sure that the Gracchi would remain in the spotlight through the publication of two works: Autour des Gracques (About the Gracchi) which was an analysis of the main primary sources for the lives of

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8 Sherwin-White, “Violence in Roman Politics,” 151.
the Gracchi; and *Des Gracques à Sylla* (From the Gracchi to Sulla) which defended the Gracchi as the potential saviors of the Republic who were killed by senators corrupted by the “disease of empire.”

However, as influential as this second school of thought was, it was also challenged by two works that later led to the formation of a third school of thought. The first of these works was by the aforementioned German historian, Matthias Gelzer (1886 – 1974). Titled *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik* (The Nobility of the Roman Republic), this pioneer work of social-history was written by Gelzer when he was only twenty-six years old. In it, he sought to dissect Rome’s ruling class in an effort to understand the nature of its power over the rest of Roman society. By analyzing how Rome’s nobility secured important positions in government and maintained them, Gelzer became the first to emphasize the importance of “clients” and how much the elite depended on these loyal retainers to ensure both the favorable passage of bills and the election of individuals to a particular office.

The other major work that inspired the aforementioned “third school of thought” was written by the German classicist Friedrich Münzer (1868 -1942). Published in 1920, just two years after Meyer’s *Caesars Monarchie*, Münzer’s book *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families) signaled a paradigm shift in the field of ancient history writing by introducing historians to the concept of prosopography. Rather than focusing on one great man after another in an effort to explain the political changes of the Late Roman Republic, Münzer emphasized the alliances that were forged between aristocratic families (through arranged marriages) for the purpose of furthering their political aims. Nonetheless, in discussing the reality of Roman Republican politics, Münzer unabashedly used anachronistic terms, just as much as his predecessors. His methodology would only gain a wider acceptance thanks to those
historians who later chose to follow in his (and Gelzer’s) footsteps, namely: Lily Ross Taylor (1886 – 1969), Sir Ronald Syme (1903 – 1989), Howard Hayes Scullard (1903 – 1983), Ernst Badian (1925 – 2011), and Erich Stephen Gruen (b. 1935). These historians not only continued to rely on the prosopographical method of writing history, they also improved it by standardizing the usage of such terms as “clientela” and “factio” to explain those alliances on which Roman aristocratic families depended to further their political aims. And whereas before the *populares* and the *optimates* had been anachronistically referred to as “political parties,” they were now referred to as “factions,” since in truth they lacked not only a clearly defined party platform, but also the kind of organizational structure associated with modern day political parties. Instead, these “factions” came to be seen as differing from one another only in that one used “traditional” tactics to climb the political ladder, while the other used more openly “populist” methods. The most important texts produced by the members of this “third school of thought,” who followed in Gelzer and Münzer’s footsteps, were: Ronald Syme’s *The Roman Revolution* (1939); Lily Ross Taylor’s *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (1948); H. H. Scullard’s *Roman Politics: 220 – 150 B.C.* (1951); Ernst Badian’s *Foreign Clientelae: 264 – 70 B.C.* (1958); and Erich S. Gruen’s *Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149 -78 B.C.* (1968).

1.3 Methodology

The subject of this thesis is tyrannicide and violence as political tools in the history of the Roman Republic. It is important therefore to define the meaning of the word “tyrannicide” as it will be used in this text, as well as what one means by “tyrant.” While the word “tyrannicide” will principally be used to signify the act of killing a person whom one perceives to be a

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“tyrant,” on occasion this term will also be used to refer to one who has killed a “tyrant.” The term “tyrant” was adopted from the Greeks by the Romans, and although the Greeks drew a distinction between a basileus, or “king,” and a tyrannos, or “tyrant,” the Romans were quick to use their Latinized word tyrannus as a synonym for their word rex, or “king.” In this text “tyrant” will signify not only a private citizen who illegally seizes political power (usually through the use of force) intending to act as a populist monarch, but also a duly elected official who governs in a cruel and arbitrary manner.

In order to better explain how the assassination of Tiberius Gracchus was not a cultural anomaly that established the tradition of tyrannicide and political violence, it is necessary to first examine the “would-be tyrants” found in the stories of Rome’s Early Republic (c. 753 - c.275 B.C.E.). Furthermore, this thesis will also analyze the various accounts of those populists of the Late Republic (133 – 30 B.C.E.) who were killed for being “would-be tyrants,” and thus establish a connection between these historical figures and their Early Republican counterparts. As such this thesis will be a prosopographical study of “would-be tyrants” in the history of the Roman Republic as found in the writings of statesmen, historians, and biographers from both the Late Republic and the Principate.

Due to the scant coverage that “would-be tyrants” from the Early Republic have received from modern historians, the format of this thesis will be narrative, as well as analytical, in order to help readers become just as familiar with these persons as they are with their more commonly discussed Late Republican counterparts. While most of the references will be to written primary sources, in conjunction with any corroborating secondary sources, the presence of any archaeological and numismatic evidence that furthers the argument of this thesis will also be mentioned where it is applicable.
1.4 Sources

Chief among the historians that will be cited are the Roman Titus Livius (c.59 B.C.E. – c.79 C.E.) and the Greek Dionysius of Halicarnassus (c.60 B.C.E. – c.7 B.C.E). Of the 142 books of Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita*, which covered the years 753 B.C.E. to 9 B.C.E, only thirty-five books have survived intact: Books 1-10 (753 – 293 B.C.E.) and Books 21-45 (218 – 167 B.C.E.). Nonetheless, summaries written during fourth century C.E., known as the *Periochae*, remain for all but two of those 142 books. While there have been histories of Rome written by Romans prior to Livy, such as those by Quintus Fabius Pictor (b. c. 254 B.C.E) and Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder (264 – 149 B.C.E.), all that is left of their texts are passing references made by later ancient historians who used them as primary sources. Apart from Fabius Pictor and Cato the Elder, Livy was also preceded by a series of historians commonly referred to by modern scholars as “annalists.” These relied mostly on state records of annual events as well as on family records, including their own. However, the histories of these “annalists” have also not survived. Accordingly, Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita* is of vital importance when it comes to reconstructing those events in Rome’s history that predate the time of the Late Republic.

Another historian who was a contemporary of Livy and had access to the same primary sources as him was Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Unlike Livy, however, Dionysius’ *Romaike Archaeologias*, or *The Roman Antiquities*, was a less ambitious project in that it only numbered twenty books and covered the years from Rome’s foundation to the start of the First Punic War in 264 B.C.E. Yet, like Livy’s work, much of Dionysius’ text is missing. The first nine books are intact, as is most of books 10 and 11, but the remainder can only be read as either excerpts or as a later epitome of Dionysius’ entire text. Nevertheless, although both of these authors wrote during the early years of the Principate (and both their texts are incomplete), the works of these
ancient historians remain the only detailed and continuous narratives of the Early Republic available to modern historians. Therefore, it is imperative that they be consulted when it comes to analyzing that bygone era in Roman history as the ancient Romans understood it. However, there is one man whose career as a writer predates that of Livy and Dionysus, and whose testimony can corroborate their histories. That man is the statesman and orator Marcus Tullius Cicero.

Born in Arpino, in 106 B.C.E., and killed on the order of Mark Antony in 43 B.C.E., Marcus Tullius Cicero is, quite possibly, the most valuable primary source of the Late Republic. Not only do modern historians have access to fifteen of his treatises on philosophy and oratory, but they also have fifty-eight of his speeches that he made either as a trial lawyer for the defense, or as a politician on the offensive against his own personal enemies. Most importantly of all, modern historians have access to 914 letters of correspondence between Cicero and his friends and family from the years 68 to 43 B.C.E. However, the utility of Cicero’s writings is not entirely confined to the study of the Late Roman Republic. Throughout his body of work, Cicero has also made several, sporadic references to “would-be tyrants” from the Early Republic. In particular, Cicero focused significantly on the murder of the aspiring “tyrant” Spurius Maelius by Gaius Servilius Ahala, the maternal ancestor of Julius Caesar’s assassin, Marcus Junius Brutus.

With regard to the events of the Late Republic, not only will I rely on the summaries from Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita*, which pertain to those years, but also on the works of two other historians who lived during this time period. The first of these is Gaius Sallustius Crispus, also known as Sallust (85 – c. 35 B.C.E). He was a partisan of Gaius Julius Caesar’s faction who after a life of politics turned to history and wrote three monographs of which only two have survived intact. Those that have survived and will be consulted are Sallust’s *Bellum
Jugurthinum, a history on the Jugurthine War (111 – 104 B.C.E.), and Bellum Catilinae, a history of the insurrection known as “Catilene’s Conspiracy” (65-62 B.C.E.). The other Late Republican historian who will be consulted is the Greek Diodorus Siculus (c. 80 – c. 20 B.C.E), whose forty-book Bibliothikes Historikes, or Library of History was written sometime between 60 and 30 B.C.E. Although Diodorus had set out to narrate a “universal” history of the ancient world in forty books, those fragments that remain of Books XXXIII to XL, which pertain to the Late Republic, will be referenced since Diodorus tended to copy his primary sources (many of which are no longer available) word for word.

Most of the other relevant sources about the Late Republic that are available were, like Livy and Dionysius’ histories, written during the time of the Roman Empire known as the Principate (27 B.C.E. – 284 C.E.). The author of the first of these is Velleius Paterculus, who is of interest because he was an officer in the Roman army who wrote his Compendium of Roman History during the reign of the emperor Tiberius (14 – 37 C.E.). He often mentions details which are absent from Livy’s Periochae. An important contemporary of Velleius was Valerius Maximus, whose Memorable Doings and Sayings is a collection of famous quotes and anecdotes that was compiled from various sources with the express purpose of giving the Romans of Valerius’ day a quick and easy guide to historical examples of virtue and vice. This text is particularly illustrative because it provides one with a clear and concise litmus test for Roman morality, as well as access to information from ancient texts that are no longer available.

Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus, or Plutarch as he is more commonly known, was a Greek biographer who was born in Chaeronea c.46 C.E. and died c. 120 C.E. Though he spent most of his life in Greece he was educated in the fields of rhetoric and philosophy and had traveled to Asia Minor, Egypt, and Rome. His major contribution to the study of both Greek and Roman
history is twenty-three pairs of biographies of famous Greek and Roman political figures known together as the *Parallel Lives*, in which Plutarch mentions many of his sources which are no longer available. Among those lost sources that he used are the histories of Fabius Pictor and Cato the Elder; a contemporary history of the Roman Republic’s final years written by the ex-consul Gaius Asinius Pollio (75 B.C.E. – 4 C.E.); the letters of Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi (190 – 100 B.C.E.); speeches by the Gracchi brothers; the memoirs of the dictator Sulla; the memoirs of Munatius Rufus (a close associate of Cato the Younger); the memoirs of Brutus’ step-son Lucius Calpurnius Bibulus; and the memoirs of Julius Caesar’s adopted son Gaius Octavius, later emperor Augustus (b. 63 B.C.E. – d. 14 C.E.).

A contemporary of Plutarch’s whose biography of Julius Caesar will be referenced is the Roman biographer Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus (c. 69 – c. 122 C.E.). What he has to say about Julius Caesar is particularly important since Suetonius had been the director of the imperial archives under the emperor Trajan (98 – 117 C.E.) and served as an imperial secretary under the emperor Hadrian (117 – 138 C.E.). Appianus, or Appian, was a Greek historian (c.95 C.E. – c.165 C.E.) who was born in Alexandria, and after moving to Rome, practiced law and wrote a history of Rome in Greek, titled *Romaika*. Of the twenty-four books in Appian’s *Roman History*, the most important section (and the most pertinent for this thesis) is that which includes Books XIII to XVII, and is often published separately as *The Civil Wars*. These books cover the years 133 to 35 B.C.E. in a continuous fashion and are noteworthy for their use of sources that were also employed by Plutarch. Also active during the reign of the Emperor Hadrian, the historian Florus is mainly known for his *Epitome of Roman History*. Although this work is largely based on Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita*, Florus will be consulted since he also used other sources such as the
writings of Sallust and possibly even the lost *Histories* of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, the Elder (c.54 B.C.E. – c.39 C.E.).

The second to last primary source writer that will be referenced is Aulus Gellius (c.123 C.E. – 170 C.E.), and although he is frequently cited by modern historians, he, like Valerius Maximus, is by no means known for being a historian himself. Rather, Gellius was an antiquarian, and his *Noctae Atticae*, or *Attic Nights*, is considered valuable to modern historians for his notes on “grammar, public and private antiquities, history and biography, philosophy (including natural philosophy), points of law, text criticism, literary criticism, and various other topics.”

The last major source that will be referenced is the *Roman History* written by the ex-consul Cassius Dio Cocceianus (c. 150 – 235 C.E.). Of its original eighty books, which were written in Greek, Books XXXVI – LX will be consulted since these cover the years 68 B.C.E. to 47 C.E.

With regard to the mechanics of the Roman constitution, I will be periodically referencing Andrew Lintott’s works *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (1999) and *Judicial Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic* (1992), in addition to Lily Ross Taylor’s works *Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Julius Caesar* (1966) and *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic: The Thirty-Five Urban and Rural Tribes* (1960). In discussing the Early Republic I will, in addition to quoting Livy and Dionysius, be citing T. J. Cornell’s *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic War* (1995) and will also be consulting Ogilvie and Oakley’s commentaries on Livy, i.e. R. M. Ogilvie’s *A Commentary on Livy: Books I-V* (1965) and S. P. Oakley’s *A Commentary on Livy: Books VI-X*, as well as Emilio Gabba’s commentary on Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Dionysius and the

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History of Archaic Rome. When I discuss the events of the Late Republic, I will also consult A. H. J. Greenidge & A. M. Clay’s Sources for Roman History, 133 – 70 B.C., as well as the other invaluable source guide, James Sabben-Clare’s Caesar and Roman Politics, 60- 50 B.C. In addition to Bennett’s 1923 dissertation on Cinna, and Astin’s 1967 biography of Scipio Aemilianus, the other “biographies” that I have relied on include: T. F. Carney’s C. Marius: A Biography (1961); D. L. Stockton’s The Gracchi (1979); M. L. Clarke’s The Noblest Roman: Marcus Brutus and His Reputation (1981); Arthur Keaveney’s Sulla: The Last Republican (1982); and Michael Lovano’s The Age of Cinna: Crucible of the Late Republican Rome (2002).

1.5 Organization

This thesis is divided into six chapters. In chapter two, three of the Early Republic’s “would-be tyrants” will be discussed individually in terms of who they were and what Livy and Dionysius have to say about them. Chapter three will begin by briefly discussing the geopolitical transformation that the Roman Republic underwent after the sack of Rome by the Gauls c. 390 B.C.E. up until the beginning of the Late Republic. The socio-political scene at the outset of the Late Republic will then be discussed briefly as a tie-in to the analysis of the lives and political careers of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus that will follow. A particular emphasis will be placed not only on the differences and similarities between how they met their demise with respect to their counterparts from the time of the Early Republic, but also on the political consequences of these deaths. Chapter four will begin by discussing the theme of political fragmentation and the use of violence in the political arena in Rome by the populist faction known as the populares. Afterwards, Gaius Marius and four important members of this populist faction will be discussed with an emphasis on the manner in which they met their ends. However, since Gaius Marius was not assassinated but still played an integral role in the rise and fall of those four who were, he
will not be treated separately. Instead, Marius’ narrative will serve first as an overture and then as a leitmotif that will be interwoven throughout the narratives of the four populists. Chapter five will then discuss the theme of political violence and tyrannicide as it relates to other political faction that arose in Rome, namely the *optimates*. While three very important populist leaders will be discussed separately, the emphasis throughout this chapter will be placed a bit more on how the conservative antagonists of these populists perceived them and, in Cicero’s case, were able to justify the use of violence against them through an appeal to tradition. Finally, chapter six will include a summary of the thesis in its entirety and will briefly discuss its significance with regard to the study of Ancient Rome.
Chapter 2: Tyrannicide as a Political Tool before 133 B.C.E.

2.1 Introduction

The complex political system of the Roman Republic was not developed in a day, or even less in a century. It was an edifice in progress that was built on top of the ruins of a monarchical system. At times seemed like a genuine representative democracy; at other times like a plutocracy. While there may have been a Senate and two assemblies in 509 B.C.E., there were as yet no Tribunes of the Plebs, much less a Plebeian Council; the laws of the land were not set down for all to see, and many of the magisterial offices that existed during the time of Julius Caesar were yet to be created. Eventually, the plebeians managed to secure the political representation that they had been clamoring for as well as increased access to the government of their city through the various magistracies that were created, such as the aedileship, the quaestorship, and the praetorship. Nevertheless, while these offices were in theory open to all plebeians, it was only those who could join the ranks of the equites, or cavalrymen, and the first two classes of infantry, or pedites, who were able to afford running for those offices. Power had merely been transferred from the kings to the aristocracy (and later wealthy plebeians) who ruled Rome through the Senate and their two presiding magistrates, i.e. the consuls. Nonetheless, the one thing that both the patricians and the plebeians in the Roman Republic had in common was a hatred of autocrats and a fear that the monarchy would someday, somehow be restored.

When the last king of Rome, Lucius Tarquinius Superbus (i.e. the “Arrogant”) was dethroned by members of Rome’s elite, those who led the rebellion against him were forever idolized in the minds of the Roman people. One of the most important of these men was Lucius Junius Brutus, so called because he feigned stupidity in order to avoid being killed by Tarquin like his father and brothers had been. Not only was Brutus instrumental in rallying the plebs to
the side of the elites in their effort to overthrow the monarchy, but it was also said that he later had his own sons, Titus and Tiberius Brutus, scourged and decapitated when they were implicated in a plot to restore Tarquin.\textsuperscript{11} Nonetheless, it was this Brutus whom the future assassin of Julius Caesar would claim as one of his ancestors thanks in part to the efforts of the Greek polymath Posidonius, who in his history of Rome mentioned that the Brutus’ family name was carried on by a third son who had previously remained unnamed because he was still an infant.\textsuperscript{12} Another important figure in the struggle to overthrow the monarchy was also the first man to have title Publicola, or “Friend of the People,” bestowed on him by the people. His name was Publius Valerius. He had not only helped Lucius Junius Brutus depose Rome’s monarchy in c. 510 B.C.E., but also, as a consul in 507, proposed a series of measures which had made him popular with the people. The most important of these measures were the right of appeal, or \textit{provacatio}, which permitted the citizens of Rome to appeal against a decision made by any of the magistrates, including the consuls; and the pronouncement of a “curse on the life and property of a man who should plot to make himself king.”\textsuperscript{13}

Since the monarchy was detested by the Romans, the accusation of aiming to restore the monarchy proved to be so damning, that from early on in Rome’s history it became the one sure way to completely discredit a political opponent in the eyes of the Roman people. In fact, it proved so detrimental to one’s career in politics that in both Livy’s and Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ history of the Early Republic, at least three men were accused of attempting to make themselves kings. In each of those cases, the three of them were effectively marked for

\textsuperscript{11} Livy 2.5.6-8; Dionysius 5.8.1-6. From here on in all primary source references will be citing the Loeb translations unless otherwise noted.
\textsuperscript{12} Plutarch, \textit{Brutus} 1.7; Thomas W. Africa also called attention to this detail in his article “The Mask of an Assassin: A Psychohistorical Study of M. Junius Brutus,” \textit{The Journal of Interdisciplinary History}, Vol. 8, No.4 (1978), p. 616.
\textsuperscript{13} Livy 2.8.2
death because of this stigma. The first one of these “would-be tyrants,” according to Livy and Dionysius, was the former consul Spurius Cassius.

2.2 Spurius Cassius Vecellinus (d. c.485 B.C.E.)

Both Dionysius and Livy (and Florus) mention at least three instances during the Early Republic when Roman citizens were killed as “would-be tyrants” in order to prevent the outbreak of any civil unrest. The first of these events occurred in 486 B.C.E. when Spurius Cassius, the consul from the previous year, was tried, condemned, and executed for being suspected of “aiming at the royal power.”¹⁴ What Florus does not mention, but Livy does, is that during his third and final consulship, Spurius Cassius was said to have been the first person to propose agrarian reform before the Senate.¹⁵ The Romans had recently defeated the Hernici, an Italian tribe from the hill country that surrounded the coastal plain of Latium, and as part of the peace treaty the Hernici had ceded two-thirds of their territory to Rome. Cassius proposed that half of this land should be given to the “commons” in Rome, and the that the other half should be given to Rome’s Latin allies, but his co-consul, Proculus Verginius, opposed Cassius’ proposals.¹⁶ While the Senate fully supported Verginius, only some of the plebeians were willing to side with him because they were not too keen on the idea of sharing land with the Latins. To ensure even greater popular support, Verginius told the plebeians that he was in no way against parceling out the newly conquered land, but that, unlike Cassius, he only wanted said land to be distributed among Roman citizens. He then accused Cassius of only wanting to provide land-grants to non-Romans because he wished to make them beholden to him as their master. When Cassius tried to win back the favor of the Plebs by proposing that the “money received from the Sicilian corn should be paid back to the people,” the people rejected him

¹⁴ Florus, *Epitome of Roman History* 1.17.25.7
¹⁵ Livy 2.8.3; Spurius Cassius Vecellinus served as consul in 503 B.C., then in 493 B.C. and finally in 485 B.C.
¹⁶ Livy 2.41.4
because they “saw it as a downright attempt to purchase regal power.”\textsuperscript{17} A seed of doubt had been successfully planted in the minds of the “commons,” and not long after his term as consul was over, Spurius Cassius was brought to trial for treason. Both Livy and Dionysius give us two versions of how Spurius Cassius met his end. The version which these historians agree to be the most plausible states that Cassius was first tried by two quaestors and “found guilty by judgment of the people.” He was then executed and his house was “pulled down by popular decree.”\textsuperscript{18} The other version, however, makes no mention of the two quaestors, or that Spurius Cassius received a public trial. Rather, this version states that it was Cassius’ own father who accused him before the Senate, tried him at home, and then had him executed.\textsuperscript{19} According to Lintott, this “second” version is probably the older of the two since at that time a Roman father had the right to kill his children “by virtue of his power as \textit{pater familias}}.”\textsuperscript{20} And no other story in Roman tradition better illustrates this than that which relates how Brutus, the founder of the republic, had his sons, Tiberius and Titus, executed for being implicated in a plot to restore the monarchy.

2.3 \textbf{Spurius Maelius (d. c.439 B.C.E.)}

Livy’s \textit{Ab Urbe Condita} tells us that a famine struck Rome in the year 440 B.C. E. and that this provided the tribunes with an opportunity to have the Plebs elect, “with no opposition on the Senate’s part,” a certain Lucius Minucius as \textit{praefectus annonae}, or “Prefect of the Corn Supply.”\textsuperscript{21} Minucius’ job involved not only purchasing grain from wherever he could manage to do so, but also regulating its distribution among those who were hit hardest by the famine.

\textsuperscript{17} Livy 2.41.8-9
\textsuperscript{18} Livy 2.41.11; Dionysius 8.79.3: Livy does not state how Cassius was executed, but Dionysius 8.78.5 states that Cassius was thrown from the Tarpeian Rock on Capitoline Hill since this was the traditional punishment for those found guilty of treason.
\textsuperscript{19} Livy 2.41.10; Dionysius 8.79.1-2: Livy adds that detail that Cassius was first scourged (just as Brutus’ sons had been) and then executed.
\textsuperscript{21} Livy 4.12.8
Though Minucius was popular with the destitute, he soon found that he had competition in the private sector. Spurius Maelius, a wealthy plebeian who is said to have had no political background, decided to go out of his way to purchase grain from Etruria (modern day Tuscany) and distribute it to the hungry people of Rome. Soon enough, his generosity with the poor won him their gratitude, and “crowds” of poor people began to follow Maelius making him “conspicuous and important beyond the measure of a private citizen.” 22 This gave Minucius a reason to fear that Maelius might be aiming at taking away his political post.

Subsequently, when Maelius ran for consul the following year, in 439 B.C.E., and lost the election, Minucius found a way to share his problem with those who had more political power than himself. 23 After biding his time, so as to confirm that his suspicions were not based on mere rumors, Minucius took his case against Maelius to the Senate. Livy stated that Minucius informed the members of the Senate that “weapons were being collected at the house of Maelius;” that Maelius was “haranguing people there” who were “certainly contriving a kingdom;” and that to this end the “tribunes had been bribed to betray liberty” and the “leaders of the mob had been assigned their parts.” 24 After hearing this alarming news, one of the recently elected consuls, Titus Quinctius Capitolinus, proposed to solve the current dilemma with Maelius by nominating Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus as dictator. Once this proposal was accepted unanimously by all the members of the Senate, the dictator Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus nominated Gaius Servilius Ahala as his Magister Equitum (Master of the Horse), or second in command.

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22 Livy 4.13.3
23 Livy 4.13.4-6; Dionysius 12.1.9-10: The fact that Maelius had thought of running for consul despite not having held any prior magistracies would certainly be cause for alarm, and Dionysius, unlike Livy, states that the leaders of the aristocracy were dejected by the fact that “the whole populace was ready, as soon as it was empowered to vote for magistrates, to grant [Maelius] whatever honor he might seek, whether the consulship, or some other magistracy, paying no heed to any law that forbade it, or to any man who opposed it.”
24 Livy 4.13.8-9
As dictator, Cincinnatus suspended the constitution, took his seat in the Forum, and had his Magister Equitum summon Maelius to appear before the dictator since he was to be tried in public for the crime of attempting to restore the monarchy. The next day, when Maelius was approached by Servilius Ahala who uttered the words “the dictator summons you,” Maelius’ blood ran cold. He tried to stand his ground and even asked why he was being summoned. Yet when Servilius informed him that it was because the dictator wanted him to answer a charge that Minucius had brought against him in the Senate, Maelius began to desperately look at the members of the crowd around him, imploring them for help with his eyes. Then, as Maelius noticed that the Magister Equitum’s sergeant was making his way towards him in an attempt to arrest him, Maelius cried out to the Roman plebs that he was “overthrown by a plot of the patricians because he had acted kindly by the commons.” He then begged them to protect him in his hour of need, and “not permit him to be murdered before their eyes.” Unfortunately for Spurius Maelius, the poor plebeians who were present on that occasion were much too terrified to do anything for him. Livy tells us that Cincinnatus congratulated Ahala for saving his country from tyranny and that in his official explanation of the incident the dictator declared that Maelius’ death was justified because “planning violence to avoid undergoing a trial, he had been repressed by violence.” What’s more, Cincinnatus is said to have ordered that Maelius’ house be demolished and the “goods which had been tainted with the offer of them as the price to buy a tyranny be confiscated.”

However, as is the case many stories from the Early Republic, there is more than one version of the tale of Servilius Ahala and Spurius Maelius. While only one version is told in

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25 Livy 4.14.3  
26 Livy 4.14.5  
27 Livy 4.15.3  
28 Livy 4.15.8
Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Romaike Archaeologias*, or *The Roman Antiquities*, contains two versions, one which is similar to the one in Livy’s history, and another which is entirely different. Though Dionysius considers the version that more closely resembles Livy’s account to be the more plausible of the two, the historian Andrew Lintott believes that the second version mentioned by Dionysius is far more credible since Dionysius refers to it as being mentioned in the history of Rome written by Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi (one of the consuls in 133 B.C.E.).

In this rendition of Servilius Ahala’s killing of Spurius Maelius, there is no mention of Quinctius being appointed dictator, and instead of being employed as a magister equitum to any dictator, Servilius Ahala is referred to as a “*privatus* acting *publiconsilio,*” or in other words as an “assassin in the name of the Senate.” This, adds Lintott, is “clearly an earlier tradition than the one which has introduced a dictator and a magister equitum,” because if this tradition was present in Piso’s history of Rome, then it would “not be surprising if the same story was in annalists earlier than him.”

If one reads Dionysius carefully one will find that is exactly the case since Dionysius mentions that this second version of the Maelius/Ahala story is not only present in Piso’s history, but also in a history of Rome written by Lucius Cincius Alimentus, who along with Fabius Pictor was one of Rome’s first native historians.

As for the tradition found in Livy, which Dionysus for the most part accepts as the more credible of the two versions he narrated in his *Antiquities*, Lintott states that it must have developed very soon after Piso. The reason being, he states, is that one must “allow for a change in the history books before the young Cicero began to learn about the great past of Rome” given that this is the version of the

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30 Ibid.
31 Dionysius 12.4.2
story that is mentioned in Cicero’s treatise entitled *De Senectute*, or *On Old Age*. However, here I must disagree with Lintott, for while it is in fact true that Dionysius states that Servilius Ahala was depicted as a privatus in both Calpurnius Piso’s and Cincius’ histories, he does not say the same about Fabius Pictor’s history of Rome. As such, it is possible that the existence of two versions of the Maelius/Ahala story went back as far as Cincius, or even further, and that Piso chose which ever version seemed to him the most plausible, and/or politically convenient.

### 2.4 Marcus Manlius Capitolinus (d. c. 384 B.C.E.)

As has been thus far demonstrated, Tiberius Gracchus was not the first “friend of the people” in Roman history to be killed because of the trumped up charge of “aiming at the royal power.” Both Spurius Cassius and Spurius Maelius were accused of it, and so was a man who prior to his execution had the honor of being called the “savior of the Capitol.” When the Gauls, who had settled in Italy’s Po River Valley, decided to cross the Apennines and invade Latium in 386 B.C.E., every Roman’s worst nightmare became a reality. The Gallic “horde,” under the command of a chieftain by the name of Brennus, became the first “barbarians” to sack Rome. Yet, tradition has it that although the eternal city was for the most part ripe for the taking, there was still one part of it that the Gauls were unable to lay hold of, and that was Capitoline Hill. Among those officers that took it upon themselves to defend the Capitol’s citadel was a patrician who had served as consul six years earlier; his name was Marcus Manlius. When the Gauls tried to take the citadel by night, Livy says that their ascent of Capitoline Hill was so quiet that they would have surely succeeded had it not been for the sacred geese of Juno and Marcus Manlius. Though Manlius was asleep at the time, the cackling of the sacred geese allegedly woke him up,

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thus enabling him to wake up his comrades and dispatch the Capitol’s attackers. For his bravery, Manlius was subsequently given the title Capitolinus and was held in high esteem by his fellow citizens, both patrician and plebeian.

The following year, however, only the plebeians held him in high regard. Whether it was because of righteous indignation, or because, as Livy believed, “he perceived that his abilities did not bring him that leadership amongst the nobles as he thought he merited,” Marcus Manlius decided to spurn his fellow patricians and be the first among them to “cast in his lot with the plebeian magistrates.”³³ Yet, instead of championing the cause of agrarian reform, Manlius chose to take a stand on debt slavery. At first, he confined himself to only delivering speeches against its practice, and even verbally attacked those patricians who profited from it.³⁴ While this may have irritated the members of the elite as a whole, it did not disturb them nearly as much as when Manlius began to publicly buy back the freedom of those debtors who found themselves either “enslaved,” or imprisoned.³⁵ But Marcus Manlius did not stop there. He also auctioned off “a farm in the Veientine district, which formed the main part of his fortune,” stating that he would not allow any of his fellow-citizens to be “‘condemned, made over, and carried off to slavery, so long as anything of my estate remains.’” He even accused the patricians of “concealing treasures of Gallic gold” since they were no longer “content with possessing the state lands unless they could also divert to their own use the money of the state” which could otherwise be used to “clear the plebs of debt.”³⁶

³³ Livy 6.11.6-7
³⁴ Livy 6.11.8-9
³⁵ Livy 6.14.2-5
³⁶ Livy 6.14.10-11
Manlius’ accusations against the patricians proved to be so unsettling for both the plebeians and the patricians that the Senate began to fear the possibility of a full popular uprising. The Senate’s solution to this dilemma was very much predictable: it decided to recall the dictator, Aulus Cornelius, who was at the moment waging war against the Volscians, a rival Latin tribe. Once Cornelius arrived in Rome he decided to solve the problem with Manlius the only way that dictators knew how: he would summon Manlius and question him about his accusations against the patricians; if Manlius refused to give him a pleasing answer, then he would have him jailed. Unlike Spurius Maelius, Marcus Manlius did not ignore the dictator’s request to appear before him, but Cornelius was not pleased with Manlius’s refusal to substantiate his claims about the secret hoards of Gallic gold, and so the “savior of the Capitol” soon found himself behind bars.37

Manlius probably should have been content with the fact that he been imprisoned and not struck down in the Forum by the dictator’s Master of the Horse, but instead he was enraged. His dignity as a public figure had been wounded. Still, Manlius’ incarceration had a silver lining. It galvanized his supporters. They “put on mourning” and held gatherings around the prison and in the end Marcus Manlius was freed only because the crowd of people that gathered outside the prison had threatened to break him out.38 Incarcerating Manlius had not averted an uprising; it set the stage for one. The following year, in 384 B.C.E., Manlius resumed his populist activities. In his speeches to the plebs that gathered at his home, Manlius reminded them that they were much more numerous than the patricians and far stronger, and that if they were “‘going to meet [the patricians] man for man’,” they would “‘fight more fiercely for [their] liberty than the [patricians] for their domination.’” With this in mind, he told the plebs to only “‘let the

37 Livy 6.16.1-4
38 Livy, 6.16.4; Livy 6.17.6
[patricians] see you ready to resist, and they will give you your rights of their own accord.’”39

How often Manlius would hold these gatherings in his house Livy does not say, but he does remark that that the Senate was deeply disturbed by the fact that plebeians were meeting in the house of a patrician who had made it known how much he detested the members of his own class. Yet, what disturbed the members of the Senate even more were the rumors that Manlius, just like Cassius and Maelius before him, was plotting to overthrow the Republic in order to make himself king. Even the tribunes of the plebeians had “made their submission to the Fathers,” (i.e., the Senate), and were, according to Livy, eager to silence Manlius because they had “perceived that their own authority would come to an end with the general liberty.”40 In other words, as long as Manlius was still alive, he would continue to provide the people with the kind of support that they would otherwise have sought from the Tribunes. However, as much as they wanted him dead, the Tribunes also wanted to avoid turning Manlius into a martyr. Therefore, whereas “the majority” of the Senate is said to have “exclaimed that a Servilius Ahala was needed” (i.e., in Livy’s words, “one who would not exasperate a public enemy by ordering his imprisonment, but would sacrifice a single citizen to end a domestic war”),41 the tribunes of the plebs, Marcus Menenius and Quintus Publilius, proposed the alternative of putting Manlius on trial as a would-be monarch. Since “nothing is less popular than kingly power,” this would effectively change the plebs from being Manlius’ supporters, to being his judges.42

Sure enough, when Manlius was put on trial before the people of Rome and was charged with aiming at kingship, the only thing that kept the people from finding him guilty was the initial location of the trial. Once the trial was moved from the front of the Capitoline Hill, to the

39 Livy 6.18.5-7
40 Livy 6.19.4
41 Livy 6.19.2
42 Livy 6.19.6-7
Campus Martius (or Field of Mars, where the troops are levied), Manlius was no longer able to remind the people of his title as “savior of the Capitol,” and he was found guilty of aiming at kingship. Consequently, Manlius met with an ironic end. His penalty for aspiring to be a king was to be flung “from the Tarpeian Rock,” so that the “same spot served to commemorate extraordinary fame and the extremity of punishment” for the “selfsame man.”

Unlike Livy, however, Florus does not mention the charge of aiming at kingship, and instead says that Manlius was “hurled from the citadel” for behaving in a manner “too arrogant and ill-fitting a private citizen on the strength of having set free a number of debtors.” Even so, Florus still placed the execution of Manlius in the same category as the executions of Cassius and Maelius, and expressed admiration for the ability of the Roman people during the Early Republic to zealously uphold their liberty and guard against the corrupting influence of “dangerous citizens.”

2.5 Summary

The overthrow of the monarchy in Rome by members of the aristocracy in 510 B.C.E. did not bring about the immediate creation of a full-fledged republic. Power was merely transferred from the kings to the aristocracy. As such, since Lucius Junius Brutus was one of the leaders of the revolt against the Tarquins, he was elected as one of the first consuls. So too was Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, who joined in the revolt against the royal family after his wife Lucretia had been raped by Sextus Tarquinius, the son of Rome’s last king. Yet, shortly after Brutus and Collatinus came to power, Brutus publicly pressured Collatinus to resign because of his name. His wife’s rape and subsequent suicide to preserve her honor had served as a powerful way to rally the people against Rome’s last king, yet Collatinus himself was nonetheless a member of the Tarquin family. Brutus, too, was related to the Tarquins, but unlike Collatinus,

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43 Livy 6.20.10-12
44 Florus, Epitome of Roman History 1.17.25.8
his name was not an overt reminder of the monarchy, and so Collatinus stepped down. To further prove his loyalty to the Republic, Brutus not only had the people swear that they would never allow a king to come to power in Rome, but even had two of his sons executed for being implicated in a plot to restore the monarchy. Later, Brutus died in battle against Rome’s last king. Thus, according to tradition, Rome’s first consul set the standard for loyalty to the Republic with both his words and his actions.

Eventually, Brutus’ comrade in arms Publius Valerius “Publicola” would go further still when he decreed that anyone found guilty of plotting to restore the monarchy would lose his civil rights. In granting him the name “friend of the people” for this level of commitment to the continued existence of the republic, the plebeians revealed that both they and the elites shared a common fear and loathing for monarchs and “would-be tyrants.” This sentiment, along with the fear of being conquered by outsiders (since the Tarquins were not Latins like the Romans, but Etruscans from the north), would be exploited by the more conservative members of the elite for much of the Republic’s history as a way to maintain the status quo. And, according to the tradition of the Early Republic, it was these conservative sentiments that led to the deaths of three men, two of them politically prominent figures in society. Still, in each of those cases, civil war did not break out; the plebs seemed to “return to their senses;” and, while the status quo was more or less maintained, real changes were brought about. Accordingly, historians like Appian can calmly state that no blood was spilled in the streets of Rome and differences between the plebs and the elites were resolved amicably. Yet, there were very real differences between Rome’s social, political, and economic climate during the Fifth and Fourth century B.C.E. and Rome’s socio-economic and political climate during the Second and First century B.C.E.

45 Livy 2.2.10
During most of the Early Republic, Rome’s soldiers were badly needed in the many wars that Rome had to fight with the other Italian tribes, especially since there was a very real fear that if Rome did not succeed in conquering its enemies it would in turn be conquered. As such, boycotting conscriptions ended up being a pretty good way for the plebs to obtain concessions from the elites. What’s more, Rome’s soldiers were not professionals, but rather full-time farmers who fought as part-time soldiers. And most of this fighting was done typically during the summer months when they did not have to worry about planting or harvesting, since these men did not want to leave their lands unattended for too long. As these soldier-farmers were forced to fight year round, and in distant lands for extended periods of time, rich landowners took the opportunity to confiscate the lands of poorer soldiers with outstanding debts. Nonetheless, these poor veterans were initially still able to work on those same lands, albeit “for a toll of the yearly crops” as rent, when they came back to Italy.

Only when enough slaves (in the form of prisoners of war) began to be imported from those territories that were slowly but surely becoming part of the Roman Empire, could rich land-owners afford to replace those tenant-farmers with this cheaper, more reliable labor source. This would in turn create an increasing population of landless poor who could no longer fight in the army and were angry enough to take up the sword in the name of any populist leader bold enough to give voice their complaints in the Forum. Until then, we see that men like

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46 Florence Dupont, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, translated by Christopher Woodall (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 123: Dupont quotes Cato the Elder’s treatise On Agriculture in stating that “It is from the farming class that the bravest men and sturdiest soldiers come.”
47 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.7
48 Ibid. Cf. Andrew Lintott, Judicial Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 42: Lintott argues that this was an “era of competition and conflict between peasant and rich proprietor” in which the latter were gaining the upper hand, but had not yet established “complete dominance of production.” That is why populists like Tiberius Gracchus, who were aware that times were changing, believed that they still might have a chance to prevent the complete takeover of the Italian landscape on the part of large agricultural estates.
Spurius Cassius were unable to rally enough plebeians to his support, much less an entire army of soldiers who swore loyalty to him above all else. Instead, the members of the elite branded him a monarchist and had him tried and executed as one. Yet when the state is the executor, it is not called an act of political violence, but an act of justice. Spurius Maelius was able to rally plenty of support due to the famine that struck Rome in 440 B.C.E., but none of his supporters were desperate enough to die fighting for him when Servilius Ahala said that he was acting on behalf of the Senate in stabbing Maelius. Furthermore, neither Ahala, nor the *equites*, who had been stationed at strategic points in the Forum in case of a riot, deemed it necessary to turn an assassination into a massacre by killing those who were with Maelius. In one version of the story, Ahala was even said to have justified his killing of Maelius with the excuse that Maelius was not only resisting arrest, but inciting a revolt. Finally, Marcus Manlius Capitolinus also had enough support, but once again there was no intent made on behalf of his faction to sacrifice their lives for the sake of his cause when he was arrested. Nor were those who made the arrest eager to spill the blood of fellow citizens. Just as in the case of Spurius Cassius, Marcus Manlius also met his fate through a state-sanctioned execution that involved the customary penalty for traitors to Rome. Thus the Senate managed to paint both those acts of violence against Roman citizens as publicly sanctioned acts of justice that were meted out in order to preserve the Republic rather than to safeguard the interests of a few.
Chapter 3: Tyrannicide, Violence and the Gracchi

3.1 Introduction

In the years after the sack of Rome by the Gauls, the Romans proceeded first to neutralize the threat of invasion posed by their Etruscan neighbors to the north and then to renew their quest to establish supremacy over the rest of the coastal region known as Latium. This determination to be masters of all Italy heightened the tension that existed between Rome and its Latin neighbors, but it also brought the Romans into conflict with the Italian tribes to the south-east of Latium, called the Samnites. Thus broke out the First Samnite War (343 - 341 B.C.E.) and the Latin War (340 – 338 B.C.E.). Though Rome would eventually obtain supremacy over the rest of the Latins, the Romans would find themselves having to fight two more wars against the Samnites and their allies the Campanians (from 326 to 304 and from 298 to 290 B.C.E.) before they could finally dominate the Samnites. Yet, in their attempt to establish control over southern Italy, the Romans found themselves in conflict with the Greek colonies in the southern coast of Italy, which had been active there since the birth of Rome.

The war that ensued between Rome and these Greek colonies became known as the Pyrrhic War (280 – 275 B.C.E.) because, in order to fight the Roman juggernaut that was barreling through Italy, the Greek colonists had called on Alexander the Great’s cousin, Pyrrhus of Epirus, to lead them into combat. Though Pyrrhus would manage to defeat the Romans twice in battle, the defeats came at such a great cost to his army that such victories would henceforth become known as “pyrrhic” victories. Even then, the Roman army would not budge and eventually defeated Pyrrhus at the Battle of Beneventum in 275 B.C.E. Still, part of the reason why Pyrrhus lost to the Romans was because he was not entirely committed to helping the Greek colonies in Southern Italy. Pyrrhus had been simultaneously trying to help another group of
Greek colonists, in eastern Sicily, wage a war against Carthaginian colonists in western Sicily. The Greek conflict with the Carthaginians over absolute control of Sicily had already sparked three wars between 480 and 315 B.C.E., and ten years after Pyrrhus would leave Italy and Sicily for good, the Romans would find themselves pulled into that conflict as well. This, in turn, would ultimately set the stage for three wars between Rome and Carthage stretching from the years 264 to 146 B.C.E. By the advent of the First Punic War, which would last twenty three years from 264 to 241 B.C.E., Rome’s population reached a peak of 382, 234 citizens.⁴⁹

All throughout the greater part of these wars, the Romans had been conquering more and more of Italy. Along the way they would typically either confiscate a portion of those newly conquered lands and found new towns, or enroll “colonists of their own to occupy those already existing.”⁵⁰ This policy was followed more or less continuously from about 340 to 170 B.C. E., and the “cultivated land” that was confiscated was either distributed to “colonists,” or it was sold or leased. However, in the period following the Second Punic War (218 – 202 B.C.E.) it became increasingly difficult to re-allocate all the land that had been confiscated and “lay desolated by war.” Therefore, according to Appian, the Romans let it be known that in the meantime “those who were willing to work [this desolated land] might do so for a toll of the yearly crops, a tenth of the grain, and a fifth of the fruit.”⁵¹ But soon enough, the rich began to acquire first any strips of land adjacent to their estates, and then their “poor neighbors’ allotments,” partly by “purchase under persuasion” and partly by force, so that these rich landowners eventually “came to cultivate vast tracts instead of single estates.”⁵² Subsequently, when the rich began to “offer larger rents and drove out the poor,” Plutarch says that a law was passed that limited the amount

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⁴⁹ Livy, Periochae 16 (264 -261 BCE)
⁵⁰ Appian, The Civil Wars 1.7
⁵¹ Ibid.
⁵² Ibid.
of land that any individual could possess to 500 iugera of land (or 311 ½ acres).\textsuperscript{53} Nonetheless, both Appian and Plutarch state that this law was not able to hold back the greed of the rich for very long, and relate how rich men initially, “by means of fictitious personages, transferred these rentals to themselves, and finally held most of the land openly in their own names.”\textsuperscript{54} As a result of these practices on the part of the wealthy, many poor plebeians found themselves landless and unable to qualify for military service. Meanwhile, the rich consolidated their lands and began to form \textit{latifundia}, or large estates dedicated either to cattle ranching, or the mass production of a single agricultural product, such as olive oil, or wine.\textsuperscript{55} On these \textit{latifundia} land-owners would employ slaves instead of the very plebeians who used to work those lands, since slaves would never be “drawn from agriculture into the army” and neither would their children.\textsuperscript{56}

Before, Rome’s overall small population enabled a greater portion of Romans to reap the rewards that came with the continuous defensive wars fought close to their city. Yet, when the wars begin to be fought more and more outside of Italy and the spoils of those wars came not only in terms of land, but also slaves that could be used by rich land owners as a cheaper and more reliable source of labor than tenant farmers, a new source of contention began to form between the elite and those poor plebeians who were finding themselves on the brink of becoming \textit{proletarii}, or, worse, \textit{capite censi}. Though during this time the minimum property requirement to fight in the army would often be lowered enough so that the \textit{proletarii} could

\textsuperscript{53} Plutarch, \textit{Tiberius Gracchus} 8.2; cf. Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.8 where Appian adds that that same law also limited the amount of animals that one could pasture on 500 \textit{iugera} of land to “100 cattle or 500 sheep.” Furthermore, Appian adds that this law contained a proviso that called for a “certain number of freedmen” to be employed on these estates, “whose business it should be to watch and report what was going on.”

\textsuperscript{54} Plutarch, \textit{Tiberius Gracchus} 8.3

\textsuperscript{55} David L. Stockton, \textit{The Gracchi} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 11-12. Stockton mentions that although this term was not used before early imperial times, that is not in itself a “compelling reason to conclude that the phenomenon which it describes was not already present in second century Italy.” Furthermore, Stockton mentions that while neither Cato the Elder (234 -149B.C.E.) or Cicero (106 – 43 B.C.E.) ever used the term “\textit{latifundia}” in their writings, the former nonetheless discussed the proper management of these type of agricultural estates in his treatise \textit{De Agricultura}, while the latter described one of the ranch style estates in a speech he delivered in 71 B.C.E.

\textsuperscript{56} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.7
enlist, those who were known as capite censi (because they were enrolled in the census based on a simple “head count,” rather than on the basis of their property value or their ability to produce children) were never granted the privilege of enlistment. All the while, upper class plebeians continued to climb Rome’s socio-political ladder, and soon many of them came to join the ranks of equally ambitious patricians and equites in forming a new socio-political group known as the “notables,” or nobles. Membership in this elite set was based entirely on whether one had attained a consulship, or had an ancestor who had been a consul. Those who did not have a consul in their family history and managed to become the first in one’s family to attain that honor were known as homines novi, or “new men.” Though these were generally looked down upon by the other nobles, they were still able to garner the admiration of their peers by presenting themselves as ultra conservatives, just as Marcus Cato the Elder had. As a result, the vast majority of upper class plebeians, who had been able to reap the rewards of the reforms brought about during the time of the Early Republic, began to distance themselves from popular politics in an effort either to establish or cement alliances with one of the six patrician families known as the gentes maiores.

Though there were at least thirty patrician families in all of Rome at the beginning of the Republic, only six of them had managed to exercise a “predominating influence” in politics until well into the second century B.C.E. These were: the Aemilii, the Claudii, the Cornelii, the Fabii, the Valerii, and the Manlii. Yet, despite the fact that these six families had actively competed against each other for pre-eminence throughout Rome’s history, they had managed eventually to ensure their survival not only through the laundry list of accomplishments that they were able to

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57 Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 16.10.10-13
attribute to their ancestors, but also through forging horizontal alliances with their erstwhile patrician competitors, as well as vertical alliances with some of the up-and-coming plebeian nobles. The two most important of the horizontal alliances that were forged by the patricians during the latter half of the Middle Republic were the Aemilo-Scipionic group\(^{60}\) and the Claudio-Fulvian group, with the former allying itself with the plebeian families of the Livii, the Servilii, the Minucii, and the Caecilii, and the latter chiefly with the Sempronii-Gracchi family with whom they shared populist sympathies.\(^{61}\) Meanwhile, the rest of the patrician families, known as gentes minores, either shone in the political spotlight for brief periods at a time, or dwindled into obscurity.\(^{62}\)

That the majority of plebeian nobles were more concerned in creating alliances with the gentes maiores than on the needs of the plebs, made it difficult for plebeian “secessions” to be staged. Nonetheless, there were still some plebeian nobles who still felt an attachment to their fellow plebs despite their alliance with one or more of these gentes maiores. Whether this was because they were unsuccessful in their attempts to integrate themselves into the coterie of the “conservatives,” or because they were genuinely troubled by the plight of the poor, is up for interpretation. What is certain is that the increasing population of landless plebeians during the Late Republic became a powerful source of rhetoric and support for those populist politicians whom the members of the elite would accuse of wanting to be kings.

\(^{60}\) See Appendix A: Stemmas I-III, on pages 129 and 130, for the Aemilio-Scipionic alliance. The Scipio family belonged to the Corneli clan and its most famous member was Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Hannibal Barca.

\(^{61}\) Scullard, 35-6; See Stemma V, on page 132, for the alliance of the Claudii and the Gracchi.

\(^{62}\) Ibid, 9.
3.2 Tiberius Gracchus (d. 133 B.C.E.)

In the summer of 133 B.C.E., a crowd of plebeians, the backbone of Rome’s army, gathered at Capitoline Hill to take part in a historic election. Earlier that year, one of the ten magistrates who presided over the Plebeian Council, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, had passed an agrarian reform bill without consulting the Senate and in spite of the fact that a fellow tribune had tried to veto his legislative proposal. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was not only the descendent of a consul on his father’s side (the elder Tiberius Gracchus had in fact been consul twice, in 177 BCE and in 163 BCE, as well as a censor in 169 BCE), but was also the grandson of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (the famous conqueror of Hannibal) on his mother’s side. Now that same Tiberius Gracchus intended on running for the office of Tribune of the plebeians for the second time in a row. This was too much for some of the more conservative members of the Senate to bear. The Senate had also arranged to meet on Capitoline Hill that same day, in the Temple of Fides on the south-east side. When they received word from an informant that Tiberius Gracchus had made a gesture in the Plebeian Council that could be construed as asking for a crown, Rome’s chief priest, or Pontifex Maximus, Publius Scipio Nasica Serapio, urged the senators to follow him and take up arms in defense of Rome’s constitution.

Tiberius knew that sooner or later an attempt would be made on his life, and many of his clients had pledged their support to defend him from bodily harm. In fact, Plutarch states that on the day he was killed, a senator who supported Gracchus’ politics by the name of Marcus Fulvius Flaccus had made his way through the crowd and alerted Tiberius that the Senate was debating the use of violence against him. It was at this point, says Plutarch, that Tiberius made

63 See Stemma IV on p. 131 for the marriage alliance between the Gracchi and the Cornelli.
the aforementioned gesture, i.e., putting a hand on his head so as to signify to those who could not hear what was going on that his life was in danger. Yet, both Tiberius and his partisans were just as astonished as the rest of the plebeians at the Plebeian Council when they saw a group of senators and their clients, armed with clubs, and led by the Pontifex Maximus, who also happened to be Tiberius’ own cousin. The crowd panicked as the senators beat their way through to Gracchus. While some of his followers stood their ground, many gave way in fear and in the end the Tribune of the Plebs, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, was clubbed to death (some say by the Pontifex Maximus himself) along with more than three hundred of his roughly three thousand partisans. Their bodies were then thrown into the Tiber River. Those of Gracchus’ supporters who survived the fray (and had not been either banished without a trial, or arrested and put to death) tried to bring Publius Scipio Nasica Serapio to trial for having murdered a tribune, but Scipio Nasica was, in addition to Pontifex Maximus, a former consul (he had been consul in 138 B.C.E., five years prior to Tiberius’ assassination). He was spared the embarrassment of a trial by the Senate, with the acquiescence of the consul Mucius Scaevola. Although he had initially been a supporter of Tiberius Gracchus, Mucius Scaevola decided that it would be best to agree with the Senate in having Scipio Nasica assigned to a diplomatic mission to Pergamum, in Asia Minor, as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened.

Before Tiberius Gracchus entered the world of politics and decided to remedy this injustice against poor, land-owning plebeians, Plutarch states that a Senator by the name of Gaius Laelius had already attempted to do so while consul in 140 B.C.E. However, when Laelius

64 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 19.2
65 See IV, p. 131; Scipio Nasica Serapio and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus were first cousins.
66 Plutarch *Tiberius Gracchus* 19.6; 20.2
67 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.16
68 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 20.3
69 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 21.2
found himself “opposed by the property-owning class, he took fright at the conflict his program seemed likely to arouse and abandoned his efforts.” As a result of his prudence, Laelius came to be known by the honorific title of “Sapiens,” or “the Wise.” This begs the question, why did Tiberius Gracchus decide to champion such a controversial issue as agrarian reform when a consul who had contemplated doing the same was labeled the “wise” for having second thoughts?

According to Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus entered the public eye at a young age, when he was co-opted into the college of augurs, though historians are unsure when this was. Shortly thereafter he was betrothed to the daughter of Appius Claudius Pulcher, who was consul in 143 B.C.E. and later censor in 136 B.C.E. This same Appius Claudius Pulcher’s grandfather, Gaius Claudius Pulcher, had been both consul and censor the same years as Tiberius’ father in 177 and 169 B.C.E. respectively. Perhaps, this political friendship, which had existed between Tiberius’ father and Appius Claudius Pulcher’s grandfather, was part of the reason why Appius pursued this alliance with Tiberius’ family. Afterwards, Tiberius joined his cousin and brother-in-law Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus in Africa. Like his adopted grandfather, Scipio Aemilianus was also elected consul in an extra-constitutional manner (he had not even served as a praetor and was only eligible to be an aedile at the time) in 147 B.C. E. so as to bring a protracted war against Carthage to a speedy end.

Unlike the Second Punic War, however, the third installment of the Roman-Carthaginian conflict was less of a protracted war than it was a protracted siege of the city of Carthage that had been raging on since 149 B.C.E. Nonetheless, after only being in charge of the siege for just

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70 Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 8.4
71 See Stemma V, p.132.
72 See Stemma I, on p.129, for Scipio Aemilianus’ family tree.
one year, Scipio Aemilianus brought the Third Punic War to an end, and it is here that, according Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus is said to have distinguished himself for courage in being the first to scale the enemy’s walls. From Africa, Tiberius Gracchus went to Spain, where he served as a quaestor for the consul Gaius Hostilius Mancinus in 137 B.C.E. Although Gaius Mancinus was, as Plutarch put it, “not a bad man,” the various calamities and military reverses that marked his campaign against the Numantines eventually earned him the reputation of being the “most unfortunate” of Roman generals. Nonetheless, despite Mancinus’ ill-luck, Tiberius still respected and honored his commanding officer. When the Numantines finally defeated Mancinus, they let it be known that they would under no circumstances negotiate a truce with any Roman save Tiberius Gracchus. This was due not only to the respect that the Numantines had for Tiberius’ father, who had treated the Numantines well when he fought in Spain, but also because they were still angry about the Senate’s repudiation of the consul Quintus Aulus Pompeius’ truce two years before. Somehow they believed that if Tiberius Gracchus stood surety for them, then the Senate would agree to a truce between Rome and Numantia. Tiberius also must have believed as much, but in the end they were both sadly mistaken.

As was to be expected, the Senate refused to acknowledge a truce made with an enemy who had defeated one of Rome’s armies. The more conservative members of the Senate then asked that Mancinus be punished. They cited as a precedent an incident from the year 321 B.C.E. when the Roman people voted to punish the generals who had made a peace treaty with

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73 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 4.4: Plutarch states that he found this information in the writings of a certain Fannius, possibly the same Gaius Fannius who later became Consul in 122 with the help of Tiberius’ brother Gaius. cf. Plutarch, *Gaius Gracchus* 8.2
74 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 5.1
75 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 5.3: The elder Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus served as a praetor in Spain in 179 B.C.E.
the Samnites after having been defeated by them at the Battle of the Caudine Forks. On that occasion the Roman people were said to have been so infuriated by this ignominious act that they had those generals handed over to the Samnites and “stripped of their general’s cloaks” for having attempted to make a treaty with the Samnites “without the authorization of the people.”

What’s more, those who most loudly condemned the treaty with the Numantines, added that, as tradition had it, it was not only the generals who had lost the Battle of the Caudine Forks that were punished, but also all those who had “taken any part in the terms of surrender, such as quaestors and military tribunes.” The soldiers who had taken part in the Numantian campaign with Mancinus and Tiberius Gracchus tried to spare Gracchus the humiliation of being “stripped and delivered up” to the Numantines. They stated that it was all Mancinus’ fault and that it was thanks to Gracchus “that the lives of so many citizens had been saved.” Tiberius, however, strove just as hard to also have Mancinus spared this archaic punishment. Nonetheless, despite Tiberius’ efforts to save his commander, the matter was put before the people of Rome, and it was voted that Mancinus alone should be delivered up to the Numantines. Gracchus and the other junior officers were spared. Scipio Aemilianus had also been in favor of rejecting Tiberius’ treaty with the Numantines and had wanted to see Mancinus punished. Yet, since he had married Tiberius’ sister, Sempronia, sometime before he was sent to Africa in 147 B.C.E., and was at this time “the most powerful and influential man in Rome,” Plutarch believes that Scipio must have “played a significant role” in ensuring that Tiberius was spared the punishment that was meted out to Mancinus.

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76 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 7.2; cf. Livy 9.5.1-13
77 Livy 9.5.1-13
78 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 7.3
Nevertheless, in defending its sense of *dignitas*, the Senate seemed to have wounded Tiberius’ sense of *dignitas* as well; at least Cicero believed as much. In his treatise on oratory entitled *Brutus*, Marcus Tullius Cicero says of Tiberius’ “turbulent” tribuneship that he entered that office in “anger at the nobility because of the animosities provoked by rejection of the treaty with the Numantines.” While Plutarch makes no mention of Tiberius feeling resentful towards the Senate for rejecting his treaty with the Numantines, he does, however, state that Tiberius “blamed” Scipio Aemilinaus for failing to help him in his effort both to ratify the treaty and save Mancinus from being punished. But even then, Plutarch believed that this incident could not have “resulted in no mischief without remedy” between Scipio Aemilianus and Tiberius Gracchus, and stated that in his opinion Gracchus would not have been killed in 133 BCE if Scipio Aemilianus had been in Rome at the time. Rather, because he held Scipio Aemilianus in such high esteem, Plutarch believed that it was Tiberius’ own ambition and the influence of his friends that was the true cause of any ill feeling between him and Scipio Aemilianus.

As for why Tiberius Gracchus decided to become a tribune of the Plebs, and champion the issue of agrarian reform, Plutarch looked for reasons other than Cicero’s belief that Tiberius was simply angry with the Senate for not ratifying his peace treaty. Some of Plutarch’s sources maintain that it was Tiberius’ mother, Cornelia, who was “at least partly to blame,” since she is thought to have told her son that she wished to be remembered not as the daughter of Scipio

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79 Cicero, *Brutus* 27.103

80 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 7.4

81 What Plutarch fails to take into consideration is that Tiberius Gracchus had come to see the Numantines as his “foreign clients” while Scipio did not want to see Tiberius’ treaty ratified by the Senate because he stood to gain from a continued war with the Numantines. As will be seen later, Scipio was eventually granted command over Mancinus’ army and this gave him the chance to add another triumph under his belt. The wealthy in Rome also stood to gain from the continued subjugation of the Iberian peoples under the Roman yoke since the provinces that had previously been created in Iberia in 197 B.C.E. had proven to be rich in minerals, such as gold, silver, and tin.
Africanus, but as the mother of the Gracchi.\textsuperscript{82} Then there is also the explanation given by Tiberius’ own brother, Gaius. He stated, in a now lost political pamphlet that he wrote himself, that when Tiberius was on his way to Numantia he was deeply moved by the sight of so many latifundia in Etruria being worked by foreign slaves, in place of small plots of land owned and farmed by Romans and Italians.\textsuperscript{83} In his speeches, Tiberius Gracchus constantly called attention to this reality. Furthermore, he reminded the people of Rome that in Sicily, the army was still struggling to quell a slave uprising that had started in 135 B.C.E. By doing so, he implied that this sort of catastrophe could happen in Italy because of the ever-growing number of latifundia. Plutarch adds to this observation by Tiberius’s brother by stating that it was “above all the people themselves who did most to arouse Tiberius’ energy and ambitions by inscribing slogans and appeals on porticoes, monuments and the walls of houses, calling upon him to recover the public land for the poor.”\textsuperscript{84} Later, in his \textit{Life of Brutus}, Plutarch stated that the people would similarly incite Brutus to kill Caesar through the use of such political graffiti.\textsuperscript{85}

Even more intriguing about Plutarch’s account of Tiberius Gracchus’ political career is that, unlike Appian, he related that Tiberius did not “draw up his law by himself,” but actually “took counsel with the citizens who were foremost in virtue and reputation” in drafting his agrarian reform bill. Among those “virtuous” and “reputable” citizens whom Plutarch named were: Tiberius Gracchus’ father-in-law, Appius Claudius Pulcher; Publius Mucius Scaevola (the

\textsuperscript{82} Plutarch, \textit{Tiberius Gracchus} 8.5
\textsuperscript{83} Plutarch, \textit{Tiberius Gracchus} 8.7
\textsuperscript{84}Ibid.; cf. Erich S. Gruen, \textit{Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 B.C.} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 49: Gruen adds that Tiberius Gracchus was also certainly inspired by the activity of other tribunes of the plebs who came before him. These representatives of the people had “on more than one occasion between 152 and 138” sought to block the levy because the “unpopularity of conscription for the Spanish Wars” had induced “unwilling victims to appeal to the tribunes.” Some of these tribunes of the plebs went as far as imprisoning the consuls so as to prevent conscription. Gruen also mentions how the introduction of the secret ballot (by the tribunes) for elections in 139 and popular trials in 137 certainly “indicates a more active and perhaps more independent voting populace.” This would certainly explain how the phenomenon of political graffiti came about in Rome.
\textsuperscript{85} Plutarch, \textit{Brutus} 9.5-7
son of the consul of 175 and one of the two consuls in 133 B.C.E.); and Mucius Scaevola’s brother, Publius Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, who was a well known and respected legalist and had been adopted by the consul of 205 B.C.E. Furthermore, Plutarch, unlike Appian, stated that Tiberius proposed two separate versions of said bill. The first version of the bill actually offered to compensate those whose lands were to be confiscated by the three man commission comprised of Tiberius, his father-in-law Appius, and Tiberius’ brother Gaius. But when Tiberius encountered the same kind of opposition as Laelius, and saw that one of his fellow tribunes, Marcus Octavius, had been co-opted by the wealthy land owners, Gracchus decided to re-write his bill along more populist lines. It was this second version of the bill, which did not compensate those whose lands were being confiscated, that Appian had in mind when he wrote that “what Gracchus had in mind in proposing the measure was not money, but men.”

Plutarch also mentioned, unlike Appian, that Marcus Octavius was not simply the pawn of the wealthy, but he was also affected by Gracchus’ proposed law, as was the Pontifex Maximus, Publius Scipio Nasica Serapio. The reason is because both of these men owned large tracts of public land. However, since Marcus Octavius was Tiberius’s most immediate concern, Gracchus tried to get his fellow tribune to withdraw the veto of his agrarian reform bill by “promising to pay him the value of the land out of his own means, although these were not splendid.” Only when Octavius refused to budge did Gracchus finally decide to have him voted out of office and replaced by a tribune who was more in tune to the needs of the plebs.

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86 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 9.1. In other words, this Tribune of the Plebs, at least initially, had a faction of high powered Roman senators standing behind him.
88 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.11
89 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 10.5: 13.3
90 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 10.5
Furthermore, he also put his seal on the treasury, in the Temple of Saturn, so as to prevent any money from being withdrawn until his bill was put to a vote. Yet another difference between Appian and Plutarch’s account is that Appian states that prior to removing Marcus Octavius from the tribunate, Tiberius Gracchus did in fact try to bring his reform bill before the Senate. Appian states that Gracchus did this out of the belief that his reform bill “was acceptable to all well-disposed persons.”[^91] As such, it was his being treated “contemptuously” by the rich in the Senate which prompted Tiberius to have Marcus Octavius removed from office before putting his bill to the vote in the Plebeian Council.

Prior to Marcus Octavius’ removal from office, the person of the Tribune had been considered inviolable, but after Tiberius had forcibly removed his colleague, Plutarch says that the tribunate had been “insulted and destroyed” and that this was “very displeasing, not only to the nobles, but also to the multitude.”[^92] While Appian agrees with Plutarch’s statement, he nonetheless makes the distinction that it was primarily the urban plebs who were offended by Tiberius’ treatment of a fellow tribune. This is important because it was ultimately the landless rural plebs that Gracchus had sought to help once his law was passed and a three-man agrarian commission was created to supervise the re-distribution of lands in dispute.[^93] Accordingly, on that fateful day in the summer of 133 B.C.E. when Tiberius Gracchus attempted to run for the office of tribune for the second time, but was clubbed to death, it was the urban plebs who abandoned him to the mercy of the senators. For although Tiberius had been anxious to obtain the votes of the rural plebs, “they were occupied with [the] harvest

[^91]: Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.12
[^92]: Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 15.1
[^93]: Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.13: Appian states that the “victorious party returned to the fields” while the “defeated ones remained in the city, and talked the matter over, feeling aggrieved.” Cf. Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 13.1-3: Plutarch’s description of Tiberius Gracchus’ legislative victory, on the other hand, focuses more on the resentment felt by the large landowners, in particular the Pontifex Maximus, Publius Scipio Nasica Serapio.
[and] he was obliged, when the day fixed for the voting drew near, to have recourse to the plebeians of the city.”

Yet, along with the fact that a large number of Tiberius Gracchus’ supporters were clubbed to death with him, what is probably the most significant aspect of Tiberius’ assassination is not that he was abandoned by the plebs in his hour of need (this had happened to populists in the past), or that he was a tribune, but rather that a dictator had not been appointed to deal with the matter. Even Appian states that he found it “astonishing” how the members of the Senate had not only “never thought of appointing a dictator in this emergency, although they had often been protected by the government of a single ruler in such times of peril,” but that “a resource which had been found most useful in former times was never even recollected by the people.”

This means that Appian was fully aware of the story about Spurius Maelius and Servilius Ahala, and that like Dionysius of Halicarnassus he too believed that the version in which Servilius Ahala was a *magister equitum*, and not a *privatus*, was the more credible of the two versions. However, this also means that Appian clearly drew a distinction between vigilante violence perpetrated by private citizens, and state sanctioned violence perpetrated by armed forces under the command of a dictator and a *magister equitum*. Thus, what is significant to Appian about Tiberius Gracchus’ assassination was that it was committed by senators under the leadership of a *Pontifex Maximus* who had not been formally invested with the *imperium* of a dictator, but was rather acting as a *privatus*.

While Appian makes it appear as if Scipio Nasica’s decision to kill Tiberius Gracchus had not been contested by any one present at the meeting of the Senate in the Temple of Fides,

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94 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.14
95 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.16
both Plutarch and Valerius Maximus tell a different story. In their version of this event, they agree that when Scipio Nasica demanded that the consul, Mucius Scaevola, “act to protect the state and put down the tyrant,” the consul “refused to take any violent action” against Tiberius Gracchus. Furthermore, Mucius Scaevola stated that he would “put no citizen to death without a trial.”  

It was this refusal to declare a state of national emergency on Mucius Scaevola’s part that enabled Scipio Nasica to declare that the consul had “betrayed the state.” This, in turn, gave the Pontifex Maximus the pretext that he needed to offer his services as a “private individual” in the consul’s stead, shouting “let those who want to save the commonwealth follow me.”  

Nonetheless, Cicero notes that though Mucius Scaevola was found to be “lacking in energy when the deed was in contemplation,” the consul later “defended Scipio Nasica’s action by several decrees in the Senate.” When Gracchus’ followers demanded that the Pontifex Maximus stand trial for the murder of a Tribune of the Plebs, the Senate (presumably with the full support of the consul Mucius Scaevola) sent him on a diplomatic mission to Asia Minor, where Plutarch states he died mysteriously as “a despised outcast” two years later.

Although Mucius Scaevola’s brother was elected Pontifex Maximus after Scipio Nasica’s death, he also died in Asia Minor thereafter. Mucius Scaevola himself was then subsequently elected Pontifex Maximus, and as high priest he would continue the tradition of keeping a record of each year’s events. These he would later publish as the Annales Maximi sometime before he died circa 115 B.C.E. Although they are now mostly lost to us, these annals served as an invaluable primary source for later ancient writers such as Cicero, Livy and Dionysius. The other consul of 133 B.C.E., Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi, also went on to write a history of

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96 Valerius Maximus 3.2.17; cf. Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 19.3  
97 Ibid.  
98 Cicero, De Domu Sua 35.91  
99 Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus 21.1-3
Rome from its beginnings up until his own time, however, while his seven-book text is also lost to us, it was eventually used as a source by writers such as Cicero, Livy, and Dionysius who often made explicit references to Piso Frugi.

3.3 Gaius Gracchus (d. 121 B.C.E.)

The year after Tiberius Gracchus’ death, the Senate commissioned the newly elected consuls, Publius Rupilius and Publius Popillius Laenas, to “punish Gracchus’ fellow conspirators according to ancestral custom.” Though many of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus’ followers were subsequently either exiled without trial or arrested and executed, the three-man agrarian reform commission that had been created by his Lex Sempronia remained in effect, and Publius Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus was elected to replace Tiberius. This member of the Licinii Crassi was, as has been stated earlier, a noted lawyer and staunch supporter of Tiberius Gracchus’ plans for agrarian reform. After Scipio Nasica was reported to have died in Asia Minor, he was elected to the post of Pontifex Maximus. The other member of the original three-man agrarian reform commission, Tiberius Gracchus’ younger brother, Gaius, was, however, in Spain when he heard news of Tiberius’ assassination.

Prior to taking up his brother’s mantle as tribune of the plebs, Gaius Gracchus first served under Scipio Aemilianus in Spain in 134 B.C.E, just as his brother had done in Africa. The following year, in 133 B.C.E., Scipio Aemilianus razed Numantia to the ground and received the additional agnomen of Numantinus after having previously received the agnomen of Africanus in honor of his destruction of Carthage. When the news of Tiberius’ death reached Spain, Plutarch states that Scipio Aemilianus reacted by quoting Homer, saying, “So may everyone perish who

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100 Valerius Maximus 4.7.1
chooses to act in this way.’”

Though the manner of his brother’s death initially scared Gaius into thinking twice about walking in his brother’s footsteps by becoming a tribune of the plebs, Scipio Aemilanus’ comment on Tiberius’ assassination gave Gaius more than enough reason to distance himself from the aristocracy as well.

Nonetheless, after he returned from Spain, Gaius proceeded to assume his place on his brother’s agrarian reform commission along with Tiberius’ father-in-law, Appius Claudius, and the famed lawyer, Crassus Mucianus. Shortly thereafter, when Crassus Mucianus became consul in 131 B.C.E., he was killed while putting down a slave revolt in Asia Minor. Appius Claudius died the following year and Appian states that the commission’s two vacant positions were soon occupied by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Papirius Carbo. As Tribune of the Plebs, in 131, Carbo had attempted to put forth a bill that would permit anyone who had already been a tribune once to be “elected tribune as many times as he wanted.” Even though Gaius Gracchus spoke in favor of Carbo’s bill, the populist “motion” was nonetheless successfully blocked by Scipio Aemilianus. According to Livy, Aemilianus spoke against the motion in “the most earnest of speeches, in which he said that, in his opinion, Tiberius Gracchus had been killed justifiably.” Seventy-nine years later, Cicero, in a court of law, would refer to this same moment in Roman history in an attempt to justify his client Milo’s use of physical violence against the former Tribune of the Plebs, Publius Clodius Pulcher. In this court case, Cicero asked the jury, as a rhetorical question, if Scipio Aemilianus had been “out of his mind” when Carbo asked for his opinion of Tiberius Gracchus’ death and the destroyer of Carthage and

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101 Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 21.4: The passage is from Homer’s *Odyssey* I.47, and it is a reference to Athena’s comment on the fate of Agamemnon’s murderer, Aegisthus, after he was killed by Agamemnon’s son, Orestes.
102 Valerius Maximus 3.2.12; Florus 1.35.4-5
103 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.18
104 Livy, *Periochae* 59 (133-129 BCE)
Numantia responded that he believed Tiberius’ death was justified. By doing so, Cicero placed his client’s action against Publius Clodius Pulcher on a par with that of killing Tiberius Gracchus. In other words, Cicero was claiming that the killing of “would-be tyrants” in the name of the republic was a morally sound custom sanctioned by the tradition of Rome’s ancestors, and therefore unquestionably justified.

Then in 129 B.C.E., something happened that not only made Gaius Gracchus temporarily retire from the public eye, but made Gaius Papirius Carbo eventually change factions. On the day in which he was said to be planning to speak out against the agrarian reform commission in a public gathering, Scipio Aemilianus was found “dead in his sleep.” Although all the relevant sources on this event agree that no inquiries were made as to the cause of Scipio’s death, due to the people’s resentment over his remarks about Tiberius Gracchus, these same sources also speculate that Scipio Aemilianus had somehow been murdered. Later source writers Appian and Plutarch include in their list of suspects Scipio Aemilianus’ wife, Sempronia (as the most likely suspect since she was Gaius Gracchus’ sister and Scipio had mistreated her); and Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi. However, it is remarkable that Marcus Tullius Cicero did not mention any of the above suspects, and stated that it was in fact Gaius Papirius Carbo who was seen as the primary suspect in 129 B.C.E. Whether or not Carbo was indeed responsible for the death of Scipio Aemilianus, the fact that his contemporaries believed him to be responsible would help explain why nine years later Carbo would go out of his way to defend Lucius Opimius, the man who ordered Gaius Gracchus’ death.

Cicero, Pro Milone 8
The controversy over Scipio’s death could also help explain why Gaius Gracchus postponed his candidacy for the quaestorship. Image was everything in Rome, and having the prime suspect in Scipio’s death as a political ally was not good publicity. As such, while Tiberius Gracchus became one of the Consul Gaius Hostilius Mancinus’ quaestors when he reached the minimum age requirement of twenty-six, his brother Gaius became one of the Consul Lucius Aurelius Orestes’ quaestors in 126 B.C.E. at the age of twenty-eight. Nonetheless, when Gaius Gracchus did eventually decide to follow in his brother’s footsteps, by becoming a tribune of the plebeians in 123 B.C.E., he defied all expectations in proposing a reform program that was far more ambitious than anything his brother had envisioned. In her text on the Late Roman Republic, Mary Beard states that although Gaius Gracchus is often cast in a “supporting role to Tiberius,” he is just as significant because he not only heralded “other major themes of later controversy,” but also because his was a “major program of reform depending on the initiative of a single individual.”107 Though most of the policy ideas that he championed as Tribunes of Plebs had in some shape or form been individually proposed by past tribunes, it seems that Gaius Gracchus had decided to engage all of them for the same reason he had his own private bodyguard. He wanted to protect his person by broadening his support network. And although Gaius Papirius Carbo abandoned his cause after Scipio Aemilianus’ death, Marcus Fulvius Flaccus was still a close ally of Gaius Gracchus.

As consul in the year 125 B.C.E., Fulvius Flaccus had already tried to pass a law granting Roman citizenship to the Italians on his own. However, although he proposed before the Senate that all of Rome’s Italian allies “should be admitted to Roman citizenship so that, out of gratitude for the greater favor, they might no longer quarrel about the land,” he was forced to give in to the

Senate’s partial warnings and partial entreaties, because the majority of senators “were angry at the thought of making their subjects equal citizens with themselves.” And to further insure that Fulvius Flaccus would not continue to press the issue, Appian states that the Senate decided to have Fulvius Flaccus spend the remainder of his consulship conducting a military campaign against the Salluvii, a tribe of Gauls from the south of modern day France who had attacked Rome’s Greek allies in Massilia (the modern city of Marseilles). The Italians in the town of Fregellae, however, did not see the issue of Roman suffrage in the same way in which the Senate viewed it, and were promptly up in arms. In hindsight, this was clearly a “warning of the sort of trouble that might be expected if some radical transformation of the political structure of Italy was not soon effected.” Yet, since the Senate did not suspect that this issue would eventually lead to the outbreak of civil war thirty-four years later, it considered the matter to be settled when it sent a praetor by the name of Lucius Opimius who, though he “accepted the surrender of the Fregellani,” also deemed it necessary to destroy their city.

As a tribune of the plebs, however, Gaius Gracchus was more successful during his first term than Fulvius Flaccus was as consul. First, he managed to pass a law “providing that if any magistrate had banished a citizen without trial, such magistrate should be liable to public prosecution.” Yet, although this law was specifically aimed at the former consul Publius Popillius Laenas for having banished several of Tiberius Gracchus’ supporters, Gaius was unable to have Laenas prosecuted. As soon as the law was passed, the former consul went into self-imposed exile to avoid standing trial. Then Gaius Gracchus proposed a law known as the lex

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108 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.21; Valerius Maximus 9.5.1.
109 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.34; cf. Livy, Periochae 60 (126 – 121 BCE)
110 Stockton, 159; Livy, Periochae 60 (126 –121 BCE)
111 Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 4.1
112 Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 4.2
frumentaria (the “corn,” or grain law) which provided for “regular monthly distributions of grain” to Roman citizens at a fixed price. It was also during this first term that, according to Livy, Gaius Gracchus passed a law increasing the power of the equites (Rome’s financial elite) at the expense of the Senate.\footnote{Livy, Periochae 60 (126 -121 BCE); Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 5.2} He did this by taking away the extortion court, the only permanent court in Rome at the time, from the senators and giving it to the equites.

By the end of his first term as tribune of the plebs, Gaius Gracchus had acquired more political clout than his brother ever had, and this was made evident by two remarkable events. First, was his successful campaigning on behalf of Gaius Fannius’ candidacy for the consulship of 122 B.C.E.; second, was Gaius Gracchus’ own election as tribune for the second time in 122 B.C.E., despite the fact that he had not even “presented himself as a candidate and did not campaign for office.”\footnote{Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 8.2} During his second term as tribune, Gaius Gracchus sought to not only extend Roman citizenship to the rest of Rome’s Latin subjects, but also proposed that “new colonies be founded at Tarentum and Capua,” for the settlement of landless Romans.\footnote{Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 8.3} At the same time Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, the ex-consul of 125 B.C.E., also managed to secure election as a tribune of the plebs so as to help Gaius Gracchus extend Roman suffrage, thus making him the only ex-consul in Roman history to have been elected a tribune of the plebs.\footnote{Appian, The Civil Wars 1.24} However, despite Fulvius Flaccus’ adamant support, the consul Gaius Fannius was not as committed to Gaius Gracchus’ cause, and after his election to the consulship of 122 B.C.E. he not only distanced himself from Gaius Gracchus, but he also openly opposed his proposals.\footnote{Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus, 8.2-3; 12.1-2. Gaius Fannius also wrote a history of his own time, and is frequently cited by Plutarch in his “Lives” of the Gracchi. For instance, Fannius is Plutarch’s source for Tiberius Gracchus’ military career in Africa.} Aside from the probability that he may have suddenly come to the conclusion that it would be an act of
political suicide to keep associating with a man who was held in contempt by the majority of senators, it is also important to take into account that sometime before or after he became consul, Gaius Fannius had married one of the daughters of Gaius Laelius Sapiens.

As was mentioned in the section on Tiberius Gracchus, Gaius Laelius was the former consul of 145 B.C.E. who had considered tackling the issue of agrarian reform but then decided to back down once he met with opposition from the Senate, thus earning the agnomen of Sapiens, or “wise.” This same Laelius features prominently in Cicero’s treatise De Amicitia (On Friendship) where Cicero has Laelius discuss the meaning of friendship with his two sons-in-law, Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius Scaevola (the future consul of 117 BCE) in the days following Scipio Aemilianus’ death. Cicero stated that this dialogue, which he penned in the year 44 B.C.E., was based on a lecture given by Mucius Scaevola (the consul of 117 B.C.E.) when Cicero was attending a law class that the ex-consul was teaching during the 90s B.C.E. Furthermore, Cicero mentioned how Mucius Scaevola told his students that his lecture on amicitia was based on his own conversations with his father-in-law, Laelius Sapiens, who was a close friend of Scipio Aemilianus.  

As an amicus, or “friend” of Scipio Aemilianus, Laelius Sapiens was a staunch conservative who is said to have stated that one cannot remain friends with someone who importunes a friend for anything that is either “contrary to good faith, or to [one’s] solemn oath, or is inimical to the commonwealth.” Prior to making this statement, Cicero had Laelius ask, in a rhetorical manner, if the “friends of Vecellinus [i.e. Spurius Cassius Vecellinus], or of Maelius” should have supported either of them in their “attempts to gain regal power?” To which Laelius is then said to have implied that such men ought to be “deserted,” by stating how Tiberius Gracchus was deserted by Quintus Tubero and “friends of his own age”

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118 Cicero, De Amicitia 1.1-2
119 Cicero, De Amicitia 11.39
when he “began to stir up revolution against the republic.”\textsuperscript{120} With a father-in-law who thought like this, and believed that Tiberius Gracchus had not only “tried to obtain regal power,” but “actually did reign for a few months,” it is no wonder that Gaius Fannius deserted Gaius Gracchus and joined the rank of the aristocrats.\textsuperscript{121}

However, the loss of Gaius Fannius’ support (which in a way mirrors Tiberius Gracchus’ loss of Mucius Scaevola’s support) was only the beginning of the end for Gaius Gracchus. The aristocrats had from that point on decided to make Gaius’ second term as tribune an unpleasant one. First, they co-opted a fellow tribune of Gaius Gracchus by the name of Marcus Livius Drusus and asked him to do the unexpected. When Tiberius Gracchus was tribune of the plebs, the members of the elite who wanted to hold back his plans for reform did so by co-opting his fellow tribune Marcus Octavius and having him veto Tiberius’ legislative proposals. This time, the aristocracy planned to derail Gaius Gracchus by asking Marcus Livius Drusus to “surpass” Gracchus in “pleasing and gratifying the people” so as to “humble or destroy the man himself.”\textsuperscript{122} And so when Gaius Gracchus proposed the founding of two colonies “composed of the most respectable citizens,” Plutarch reports, the aristocrats would accuse him of “trying to ingratiate himself with the people,” but when Livius Drusus proposed that he was going to found twelve colonies composed of “three thousand of the poorest citizens,” these same aristocrats “approved his scheme wholeheartedly.”\textsuperscript{123} What’s more, when Gaius Gracchus campaigned in favor of Fannius, in his bid for the consulship of 122 B.C.E., he had also opposed the candidature

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\textsuperscript{120} Cicero \textit{De Amicitia} 11.36-37  \\
\textsuperscript{121} Cicero \textit{De Amicitia} 12.41  \\
\textsuperscript{122} Plutarch, \textit{Gaius Gracchus} 9.1  \\
\textsuperscript{123} Plutarch, \textit{Gaius Gracchus} 9.2
\end{flushleft}
of Fannius’ competitor, Lucius Opimius. And so, now Opimius was bent on not only being elected consul for the year 121 B.C.E., but also on revenge.\textsuperscript{124}

Gaius Gracchus and his supporters suspected that if Opimius became one of the two consuls in 121 B.C.E. he would aim to repeal all of the Gracchan laws. With this fear in mind, Gaius Gracchus, according to Plutarch, decided that it was now the right time to propose a law to extend Roman citizenship to the Latins, thus augmenting his voter base. It is for this reason that he is also said to have moved from his house on the Palatine (where the most expensive homes in Rome were) to a house near the forum\textsuperscript{125} since this is where “most of the humblest and poorest citizens lived.”\textsuperscript{126} And though Gaius Gracchus had only proposed to extend Roman citizenship to the rest of the Latins and not all the Italians, Plutarch says that a “great multitude” of Italians started to “gather in Rome” from all parts of Italy to support Gaius Gracchus. Perhaps, these Italians had concluded that Gaius Gracchus would be able to succeed where Flaccus had failed, but that first all the Latins had to be granted Roman citizenship before the Italians had a chance to acquire the suffrage as well. But, if this is what the Italians thought, then the Senate must have also reached the same conclusion. It soon put pressure on the consul Fannius to issue a decree that forbade all those who were not “Roman by birth” from being within five miles of Rome when the voting took place.\textsuperscript{127} Not only did this strategy help the Senate prevent the passage of Gaius Gracchus’ law, but it also helped prevent Gaius Gracchus from attempting to run for yet another term as Tribune of the Plebs. Furthermore, Gaius’s opponents were also able to successfully secure “Opimius’ election as consul” for the following year.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{124} Plutarch, \textit{Gaius Gracchus} 11.2-3
\textsuperscript{125} See Appendix B: Illustration 2, p. 138, for a plan of the Roman Forum during the time of the Late Republic.
\textsuperscript{126} Plutarch, \textit{Gaius Gracchus} 12.1
\textsuperscript{127} Plutarch, \textit{Gaius Gracchus} 12.1-2
\textsuperscript{128} Plutarch, \textit{Gaius Gracchus} 13.1
As soon as Lucius Opimius became consul in 121 B.C.E., Plutarch stated that Gaius’ enemies prevailed on the consul to begin dismantling Gaius’ laws. Yet, given Opimius’ resentment of Gaius Gracchus’ campaigning against his candidacy for the consulship of 122 B.C.E., Opimius probably did not need too much convincing on the part of Gaius’ opponents. On the day that the dismantling process was set to occur on the Capitol, the consul performed a customary animal sacrifice. As Opimius’ attendant, Quintus Antyllius, was disposing of the animal’s entrails, it is said that either one of Fulvius Flaccus’ or Gaius Gracchus’ supporters killed Antyllius. Either way, both Appian and Plutarch agree that this incident provided Opimius with the excuse he needed to declare a national emergency. Unlike in the case of Tiberius Gracchus, where the Senate had been unable to pressure the consul Mucius Scaevola to issue a state of national emergency and use violence if need be to restore order, this time the Senate found in Opimius a consul who was more than willing to be made a dictator. As dictator, he was granted the extra-constitutional power to use violence against a fellow Roman citizen who had been deemed to be a hostis, or “enemy of the state.” The nature of this enmity is made all the more obvious by Plutarch, for in his narrative he states that the Senate’s decree instructed Opimius “to preserve the safety of the state in any way he could and to put down the tyrants.”

In declaring Gaius Gracchus to be an “enemy of the state,” and in effect deeming him to be no less a threat to Rome’s safety than Hannibal was during the Punic Wars (which incidentally was the last time that the Senate had given a consul dictatorial powers for the purpose of protecting Rome against her enemies), the Senate had given Lucius Opimius the right to wage war on Gaius Gracchus and his partisans. Though Appian alone states that Gaius Gracchus and Marcus Fulvius Flaccus attempted to recruit Rome’s urban slaves to fight for them.

129 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.25; Plutarch, *Gaius Gracchus* 13.4
130 Plutarch, *Gaius Gracchus* 14.3
with the promise of manumission, both Appian and Plutarch agree that Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus assembled together on the Aventine Hill with a gang of armed supporters. From here they first tried to parley with the Senate and to this end Fulvius sent his youngest son Quintus, “who was not yet eighteen,” to approach the Senate as an envoy “seeking to come to an arrangement and to live in harmony.”\(^1\) Though Quintus Flaccus’ first attempt at a parley was rebuffed, Opimius had him arrested when he attempted to approach the Senate a second time. Opimius then launched an attack on the Gracchan and Fulvian supporters on the Aventine Hill, wounding many of Fulvius’ party and throwing them “into such confusion that they fled in terror.”\(^2\) While this was happening, however, Plutarch states that Gaius Gracchus had sequestered himself in the Temple of Diana and would have committed suicide right there and then had not two of his “most faithful friends,” Pomponius and Laetorius, convinced him to flee instead.\(^3\) Gaius Gracchus then crossed the Pons Sublicius, the wooden bridge on the Tiber, and committed suicide with the help of his Greek slave, Euporus, while his friend Pomponius, an *eques*, held back Gaius’ enemies on the bridge before ultimately falling on his sword as well.\(^4\) Fulvius Flaccus, however, was not as lucky. Though he and his eldest son sought refuge in a nearby house, they were captured by Opimius’ men and put to death.

Just as the body of Tiberius Gracchus had been thrown into the Tiber River by his attackers, so too were the corpses of Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus, but unlike Tiberius, both Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus’ heads were cut off and given to Opimius because the consul had promised to pay for them in gold, and by the pound. According to Appian, Opimius even let the houses of both Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus be looted by the people, though

\(^{1}\) Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.26; Velleius, 2.7.2; cf. Plutarch, *Gaius Gracchus* 16.1
\(^{2}\) Plutarch, *Gaius Gracchus* 16.4
\(^{3}\) Ibid.
\(^{4}\) Velleius, 2.6.6-7
Plutarch appears to be more accurate when he states that their houses were actually “sold” and the “proceeds” were “confiscated by the public treasury.” Of the two writers, only Plutarch states that Opimius prohibited the widows of both men to mourn their deaths, but both concur that the supporters of both men (as many as three thousand says Plutarch) were, on Opimius’ orders, incarcerated without trial and executed, including Fulvius Flaccus’s youngest son, Quintus, who had merely acted as a messenger. Furthermore, both authors agree that the Senate demonstrated satisfaction with Opimius’ actions in securing the safety of the state by allowing him to restore the Temple of Concord, while Plutarch writes that Gaius’ supporters went so far as to write the following bit of political graffiti on the Temple to voice their discontent: “This Temple of Concord is the work of mad Discord.”

The following year, however, once Opimius was no longer consul, the followers of Gaius Gracchus went even further than writing on walls, and attempted to have Opimius tried in public for having arrested and executed Roman citizens without a trial. Unlike Popillius Laenas, who had earlier decided to go into self-imposed exile rather than stay in Rome to stand trial for committing a similar offence, Opimius decided that he had nothing to hide from his accuser. Yet, try as he might to get the Centuriate Assembly to convict Opimius, the Tribune of the Plebs, Publius Decius, was unable to outsmart Opimius’ advocate who was none other than Gaius Papirius Carbo, Gaius Gracchus’s former ally and at the time one of the two consuls for the year 120 B.C.E. With Carbo arguing that Opimius had committed “a just act” in killing Gaius Gracchus through the use of a rhetorical question in which he asked the assembly “if a consul is someone who takes counsel for his country, was that not precisely what Opimius had done?”

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136 Ibid.
137 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.26; Plutarch, *Gaius Gracchus* 17.6
138 Stockton, 200.
Roman people had no problem acquitting Opimius. The following year, however, the famous orator, and later consul of 95 B.C.E., Lucius Licinius Crassus, prosecuted Carbo for some non-specific crime. According to Cicero, Licinius Crassus, who was only twenty-one years old at the time, did not even get a chance to convict Papirius Carbo, since the former consul of 120 B.C.E. decided to skip that portion of the trial entirely by killing himself with poison.\(^{139}\) Thus, in Cicero’s eyes, the murderer of Scipio Aemilianus met with a fitting end.

### 3.4 Summary

Though there are differences and similarities between the manner and the circumstances in which Tiberius Gracchus was killed in 133 B.C.E. and those in which his Early Republican predecessors were killed, the differences appear to be more glaring. For instance, when Tiberius Gracchus was killed, he was not first arrested and then given the luxury of a trial like Spurius Cassius, the three-time consul, or Marcus Manlius, who saved the citadel on the Capitoline Hill from the Gauls. Neither was he thrown from the Tarpeian Rock as both Manlius and Cassius were (according to Dionysius\(^{140}\)), much less stabbed to death in the Forum like Spurius Maelius was by Servilius Ahala. No state of emergency had been declared, and the Senate had not ceded control of the situation to a temporary dictator as it had done in the past. Instead, Tiberius Gracchus was clubbed to death, along with several of his followers, by a group of senators and their clients led by the Pontifex Maximus whose rallying call had been to “save the Republic.” Also, while Servilius Ahala deemed that it was only necessary to kill Spurius Maelius in order to “save the Republic,” the Pontifex Maximus Scipio Nasica and his coterie of senators lost control

\(^{139}\) Valerius Maximus 3.7.6 on p. 306, n.18 of the Loeb Classical Library’s *Memorable Doings and Sayings*, vol. 1
\(^{140}\) Dionysius of Halicarnassus 8.78.5; 14.4.6
of the situation and killed not only Tiberius Gracchus, but several of his supporters who may or may not have engaged the senators in an effort to defend the Tribune of the Plebs.

However, as varying as the circumstances of all these men’s deaths may be, they all share the underlying theme of tyrannicide. In other words, their deaths were generally portrayed as both just and necessary because they had been accused of being “would-be tyrants.” Yet another similarity that stands out is that these men were labeled as “tyrants” and accused of “aiming at the monarchy” because they perceived the rights of the plebeians to be as important, or more so than those of the elite. The secret of the Roman Republic’s growth and endurance from a small Italian city-state to a Mediterranean imperial power, according to the Greek historian Polybius (c. 200 – 118 B.C.E.), was that its political system was a hybrid of three forms of government, namely monarchy (the Consuls), oligarchy (the Senate), and democracy (the Assemblies).141 While each of these forms of governments had proven to be unstable in their purest forms, as was evidenced throughout the histories of the various Greek city-states, Polybius believed (as did Plato and Aristotle before him) that the secret to attaining political stability was to create a hybrid system in which the strengths of each of these three aforementioned forms of government would somehow keep their respective weaknesses in check. Though Polybius’ history of Rome, in which he outlined his theory of government, was meant to be read by Greeks as a treatise on how and why Rome became a Mediterranean super power, it was also read by Romans as well, especially conservatives like Cicero. For these conservatives, Polybius’ theory of government helped them explain why they found populists like the Gracchi so dangerous: namely because they were supposedly threatening to destabilize the state by giving too much power to the

democratic component of the republic. The only way to stop that from happening was to strengthen the oligarchic component, i.e. the Senate.

Yet, in taking matters into its own hands rather than delegating entirely to either a *privatus*, or a dictator with a *magister equitum*, the Senate ended in inadvertently sanctioning the use of gang violence to accomplish political ends. It would have been far better for the Senate if it had arrested Tiberius Gracchus, tried him, and then executed him so as to make the popular assemblies complicit in his death. Instead, it created a martyr. When the conservative general Scipio Aemilianus was asked by Gaius Papirius Carbo, one of the tribunes of the plebs, what he thought of Tiberius Gracchus’ death and he publicly approved of it, the plebeians were enraged. The followers of Tiberius Gracchus sought to have the Pontifex Maximus tried for his crime against a Tribune of the Plebs, but Scipio Nasica Serapio was sent on a diplomatic mission to Asia Minor by one of the Consuls of the year. However, unlike Servilius Ahala, who was not only allowed to come back to Rome after being tried and exiled for killing Spurius Maelius, but was even elected consul, Scipio Nasica never got to return to Rome. A year after he was sent to Asia Minor, he died, and, according to Plutarch, it was rumored that he had been killed by sympathizers of Tiberius Gracchus.

Since reasserting the prerogatives of the Senate against “would-be tyrants” had proved to be unpopular when members of the Senate had tried to do so by taking matters in to their own hands, the conservatives decided to bide their time with regards to Gaius Gracchus and wait for him to draw “first blood.” Furthermore, instead of attempting to derail Gaius through the use of a conservative Tribune that could veto his proposals as they had done with his brother, they opted for discrediting him in the eyes of the plebeians with a candidate for the tribunate that, at least in terms of campaign promises, seemed to be more of a “populist” than Gaius. Then, rather
than wait for Gaius to make any kind of gesture that could be construed as asking for a crown, the moment that was seized upon as the signal to physically neutralize Gaius was when one of either Gaius or Flaccus’ supporters killed a supporter of the consul Opimius. This gave the conservative members of the Senate an opportunity to legitimately declare a state of national emergency that called for summoning a dictator to wage war on Gaius Gracchus as an enemy of the state. Later ancient historians and biographers such as Velleius Paterculus and Plutarch would eventually applaud the Senate’s approach towards eliminating Gaius Gracchus as a threat to the state, in comparison to their approach towards eliminating his older brother Tiberius.

It is in this light that one should comprehend the preference among most ancient historians for the version of Spurius Maelius’ death at the hands of an Ahala who is a *magister equitum* instead of the version in which he is killed by an Ahala who is acting as a *privatus*. While the former is a type of political violence that can be interpreted as the legitimate use of a constitutional power that was created for the protection of the state as a whole, the latter type of political violence is not only informal, but has the potential of being misconstrued as the product of a partisan, or even personal, vendetta. That is why the only problem that these same historians had with regards to the use of political violence that was implemented against Gaius Gracchus was the Consul Opimius’ behavior. Both Velleius and Plutarch saw Opimius as having overstepped his bounds as dictator in asking for the head of Gaius Gracchus. It was probably this more than anything else that drove a wedge in the Senate and led to the creation of what Plutarch calls two factions, namely the *optimates* and the *populares*. Though these two groups did not really have “party platforms” much less coherent ideologies or party infrastructures that can be compared to those of any existing political party, it can be said with certainty that they differed in terms of what segment of the population they looked to for their political support.
While the *optimates* (from the Latin word *optimus*, meaning “best”) sought support from those members of the Roman elite who believed that the Assemblies were becoming too powerful and that the Senate should regain the supremacy it once had, the *populares* sought their support among the ever growing population of the plebeians in Rome and believed that political power should lie more with the Assemblies than with the Senate.
Chapter 4: *Populares*, Post-Gracchan Tyrannicide and Violence

4.1 Introduction

After the Tribune of the Plebs Gaius Sempronius Gracchus and the former consul Marcus Fulvius Flaccus died in 121 B.C.E., it would take another twenty-one years before another populist politician was killed in the streets of Rome as a “would-be tyrant.” The *optimates* had demonstrated that it would take more than mere political maneuvers and popular uprisings to thwart their intentions of reasserting the authority of the Senate over that of the Assemblies. Being a consul was clearly not enough to challenge the Senate; nor was it enough for a man to be simply a war hero, a man of wealth, or a Tribune of the Plebs with the active support of a former consul and armed partisan supporters. This was because the Senate had something far greater on its side, and that was power to invoke a dictator who could suspend the constitution and use the army to restore order. This senatorial power was called *senatus consultum ultimum*, or “the Senate’s final decree,” and from the years 121 to 44 B.C.E. the Senate invoked it at least four times. It was not only invoked against the Tribune of the Plebs Gaius Gracchus, but also against the Tribune of the Plebs Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, as well as Cicero’s rival for the consulship, Lucius Sergius Catiline, and even Gaius Julius Caesar. And in each instance, it seemed to be that the Senate was sending the very clear message that if one wanted to challenge its authority, one would have do so with an army of one’s own. It is with this in mind that the populists who decided to follow in the footsteps of the Gracchi began to ally themselves with not just any populist consul (or former consul), but rather with populist consuls who commanded the respect of soldiers that were more loyal to him than to the Senate in Rome.142

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142 Robin Seager, “Introduction” in *The Crisis of the Roman Republic* edited by Robin Seager (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969), x: Seager states that the tribune Saturninus, in “treading in the steps of the Gracchi,” was fully aware that he ran the risk of being murdered by the “defenders of the established order.” However, since he was also aware
The most influential of the populist consuls before the rise of Gaius Julius Caesar was Gaius Marius. Born in Arpino to an Equestrian family, Gaius Marius was six years younger than Tiberius Gracchus and two years older than Gaius Gracchus. Yet, while the Gracchi could lay claim to plebeian nobility on their father’s side and patrician nobility on their mother’s side, Marius’ family tree was conspicuously lacking in consuls. Furthermore, while it is true that the inhabitants of Arpinum had been considered Roman citizens ever since they were granted the suffrage in 188 B.C.E., Marius was still seen as an out-of-towner by the Roman elite. Nonetheless, while his lack of a political pedigree led Marius to make a name for himself as a soldier first and foremost, he was more than fully aware of the fact that if he would ever become consul he would have to rely on the patronage of those nobles who were the most politically active at the time. According to Plutarch, the plebeian noble that Marius turned to for help was a Caecilius Metellus, since Marius’ family had been a “hereditary client” of the Caecilii Metellii.143 Though Plutarch does not specifically state which member of the Caecilii Metellii aided Marius in his bid for the tribuneship in 119 B.C.E., according to T.F. Carney it was probably Quintus Caecilius Metellus Balearicus, who had been one of the consuls in 123 B.C.E. and had received his agnomen “Balearicus” after he conquered the Balearic Islands that same year.144 Furthermore, after war broke out between Rome and Numidia, it was Metellus Balearicus’ cousin, the consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus, who took Marius to Numidia as his personal legate in 108 B.C.E.

143 Plutarch, Marius 4.1; See Stemma VI, p.133, for the family tree of the Metelli.
144 Ibid; cf. Thomas F. Carney, A Biography of C. Marius (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum Ltd., 1961), 17 n. 89: Carney makes the case that Marius had more than likely already served as a military tribune, or “staff officer,” in the Balearic Islands under this member of the Caecilii-Metellii clan due to the fact that Marius, as a cliens, or client, of the Metelli had a “right to special consideration,” and Metellus was in need of “staff officers.”
As a commander in Numidia, Marius quickly earned the respect of his men by displaying both courage in the face of danger and an eagerness to endure hardships with his men. And so by the year’s end, Marius decided to capitalize on his popularity with the troops and Metellus’ slow progress in the war against Jugurtha by doing something neither of the Gracchi would have done. He went back to Rome and ran for consul himself, without Metellus’ approval. Though Marius succeeded in winning the consulship for the following year, he had to attack the aristocracy, especially Metellus Numidicus, in order to do so. And attack them he did, claiming that the Senate only gave “arms and honors to those qualified by their property” rather than ability.\(^{145}\) Therefore, when Marius became consul in 107 B.C.E., he eliminated the property qualifications for military service.

Whereas before, Roman soldiers had fought to defend the piece of Roman, or Italian land that they possessed with their own weapons, Marius’ reform led to droves of landless men joining the army in the hopes of being supplied with weapons by the state and then given a piece of Roman, or Italian land as payment for their service. However, since Marius could not provide these “capite censi” soldiers with the kind of private servant that plebeian soldiers usually had to carry their supplies, Marius had them tote their own gear, thus leading them to be called “Marius’ Mules.” In theory, Marius’ reform should have been able to finally solve Rome’s problem of an increasing population of “capite censi” caused by a decreasing population of “eligible” (i.e. property-holding) soldiers. In order for this to have worked out well, however, the Senate would have had to ensure that no soldier went unrewarded. However, the Senate was not always able to provide veterans with the land their generals had promised, and so these soldiers began to look to their generals for answers. Since marching on Rome had not yet been

\(^{145}\) Plutarch, *Marius* 9.3
conceived of as a viable possibility, these generals had to rely on political power to fulfill the promises they had made to their troops.

Ultimately, Marius’ reform of the military not only increased the size of Rome’s army, but also brought about a shift in loyalty on the part of the rank and file. Whereas before, Rome’s soldiers pledged allegiance to the Senate and the people of Rome (senatus populusque romanus, or SPQR as was printed on the pennants of the Roman legions), their allegiance would, in less than twenty years, shift in favor of imperatores, i.e. those consuls or proconsuls who had imperium, or “command,” over a given army and had been hailed by their troops (if not the Senate) as worthy of receiving a triumph in celebration of their victory over Rome’s enemies. It would be these imperatores that populist politicians, beginning with Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, would look to for support in challenging the Senate’s authority. In exchange, this new breed of populists would offer the imperatores the kind of political support that these military-minded men needed in order to maintain their authority in Rome within a constitutional framework.

However, though the members of the populares faction that will be discussed in this chapter were eventually accused of being “would-be tyrants” by the optimates, none of these populists ever attempted to pass a law that would make either them, or their new patrons (i.e. the imperatores) kings of Rome. What’s more, they never publicly voiced a desire to be made king by their armed supporters. While these populares differed from the Gracchi in that they had sought the patronage of imperatores to keep themselves from suffering the same fate as the Gracchi, they harbored the same two objectives: a) eliminate the monopoly that the most conservative of senators (i.e. the optimates, or boni, i.e. “the good”) had over the Senate as a whole; and b) break the stranglehold of the Senate over the Assemblies by gradually making it
subordinate it to the Assemblies. For instance, while it was the Centuriate Assembly that ultimately decided whether or not to go to war, it almost always took the Senate’s “advice” on the matter. The opposite was true in the city-state of Athens where it could be argued that the Assembly, or Ekklesia, had more power than the Council of Five Hundred, or Bouletherion, which was the Roman Senate’s counterpart. Nonetheless, while it is possible that the populares may have been in part inspired by the “democratic” model found in Athens, they never once attempted to make significant structural changes to Rome’s political edifice, such as allowing for Tribunes to preside over the Centuriate Assembly, or even eliminating the Centuriate Assembly altogether and assigning its responsibilities (e.g. voting for consuls and praetors and deciding on matters of war and peace) to the Tribal Assembly. Instead, they focused all their energy on changing the face of Roman politics by pushing for the establishment of colonies inside and outside Italy for those capite censi that fought in the armies of their imperator patrons, thus creating new property holding soldiers. In addition, they also sought to extend Roman citizenship (which entailed the right to vote) to all those Italians who until then only had iura Latina, or “Latin rights,” also known as civitas sine suffragio, or “citizenship without suffrage.” This entailed the right to move to Rome and form commercial and marital contracts with Roman citizens, but not, of course, the right to vote.146

Since the optimates believed that only native born Roman citizens, preferably those who belonged to a noble family, were fit to serve as Roman senators and magistrates, they

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146 T.J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars, c.1000-264 B.C. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 295; 349. On p.295, Cornell discusses “Latin rights” and explains that the right to move to Rome, or to any other Latin city, was called ius migrationis; the right to form commercial contracts was called ius commercium; and the right to marry was called ius connubium. He explains that these were rights that were held in common by all the Latin communities who were members of the Latin League that had formed in an effort to better meet the challenge of Rome’s military excursions into Latium. After the Latinii were subdued by the Romans, these “Latin rights” were redefined in terms of the Latinii’s relation to Rome, hence the second name of civitas sine suffragio, since it was entirely up to Rome which communities, or individuals were worthy of voting in its elections.
vehemently opposed the extension of Roman rights. What’s more they knew that this extension of rights would not only give the *populares* a greater electoral base when it came time to voting on the passage of their populist laws, but it would also create more competition for the native *nobiles* when it came time to running for public office. Wishing to avoid an all out civil war, the Senate would resort to issuing its so-called “final decree,” though this “constitutionally” sanctioned killing in the name of order would only achieve the Senate’s desired goal for a matter of ten years. Eventually, the Senate’s intransigence on the issue of civil rights would ultimately lead Rome’s Italian allies to declare war when yet another populist who championed the Italian cause was silenced, only this time by a private assassin. This war, known as the *Bellum Socii* (commonly translated as the “Social War,” though a better translation would be the “War of the Allies”) ultimately led to the conferring of Roman citizenship to the Italian allies. However, the nature of this Social War would, in turn, lead to an increase in patron-client relationships along military lines and set the stage for yet another civil war shortly after the completion of the “War of the Allies.” This civil war would be fought between *imperatores* that belonged to the *populares* faction and *imperatores* that belonged to the *optimates* faction. In it, one of the populist leaders, a consul by the name of Lucius Cornelius Cinna, would be killed as a “tyrant” by his own troops.

**4.2 Lucius Appuleius Saturninus and Glaucia (d. 100 B.C.E.)**

Unlike most consuls, Marius was first and foremost a military man and yet he was able to serve as a consul a record number of seven times. The reason being is because most of the time “luck,” in the guise of Bellona (the Roman goddess of war), was on his side, but when “luck” failed, there were “demagogues” on the sidelines ready to help. “In war,” says Plutarch, “his great reputation and supreme power came to him because he was needed; in civilian life, his
supremacy was restricted and so he resorted to attempts to win the goodwill of the mob."

The first five times he secured the consulship it was because the war in Numidia, and then a defensive war against the invading Cimbrians and Teutons (Germanic tribes from the north who had already defeated the armies of three consuls and one proconsul), allowed Marius to shine as a competent military commander in combat zones where “civilians” had previously shown themselves to be incompetent. Although Marius did require a little bit of support from the tribune Lucius Appuleius Saturninus when he ran for his fourth consulship in 103 B.C.E., it was not until the sixth time that Marius ran for consul in 101 B.C.E. that he needed to rely on the support of both Saturninus and Saturninus’ associate Gaius Servilius Glaucia. This, however, brought him into further conflict with the nobility and in particular with the noble whom he feared the most, the former consul of 109 B.C.E., Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, especially since in 101 B.C.E. Numidicus was also running for the consulship.

\[147\] Plutarch, Marius 28.3
\[148\] Cf. Livy, Periochae 63 (114 -11 BCE); 64 (112 -109 BCE); 65 (109 -107 B.C.E); 66 (106 -105 BCE); and 67 (105 -102 BCE): The first defeat was in 113 B.C.E. when the consul Gnaeus Papirius Carbo (the brother of Gaius Papirius Carbo, consul of 120 B.C.E.) was sent to Illyricum (currently Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and northern Albania) to stop the Cimbrians from plundering that province but then was routed with his entire army; the second defeat occurred in 109 B.C.E. when the consul Marcus Junius Silanus was sent to put an end to Cimbric incursions in the Roman province of Gallia Narbonensis (modern day southern France); the third defeat occurred in 105 B.C.E. when the armies of the consul Gnaeus Mallius Maximus and the proconsul Quintus Servilius Caepio were annihilated at the Battle of Arausio (near the present day town of Orange, in southeastern France).
\[149\] Plutarch, Marius 14.7-8. Marius pretended to be reluctant about running for the consulship, only to then have Saturninus call him a traitor for refusing to serve Rome in its hour of need. Although he claims that Saturninus’ acting was “unconvincing,” Plutarch states that this little ruse nonetheless helped convince the people of Rome to vote for Marius; cf. Carney, 35 n.175: Carney explains that threat of invasion on the part of the Cimbri and Teutons had receded near the end of 103 B.C.E. (only to resurface the following year) and as such Marius had to rely on Saturninus’ support, especially since Saturninus had amassed plenty of popular support through the passage of a law that granted grain doles to the Plebs at a fixed price.
\[150\] Plutarch, Marius 28.5. As to why Marius would need to rely on the support of “demagogues” at that particular moment, Plutarch suggests that it may have something to do with the Senate’s disapproval of Marius actions earlier that year, i.e. that Marius had granted Roman citizenship to about 1,000 men from the Italian town of Camerinum for their bravery in the Cimbrian War (Plutarch, Marius 28.2). However, when his action was decried in the Senate as having been illegal and Marius was “called to account for it,” Marius simply replied that “the din of warfare had drowned the voice of the law” (Plutarch, Marius 28.3).
According to Plutarch, Marius saw Saturninus and Glaucia as being useful to him because they both “had a rabble of needy and noisy fellows at their beck and call” with whose assistance they would be able to introduce favorable laws.\(^{151}\) Yet, this was not the only reason why Marius had sought out the political assistance of these particular men. Though it was already mentioned that Saturninus had first helped Marius win an election in 103 B.C.E., it has been argued that these two forged their political alliance the year that Marius came back triumphant from Numidia in 104 B.C.E.\(^{152}\) While Marius’ career was clearly on the rise, at that point in time Saturninus’ own entrance into the world of politics was not beginning so well. Unfortunately for Saturninus, he had by his early thirties acquired a reputation of being a man of “licentious pursuits,” and so, although he successfully managed to be elected to serve as quaestor for the year 104 B.C.E. in charge of “the transport of grain from [Rome’s port town of] Ostia to Rome,” his “idle and frivolous behavior” eventually led the Senate to believe that he was not the right man for the job.\(^{153}\) As such, the Senate stripped Saturninus of his post and transferred it to the *princeps senatus* (i.e., the “first senator” on the senatorial roll sheet) Marcus Aemilius Scaurus. Subsequently, Saturninus took it upon himself to mend his “former loose habits,” run for Tribune of the Plebs, and was duly elected by the people.\(^{154}\)

Whether Saturninus developed a grudge towards the Senate after having been stripped of his quaestorship, in much the same way that Tiberius Gracchus is said to have developed a grudge towards the Senate after it rejected his treaty with the Numantines, is possible, though not

\(^{151}\) Plutarch, *Marius* 28.5

\(^{152}\) Carney, 34.

\(^{153}\) Diodorus of Siculus 36.10.12.

\(^{154}\) Ibid, cf. Carney, 34 n.172 and 173: Carney explains that Saturninus could not have won the election to the tribunate as easily as Diodorus makes it seem, and that as such, he believes that Saturninus must have received support from Marius, who at this time had both the resources and the motives for “supplying this support.” This would explain why the following year, when Saturninus formally began his term as Tribune, Saturninus pushed through a law that bestowed land grants in Africa to Marius’ veterans. This settlement had previously been “implied in Marius’ campaigning speeches of 108” and was “necessary to the attraction of future volunteers.”
entirely certain. More certain is that both Lucius Appuleius Saturninus and Gaius Servilius Glaucia had their own reasons to harbor a grudge toward Marius’ inimicus (i.e., enemy) Metellus Numidicus. Near the end of Saturninus’ term as a Tribune of the Plebs in 103 B.C.E., Metellus Numidicus had decided to run for the office of censor for the following year along with his cousin Gaius Caecilius Metellus Caprarius (who was Metellus Balearicus’ younger brother). Once these two Caecilii Metelli secured their elections as censors for the year 102 B.C.E., Numidicus decided to fully exercise his censorial power to monitor the ethics of Rome’s political elite. In so doing, he fought hard to remove both Saturninus and Glaucia from the list of senators because of their “disgraceful mode of life.” Though Numidicus ultimately failed to demote these two, because his fellow censor prevented him from doing so, Glaucia and Saturninus had been trying to avenge their “honor” ever since. But first, Saturninus had to secure the office of Tribune of the Plebs once more. He did so with the help of Glaucia who was able to run successfully for the office of Tribune near the end of 102 B.C.E.

As Tribune of the Plebeians in 101 B.C.E., Glaucia presided over the tribunician elections for the following year, and so Saturninus decided to run for tribune at that exact moment. The only thing that stood in the way of his election, however, was an aristocrat by the name of Nonius who was also planning on running for the office of tribune, but Saturninus took care of this obstacle by having Nonius killed. With Saturninus as tribune in the year 100 B.C.E., Marius was once more able to find an extra-senatorial ally with mutual interests to help him get rid of Metellus Numidicus, and Saturninus was able to obtain the kind of consular

155 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.28; cf. Carney, 35 n.176: While it is not known for sure what Glaucia was accused of, Carney argues that it is possible that Saturninus was being censored for his “attacks” on the ambassadors of Mithridates VI, King of Pontus, as a privatus at some point in the year 102 B.C.E. However, it is uncertain if this “attack” on the ambassadors, which is only mentioned by Diodorus of Siculus, occurred in 102 B.C.E. or the following year.
156 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.28; Plutarch, Marius 29.1
support he needed to further his own plans. In the case of Metellus, the plan was to have him humiliate himself in the eyes of the people to such a degree that they would be in favor of having him exiled. Since it was well known that Metellus prided himself on being a man of principle, and, as such, always kept his word, Saturninus proposed an agrarian law in which he stipulated that all the members of the Senate had to publically take an oath pledging to support the people’s vote.\textsuperscript{157} Knowing full well that Metellus would never agree to take such an oath in public, Marius assured the Senate that he would not abide by the stipulations of Saturninus’ reform bill, and thus lured all the senators, in particular Metellus, into his confidence. When the day on which the oath was to be taken finally arrived, Marius astounded the Senate by unabashedly complying with Saturninus’ request. As speechless as they were at first, every single one of the senators were soon enough shamed into falling in line with Marius’ example. Everyone but Metellus that is; true to his word, he refused to take Saturninus’ oath and as such provided the tribune with the kind of ammunition he needed. Saturninus immediately declared that it be put to vote whether Metellus should be denied fire and water, in other words exiled. Though this turn of events did not please Metellus in the least, he saw that the people were clearly incensed by his refusal to take an oath on their behalf, and so, not wishing to be the cause of a popular uprising, Metellus chose to go into voluntary exile.\textsuperscript{158} Marius and Saturninus had gotten exactly what they wanted.

Once Metellus Numidicus was out of the way, the sources all agree that Saturninus begin to act according to the dictates of his own desires, regardless of Marius’ prior approval, but Appian gives the specifics. Later in the year 100 B.C.E, Glaucia decided to run for consul. Although Marcus Antonius (the grandfather of Julius Caesar’s associate) had been elected to one

\textsuperscript{157} Plutarch, \textit{Marius} 29.1-4
\textsuperscript{158} Plutarch, \textit{Marius} 29.7
of the two posts “without dispute,” Appian states that Glaucia and Gaius Memmius (who had been a tribune in 111 B.C.E. and a praetor in 102 B.C.E.) were “rivals for the other.” Since Memmius had the better record, Glaucia feared that he would not be able to win. And so, a band of Glaucia and Saturninus’ supporters are said to have clubbed Memmius to death in full view of the people. When Tiberius Gracchus was killed he was also in the process of running for public office, and so these men must have thought that they were entirely justified.

Though Marius stood off to the side at first, he soon realized that he had to restore control of the situation. According to Appian, both Glaucia and Saturninus had already taken refuge on the Capitol with their partisans before Marius brought his troops, since the urban plebs were not at all pleased by the killing of Memmius. Plutarch, on the other hand, states that Glaucia and Saturninus were cornered into the Capitol by Marius and his troops. In the end, both Appian and Plutarch agree that Glaucia and Saturninus only surrendered for two reasons: Marius had cut off the water supply to the Capitol; and both Glaucia and Saturninus still believed they could trust in Marius to protect them. However, while Appian and Plutarch also agree that Marius tried to spare these men from the wrath of the people, they each give their own version as to how Saturninus and Glaucia met their end. Whereas in Plutarch’s narrative, both Saturninus and Glaucia were slaughtered as they came out of the Capitol, Appian states that Marius had them hidden in the Senate House for protection until they could be tried for their crime. It was

159 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.32  
160 Livy, Periochae 69 (100 BCE)  
161 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.32  
162 Plutarch, Marius 30.3  
163 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.32; Plutarch Marius 30.3  
164 The Senate House was originally called the Curia Hostilia, and was said to have been built during the reign of Rome’s king Tullius Hostilius. This building burned down in 52 B.C.E., and subsequently Julius Caesar commissioned its reconstruction in 44 B.C.E. However, this new Senate House, which came to be known as the Curia Julia, was not completed until 29 B.C.E.  
165 Plutarch, Marius 30.4; Appian, The Civil Wars 1.32
here that some men then broke in through the roof of the Senate house and killed Saturninus and Glaucia with roof tiles. Either way, “order” was restored. Yet, now that his populist ally was out of the picture Marius found it difficult to prevent the Senate from ultimately recalling Metellus Numidicus. While a majority of the tribunes of the plebs had lobbied hard to have Numidicus recalled from exile in 99 B.C.E., they were initially unable to do so because of a veto on the part of the tribune Publius Furius. Then a year later, the Senate finally recalled Numidicus, thanks in large part to the entreaties of Numidicus’ son. Though Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus decided to retire from politics entirely upon his return to Rome, his son Quintus Caecilius Metellus was more than eager to take up his mantle, and was granted the agnomen Pius for his public display of filial devotion. There was nothing that Marius could do now but to likewise abstain from politics. He then left Rome, and Italy altogether, for Asia Minor.

Although Marius let it be known that he intended on keeping a religious promise (involving sacrifices for the Mother of all Gods in Cappadocia and Galatia), Marius was more than aware that Rome’s foreign interests in that corner of the Mediterranean would sooner or later spark a conflict with a certain Eastern monarch that had expansionist plans of his own. Consequently, when Marius finally did return to Italy it was precisely because a war had broken out between Rome and Mithridates VI, the famed poison king of Pontus. Since Marius had “grown great through war” and believed that his “power and his reputation were gradually fading away while he remained unemployed and inactive,” he hoped to be given the command against Mithridates so that he would be able to “delight Rome with the spectacle of more triumphs” and be famous once again. Yet Marius did not find it so easy to reintegrate himself into Roman

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166 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.33
167 Ibid.
168 Plutarch, Marius 31.1-2
169 Ibid.
society because he lacked, according to Plutarch, the ability to make himself “socially pleasant and politically useful.” And then there was the fact that at the time most of Rome’s nobility was busy eating out of the hand of Marius’ one time protégé and current rival, Lucius Cornelius Sulla. Plutarch says that this was mostly because the nobility was jealous of Marius, but it is also important to note that Sulla, unlike Marius, was very much in tune with the politics of the nobility, and according to his supporters it was he and not Marius who was responsible for successfully ending the Numidian War against Jugurtha. This last point, however, more than anything else, made Marius both jealous of Sulla and angry with him for “stealing the glory of his achievements.” Still, the civil war that would eventually break out between their two factions was postponed by the onset of the so-called Social War.\textsuperscript{170}

The Social War derived its named from the Latin word \textit{socii}, which means “allies,” and as such refers to the war that was fought between Rome and her Italian “allies” from 91 to 89 B.C.E. Previous wars between Rome and the other Italian tribes had been fought to determine which tribe would dominate the entire peninsula, and on the surface it seemed as if this war would be no different from those of the past. However, while some Italian tribes did in fact want to supplant the Romans as masters of all Italy, others simply wanted to be recognized as fellow citizens rather than loyal subjects. When he was consul in 125 B.C.E., Fulvius Flaccus (Gaius Gracchus’ political ally) had proposed that all of Rome’s allies be granted Roman citizenship, so that “out of gratitude” they would no longer quarrel over the public land that was yet to be distributed.\textsuperscript{171} Though the Italians were indeed grateful for this offer, the Senate had resented the idea of “giving their subjects political rights equal to their own, and so this attempt was

\textsuperscript{170} Plutarch, \textit{Marius} 32.2-3  
\textsuperscript{171} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.21
This refusal on the part of the Senate to recognize the Italians as their equals made the Italians turn towards Gaius Gracchus. This was also why Fulvius Flaccus allied himself with Gaius Gracchus and became a Tribune of the Plebs, making Flaccus the only ex-consul in Roman history to hold the office of tribune. When both were killed in 121 B.C.E., the Italians were distraught and infuriated by the fact that they were left without politicians to champion their cause. But then, in 91 B.C.E. there appeared yet another tribune who was willing to push for Italian citizenship. His name was Marcus Livius Drusus, and he was the son of Gaius Gracchus’ former rival. According to Diodorus of Sicily, Marcus Livius Drusus was both “the wealthiest man in the city,” and the “most competent orator of his generation,” and so at first, it was believed that he would become the “champion of the Senate.” However, when news spread that Drusus had been killed in his own home by an unknown assassin, the Italians were enraged. As the Roman historian Velleius Paterculus said in his Compendium of Roman History, “the long smoldering fires of an Italian war were now fanned into flame by the death of Drusus.”

Though the fighting eventually ceased in 89 B.C.E., part of the reason why the war did not last very long is because by 90 B.C.E. the consul Lucius Julius Caesar (the cousin of Sextus Julius Caesar, the consul of 91 B.C.E., and the future dictator’s uncle) decided to push for a law that offered Roman citizenship to any of their former “allies” who would opt to surrender and side with Rome against the other Italians. By the end of the war, the only Italians that remained without Roman citizenship were the Samnites and the Lucanians. Even then, those Italians who had been given citizenship, per the Lex Julia of 90 B.C.E., were not incorporated.

\[172\] Ibid.
\[173\] Diodorus Siculus, 37.10.1
\[174\] Velleius 2.15.1
\[175\] See Stemma IX, p. 136, for Julius Caesar’s family tree.
into one of Rome’s thirty-five “tribes” (i.e. rural and urban districts represented as voting units in the *Comitia Tributa*, or Tribal Assembly),\textsuperscript{176} but rather into ten new “tribes.” While they were initially content even to be considered as participants in Rome’s electoral process, it later dawned on them that they had been given the short end of the stick. Before these ten new “tribes” would be called on to vote, the majority of votes needed to pass any measure in the *Comitia Tributa* would have already been supplied by a majority of the original thirty-five “tribes.” Therefore, there would hardly ever be any need even to consider the other ten “tribes.” But as Appian states, this technicality would go on to become the “cause of another round of civil strife.”\textsuperscript{177}

### 4.3 Publius Sulpicius Rufus (d. 88 B.C.E.)

After the “Social War” ended, the debate over Mithridates was resumed. Consular elections were held, and Lucius Cornelius Sulla was elected along with Quintus Pompeius Rufus,\textsuperscript{178} the grandson of the aforementioned consul of the year 141 B.C.E who had proposed a peace treaty with the Numantines, but had been rebuffed by the Senate. Prior to his election as consul, Quintus Pompeius Rufus had earned the respect and admiration of the *optimates* by being one of the tribunes who fought hard to recall Metellus Numidicus in 99 B.C.E. As for Lucius Cornelius Sulla, prior to his election he had made a name for himself by securing the capture of Rome’s enemy, Jugurtha, in 105 B.C.E, thus effectively ending the seven year long conflict with Numidia. Nonetheless, since Sulla had only been a quaestor at the time, it was his commanding officer, Gaius Marius, as consul, who was granted a *triumphus*, or “triumph.” In this traditional

\textsuperscript{176} As of 241 B.C.E., Rome was comprised of four urban “tribes” and thirty-one rural “tribes,” and since the Romans used a system of block voting each of these “tribes” had one vote. Cf. Lilly Ross Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966), 65.

\textsuperscript{177} Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.49

\textsuperscript{178} See Illustration 6, p. 140, which is of a coin commemorating Sulla’s consulship in 88 B.C.E. with portraits of both Sulla and Quintus Pompeius Rufus.
victory parade that marched through Rome with the Senators in front, followed by the spoils of war and then the *imperatur* riding in a four horse chariot, leading his unarmed army, it was Marius, as *imperator*, who was able to parade Jugurtha as his captive. Sulla would go on to serve once more under Marius’s command from 104 to 103 B.C.E., during the Cimbric War. Still, the question over who deserved most of the credit for Rome’s victory in the Numidian War would continue to be a source of contention between these two headstrong men.179

During the Social War, both Marius and Sulla were given the opportunity to command armies under one of the two consuls. Marius fought rebellious Italians in the North with the Consul Publius Rutilius Lupus, and Sulla fought Italians in the South with the Consul Sextus Julius Caesar.180 If both men proved themselves as capable military commanders, it was Sulla who was able to make the most of this bloody conflict (which cost the Romans and Italians an estimated 300,000 lives) since Sulla was able to find a formidable client base in the soldiers under his command.181 Furthermore, by the time he attained his first consulship, Sulla was only fifty and in prime physical condition, while Marius was by then sixty-nine and out of shape. Marius should have retired to his country estate, but he did not want to because he desired the

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179 Plutarch, *Marius* 32.2: Plutarch states that in 91 B.C.E., just before the outbreak of the Social War, Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, was made an ally of Rome and that he in turn expressed his gratitude by dedicating on the Capitol some statues of the goddess Victory carrying trophies. However, alongside these statues of Victory were also “gilded figures representing Jugurtha being surrendered by [Bocchus] to Sulla,” and this made Marius furious at the idea that Sulla was “stealing the glory of his achievements.”

180 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.40; cf. Ernst Badian, “Caepio and Norbanus” in *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, edited by Ernst Badian (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), 55: Badian states that if one analyzes the lists of *legati* under each consul during the Social War (as given by Appian) one can observe how the consul Lucius Julius Caesar and his staff represented the *optimates*, while those serving under the consul Publius Rutilius Lupus represent their political opponents “whom we may call Mariiani,” or Marius’ faction.

181 Carney, 55 n.252 and 253. Carney explains that up until 100 B.C.E., and Saturninus’ untimely death, Marius had been able to stay on top in the world of Roman politics through his ability to perceive the prevailing mood of the times and make the necessary adjustments to achieve his ends. By the time of the Social War, however, it was Sulla who was first able to appreciate how this bloody peninsular conflict, in its devastation, increased “ethnic and political hatred” between Italians and Romans, and filled Rome’s armies with “foreigners, freedmen and slaves.” And whereas Marius, as a general, was a “strict disciplinarian” who was “not renowned for generosity over allotments,” Sulla was not only lax with regards to discipline, but was also “lavish beyond precedent” when it came to rewarding his troops.
wealth and the glory that came with a successful military command, as well as the fame that came with breaking the record in number of consulships. With Sulla as consul, however, chances were that the Mithridatic command would surely go to him. And so Marius had to once more rely on the support of a “demagogue.” His name was Publius Sulpicius Rufus, and according to Appian, Marius convinced him to pass a law that would re-distribute the “newly enfranchised Italian citizens” among Rome’s original thirty-five tribes. That way, Marius would surely be able to acquire the popular support he needed to secure the Mithridatic command. However, since these “newly enfranchised Italians citizens” out-numbered the old Roman citizens, violence soon broke out in the streets between crowds of Italians and crowds of Romans carrying clubs and stones. The Senate then took the opportunity to postpone the vote on Sulpicius’ civil rights bill, by proclaiming a justitium, or “suspension of public business.” This did not please Sulpicius in the least bit, and so he took it upon himself to ensure that the law he was proposing would be voted on as scheduled. This time, however, Sulpicius relied on the equites for help. He was able to look to the equites for assistance because they had as much reason to be angry with the Senate as the Italians did. Yet, their grievance was due to their diminished participation in the juries, thanks in large part to one of Marcus Livius Drusus’ laws which had equites share the juries with the senators.

182 Plutarch, *Marius* 28.6: Plutarch mentions that the only other person in Rome’s history to have attained six consulships before Marius was Marcus Valerius Maximus Corvus. However, unlike Marius, Corvus had not held the majority of his consulships in a consecutive fashion, i.e. Corvus was consul in the years 348, 346, 343, 335, 300, and 299 B.C.E. Upon attaining his seventh consulship, Marius would thus outdo Corvus and in the years after Marius’ death no other Roman in the history of the Republic would surpass him in number of consulships. Thus, one can imagine the level of competitiveness that Roman Republican politics engendered.


184 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.35
Both Appian and Plutarch mention that Sulpicius had a gang of armed *equites* as his supporters.\(^{185}\) Plutarch adds that Sulpicius called these his “Anti-Senate.”\(^{186}\) In his *Life of Marius* he states that this “Anti-Senate” was comprised of only six hundred young *equites*, while in his *Life of Sulla* Plutarch claims that the “Anti-Senate” consisted of as many as three thousand young *equites*. Nonetheless, regardless of these numerical inconsistencies, in both accounts these *equites* serve the same purpose. They were there to bully the Senate into passing any legislation that Sulpicius proposed. Although this may seem like an act of sheer lunacy to modern audiences, there was a method to Sulpicius’ “madness.” In 133 B.C.E. members of the Senate and their clients killed the tribune Tiberius Gracchus in the Forum because they did not agree with his politics. Yet, they were not held accountable for their actions. Furthermore, leading men such as the famed war hero Scipio Aemilianus had condoned the killing of Tiberius. Far from scaring the populists into submission, such acts only made them all the angrier and all the more willing to imitate their so-called “belters.” The Pontifex Maximus Scipio Nasica was able to interrupt a meeting of the Plebeian Council to commit acts of violence, and so Sulpicius was going to do the same, but with the Senate. Thanks to this precedent, a little more than a generation later, the tribune, Publius Clodius Pulcher, would follow in the footsteps of Sulpicius and help a man whom Sulla considered a second Marius, namely Gaius Julius Caesar.

Sulpicius and his “Anti-Senate” may have helped Marius to obtain the much-coveted Mithridatic command, but they were unable to do so without humiliating another public official who prided himself on his accomplishments just as much as Marius did – the consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla. Unlike Metellus Numidicus, however, Sulla was not planning on self-imposed exile. After Sulpicius’ attack on the Senate, Sulla decided to regroup with his army, which was


\(^{186}\) Ibid.
still in the act of besieging the rebel Italian town of Nola. Just as he was telling his troops how Marius and Sulpicius had seized control of the Senate and were trying to take the Mithridatic command away from him, two tribunes approached Sulla’s camp. They announced that it was the will of the people of Rome (thanks to the passage of a bill proposed by Sulpicius) that Sulla should immediately relinquish the Mithridatic command in favor of Marius. Sulla’s army, however, did not take this news lightly, and his troops, unwilling to part with their commander, killed the two tribunes. At this point Sulla decided to do the unthinkable. Realizing that he would no longer be able to go to Asia Minor, and that going to Rome unarmed meant being held accountable for his troops’ crime, Sulla opted to march on Rome and take it by force.

In this way, says Appian, the “episodes of civil strife escalated from rivalry and contentiousness to murder, and then from murder to full-scale war.” Sulla’s army, Appian continues, was “the first army composed of Roman citizens to attack its country as though it were a hostile power.” Although historians of the Late Republic had attempted to find a precedent for the violence of the civil discords in their own time, there were no past events in Rome’s history that could be compared to Sulla’s marching on Rome with a Roman army. Still there were some acts that were replicated. Just as Sulla had been chased out of Rome by Marius and his tribune, so now Sulla chased both Marius and Sulpicius out of Rome. And just as Opimius had done with the Gracchi, Sulla decided to put a price on both Marius and Sulpicius’ heads, along with Marius’ son and nine other men, all of whom he declared to be exiled as

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187 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.60
188 Ibid.
189 According to Roman tradition, the only event in Early Republican times that could be compared with Sulla’s act of marching on Rome was that of the disgruntled ex-consul Gaius Marcius Coriolanus, who after being exiled attempted to invade Rome at the head of a Volscian (i.e. foreign) army in c.490 B.C.E. only to eventually relent at his mother’s entreaties. Cf. Livy 2.35.6-40.10; Dionysius of Halicarnassus 7.21 -8.62; Plutarch, *Coriolanus* 30-36.
enemies of the state for being seditious.\textsuperscript{190} Though Marius managed to escape to Africa with his son by Julia,\textsuperscript{191} Gaius Marius the Younger, the erstwhile Tribune of the Plebs, Publius Sulpicius Rufus, was not as lucky. According to Plutarch, he was betrayed by one of his own servants. Sulla was then said to have rewarded this servant for his service to Rome first by granting him his freedom, and then having him thrown from the Tarpeian Rock as a lesson to any other slaves who might be thinking of betraying their masters.\textsuperscript{192} Velleius Paterculus, on the other hand, says nothing about any servants betraying Sulpicius, but rather that he was “overtaken by horsemen and slain in the Laurentine marshes.”\textsuperscript{193} Sulpicius was then decapitated and his head was said to have been “raised aloft and exhibited on the front of the rostra.”\textsuperscript{194} If Velleius is right, then this would be the first time that the head of an enemy of the state was displayed in this manner, but as he himself adds, it would not be the last. While Sulla would not go on to re-use this same terror tactic until five years later, before then Marius and Cinna would emulate him, and eventually so would Mark Antony the year after Gaius Julius Caesar’s assassination.

4.4 Lucius Cornelius Cinna (d. 84 B.C.E.)

After Sulla had driven Marius out of Rome in 88 B.C.E., he moved to take back his place as consul along with Quintus Pompeius Rufus. The two men then tried to restore the authority of the Senate and make the necessary preparations to ensure that Rome would be safe while Sulla was fighting Mithridates in the east. For this purpose, the Senate decided to give Pompeius

\textsuperscript{190} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.60; cf. Velleius 2.19.1. Though both Velleius and Appian state that twelve men were declared enemies of the state by Sulla, only Appian gives the name of all but three of those men. Apart from the three already named above, the other six men that Appian lists are Publius Cethegus (who would later defect to Sulla’s side); Marcus Junius Brutus (a praetor in 88 B.C.E., who was not the father of the Brutus who would assassinate Julius Caesar, but was possibly a cousin of his); Gnaeus and Quintus Granius; Publius Abinovanus (who also would later defect to Sulla’s side); and Marcus Laetorius.

\textsuperscript{191} This Julia was Gaius Julius Caesar’s aunt. See Stemmas VIII and IX, p. 135 and p.136 respectively, for the Marian and Julian family trees.

\textsuperscript{192} Plutarch, \textit{Sulla} 10.1.

\textsuperscript{193} Velleius 2.19.1

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
Rufus charge of the Italian armies which had formerly been under the command of his cousin Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, as consul of the previous year during the Social War. However, neither Pompeius Rufus, nor the Senate knew that during the course of the Social War, Pompeius Strabo (the father of Julius Caesar’s future rival, Pompey the Great) had developed a very strong patron-client relationship with his soldiers, just as Sulla had with his. In fact, when Strabo moved back to his home region of Picenum (the modern day regions of Marche and Abruzzo), at the end of his term in office as consul in 89 B.C.E., he brought all of his veterans with him and had hoped to be eligible for a second consulship the following year. The consulship instead went to Sulla and Pompeius Rufus, but Strabo decided to maintain his soldiers with him. When Pompeius Rufus crossed the Apennines to relieve his kinsman of his command, Strabo is said to have “welcomed the consul into his camp” despite the fact that he was “annoyed” with losing his command to Rufus. Since Strabo was no longer “officially” in charge of his army anymore, Appian states that he left Rufus, and that it was while Strabo was away “transacting some business,” that Quintus Pompeius Rufus was “killed by a mob of soldiers who surrounded him on the pretence of listening to him.”195 Though Appian adds that Strabo was “furious” with his soldiers for having committed this illegal act, and Velleius Paterculus states explicitly that Pompeius Rufus was killed in a “mutiny” which Strabo himself had instigated, both Appian and Velleius agree that Strabo nonetheless deemed it unnecessary to punish those soldiers who had killed Pompeius Rufus.196

Even Sulla did nothing to see that his colleague’s murderers were punished. He may have thought that if he tried to punish Strabo, then charges would eventually be brought against

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195 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.63
196 Ibid; cf. Velleius 2.20.1. While Appian is ambiguous as to Strabo’s level of involvement in Pompeius Rufus’ death, and relates that Strabo expressed indignation “over the illegal killing of a consul,” Velleius unequivocally states that Quintus Pompeius was killed in a mutiny which he himself instigated.
him as well due to the fact that his troops had already killed two Tribunes. As such, Sulla turned his attention towards another pressing matter, namely supervising the election of the consuls for the following year, so he could leave Italy to wage war on Mithridates. While Sulla nominated Gnaeus Octavius, the people are said to have selected Lucius Cornelius Cinna. Other than Livy and Cicero, the source writers do not say much about Lucius Cornelius Cinna’s career prior to his election to the consulship of 87 B.C.E. According to Livy, Cinna and Metellus Pius fought together as “lieutenants” during the Social War, and Cicero stated that at that time Cinna held the “praetorian rank.” Nonetheless, both Plutarch and Cassius Dio make it clear that Sulla was more than aware of his relative’s populist sympathies. After both Cinna and Octavius were formally elected as consuls for the following year, Plutarch stated that Sulla made Cinna publicly swear that he would abide by Sulla’s commands. This Cinna did, and then threw a rock stating that he might be thrown out of Rome, like that rock from his hand, if he went back on his word to Sulla. Though the remaining fragments from this particular part in Cassius Dio’s history of Rome do not relate the story of the stone throwing, they do tell us that while Sulla thought Cinna to be a “base fellow,” he did not want to “make an enemy of him, because the man already had some influence of his own.” More importantly, Dio states that Cinna had “repeatedly said and declared on oath, to assist [Sulla] in every way whatsoever.” As for the identity of the “special interest groups” with whom Cinna “already had some influence of his own,” the historian Michael Lovano states that it was both those “relatives and friends who were fighting for a recall of political exiles, especially Marius and the allies of Sulpicius.” In addition, Cinna

197 Livy, Periochae 76 (89 BCE); Cicero, Pro Fonteio 19.43: In addition to listing Cinna as one of the men who held the praetorian rank at that time (i.e. during the Social War), Cicero went on to state that these were men who (in contrast to many of the senators of Cicero’s own generation) “gained their military knowledge not from text-books but from their operations and their victories.”
198 Plutarch, Sulla 10.4
199 Dio 31.102.2-3
also relied on the support of those “Italian leaders who wanted to see their new votes distributed among the thirty-five tribes, as Sulpicius had promised them.”

Whether Cinna genuinely wanted to help the Italians, or simply wanted to increase his electoral base, is debatable. Either way, he was clearly presenting his credentials as an unabashed member of the *populares* faction, and consequently a potential ally of Gaius Marius, by promising to promote the cause of Italian suffrage. This did not please the *optimates*. On principle, these staunch conservative members of the Senate did not want Italians to have any influence at all in the assemblies. They wanted to maintain what they saw as an inherent social hierarchy where most Italians served as clients for their Roman patrons, just as most non-Italian foreigners served as both rural and urban slaves for their Roman and Italian masters. As was stated before, though the Roman Republic may have appeared to be a mixed political system to Polybius, both the *populares* and the *optimates* saw it as functioning more as an ethno-centric oligarchy. Since the *optimates* feared that the growing “power and numbers” of the Italians might weaken the “prestige of the older citizens,” they aimed to keep this oligarchy of the Romans, for the Romans, and by the Romans, functioning as such, by keeping “the beneficiaries” from having “greater power than the benefactors.” Though these same *optimates* were generally speaking just as contemptuous of poor Romans as they were of non-Romans, they knew that they would need to broaden their electoral base in order to defeat Cinna’s populist proposal. And as was the case with Spurius Cassius in 486 B.C.E., the only thing that both the Roman populace and the Roman elite had come to hate as much as the idea of a re-constituted monarchy was the notion that foreigners should be treated as their equals.

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201 Velleius, 2.20.2
Spurius Cassius had been made to look especially tyrannical by the elites when he wanted to distribute land that otherwise would have gone to Romans alone to a non-Roman Italian people known as the Hernici. Likewise, Cinna was trying to give Roman rights to non-Roman Italians, and like Spurius Cassius, he was abandoned by the Roman people for trying to do so.

That Cinna had “brought together into the city a great multitude from all parts of Italy” on the day that his law was going to be voted on signifies that the consul knew he was going to have to rely on more than just a handful of his own supporters to pass any kind of civil rights reform legislation.\textsuperscript{202} All the sources agree that the electoral process that day disintegrated into a series of violent altercations between the \textit{optimates} and Cinna’s followers, ultimately resulting in Cinna being thrown out of Rome by the consul Gnaeus Octavius. Only Appian provides some degree of detail as to how the voting turned to violence. According to Appian’s account of the event, both Cinna’s Italian followers (who “shouted their demand to be distributed among all the tribes”) and those who were “inclined to Octavius,” went to the Forum that day “armed with concealed daggers.”\textsuperscript{203} Though it is not certain where Cinna was while the voting was taking place (it is possible that one of the tribunes present was acting on his behalf), Octavius is said to have been at home “awaiting the outcome” when he was informed that a “majority”\textsuperscript{204} of the tribunes had “vetoed the proceedings” and that the “new citizens” had “rioted.” Furthermore, these disfranchised Italian citizens were said to have gone so far as to “unsheathe their knives in public,” climb the speaker’s platform, and “threaten the obstructive tribunes.”\textsuperscript{205} After hearing

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{203} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.64  \\
\textsuperscript{204} Appian’s use of the term “majority” can be considered deceptive for two reasons: first, all that was needed to veto a law proposed by any of the ten tribunes was for one dissenting tribune to veto his colleague’s proposal; second, according to Livy, as per \textit{Periochae} 79 (87BCE), Cinna was eventually chased out of Rome with six tribunes of the plebs, which means that only four of the tribunes were against Cinna’s plan to fully enfranchise the Italians.  \\
\textsuperscript{205} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.64
\end{footnotesize}
this news, Gnaeus Octavius set out for the Forum with an armed group of his supporters. Upon reaching the scene of the disturbance, he made his way through the crowd to protect the “obstructive” tribunes from being assaulted. By this time Cinna himself must have been present, since Appian states that Octavius then drove Cinna and his followers out of the Forum while Octavius’ own followers not only attacked the “new citizens,” but even “killed a large number.” On his way out of the city, Cinna tried to rally slaves to his cause by promising them freedom in return, much like Gaius Gracchus and even Marius are said to have done, but to no avail. Due to this attempt on Cinna’s part to call on slaves to fight with him against his co-consul, the Senate decided to deny Cinna his consular status. In his place, the Senate nominated Lucius Cornelius Merula (who at the time was flamen dialis, or priest of Jupiter) as consul suffectus, or “substitute consul.” Cinna’s only hope now was to rally the support of those soldiers with whom he had been fighting during the Social War. This task was made all the easier for him to accomplish thanks to the support of members of the populares faction who had also fought in the Social War with Cinna, especially Gaius Marius.

According to Diodorus Siculus, both Cinna and Marius had held a meeting with the “most eminent leaders” of their faction before entering Rome in order to consider “how to establish peace on a firm basis.” With this end in mind, they concluded that they had to “put to death the most prominent of their opponents” who were “capable of challenging their power.” Those who were known to have been executed because they were marked for death (by either Cinna, Marius, or any of the other members of the junta that they now found themselves in charge of), were: the consul Gnaeus Octavius; the flamen dialis, and former consul suffectus, Lucius Cornelius Merula; Quintus Lutatius Catulus (the former consul of 102 B.C.E. who as

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206 Ibid.
207 Diodorus, Fragmenta 38/39.2.4
Marius’ fellow consul fought with him in the Cimbrian War; Marcus Antonius, the famed orator and former consul of 99 B.C.E.; both Lucius Julius Caesar, the former consul of 90 B.C.E., and his brother Gaius Julius Caesar Strabo; Publius Licinius Crassus (the former consul of 97 B.C.E. and censor of 89 B.C.E.) and his elder son; the Tribune of the Plebs for the year 87 B.C.E., Sextus Lucinius; Gaius Atilius Serranus, former consul of 106 B.C.E.; Publius Lentulus; Gaius Nemetorius; Marcus Baebius; and Quintus Ancharius.208

Because Cinna had the need to “establish his claim to constitutional propriety,” he had to brand both Octavius and Merula as “guilty of high treason” and subsequently have the two of them killed.209 Yet, while Octavius was killed without a trial,210 Cinna did attempt to have Merula tried before a jury, but ultimately failed to do so since Merula took the opportunity to commit suicide by “opening his veins” at the altar of Jupiter before he could have his day in court.211 Quintus Lutatius Catulus, Marius’ former colleague as consul of 102 B.C.E., also decided to evade the scandal of an impending public trial by committing suicide. The other men in the aforementioned list, however, were not so lucky. Marius and Cinna even had Sulla’s

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208 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.71-74; Plutarch, Marius 43.3-45.1; Diodorus Siculus, Fragmenta 38/39.4.1-3; Velleius, 2.22.1-4; Florus 2.9.21.13-16; Livy, Periochae 80 (87 BCE); Valerius Maximus 1.6.10; 5.3.3; 8.9.2; 9.12.4; 9.12.5.
209 Carney, 66; cf. Ernst Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,” in Studies in Greek and Roman History, 222: Badian makes the same argument and states that since the consul Octavius had “used force against [Cinna] as a consul of the Roman people,” this enabled Cinna, as consul, to reciprocate.
210 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.71. According to Appian, the consul Octavius was killed by the prefect Censorinus. He then cut off the consul’s head and sent it to Cinna who in turn is said to have had it displayed in the Forum (thus doing with Octavius’ head what Sulla had done with Sulpicius). However, in Octavius’ case this would be the first time that the head of a consul would be displayed in this manner. Cf. Velleius, 2.22.1. Velleius is the only other source that records Censorinus as killing the consul Octavius, and states that he was acting under Cinna’s orders. cf. Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,”222: Badian argues that Cinna could have used “legal methods” to deal with both Octavius and Merula and therefore had “no need for murder.” Consequently, Badian does not believe that Cinna ordered Censorinus to kill the consul Octavius, but that Octavius was instead “killed in the fury of the first occupation, perhaps by a personal enemy.” However, Badian is unclear as to whether this means that Octavius was killed by an unidentified personal enemy and that his murder was later attributed to Censorinus (and by extension Cinna), or that Censorinus might have been the “personal enemy” of Octavius who acted in an impromptu manner, but subsequently claimed to have been simply following Cinna’s orders so as to avoid being held accountable. Either scenario is possible.
211 Appian, The Civil Wars 1. 74
house “razed to the ground, his property confiscated, and [Sulla] himself voted a public enemy,” although his wife and children managed to escape and joined him in the East.\textsuperscript{212}

“There are signs,” says Carney, “that all but the most implicated in anti-Marian activities were allowed to escape.”\textsuperscript{213} Those who were “allowed to escape” were later declared exiles, but there were still some in Rome who were not killed in 87 B.C.E. because they were simply waiting to be executed. Since these particular “enemies of the state” were public officials, Marius and Cinna had decided to defer their execution pending the “completion of their year of office.”\textsuperscript{214} Such was the case of the Tribune of the Plebs, Sextus Lucinius, who in 88 B.C.E. had been elected to be one of the ten tribunes for the year 87 B.C.E. Since Marius and Cinna were waiting for his year in office to be over before having him tried, it is more than likely that he was one of the tribunes who had opposed Cinna’s proposal to distribute the enfranchised Italians in the thirty-five tribes when Cinna was first chased out of the city by Octavius’ partisans. Nonetheless, despite the fact that Marius and Cinna had taken it upon themselves to either execute or exile those who they considered enemies of the state, such behavior was no different from that of the consuls who held office the year after Tiberius Gracchus’ assassination, and yet Cicero did not consider these consuls to have acted in a tyrannical fashion. Furthermore, as Badian explains, there were four other consulars, apart from Marius in Cinna, residing in Rome at the time, and three of them “more than passively accepted the authority of the government.”\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{212} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.73
\textsuperscript{213} Carney, 66; cf. Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,” 221. Badian argues convincingly that “all those victims of 87 about whose past we know anything at all,” with the exception of Octavius and Merula, “were former friends of Marius whom he had reason to hate for betraying him.” Each of these “aristocratic friends” had gradually deserted Marius after he had “saved the Republic” for them in 100 B.C.E. so that Marius eventually had to form an alliance with Sulpicius Rufus in order to become a viable contender for the Mithridatic command.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,” 215-6: These consuls were Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who had been Marius’ co-consul in 100 B.C.E.; Quintus Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95); Marcus Perperna (cos. 92); and Lucius Philippus (cos. 91). While Philippus and Perperna were elected to the censorship in 86 B.C.E., Lucius Valerius Flaccus became
After the execution of Sextus Lucinius, Marius and Cinna’s main preoccupation was to prepare for Marius’ departure. Yet, time was not on Marius’ side, and the aging general, now seventy years old, contracted pneumonia and died on the thirteenth of January, just as he attained his seventh consulship. When Cinna received word that the Senate had entered in communication with Sulla, and that Sulla had made it clear that he was intending to “take vengeance…upon the guilty ones” on behalf the entire city of Rome and all those who had flocked to his banner, Cinna moved quickly to recruit soldiers from all over Italy. He then proceeded to take them across the Adriatic to Liburnia, on the northern coast of Illyria, which was to act as his “base against Sulla.”

Though the first detachment of troops that set sail across the Adriatic Sea was said to have made it safely to Liburnia, the second encountered a storm and those who survived, upon reaching Liburnia, “escaped to Rome immediately” as they did not relish the idea of having to

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Carney, 70; Cf. Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,” 222. Badian refers to Marius’ death as being “providential” for Cinna. It is worth noting that the executions and exiles associated with Cinna’s “Dominatio” ceased after Marius’ death, and as such Badian considers Cinna to have been Marius’ “uneasy accomplice.”

Appian, The Civil Wars 1.77; cf. Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,” pp. 227-8. According to Badian, Cinna attempted to take his army to Liburnia for only one reason: “to train his men in a short campaign in Illyria to give them [the] confidence, cohesion and experience” that they needed in order to face Sulla’s more experienced troops. Badian’s reasoning is based on the fact that Octavian (the future emperor Augustus) went there in 32 B.C.E. in order to provide training for his troops in case they would have to fight Mark Antony’s more experienced soldiers on land. Cinna’s soldiers ultimately mutinied because they were short-sighted and “did not see why they should be taken overseas to fight an unnecessary war, when their homes might be threatened” by Sulla’s invading army. Besides, adds Badian, Liburnia had “hardly been touched by the Romans” prior to 78 B.C.E, which was the “first year the restored Republic proceeded to deal with barbarians on all frontiers.”; cf. Michael Lovano, The Age of Cinna: Crucible of Late Republican Rome (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002) , 98, 109. Lovano, on the other hand, disagrees with Badian as to why Cinna went to Liburnia and convincingly explains that Cinna’s decision to send his troops to Liburnia was possibly a “prelude to a military-linkup with [Lucius] Scipio Asiagenes in the Balkans, as part of an offensive against Sulla.” This same Lucius Scipio Asiagenes, Lovano explained, had earlier been dispatched by Cinna to “replace the governor of Greece, C. Sentius, and quell unrest among the Thracian and Illyrian tribes” and by 85 B.C.E. had already “accomplished his mission.”
fight against fellow citizens. Upon hearing this news, the rest of the troops who were awaiting
their turn refused to leave Italy. Cinna was furious. He then ordered these soldiers to assemble
with the intent to upbraid them for their insubordination. Once they were gathered, one of the
lictors in the act of “clearing the road for Cinna” happened to strike a soldier whom he found in
his way. This only provoked another soldier to strike the lictor, and when Cinna ordered this
soldier to be arrested for this offence against the person of the consul, “a clamor rose on all
sides.”

Several of the rest of the soldiers then started throwing stones at Cinna, and soon
enough some of the soldiers who found themselves close enough to Cinna to inflict even more
harm on him, took out their daggers and stabbed the consul to death.

Thus Cinna met the same fate as Quintus Pompeius Rufus, and just as in the case of
Pompeius Rufus, the Senate did not bother to have these troops punished for killing their
commanding officer. While Velleius Paterculus simply states that Cinna was “slain in a mutiny
of his army” and does not give any further details or explanations, Plutarch gives a somewhat
plausible reason for the mutiny that led to Cinna’s death. According to Plutarch, after
Pompeius Strabo died, his charismatic son, the future Pompey the Great, had momentarily sided
with Cinna for expediency’s sake. This was despite the story that Cinna supposedly first paid a
member of Pompeius Strabo’s camp to kill Pompey (when Strabo and Cinna were at war with
each other outside Rome’s walls), and then had his troops ransack Pompey’s house in Rome.

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218 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.78
219 Velleius, 2.24.5
220 Plutarch, *Pompey* 3 - 4.1. Plutarch states that the person who was bribed by Cinna to kill Pompey was named Lucius Terentius and that he was actually a friend of Pompey who “shared his tent with him.” Plutarch also mentions that several other members of Strabo’s camp were also bribed to set fire to Strabo’s tent, but that someone eventually informed Pompey of this entire conspiracy and he was able to not only secretly slip out of his tent before Terentius came to kill him, but also “put a guard round his father’s tent” to ensure that no one tried to burn it down. Cf. Livy, *Periochae* 79 and Velleius, 2.21.2 who both recorded that Pompeius Strabo equivocated when it came to dealing with Marius and Cinna’s rebel army, with Livy stating that he was “aiding both sides” and Velleius explaining that Strabo was still bitter over having lost the consular election of 88 to Pompeius Rufus. Ultimately,
Moreover, Plutarch states that Pompey was with Cinna’s army at the time that Cinna was sending troops to Liburnia, but that when he had heard that “various accusations and suggestions were being made against him,” Pompey began to fear for his life and decided to abscond.\footnote{Plutarch, \textit{Pompey} 5.1} Once word had gotten around the camp that Pompey was missing, along with the rumor that Cinna had killed him, Plutarch states that “all those who had for a long time hated Cinna and felt oppressed by him” found a reason to mutiny against him. Although Cinna tried to escape, he was apprehended by a centurion who already had his sword drawn for the occasion. When Cinna got down on his knees and begged him to spare his life, showing him his consular signet ring, the centurion was said to have replied, “I have not come here to seal documents, but to punish a wicked, lawless tyrant,” and then ran him through with his sword.\footnote{Plutarch, \textit{Pompey} 5.2}

Since Pompey would later join Sulla’s army, upon his return to Italy in 83 B.C.E., and go on to wreak so much carnage in Sulla’s name that his enemies dubbed him \textit{adulescentulus carnifex}, or the “teenage butcher” (he in fact was only in his early twenties), it seems hard to believe that Pompey was once on Cinna’s side.\footnote{Valerius Maximus, 6.2.8. An old, son of a freedman from Formiae, by the name of Helvius Mancia, was said to have called Pompey this at a public meeting (c. 55 B.C.E.) in which he had proceeded to berate Pompey by reminding his audience of the atrocities that Pompey had committed while in Sulla’s service.} Nonetheless, throughout his career Pompey would show himself to be quite unstable in terms of his “political affiliations,” just like his father, and it has been argued that since Cinna’s camp at the time of the Adriatic crossing was in Picenum (i.e., Pompeius Strabo’s and his son’s birthplace and base of operations), it seems “quite reasonable that the consul…should have invited the young man to accept a commission in

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Strabo threw his entire support behind the consuls in Rome (Velleius, 2.21.3) but died soon after either because he was struck by lightning (Plutarch, \textit{Pompey} 1.2) or a “pestilence” affected both armies (Velleius 2.21.4). Once Strabo was dead, an attempt at mutiny, such as Plutarch describes, may have occurred given Strabo’s equivocating and the fact that both Velleius and Plutarch describe Strabo’s soldiers as feeling joy or the need to desecrate Strabo’s body after he died (Velleius 2.21.4; Plutarch, \textit{Pompey} 1.2).
\end{flushright}
the new army.”

As for the story of Pompey’s role in the mutiny that killed Cinna, Bennett argues that it does appear to be a bit “colored up by flatterers of Pompeius Magnus” so as to demonstrate how Pompey was already, at that early stage in his life, loved and admired by his troops.” Nonetheless, in his opinion, the “modicum of truth” that one can infer from this story is that “Pompey had been inciting the troops to rebel against leaving Italy,” and that that was the reason why “charges and accusations” were made against Pompey, which later made him fear for his life and secretly depart Cinna’s camp. As such, in light of this interpretation, Bennett sees Pompey as being “partially and indirectly responsible for the riot in which Cinna was killed.”

Yet, if Pompey’s machinations were only partially responsible for the riot that led to Cinna’s death, then what else made this mutiny possible? Other than the fact that the recruits under Cinna’s command were a little green, and were afraid to face Sulla’s seasoned veterans, Bennett himself, as well as other historians, lay the rest of the blame with Cinna. While the overall argument of these historians is that Cinna’s lack of military experience and his cruelty toward the troops led to his demise, Bennett argues that it was specifically Cinna’s autocratic pretensions that gave his soldiers the grounds for killing him, as is evidenced mainly by the regular use of the term “Dominatio” by those primary source writers who wrote about Cinna’s administration. In fact, Bennett not only concurs with the indictment of the centurion who killed Cinna in Plutarch’s narrative, but he also goes so far as to state that Cinna was both the “first tyrant of Rome since the expulsion of the Tarquins” and the “forerunner of the army-made

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224 Bennett, 61; Cf. Badian, “Caepio and Norbanus,” 55: Badian states that as of 87 B.C.E. the young Pompey enjoyed the support of Cinna’s “influential friends,” including Gnaeus Papirius Carbo, who would later be elected as Cinna’s co-consul in 85 B.C.E. Furthermore, Badian argues that since Pompeius Strabo was one of Lupus’ legates during the Social War, and was “hated by the nobility,” it may be said that Strabo was “one of the Mariani.”

225 Ibid.

226 Ibid, 63. Cf. Lovano, 109 n.13 for references to the opinions of other historians, including Gabba, Badian, and Keaveney, with regards to what led to Cinna’s demise.
emperors.” However, there are other historians who have since disagreed with this characterization of Cinna.

Both Ernst Badian and Michael Lovano have argued that because the primary source writers who chose to narrate the events of the 80s B.C.E. were generally influenced by “Sulla’s version of the events,” there is a tendency on the part of some modern historians to accept without question the distorted picture of Cinna which the Sullan annalists paint, whether it be as a constant enemy of the “senatorial oligarchy,” or a “willing bringer of civil strife for his own selfish ambitions,” or even simply just as a man of “weak or degenerate moral character.” Yet, if one analyzes the sources carefully, one finds a man who a “successful and competent military commander in the Social War,” and an “astute judge of the political climate in Italy.” He was also a politician who, because of “conviction and ambition,” championed the cause of “disgruntled Italians” and in turn was opposed by a conservative group of senators who revealed themselves as unwilling to tolerate any “disruption of the established order.” What’s more, these same conservatives had proved themselves to be “unable to cope with constitutional crises” without resorting to “unconstitutional methods and force.” And in forcefully removing Cinna

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227 Ibid, 62.
228 Lovano, 137; cf. Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,” 208-12: Badian explains that very little is said about the Cinnan “Dominatio” in ancient texts because “apart from Cicero’s scattered reminiscences,” Livy is our “main informant.” However, Livy was a “philosopher by training” with little to no political experience who based most of what he wrote about that period on two “Sullan” sources. The first of these sources was undoubtedly Sulla’s own Commentarii, while the other was more than likely Lucius Cornelius Sisena who was praised by Cicero as being the “greatest historian of his age” (Cicero, Brutus 228) and was also lauded by the historian Sallust who at the same disapproved of his “partiality for Sulla” (Sallust, Jugurthine War 95.2). Nonetheless, these two “Sullan” sources differ from one another in that the view presented by Sulla’s own writings is that “Sulla invaded Italy in the company and at the request of all that mattered in the Senate,” while Sisena’s describes a reality in which “only a small clique had wanted civil war, and that the Senate as a whole, opposing them, had worked for concordia as long as possible.” Accordingly, this second version stated that the nobilitas had not actually begun to side with Sulla until after he landed in Italy in 83 B.C.E., and it is this narrative of those turbulent years that is found, albeit sporadically, in Cicero’s writings, especially when he said that “everyone knows how I worked for concordia as a long as possible, and then for Sulla’s victory” (Cicero, Pro Roscio Amerino, 136).
229 Ibid.; Cf. Badian, “Waiting for Sulla,”223. Other than why Cinna set sail for Liburnia, the one other point where Badian differs with regards to Cinnna’s career is the characterization of him as a politician who “championed” the cause of the “disgruntled” Italians because of “conviction and ambition.” While Badian does not deny that Cinna
from office with the express purpose of preventing any kind of constitutional reform being made, they made a martyr out of him in the eyes of the Italians and thus emboldened him to fight fire with fire by emulating Sulla’s exemplary march on Rome. Yet, even though Cinna may have had many of his opponents executed without trial (the principal reason why both Cinna’s rule, and later Sulla’s, was called a *dominatio*), Cinna did not “have the power to control all aspects of Roman society” and his authority was not as far reaching as either Sulla’s or Julius Caesar’s.\(^{230}\) For instance, unlike either of those two men, Cinna never had himself made dictator, let alone dictator for life, and unlike Sulla his attempts to restore order to the city of Rome did not include diminishing the traditional powers of the Tribunate (which no dictator before Sulla had ever done). Bennett’s characterization of Cinna as the “first tyrant of Rome since the expulsion of the Tarquins” is therefore grossly inaccurate. Nonetheless, Lovano makes it clear that despite what Cinna actually did or did not do as consul from 87-84 B.C.E., not long after his death his name became “synonymous in political propaganda with tyrant,” as did the names of Sulla and Marius, and eventually that of Julius Caesar.\(^{231}\) As such, I have discussed him not because I believe Cinna to have been a tyrant as Bennett did, but rather because he was accused of being one, after the fact, so as to justify his having being killed in a senseless manner in the first place.

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\(^{230}\) Ibid, 138. Lovano explains that the term *dominatio* technically had two meanings; it “denoted o the power of a *paterfamilias* as well as the absolute and arbitrary rule of a tyrant.”

\(^{231}\) Ibid, 139.
4.5 Summary

Like the Gracchi, the *populares* who followed their example were killed because they were accused of wanting to make themselves sole masters of Rome by the *Optimates*. Yet none of them ever attempted to pass a law that would make them kings of Rome, much less dictators for life. Rather, they had been attempting to pass laws that would benefit those whom the Senate seemed determined to ignore, namely Italians and those plebeians who found themselves on the brink of losing their right to serve in the infantry. However, while the Post-Gracchan *populares* were as eclectic in their legislative proposals as Gaius Gracchus, first Saturninus and then Sulpicius (in marked contrast with both of the Gracchi as well as their own peer Livius Drusus) sought to make an alliance with a politician by the name of Gaius Marius who was first and foremost a military commander. They did this not only to add the weight of force to their legislative proposals, but also to avoid suffering the same fate as the Gracchi. At the same time, since the patron-client relationship was a two way street, these populists pushed for the establishment of colonies inside and outside Italy for those *capite censi* that fought in the armies of their *imperator* patron (creating new property holding soldiers), and expanding Roman citizenship (which entailed the right to vote) to all those Italians who only had Latin rights, also known as *civitas sine suffragio* (which entailed the right to move to Rome and form commercial and marital contracts with Roman citizens, but not to vote).

However, since the *optimates* believed that only free, native born Roman citizens, preferably those who belonged to a noble family, were fit to serve as Roman senators and magistrates, they vehemently opposed the extension of Roman rights. What’s more they knew that this extension of rights would not only give the *populares* a greater electoral base when it came time to vote on the passage of their populist laws, but it would also create more
competition for the native nobiles when they ran for public office. Wishing to avoid an all out civil war, the Senate resorted to issuing its so-called “final decree.” Though this “constitutionally” sanctioned killing in the name of order helped the optimates maintain peace on their own terms when Saturninus was killed in 100 B.C.E., this peace would only last for ten years since their intransigence ended up leading to the very thing they supposedly wanted to avoid. Indeed, after hearing about the assassination of the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus in 90 B.C.E., the Italians were so angry that yet another Roman politician, who seemed to care about their being granted Roman rights had been killed, they decided to declare war on Rome.

While this so-called Social War ultimately led to the conferring of Roman citizenship to Rome’s Italian allies, it also sowed the seeds for further civil strife. The reasons for this were three-fold. First, the Social War had led to an increase in the development of patron-client relationships along military lines among both the populares and the optimates factions. Second, the supposed granting of citizenship to the Italians by the Lex Julia proved to be nothing more than an empty gesture since the Italians were not integrated into the thirty-five tribes, which soon became a bone of contention between populares and optimates. Third, there was the personal enmity (born of jealousy and resentment) that existed between Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla going as far back as the Numidian War against Jugurtha. These three elements combined to set the stage for yet another civil war, known as Sulla’s Civil War, at the outbreak of which Sulpicius Rufus would lose his life and, according to Velleius, be the first whose head was displayed in the Forum.

During this civil war which was both a sequel of the Social War and an intensification of the street fighting that up until that moment characterized the strife between populares and optimates, Marius the military commander once again relied on a politician with populist
tendencies to obtain the consulship. However, this time the populist politician was not a tribune, but a deposed consul who, unlike the Gracchi, Saturninus, and Sulpicius, was able to escape being killed in the streets as a “would-be tyrant” by the strong arm of the Senate and live long enough to cash in on his alliance with an imperator. Yet, even then this consul with populist ties, who would not tamper with the office of Tribune of the Plebs, also found it necessary to do two seemingly contradictory things once he was in power: execute his (and his associates’) most ardent political opponents, and conciliate with the Senate so as to maintain the peace in Rome and himself in power. Nonetheless, despite Cinna’s best efforts to keep his regime’s executions limited in scope, and to govern Rome as a moderate who believed in both order and progress, he ended up being assassinated by his own troops and later branded a tyrant. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, Cinna’s enemy, Lucius Cornelius Sulla behaved more like a tyrant than Cinna. In the name of restoring order in Rome and Italy Sulla not only had himself made dictator (with the power to choose for how long he would be in power), but also crippled the office of Tribune of the Plebs and extended his political persecutions to include the families, friends, and acquaintances of his enemies. Though these measures certainly would create a sense of order and stability, it would not last for long since the peace that Sulla “restored” was rooted in a generalized fear of Sulla, his troops, and his lackeys. In the long run, his repressive measures further fanned the flames of hatred between populares and optimates that led to a new wave of uprisings, street fighting, and all out civil war.
Chapter 5: *Optimates*, Post-Gracchan Tyrannicide and Violence

5.1 Introduction

Despite Sulla’s professed intentions for returning to Italy, when he arrived at Brundisium (modern day Brindisi) in 83 B.C.E., the newly elected consuls in Rome, Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus Asiagenus and Gaius Norbanus, did not see him as one who was planning on liberating the eternal city from the grip of tyranny, but rather as a conqueror whose “victory would be more destructive than his first march on Rome.”

Even the Senate, which had previously entered in negotiations with Sulla via letter so as to bring about some kind of reconciliation between Sulla and his enemies, was beginning to feel more than a little afraid of the erstwhile proconsul’s anger. The Senate especially feared how Sulla’s anger would manifest itself against those senators who had decided not to leave Italy and join him in Asia Minor. Sulla, after all, had made it perfectly clear in his latest correspondence with the Senate that he would never be on good terms with Marius and Cinna. Furthermore, Sulla declared to the Senate that he, “with a devoted army,” was better suited to grant the Senate the kind of “lasting security” that the Senate itself was incapable of providing for him and his followers.

Given this choice of words, there could not have been any room for doubt in the Senate as to whether Sulla was going to disband his army once he got back to Italy. Accordingly, while there were some in the Senate who personally loathed Sulla, the vast majority of senators were more motivated by the instinct to preserve the Senate as an institution (and their position in it) from any threats made against it when they decided to issue the following decree: “The consuls should take care, lest the State

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232 Lovano, 113.
233 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.79
should come to any harm.” These, of course, were the words normally associated with the now famous senatus consultum ultimum, or the Senate’s final decree, and with them the Senate had in essence declared war on Sulla as a hostis, or “enemy of the state.”

Although Sulla would ultimately put the Senate back into the position of undisputed authority that it had enjoyed from the time of the Punic Wars up until the time of the Gracchi, Lucius Cornelius Sulla would in the process behave every bit like the tyrant that the optimates accused the populares of aspiring to be. Through this bad example he ultimately undermined those very constitutional reforms that he championed in the name of restoring the oligarchy to its “rightful place.” The wave of political killings unleashed on Rome the year after Sulla had come returned to power in 82 B.C.E. was unlike anything that had come before it. For the first time lists of enemies of the state would be made public, and whereas before the property of condemned men was auctioned off, this time it went to anyone who was willing to do the state the personal favor of killing these hostes. While his proscriptions would, in the short run, lead some, like Crassus and Catiline, to become very wealthy at the expense of those who were proscribed by Sulla’s regime, in the long run they also intensified the rift between optimates and populares. Then there were those who benefited more from Sulla’s habit of showering his favorites with military commands, regardless of whether they were legally qualified or not. This was the case with Pompey, who became “Great” thanks to those military commands that Sulla gave him. In the future, generals like Pompey would not only continue to expect to be rewarded with military assignments, regardless of their political rank, but would also learn to blackmail the Senate into giving them what they wanted by threatening to march on Rome with their armies.

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234 Lovano, 113. For his source, Lovano cites Julius Exuperantius who, although he wrote a short history of events about the Late Republic in the 4th century C.E., relied heavily on Sallust, the senatorial member of Gaius Julius Caesar’s factio, or faction, who wrote monographs on the Jugurthine War and the Catiline “Conspiracy” (which are intact), as well as a history of the Late Republic that covered the years 77 B.C.E. to 62 B.C.E. which has only survived as fragments and citations found in the works of authors from the imperial era.
Even Crassus would follow Pompey’s lead in blackmailing the Senate into granting him a consulship. Yet, he did so only when he realized that in order to attain the respect and admiration of his peers, it was not enough to be the richest man in a city where attaining consular rank and earning the right to a military triumph meant everything.

However, since neither Crassus nor Pompey wanted to keep threatening Rome with invasion every time they desired something from its government, they realized that the best way to secure what they wanted was to rely on more constitutional means, namely the Tribunate. That is why these two men helped restore to the Tribunate the status it had before Sulla’s reforms. Sulla was able to get things done his way when he was in charge and did not need to rely on the tribunes because he did not have any qualms about instilling fear in the Senate and the people of Rome when he felt he must do so. He also did not have to worry about being assassinated because he had the full support of his army, just like any future emperor of Rome. As such, his enemies may have hated him, but they were too afraid to do anything about it. On the other hand, Rome’s next dictator after Sulla, Gaius Julius Caesar, did not believe in instilling fear in the hearts of the Senate and the people through proscriptions. So while Caesar’s enemies hated him for making himself dictator for life, as Sulla had done, they did not fear him enough to hesitate killing him. Thus, both Sulla and Caesar were labeled tyrants during their own time and long after they died, but only Caesar met with a tyrant’s death.

5.2 Lucius Cornelius Sulla’s Dominatio (81 – 79 B.C.E.)

The last time there had been a dictator in Rome was 120 years before, when the Romans were still fighting against Hannibal during the Second Punic War, and even then the term of this extrajudicial office was only six-months. However, when Sulla communicated to Valerius Flaccus that he wanted to revive this office, he told him that he should tell the people to appoint a
dictator who would hold onto this position for as much time as that person felt that he needed to “firmly re-establish” the city of Rome, its government, and its overall control over Italy. What’s more, Sulla added that he believed himself to be the most “serviceable to the city in that capacity.”

Although the people had long expressed an absolute distaste for anyone with monarchical and/or tyrannical affectations, and as such did not like Sulla’s proposal, according to Appian, they had come to believe that they had no other options available to them. Thus, they “welcomed this pretence of an election as an image and semblance of freedom,” by electing Sulla as their “absolute master for as long a time as he pleased” on the condition that he would use this power for, “the enactment of such laws as he himself might deem best and for the regulation of the commonwealth.”

Thanks to the passage of the Lex Valeria, Sulla was named dictator legibus faciendis et reipublicae constituendae, and as such Sulla named Valerius Flaccus as his magister equitum. So as to demonstrate that he intended on not only “making laws,” but also enforcing them with the intent to “(re)constitute the Republic,” Sulla had his general, Quintus Lucretius Ofella, killed in the Forum. This he did because Ofella had tried to run for the office of consul, despite the fact that he had not yet even been a praetor. When the people seized the centurion who had committed this violent act and took him before Sulla complaining that this man had acted unlawfully in killing Ofella and must be punished, Sulla told the people to let the centurion go since he had acted according to the dictator’s orders.

The following year the political killings would resume since Sulla had declared that while he would indeed attempt to “bring about a change” in Rome which would be “beneficial to the

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235 Ibid.
236 Ibid. 183-4.
238 Plutarch, Sulla 33.4
people” if they obeyed him, he would also refuse to spare any of his enemies. Rather, he would “visit them with the utmost severity” and “take vengeance” on any private citizen or magistrate who in his eyes had “committed any hostility,” through the use of “strong measures.”\(^\text{239}\) However, according to Plutarch, many of these initial killings were done in such an arbitrary manner that they appeared to have been only executed because Sulla had allowed his minions to satisfy their desire to persecute those with whom they had personal grudges.\(^\text{240}\) As a result of this, many senators began to fear for their lives and were soon imploring Sulla not necessarily to pardon those whom he was determined to kill, but rather to “free from suspense” those whom he decided not to kill. Yet, when Sulla responded that he could not give them the names of those he was going to spare because he did not yet know them, one of Sulla’s partisans (according to Plutarch it was one of the younger members of the Caecili Metellii clan) countered this reply by asking Sulla to write down the names of those he did not intend to spare.\(^\text{241}\) However, since this story is mentioned in only one other source, which according to Plutarch states that it was actually a senator by the name of Fufidius and not Gaius Caecilius Metellus who gave Sulla the idea to write down the names of the condemned, it is possible that this was concocted after Sulla’s death so as to place the blame for the ensuing proscriptions elsewhere. Nonetheless, even if the story were true, what matters most in this case is not who was the first to come up with the idea, but rather who was the first to put it into practice; there the blame lies completely with Sulla.

Whereas he had been reluctant to set in writing the names of those whom he was going to spare, Sulla was more than willing to set down the names of those whom we wished to see dead.

\(^{239}\) Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.95

\(^{240}\) Plutarch, *Sulla* 31.1

\(^{241}\) Plutarch, *Sulla* 31.2
This he did by inscribing them on a “whitened tablet” which was displayed in the Forum as if it were a “register of senators,” or a “list of approved soldiers,” so that from time to time people would “rush up to it eagerly in crowds, just as if it contained some favorable announcement.”\textsuperscript{242}

According to Appian, the first of these lists contained about forty senators and 1,600 \textit{equites}. Sulla was not only the first to make and display such “formal lists” of enemies of the state, but he was also the first to offer prizes to both “assassins and informers,” and even the first to threaten with punishment those who tried to hide the proscribed.\textsuperscript{243} Nor was anyone allowed to mourn over a friend who had been proscribed and executed, or to “exult over an enemy” for even this could get one killed.\textsuperscript{244} As for the children and grandchildren of the proscribed, not only did they have their property confiscated, they also lost their “civil rights.” As a result they were barred by law from running for public office in the future.\textsuperscript{245}

After this first proscription list, another was posted which contained the names of about two hundred people (many of them senators), followed by yet a third list with the same number of people. Sulla then made a public speech in which he explained that so far he had only put down the names of those he happened to remember, but “those who escaped his memory for the moment would have their names put up later.”\textsuperscript{246} Even then, despite the fact that those names that were written down had become public knowledge, many of these proscribed men were still “taken unawares” since they were killed whenever and wherever they happened to be caught, whether it was in their homes, in the streets, or in the temples.\textsuperscript{247} Others were “dragged through

\textsuperscript{242} Cassius Dio, \textit{Fragmenta} of Books 30-35, 109.14
\textsuperscript{243} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.95
\textsuperscript{244} Cassius Dio, \textit{Fragment of Books} 30-35, 109.15-16
\textsuperscript{245} Plutarch, \textit{Sulla} 31.4
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{247} Appian, \textit{The Civil Wars} 1.95
the city streets” and then “thrown at Sulla’s feet.” However, some who were fortunate enough either to be banished, or simply to have their property confiscated. Others even managed to escape Italy altogether as Gaius Julius Caesar would do, after he was proscribed for refusing to divorce his wife Cornelia because she was Cinna’s daughter. Still, not everyone was as fortunate as Gaius Julius Caesar. Many who tried to escape had not been so lucky since Sulla’s spies were “searching everywhere for those who had fled the city,” and those whom they caught were usually killed on the spot. What’s more, the proscriptions and confiscations were not exclusive to Rome as had been the case when Cinna and Marius had executed their enemies.

Since Sulla also wanted to rid himself of all those Italians who had fought in the armies of Marius, Cinna, Carbo, and Norbanus, lists had been posted all over Italy. Even those who had been suspected of merely contributing money to their armies, or “giving counsel against Sulla,” were hauled into court and accused of being enemies of the state. Entire communities were also punished for siding with Marius and Cinna, and while some of these had their citadels demolished, or their walls destroyed, or were forced to pay huge fines, most had their lands sequestered and divided amongst Sulla’s soldiers in order to ensure the loyalty of both Sulla’s troops (by means of affection) and those communities that were being penalized (by means of fear). Before Sulla formerly ended the proscriptions he committed one last act of revenge. He dug up the ashes of his rival, the elder Gaius Marius, and scattered them. Marius’ nephew,

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248 Ibid.
249 Plutarch, Julius Caesar 1.1-5
250 According to Velleius (2.41.2, p.139) Gaius Julius Caesar was not the only one whom Sulla had forced to divorce his wife. The senator Marcus Pupius Piso had also been forced to divorce his wife since she was Cinna’s widow. However, while Caesar, who was eighteen at the time, was proscribed for refusing to divorce Cinna’s daughter (and barely managed to get out of Italy alive), Marcus Piso, a man of thirty-three, decided to give in to Sulla’s demands and was spared
251 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.95
252 Appian, The Civil Wars 1.96
253 Ibid.
Marcus Marius Gratidianus,²⁵⁴ had also been proscribed and, according to Plutarch, was killed by a young patrician partisan of Sulla’s by the name of Lucius Sergius Catilina, who was also among those who had become wealthy at the expense of the proscribed by taking their properties. After supposedly killing his own brother-in-law, Quintus Caecilius, and then asking Sulla for the favor of having him added to the proscription lists so that it would appear that he had been killed in a “lawful manner” (which was what Sulla had already done with the names of all of Carbo’s lieutenants who were killed at the Battle of the Colline Gate), Sulla granted Catiline’s request on the condition that he do Sulla a favor as well, namely kill Marcus Marius Gratidianus.²⁵⁵ While Valerius Maximus does not give the name of Sulla’s partisan who was responsible for Marius Gratidianus’ death, both he and Plutarch supply the details of his death. First, Catiline had Gratidianus dragged through the streets, in full view of the people of Rome, to the tomb of Quintus Lutatius Catulus (the former consul of 102 who had committed suicide in 87 so as to avoid standing trial). He then “gouged out the wretched man’s eyes and broke his body limb by limb,” after which he cut off Gratidianus’ head and had it sent to Sulla. Furthermore, Catiline is also said to have slain Marcus Plaetorius on the spot because he had “fainted away at Marius’ execution.”²⁵⁶ Later, names of both Marius Gratidianus and Marcus Plaetorius were added to the list of those proscribed so that the legality of their executions would not be questioned.

However, the year before he died in his country estate, Sulla shocked everyone in Rome by not only refusing to run for consul (and allowing Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus and Appius Claudius Pulcher to be duly elected), but also by resigning his position as dictator. Appian

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²⁵⁴ See Stemma VIII, p. 135; Marius Gratidianus was also a relative of Cicero by marriage.
²⁵⁵ Plutarch, Sulla 32.2
²⁵⁶ Valerius Maximus, 9.2.1
stated that he found this “paradox” particularly perplexing since Sulla had destroyed of his enemies “ninety senators, fifteen consulars, and 2,600 equites,” had confiscated the properties of these men, and left many of them “cast out and unburied,” and yet on the day that he publicly laid down his office of dictator and proclaimed himself a private citizen, he was “undaunted by the relatives of these persons at home” and the “banished abroad.” However, as perplexing as this seems, one has to take into account that Sulla was able to peacefully resume the life of a private citizen, because he could count on the support of “120,000 men throughout Italy who had recently served under him in war and had received large gifts of money and land from him,” as well as on the three hundred senators that he had personally enrolled, and the 10,000 Cornelii freedmen who owed their freedom and citizenship to him alone.

5.3 Marcus Tullius Cicero vs. Lucius Sergius Catilina (63-62 B.C.E.)

While it is true that Cicero’s views on the use of violence in politics were in part shaped by the beliefs of Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, one could argue that he was even more influenced by the tradition of tyrannicide in early Roman history as espoused by the consul Valerius Publicola and which is found in both Livy’s *Ab Urbe Condita* and Dionysus of Halicarnassus’ *Roman Antiquities*. As such, though Cicero in theory abhorred “violence in a city,” he believed that once the “conventions of civilization are disregarded, it is morally and legally justifiable to use force to settle disputes.” One example of this disregard of the “conventions of civilization” was the existence of a tyrant. However, Cicero not only reserved the “penalty of assassination” for those who had actually taken the position of king, but was also willing to follow the precedent of early Roman history in “sanctioning the killing of anyone said

257 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.103
258 Appian, *The Civil Wars* 1.100
259 Andrew W. Lintott, *Violence in Republican Rome.* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 53-54
to be aspiring to a *regnum.*”²⁶⁰ When he denounced Lucius Sergius Catiline in the Senate House for plotting to overthrow the government in order to make himself a master of Rome, Cicero not only lamented that Catiline had not already been led to his death on a “consul’s orders,” but also simultaneously praised the example set by Servilius Ahala in killing Spurius Maelius with “his own hand.” Cicero then admonished his own contemporaries for lacking the “valor that used to be found in this Republic and caused brave men to suppress a citizen traitor with keener punishment than the bitterest foe.”²⁶¹ This first speech against Catiline would also be the first instance in which he drew a parallel between Ahala’s assassination of Maelius with that of Scipio Nasica’s assassination of Tiberius Gracchus, as well as the Senate’s use of the *senatus consultum ultimum* against Gaius Gracchus and then against Lucius Saturninus, stating that Gaius Gracchus was “for all the distinctions of his father, grandfather and ancestors” killed on “vague suspicions of treason.”²⁶²

5.4 *Marcus Tullius Cicero vs. Publius Clodius Pulcher (d. 52 B.C.E.)*

Yet another incident in which the story of the killing of Spurius Maelius by Gaius Servilius Ahala provided Cicero with the precedent for “desiring” the destruction of “political opponents,” was the case of Publius Clodius Pulcher.²⁶³ Clodius, in the capacity of a Tribune of the Plebs, had previously exiled Cicero in 58 B.C.E. for having executed Roman citizens without a trial during his consulship in 63 B.C.E., and so when the tribune Titus Annius Milo was charged with having murdered Clodius Pulcher in 52 B.C.E., Marcus Tullius Cicero was his advocate in court. Though he failed to have Milo acquitted, Cicero did his best to exculpate him by claiming that that it was no more wrong for Milo to have killed Clodius Pulcher than it was

²⁶⁰ Ibid, 54.
²⁶¹ Cicero, *In Catilinam* I, 3
²⁶² Cicero, *In Catilinam* I, 4
²⁶³ Lintott, *Violence in Republican Rome,* 55.
for other famous Romans of the past to have killed “Roman citizens who are criminals.”

Among those famous Romans that Cicero enumerated were not only Servilius Ahala, but also Publius Nasica, who killed Tiberius Gracchus in 133; Lucius Opimius, who was Consul when Gaius Gracchus was killed in 121; Marius as consul in 100, when Saturninus and Glaucia were killed; and even the Senate under his consulship in 63 B.C.E., when the Catilinarian conspirators were executed without trial.

5.5 Marcus Junius Brutus vs. Gaius Julius Caesar (d. 44 B.C.E.)

Yet, Cicero was not the only Roman politician of the Late Republic to draw inspiration from the assassination of Maelius at the hands of Servilius Ahala. Although some historians, such as Ronald Syme, have dismissed ancestral appeals as “‘dubious history – and irrelevant,’” Thomas Africa explains that in so doing these historians underestimate the “effect of [ancestral] masks and stories in providing an identity for young nobles.” Such was the case with Marcus Junius Brutus. In response to Mark Antony’s accusation that he had instigated both Marcus Junius Brutus and Decimus Junius Brutus to kill Julius Caesar, Cicero stated that because, in his opinion, the killing of Caesar was a “glorious deed” that had been brought about for the “liberation of the fatherland,” the two Brutii involved did not require his encouragement. Rather, added Cicero, they were motivated by the fact that both of these Brutii “saw Lucius Brutus’ portrait every day, and one of them Ahala’s.” Having “sprung from such ancestors,”

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264 Cicero. Pro Milone 8

265 Africa, 617. Nonetheless, Africa also believed that there were underlying, personal motives for Brutus’ animosity towards Caesar, and that Brutus’ republicanism was simply a “mask” that he used to lend an “aura of respectability” to the assassination of the dictator.


267 See Illustration 3, on p.139, for a picture of a bust of Lucius Junius Brutus.
he asked Antony, “would they seek inspiration from outsiders rather than from their own blood, abroad rather than from home?”

In his *Life of Brutus*, Plutarch states that Brutus was a descendant of “that Junius Brutus” whose bronze statue was erected on the Capitol with a sword in its hand and was placed “among those of the kings, in token that he was most resolute in dethroning the Tarquins.” As for Brutus’ mother, Servilia, Plutarch relates that she was said to have “traced her lineage back to Servilius Ahala.” However, in explaining who this Servilius Ahala was to his Greek audience, Plutarch preferred the second, though less favored, version of Ahala’s story as it is found it Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Roman Antiquities*. Consequently, Plutarch states that when Spurius Maelius “was seditiously plotting to usurp absolute power,” Ahala took a dagger “under his arm,” found Maelius in the Forum, drew close to him as if “intending to confer privately with him,” and then when Maelius leaned in to listen, “stabbed him to death.”

Though this is not the version of the story that is referenced in Cicero’s *De Senectute*, and is also not the tradition that is favored by either Dionysius or Livy, it seems that Plutarch chose it because it clearly foreshadows the manner of Caesar’s assassination at the hands of Brutus and his co-conspirators as Tullius Cimber distracted the *dictator* with a plea “in behalf of his brother who was in exile.” And much like the Ahala in Dionysius’s second version brandished his “sword dripping with blood” and shouted to his fellow citizens that he had “destroyed the tyrant at the command of the Senate,” so too did Brutus and his co-conspirators brandish their “naked daggers” with their “hands smeared with blood” as they called upon their fellow citizens to

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268 Cicero, *Philippicae* II.26

269 Plutarch, *Brutus* 1.1

270 Plutarch, *Brutus* 1.5

271 Ibid.

272 Plutarch, *Brutus* 17.3
“assert their liberty.”\textsuperscript{273} Plutarch even made it a point to state that Brutus was encouraged to kill Caesar because of his regal pretensions, not just in his \textit{Life of Brutus} but also in his \textit{Life of Antony} and his \textit{Life of Caesar}. For while he stated that Cassius “hated the ruler,” Brutus is said to have only opposed “Caesar’s rule,”\textsuperscript{274} and he singles out both Antony’s offering Caesar a crown,\textsuperscript{275} and Caesar’s punishment of the tribunes Marullus and Flavius, for tearing off the diadems from Caesar’s statues,\textsuperscript{276} as the events that “most encouraged” Brutus. Any taunting on the part of Cassius or other fellow citizens that may have enticed Brutus to act was also centered on a popular distaste of Caesar’s regal affectations as well as on a belief that one could only maintain the \textit{dignitas} of one’s family by living up to the example of one’s ancestors. This is why Plutarch has Cassius tell Brutus that the populace looked to him as a praetor not for “public doles and theatrical spectacles,” but rather to “deliver them from tyranny” since they “count on this as a debt which [Brutus] owe[s] to [his] ancestry.”\textsuperscript{277}

“Family sentiment” in Ancient Rome was at its worst an “arrogant assumption that the prizes of political life were reserved to the descendants of those who had previously held them,” combined with an “unscrupulous use of wealth and power to ensure their continued enjoyment.” At its best, however, this familial “sentiment” was a “creditable desire to emulate one’s ancestors by serving the state at home and on the field of battle.”\textsuperscript{278} If we are to believe the characterization of Marcus Junius Brutus given by Plutarch, then this “descendant” of the founder of the Roman Republic was certainly one of those \textit{nobiles} who aimed to exhibit his “family sentiment” through emulation rather than arrogance and artifice. Yet, as M.L. Clarke

\textsuperscript{273} Dionysus of Halicarnassus, 12.4.4; Plutarch, \textit{Brutus} 18.7.
\textsuperscript{274} Plutarch, \textit{Brutus} 8.6
\textsuperscript{275} Plutarch, \textit{Antony} 12-13.1
\textsuperscript{276} Plutarch, \textit{Caesar} 61-62.2
\textsuperscript{277} Plutarch, \textit{Brutus} 10.6
stated in his own biography of Brutus, emulating his ancestors meant for Brutus a "particular political attitude," namely that of "opposition to any form of despotism." This was first demonstrated early on in Brutus’ career, when he served as one of the three officials in charge of the Roman mint. It was on this occasion that he issued a coin that “bore a head of Libertas with a representation of Lucius Brutus on the reverse,”279 as well as another that had “Lucius Brutus’ head on one side and that of Ahala on the other.”280

Although the precise year is not known for sure, it is conjectured that Brutus was one of the tresviri monetales in the year 54 B.C.E. This post was normally held by “young men of good family at the outset of their political career,” and sure enough the following year Brutus climbed the first step of the cursus honorum when he became a quaestor and was sent to Cilicia to serve its provincial governor, Appius Claudius.281 Though these “young men” who served as Rome’s minters usually put their family’s name on the coins that they issued, along with images that made some kind of reference to their family’s past, or present exploits,282 Clarke states that perhaps Brutus’ decision to display the images of Lucius Brutus and Servilius Ahala in 54 B.C.E was as much of a political move as a demonstration of pride in his ancestors.283 That same year, Cicero mentioned in his letters to Atticus that there were rumors about the possibility of Pompey becoming a dictator and that this gave him cause to “lament” the end of the “old free republic.” As such, the political statement that Brutus tried to make as a minter could have been

279 See Appendix B: Illustration 5, on p. 140, for an image of this coin.
280 Clarke, 10; see Illustration 4, on p.139, for an image of this coin.
281 Ibid, 16; cf. Africa, 613: Africa argues that the circumstances of Brutus’ marriage to Appius Claudius’ daughter, in addition to Appius Claudius’ own stance of opposition toward Julius Caesar, contributed to Brutus’ decision to personally hate Caesar. According to both Africa and Ronald Syme (The Roman Revolution 34, 58) Brutus had been originally been betrothed to Julius Caesar’s daughter Julia, but was “swept aside” in favor of Pompey. Brutus then went on to marry Claudia, his first recorded wife.
282 See Illustration 6, on p. 140, for an image of a coin produced by a fellow minter of Brutus who issued a coin with a depiction of his two grandfathers, i.e. Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Quintus Pompeius Rufus, the consuls of 88 B.C.E.
283 Clarke, 16.
his way of reassuring those who feared the end of the “old free Republic” that he could be counted on to “champion freedom and oppose autocracy.”  

Furthermore, Cicero’s correspondence with Atticus reveal an even more telling sign that Marcus Junius Brutus’ self-image as a Roman man was as influenced by the tradition of Gaius Servilius Ahala as it was by that of Rome’s first consul, Lucius Junius Brutus. Marcus Brutus had requested Atticus to draw up a “family tree” for him in which both of these ancestors figured.  

However, as similar as Brutus’ and Cicero’s views on the use of tradition to justify political violence seemed to be, they were not identical. In his *Life of Brutus*, Plutarch states that while all the other conspirators were for assassinating Mark Antony, as well as Julius Caesar, Brutus alone was opposed to the idea. Conversely, in a letter addressed to one of the conspirators (Trebonius) in February of the following year, Cicero stated that if he had been “invited to that most attractive feast on the Ides of March” there would have been no “leftovers” to cause any “complications.” Furthermore, when he addressed Brutus himself in a letter dated April of 43 B.C.E., Cicero even went so far as to caution him that the “role of clemency is, and should be, apt for different circumstances and different times,” for in that civil war in which they found themselves, what was ultimately being decided was “nothing other than whether we continue to exist or not.” Yet, as Plutarch explained, Brutus did not want to kill Mark Antony for two reasons: first and foremost, Brutus believed that the conspirators should “only act with

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284 Ibid. cf. Africa, 610: Citing one of Cicero’s letters (*ad Atticum*, II, 24). Africa states that Brutus had been previously been implicated in a “conspiracy to murder the ‘tyrant’ Pompey, in the year 59 B.C.E., by an informant named Vettius. However, when Julius Caesar, who was consul that year, had Vettius testify again before the Senate on the following day, Vettius “omitted” any mention of Brutus due the intervention of a “nocturnal appeal.” Since Julius Caesar had been having an affair with Brutus mother since before he was born (and it was rumored that Brutus was Caesar’s illegitimate son by Servilia) Africa is certain that Servilia had intervened on her son’s behalf.  

285 Clarke, 11.  

286 Plutarch, *Brutus* 18.4  

287 Cicero, *ad Fam.* 10.28  

288 Cicero, *ad Brut.* 2.2
strict justice,” and second, he “held out hope that Antony might undergo a change of heart…once Cesar was out of the way.” Lintott went into further detail and explained that because “Antonius was not yet himself rex” Brutus was reluctant to go against the example established by Servilius Ahala, who had limited himself to killing Spurius Maelius and not any of his supporters. As such, to go beyond killing the tyrant Caesar would be to “mar the picture of the assassination as an act of public justice” since Antony had not yet become an outlaw. After all, it was Caesar’s “deeds and speeches” that made it easy for the conspirators to focus all their propaganda on one point, namely that Caesar “wanted a regnum.”

5.6 Summary

Lucius Cornelius Sulla ultimately put the Senate back into the position of undisputed authority that it had enjoyed from the time of the Punic Wars up until the time of the Gracchi. Yet, in the process, this ambitious general behaved every bit like the tyrant that the optimates accused the populares of aspiring to be. Through his bad example he would ultimately undermine those very constitutional reforms that he would champion in the name of restoring the oligarchy to its “rightful place.” The wave of political killings that was unleashed on Rome the year after Sulla came back into power in 82 B.C.E. was unlike anything that came before it. For the first time, lists of enemies of the state were made public, and whereas before the property of condemned men was auctioned off, this time it would go to anyone who was willing to do the state the personal favor of killing these hostes. While Sulla’s proscriptions would in the short run lead to some, like Crassus and Catiline, to become very wealthy at the expense of those who

289 Plutarch, Brutus 18.4-5
290 Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome, 64
291 Ibid.
292 Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 190. See Illustration 8 on page 141. The image is of a coin that Brutus had struck the year after Caesar’s assassination to commemorate the “liberation” of Rome from the “slavery” of Caesar’s tyranny and raise money to fight against Antony and Octavian.
were proscribed by Sulla’s regime, in the long run these state sanctioned assassinations also intensified the rift between *optimates* and *populares*. Then there were those who benefited more from Sulla’s habit of showering his favorites with military commands, regardless of whether they were legally qualified or not. A prominent example of this was Pompey, who became “Great” thanks in large to those military commands that Sulla gave him. Consequently, Pompey not only continued to expect to be rewarded with military assignments (despite the fact that he had not even reached the rank of consul, much less praetor), but he also learned to blackmail the Senate into giving him what he wanted by threatening to march on Rome with his army. Even Crassus, out of envy for Pompey’s successful career, followed his lead in blackmailing the Senate into granting him a consulship.

However, since neither Crassus nor Pompey wanted to keep threatening Rome with invasion every time they desired something from its government, they realized that the best way to secure their goals was to rely on more constitutional means, namely the Tribunate. That is why these two men helped restore the status that the Tribunate had before Sulla’s reforms. Sulla was able to get things done his way, when he was in charge, and did not have the need to rely on the tribunes because he did not have any qualms about instilling fear in the Senate and the people of Rome when he felt the need to do so. He also did not have to worry about being assassinated since he had the full support of his army, just like any future emperor of Rome. As such, his enemies may have hated him, but they were too afraid to do anything about it. On the other hand, Rome’s next dictator after Sulla, Gaius Julius Caesar, did not believe in instilling fear in the hearts of the Senate and the people through proscriptions. Thus, while Caesar’s enemies hated him for making himself dictator for life, just as Sulla had done, they did not fear him enough to hesitate killing him. That is why, although both Sulla and Caesar were labeled tyrants
during their own lifetime (and continued to be seen as such long after they died) only Caesar met with a tyrant’s death.
6.1 Summary of Thesis

The assassination of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C.E. came to be seen by both ancient and modern historians as the first instance of bloodshed in the “Struggle of the Orders” between the patricians and the plebeians. However, the members of the Roman elite (from which all Roman historians and biographers sprang forth) had a predilection towards honoring the examples of their ancestors as timeless models of moral excellence. What’s more, they believed that all “social ills” were derived from the actions of individuals who refused to emulate those ancestral models. That is why in Appian’s narrative of Tiberius Gracchus’ assassination, Appian, as narrator, marvels at the fact that it did not occur to the consuls of 133 B.C.E. to appoint a dictator (as their ancestors are said to have done in the past), while both Cicero and Plutarch (in a more credible scenario) depict the Pro-Gracchan consul Mucius Scaevola as resisting the pressure on the part of the Senate to take such drastic measures. Hence, according to Plutarch and Cicero, the Pontifex Maximus Scipio Nasica Serapio only resorted to acting as a privatus (an action that Appian marveled at) because of these two reasons: first, the consul Mucius Scaevola would not use his power to nominate a dictator; and second, the other consul, Piso Frugi, an Anti-Gracchan politician, was away from Rome at the time.

This momentous event was most certainly recorded in the *Annales Maximi*, kept by the Pontifex Maximus each year, and these annals were eventually used as a source by later ancient historians after they were published by Publius Mucius Scaevola, the former consul of 133 B.C.E., after he himself became Pontifex Maximus. The other consul of 133 B.C.E., Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi, also recorded the death of Tiberius Gracchus in his seven book history of Rome, and, as Dionysius stated, he also wrote that Servilius Ahala killed Spurius Maelius as a
privatus. While one could argue that Piso Frugi “invented” this version of the story in order to exculpate the Pontifex Maximus, Scipio Nasica Serapio, this could not have been the case. Dionysius also stated that this version of the Maelius/Ahala story can be found in the history of Rome written by Lucius Cincius Alimentus, who, along with Fabius Pictor, was one of Rome’s first native historians. However, since Dionysius also consulted Fabius Pictor and he does not mention him as being one of the historians who stated that Servilius Ahala was a privatus (rather than a magister equitum) it can be argued then that the existence of the two traditions about this event predated Piso Frugi and Mucius Scaevola. Therefore, it can be stated, with confidence, that each of these men then chose whichever story was most politically convenient for them.

Regardless of which story was the more likely to have occurred (that Servilius Ahala was a magister equitum, or that he was a privatus), the moral that both stories wanted to convey was one and the same: the killing of “would-be tyrants” was a necessary and justifiable act if sanctioned by the Senate, for in both stories it is ultimately the Senate that condoned the killing of Spurius Maelius on the grounds that he was plotting to make himself king. Nonetheless, the public backlash that some of the more conservative senators (like Scipio Aemilianus) endured for attempting to justify the killing of Tiberius Gracchus at the hands of a privatus, must have led the Senate to conclude that in the future it would need to rely on a more “constitutional” method of silencing opposition. As such, when it came to Gaius Gracchus and those political rebels who followed in his footsteps, the Senate revived the ancient custom of giving a consul dictatorial powers to defend Rome against enemies of the state. However, while in the past these powers were bestowed on consuls so that they might defend the state against a foreign enemy (like Brennus the Gaul, or Hannibal of Carthage), this time the Senate was empowering the consul to
use military force and kill, if necessary, those Roman citizens whom it considered to be a threat to the well-being of the Republic.

Yet, in relying on violent means to silence those who claimed to champion the cause of the plebs, the Senate was helping to both resuscitate and sanction the Early Republican idea that the use of violence against one’s domestic rivals was acceptable. Nonetheless, this was only the case provided that one labeled one’s *inimici* as tyrants, and therefore as enemies of the state rather than just personal ones. This in turn allowed tyrannicides to justify killing their political rivals in the name of restoring order as an inherently Roman tradition sanctioned by the *mos maiorum*, or “customs of the ancestors.” Consequently, later historians came to see the overwhelming majority of these tyrannicides as legitimate, provided that they were able to be explained as selfless acts of patriotism as prescribed by the ancestors. In each of those past instances, where domestic enemies were punished, execution was seen as a selfless act of patriotism because the supporters and families of the accused were spared, and the deceased bodies of the accused were not treated in a cruel manner. Moreover, when possible, the acquiescence of the people was sought after through their participation as jurors in a public trial.

This, however, was not the case with the death of Tiberius Gracchus, or that of Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus, since a number of their supporters were also killed with them. Yet, while later ancient historians saw the killing of Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus as being more justifiable than that of his brother Tiberius, their decapitation for the simple amusement of the Consul Opimius was seen as disgraceful by all the source writers. Thus, what would have otherwise been seen as a selfless act of patriotism in defense of Rome was marred by an act of cruelty that made it look like Opimius was motivated more by personal hatred than devotion to Rome. This lack of moderation would later be seen in Sulla’s executions, as well as
in Cicero’s desire to see Catiline’s fellow conspirators executed without a trial. The only one of the *optimates* who would endeavor to return to the original model of the Early Republican ancestors would be Marcus Junius Brutus in his determination to assassinate Caesar while sparing the members of his faction. By then, however, this call for moderation in ridding the state of “tyrants” would be deemed impractical and idealistic, even by Cicero with his desire to return to those days of senatorial supremacy characteristic of the Middle Republic.

### 6.2 Significance of Thesis

Since many acts of tyrannicide followed that of the Gracchi, including that of Julius Caesar eighty-nine years later, modern historians such as Mary Beard, Ernst Badian, and H. H. Scullard see the year 133 B.C.E. as serving a justifiable terminus post quem for the era in Roman history known as the Late Republic. While this thesis does not set out to call into question the justification of Tiberius Gracchus’ death as a terminus post quem for the Late Republic, it does set out to question the assumption that Tiberius Gracchus’ death was a complete anomaly in the history of Rome as the Ancient Romans knew it. Both Astin in his biography of Scipio Aemilianus, and Lintott in his article on the tradition of violence in the Early Roman Republic, have in their own ways supported the idea that tyrannicide and political violence are ideas whose roots go back as far as the time of Early Republic. This thesis is an attempt to further this debate. Through a textual analysis of the differences and similarities found in the acts of violence and tyrannicide that are portrayed in the narratives of the Early and Late Republic, I believe that I have helped shed new light on the significance of Tiberius Gracchus’ assassination in 133 B.C.E. This political murder was an attempt to revive an earlier tradition of tyrannicide which quickly turned into something new: a factional massacre.
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STEMMA 1

THE FAMILY OF AEMILIUS PAULLUS

L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 219, 216)

P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus (cos. 205, 194) ==
Aemilia

Papiria == L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182, 168) == ?

(See Stemma II)

Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus
(cos. 145)

Q. Aelius Tubero == Aemilia

Q. Aelius Tubero

Aemilia == M. Porcius Cato

Two sons (d.167)

P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus
(cos. 147, 134)

(See Stemma II)

Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus (cos. 121)

STEMMA II

THE FAMILY OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS

THE SCIPIO FAMILIES

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130
**THE TWO FAMILIES**

(Cn. Cornelius Scipio)

- consul 298
- censor 280

(L. Scipio Barbatus)

- consul 259
- censor 258

(P. Scipio)

- consul 218

(Ti. Gracchus)

- consul 259
- censor 258

(P. Scipio AFRICANUS)

- m. Aemilia
  - consul 205, 194
  - censor 199

(L. Scipio Asiaticus)

- consul 190

(Cn. Scipio Calvus)

- consul 222

(T. Gracchus)

- consul 238

(P. Gracchus)

- consul 215, 213

(T. Gracchus)

- consul 177, 163
- censor 169

(P. Scipio)

- consul 190, 191

(L. Scipio)

- consul 205, 194

(Sempronius)

- consul 1

(adopted)

(Cornelia)

- minor
- major

(Tiberius)

- m. Claudia
  - born 163
  - quaestor 137
  - tribune 133
  - † 133

(T. Gracchus)

- born 154
- quaestor 126
- tribune 123, 122
- † 121

(P. Scipio Aemilianus)

- consul 147, 134
- censor 142
- † 129

(P. Scipio Nasica)

- consul 163, 155
- censor 159

(Cornelia)

- major

(P. Scipio)

- consul 147, 134
- censor 142
- † 129

(P. Scipio Nasica)

- consul 163, 155
- censor 159

(T. Gracchus)

- consul 177, 163
- censor 169

(P. Scipio)

- consul 190, 191

(L. Scipio Asiaticus)

- consul 190

(P. Scipio)

- consul 215, 213

(P. Scipio Aemilianus)

- consul 147, 134
- censor 142
- † 129

(P. Scipio Nasica)

- consul 163, 155
- censor 159

Laelia == Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 117)
L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95) == Mucia
C. Marius == Fulcinia
C. Marius (cos. 82) == Licinia
Sextus Julius Caesar (cos. 91)
Julia == M. Atius Balbus

P. Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 138)
P. Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 111)
P. Scipio Nasica == Licinia (pr. 93)

Marcia == C. Caesar
Aurelia == C. Caesar
C. Julius Caesar (dictator)
C. Octavius == Atia
C. Octavius (Augustus)
Terentia == Marco Tullius Cicero (cos. 63)
Tullia

P. Scipio Nasica Serapio
L. Licinius Crassus

M. Marius Gratidianus
Gratidia == M. Tullius Cicero
M. Marius
Helvia == M. Tullius Cicero

Q. Tullius Cicero == Pomponia
T. Pomponius Atticus

C. Marius

M. Marius

Sextus Julius Caesar

L. Julius Caesar

Q. Marcius Rex (Pr. 144)

C. Julius Caesar == Marcia

M. Aurelius Cotta == Rutilia

L. Aurelius Cotta (Cos. 144)

C. Cotta (Cos. 75)

M. Cotta (Cos. 74)

L. Cotta (Cos. 65)

L. Aurelius Cotta (Cos. 119)

C. Julius Caesar Strabo

L. Julius Caesar (cos. 90)

C. Julius Caesar (Pr. † 85) == Aurelia († 54)

L. Aurelius Cotta (Cos. 119)

Julia († 69)== C. Marius

(cos. 107)

L. Cornelius Cinna (Cos. 87-84)

C. JULIUS CAESAR (100-44)

(1) == Cornelia († 69)

Julia († 54) == (4)Cn. Pompeius Magnus

Q. Pompeius Rufus (Cos. 88)

L. Cornelius Sulla (Cos. 88, etc.)

C. Marius (cos. 82)

Q. Pompeius Rufus == Cornelia

L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58) == Rutilia

M. Antonius Orator (cos. 99)

Julia == M. Antonius Creticus (pr. 74)

Marcus Antonius (cos. 44, 34)

(by his first wife) Marcia == M. Porcius Cato Uticensis († 46)

ILLUSTRATION no. 1
THE SEVEN HILLS OF ROME

Source: (Essential Architecture- ROME); History of Rome at: http://www.italian-architecture.info/ROME/RO-HIST.htm
Map Description
Historical Plan of the Roman Forum and its Vicinity at the Time of the Republic. (Republican Forum)
Plan of the Roman Forum and its vicinity at the time of the Republic

1 Temple of Concord
2 Scalae Gemoniae
3 Prison (Tullianum)
4 Senaculum
5 Graecostasis
6 Rostra
7 Temple of Janus
8 Lapis Niger (Grave of Romulus?)
9 Temple of Venus Cloacina
10 Temple of Saturn, Aerarium (State Treasury)

Source: Historical Atlas by William Shepherd (1923-26)
(image source: http://klio.uoregon.edu/maps/rr/city/republican_forum_shepherd.jpg)
ILLUSTRATION no.3

Lucius Junius Brutus, bust in the Capitoline Museum, Rome.

ILLUSTRATION no.4

Description:

Roman Republic, Rome mint, 54 BC., Denarius (18-19 mm / 4.03 g), Obv.: BRVTVS, head of L. Junius Brutus (consul 509 BC.) to right. Rev.: AHALA, head of C. Servilius Ahala (magister equitum 439 BC.) to right.
Cr. 433/2 ; Syd. 907 ; Bab. (lunia) 30 ; Vagi 82

Source: Ex Albert M. Potts Collection, from Royal, April 1959.
(Image source: http://numismatics.org/collection/1944.100.3244)
ILLUSTRATION no.5

Description:
Struck by Marcus Junius Brutus Rome, 54 BC
Obv.- LIBERTAS left; Bust of Liberty right, jewels in hair
Rev.- BRVTVS in exergue, the consul L. Junius Brutus walking left between two lictors preceded by an accensus.
Crawford 433/1; Sydenham 906; Junia 32
20mm; 3.6g; Silver


ILLUSTRATION no.6

Description:
ROMAN REPUBLIC. Q. Pompeius Rufus. Ca. 54 BC. AR denarius (3.55 gm). Rome. Bare head of Sulla right, SVLLA. COS before / Bare head of Q. Pompeius Rufus (Cos 88) right, RVFVS. COS behind Q. POM. RVFI behind. Crawford 434/1. Sydenham 908. RSC Pompeia 4. RCTV 399. Sulla and Rufus, the moneyer's two grandfathers, were consuls together in 88 BC. These are the first portraits to appear on Roman coins, and the only numismatic portrait of the famous Sulla, a precursor of Pompey, Caesar, and the Roman emperors.

Source: Freeman & Sear Collection (image source: http://www.acsearch.info/record.html?id=184766)
ILLUSTRATION no. 7


**Source:** Lewis collection, 157 and Leu 10, 1974, 8 sales.
(Image source: [http://www.acsearch.info/record.html?id=36986](http://www.acsearch.info/record.html?id=36986))

ILLUSTRATION no. 8

**Description:**
The S.C. Markoff Collection of Roman Coins. The Roman Republic. Marcus Junius Brutus L. Plaetorius Caestianus. Denarius. Northern Greece 43-42 BC, AR 3.45 g. BRVTVS IMP L·PLAET ·CEST. Bare head of Brutus right, wearing short beard. Rev. EID-MAR Pileus (liberty cap) between two daggers. Crawford 508/3; Cahn 22d; CRI 216; Sydenham 1301; Kestner; BMCRR East 68-70; RSC 15.

**Source:** Numismatica Ars Classica NAC AG, Auction 62, 2005
(Image source: [http://www.acsearch.info/record.html?id=552019](http://www.acsearch.info/record.html?id=552019))