SITUATIONAL THREAT AS A DETERMINANT
OF LEVEL OF DOGMATISM

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology

by

Carol Woodward

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The thesis of Carol Woodward is approved:

Committee Chairman

California State University, Northridge
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ABSTRACT

SITUATIONAL THREAT AS A DETERMINANT OF LEVEL OF DOGMATISM

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Carol Woodward

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This study investigated the extent to which individuals' scores on the Hokeach Dogmatism Scale varied with changes in situational threat. The Dogmatism Scale was administered to the introductory psychology classes at California State University, Northridge during the first week of the spring semester. Three months later fifty-one subjects participated in a study of beliefs and values. They were asked to indicate their relative preferences for five philosophies of life. In a discussion that followed the subject's preferred philosophy was attacked and challenged. Three levels of threat were employed to which subjects were randomly assigned. For those in the high threat condition, the view the subject had rated as number one was attacked. For subjects in the moderate threat
condition the argument was directed toward the view rated third and for those in the low threat condition, the view rated fifth was questioned. After a period of conversation, the subjects were asked to fill out an opinion survey. This questionnaire contained another form of the Dogmatism Scale and a Future Orientation Scale. The Future Orientation Scale was included to test the notion that dogmatic individuals have relatively narrow future oriented time perspectives.

An analysis of variance performed on the Dogmatism Change Scores was not statistically significant. An analysis of variance on the Future Orientation Scores was also not statistically significant. Some possible reasons for the failure to find differences between the experimental groups are examined.
SITUATIONAL THREAT AS A DETERMINANT OF LEVEL OF DOGMATISM

Carol Woodward

California State University, Northridge

While personality is one of the most familiar concepts in psychology, agreement as to what constitutes personality is rare. As a result, numerous theories of personality have been put forth over the years. Hull and Lindzey (1957) and Maddi (1968) describe twenty different personality theories, having confined themselves to the ones they felt were most influential. This proliferation of theories arose primarily because personality has been an elusive concept and so loosely defined that different theorists have actually been considering quite different phenomena. Most accepted definitions of personality, however, have two things in common. They assume a consistency within personality and use this as a mechanism for explaining consistency in behavior. Thus, traditional theorists characterize individuals according to enduring traits, types, developmental history or psychodynamic structure. By way of example, Byrne (1966) defined
personality as the "combination of all the relatively enduring dimensions . . ." on which individuals could be measured and then went on to indicate that the interest in personality was in the interrelationships among the stable characteristics and behaviors of individuals. Fromm (1955) viewed personality as the "totality of the inherited and acquired psychic qualities which are characteristic of the individual and which make the individual unique." He felt that these psychic qualities constituted a frame of reference for the individual which gave him a consistent way of comprehending the world and behaving. These and many other definitions reflect the basic underlying assumption that personality is composed of stable, persistent, patterned characteristics that endure over time.

The traditional view of personality has been challenged in recent years by social learning theorists who feel that behavior is considerably less consistent and far more specific to or dependent upon situational variables than prevailing theories have recognized (Mischel, 1972). Any psychic mechanism to explain consistency in behavior is therefore unnecessary, or at the very least must be re-examined and redefined to allow for an explanation of the wide variability of behavior as well. These theorists feel that the significance of the context in which behavior occurs has not been sufficiently appreciated and have proposed a theory of behavioral specificity as an alter-
native. According to this notion apparent consistencies and stabilities in behavior can be explained by (1) environmental regularities (similar behavior leading to similar consequences), (2) the constancy of social rules and sanctions, (3) the persistence of behavioral labels (role expectations producing uniformity of conduct), and (4) the effectiveness of intermittent reinforcement (Mischel, 1968).

The work of social learning theorists has started to shift interest away from a search for consistency and generality in personality to a study of the malleability and changeability of behavior. An illustration of this is provided by Bandura and Walters (1963) in a study of the relationship of family patterns to child behavior disorders. They observed that boys whose parents encouraged them to be aggressive with peers, but who were punished for aggression in the home, behaved aggressively at school but non-aggressively at home. Mischel (1966) reported that questionnaires dealing with attitudes correlated with other questionnaires but were less likely to relate to non self-report behavior. He asked children whether or not they would postpone immediate smaller rewards for the sake of larger but delayed outcomes in hypothetical situations. Their answers in these hypothetical delay-of-reward situations were found to relate to other questionnaires dealing with a variety of attitudes, however, their
verbal responses were unrelated to their actual delay-of-reward choices in real situations. This emphasis on situation specificity has served to remind those who study personality that what they are really trying to understand is behavior — and behavior is always related to the context in which it occurs.

The issue of behavioral specificity has actually been suggested for some time. In a series of studies on character, Hartshorne and May (1928) found that some traits, such as deceitfulness, were situation specific in that children who were tempted to cheat in the classroom might not on the playground, or they might cheat a bus driver but not a friend. Their low correlations of one deceit score with another cast some doubt on the consistency of a generalized central trait of honesty. In more recent support of this notion, some studies have shown that self-ratings and descriptions are highly susceptible to modification. Jones, Gergen, and Davis (1962), Jones, Gergen and Jones (1963) and Gergen (1965) have demonstrated that the way a person defines himself is greatly influenced by his motivation in a given situation. Miller, Doob, Butler and Marlowe (1965) were able to alter subjects' self-ratings markedly as a result of the subjects' perceptions of others' expectations, and Sales and Friend (1973) reported that failure at an experimental task increased subjects' levels of authoritarianism while success at the
Traditionally, theories of personality that have employed cognitive constructs have found it necessary to postulate some organizing process which was felt to be responsible for the interpretation and representation of external events to the organism. The ego of Freudian theory was said to mediate between the environment and the individual while Tolman (1948) discussed the conditions under which the "cognitive map" of the organism operated as an intervening variable in behavior. Kelly (1955) utilized the notion of a personal construct system to explain the individual's behavior in actively perceiving and responding to the environment. The work of these and other theorists suggested that conceptual schemes were structured differently from one individual to another and that an understanding of these differences in structure was necessary in order to predict the behavior of the individual.

Paralleling these developments, a number of other investigators formulated various theories of cognitive organization. Bartlett (1942) utilized the concept of "schema" to refer to the organization of previous experience which affected behavior in the present and Bieri and Blacker (1955) posited cognitive organization around a complexity-simplicity dimension. Perhaps the most thoroughly developed thesis has been that of Rokeach (1960) who put forth the idea that cognitive systems could be conceived of as
being organized into belief and disbelief systems. He defined personality as an organization of beliefs or expectancies having a definable and measureable structure, and suggested that objective reality was represented and mediated within a person by these beliefs. In his investigations of the properties of belief and disbelief systems, Rokeach described what he termed open-mindedness and closed-mindedness.

Rokeach believed that most any situation in which a person had to act contained certain characteristics that pointed to the appropriate action to be taken. If a person reacted in terms of such relevant characteristics, his response would be correct or appropriate. The same situation also contained irrelevant factors, not related to the inner structure or requirements of the situation. To the extent that the response depended on such irrelevant factors, it would be incorrect and/or inappropriate. He stated that everyone needed to be able to evaluate adequately both the relevant and irrelevant information that he received from his environment, and this led to what he felt was a basic characteristic that defined the extent to which a person's belief system was open or closed; that is, a person's belief system was open to the extent he could receive, evaluate and act on relevant information from the outside unencumbered by the irrelevant factors within the situation. He described dogmatism as a closed way of thinking which
could be associated with any ideology regardless of content and marked by an authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward those with opposing ideas and a sufferance for those with similar ones. To say that a person was dogmatic, he felt, was to say something about the way he thought — not only about single issues but about networks of issues. He concluded that it wasn't what an individual believed but how he believed it.

In an earlier publication (1951) Rokeach had suggested that cognitive organizations might vary not only between but within an individual. If the former were the main focus of attention, the assumption was made that the cognitive structures of different individuals would be relatively enduring and stable over time. However, if the latter were the main focus of attention, the assumption would then be made that while cognitive structures of a given individual might be relatively stable, there could be significant fluctuations and instabilities due to situational changes that necessitated cognitive reorganization. Rokeach's own concern and emphasis (1951) and that of most researchers in the area since then (Hanson, 1968; Powell, 1962; Kemp, 1963) has been on the differences in cognitive organization between individuals; however, in consideration of the previous discussion of the behavioral specificity hypothesis it might be more profitable to dispense with the personality interpretation of dogmatism altogether and to
focus strictly upon the behavioral specificity interpretation.

In his original formulations about dogmatism Rokeach had speculated that individuals might become predisposed at an early age to forming closed systems of thinking in proportion to the degree they felt anxious or threatened. He suggested that it was possible that dogmatism represented a network of cognitive defenses against anxiety and thus might constitute a defense mechanism.

Various data support the idea of a relationship between closed-mindedness and threat. For example, Rokeach (1960) observed a positive relationship between dogmatism and MMPI anxiety and this result was replicated by Fillenbaum and Jackman (1961). Further, Lipset (1963) noted that lower class individuals have particularly high levels of dogmatism and he argued that the economic threat of lower class life was an important determinant of this finding. Kemp (1961) has asserted that open-minded people are less threatened than closed-minded people. He found that closed-minded individuals approached a new experience apprehensively; i.e., they were defensive, insecure and threatened, and finally Tosi, Fagan and Frumkin (1968) found a significant relationship between dogmatism and the extent to which individuals perceived a group personality testing situation as threatening.

While Rokeach finally concluded that there was a cen-
tural underlying stable tendency in people to be open-minded or closed-minded, an alternative conclusion consistent with Rokeach's defense mechanism hypothesis and with the dogmatism and threat literature cited above, is suggested here. For it may well be that it is the perception of the world as threatening and not dogmatism that is the relatively enduring characteristic and that dogmatism is simply a situation specific reaction to such perceptions. This is not an attempt to substitute another personality characteristic for dogmatism but rather to suggest that this perception of the world as threatening may be simply a perception based on the forementioned environmental regularities, role expectations, intermittent reinforcement and the constancy of social sanctions.

Given this alternative, both Rokeach's "... a person will be open to information insofar as possible and will reject it insofar as necessary" and the behavioral specificity view are reconciled and dogmatism becomes a descriptive label for a particular form of threat reaction.

It is the hypothesis of this study that the extent to which an individual is dogmatic varies with the situation in which the person finds himself. Specifically, under conditions of high cognitive threat individuals will score higher on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale than they will under conditions of moderate threat. Subjects in a low threat situation will score lowest on the Dogmatism Scale.
Two corollary hypotheses are also tested in this study. Rokeach believed that one major function served by closed-mindedness was to defend the self against anxiety and according to May (1950) the central feature of anxiety, as distinguished from fear, is a dread of the future. This is so, Rokeach (1960) suggested, because the future is the most ambiguous and unknowable medium in man's cognitive world. It followed, he felt, that attempts to cope with anxiety involved a de-emphasis of the present and a preoccupation with the future. It also followed, he added, that people characterized as dogmatic should manifest not only more anxiety but also more future orientation. The relationship between dogmatism and future orientation has been explored and, to some extent, established (Roberts and Herrmann, 1961; Rokeach and Bonier, 1960). Also, Zurcher and Willis (1967) found a significant positive relationship between their Future Orientation Scale and dogmatism as measured by Rokeach's scale. A second hypothesis of this study, therefore, is that subjects in the high threat condition will score higher on a scale designed to measure future orientation than will subjects in moderate or low threat conditions.

Finally, since high dogmatics are said by Rokeach to exhibit an increased willingness to comply with authority figures, it follows that subjects in the high threat condition would comply with a request from the experimenter.
to sign an unpopular petition more frequently than would moderate or low threat subjects.
METHOD

The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale Form E was administered to the introductory psychology classes at California State University at Northridge. The individual instructors gave the scale to their classes during the first week of the spring semester. Twelve weeks later in the semester fifty-one subjects were signed up as part of their semester requirements for a "Survey of Beliefs and Values." When they arrived to participate in the experiment they were told that the psychology department was interested in gaining information about the values and belief systems of individuals. Accordingly, they were asked to study a pamphlet entitled *Ways to Live* (see Appendix A). The pamphlet was composed of five philosophies of life that were taken from a document compiled by Charles Morris (1956) and contained orientations toward life that differed widely in their content. Each included values advocated in one of the ethical or religious systems of mankind. They were then asked to indicate their relative preferences for each philosophy of life by ranking them in the order that they agreed with them, putting first the number on the one they liked the best, then the number of the one they liked the next best, and so forth. At this time they were also asked to indicate on a seven-point scale the ex-
tent to which they agreed or disagreed with each philosophy. After they had completed this task, they were engaged in a conversation about their ratings of the philosophies and their own values under the guise of gathering more information about people's belief systems. Gradually, the experimenter began to call into question the subject's preference on the Ways to Live pamphlet. The experimenter already had on hand counter-arguments for each of the views and began to point out flaws in the subject's choice. Three levels of threat were employed to which subjects were randomly assigned. For those in the high threat condition, the view the subject had ranked number one was attacked. For subjects in the moderate threat condition the argument was directed toward the view ranked third and for those in the low threat condition, the view ranked fifth was questioned.

After a period of conversation in which the experimenter continually drew the subject out, asked questions about his beliefs and indicated her surprise and lack of agreement with his value system, the subject was asked to fill out an opinion survey. This questionnaire contained Zurcher and Willis' (1967) Future Orientation measure (see Appendix B) and Form D of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (see Appendix C). The Future Orientation measure is a fifteen-item Likert scale and was included because Rokeach described dogmatic individuals as having relatively narrow
future oriented time perspectives.

After the subjects completed the questionnaire they were thanked for their participation in the survey and as they were leaving, as an apparent afterthought, they were asked to sign a petition which the experimenter was helping the psychology department to circulate. The petition requested that the experimental requirements of introductory students be increased from ten credits (fifteen minutes per credit) to fifteen credits. This is an unpopular issue with most students.

After the experiment was completed, the purpose of the study was explained to the subjects.
RESULTS

In order to ensure that subjects in the three experimental conditions did not differ significantly on their initial levels of dogmatism an analysis of variance was performed on the premeasures, i.e., the Dogmatism Scale administered at the beginning of the semester. The obtained F did not approach significance and it was concluded that the groups did not differ initially.

As a primary test of the main hypothesis that dogmatism would increase in response to increases in environmental threat an analysis of variance was performed on the dogmatism change scores. As indicated in Table 1 the results were not statistically significant. As a second way of testing the same hypothesis correlations were computed between the pre-dogmatism scores and the post-dogmatism scores which yielded correlations of .82 for the low threat condition, .49 for the moderate threat condition, and .72 for the high threat group. A test for differences between independent correlations was calculated which indicated that the three correlation values were not significantly different.

An analysis of variance was conducted on the Future Orientation Scale scores and as can be seen in Table 2 these results were also not statistically significant.
### TABLE 1

**Analysis of Variance of the Dogmatism Change Scores**

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<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
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<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>784.27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>392.13</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>9499.42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>197.90</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10283.69</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
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### TABLE 2

Analysis of Variance of the Future Orientation Scores

<table>
<thead>
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<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>139.45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>69.73</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>3414.24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>71.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3553.69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Product-moment correlations were calculated between the post-dogmatism scores and the future orientation scores which resulted in a value of .64 for the low threat condition, .47 for the moderate threat condition and .59 for the high threat condition with an overall correlation of .53 for all fifty-one subjects. These correlations paralleled those observed by Zurcher and Willis.

Finally, it was expected that subjects in the high, moderate and low threat conditions would differ in their willingness to sign a petition. Subjects fell into one of six categories: Eleven in low-threat-signed; six in low-threat-not-signed; nine in moderate-threat-signed; eight in moderate-threat-not-signed; six in high-threat-signed; and eleven in high-threat-not signed. While the obtained \( \chi^2 \) of 2.97 (2 df) was not significant, there was a noticeable trend in the subject's compliance with the request. Sixty-four and one-half percent of the subjects in the low threat condition signed the petition compared with 52.9% in the moderate threat condition and 34.7% in the high threat condition. The trend was not in the direction that was anticipated however, as compliance decreased with an increase in level of threat.
DISCUSSION

The results do not support the prediction that an increase in situational threat will result in an increase in dogmatism. Some reasons for the lack of support for the hypothesis need to be examined. In the first place, it may be that the behavioral specificity hypothesis is an over-simplification. The specificity theory, as proposed by the social behaviorists, represents a challenge to those who support viewpoints about personality which stress some generality and consistency of traits or other dimensions of personality. One reservation about the specificity theory that is often cited by traditional theorists is its lack of acknowledgement of possible genetic factors in personality. There is evidence to suggest that genetic or congenital aspects of behavior provide some basis for generality of personality beyond what the specificity doctrine proposes. The tendency for the social behavior theorists to be environmentalists is influenced in part by their historical affiliation with behaviorism which has typically been environmentalist. Although the social behaviorists have not flatly denied congenital influences, they have shown little interest in them. Several decades ago, the so-called heredity-environment question was the center of a lively controversy, however, today many psychologists
look upon it as a dead issue. The view currently held by many is that both genetic and environmental factors enter into almost all human behavior.

Anne Anastasi (1958) argued that although a given trait may result from the combined influence of genetic and environmental factors, a particular difference in this trait between individuals may be traceable to either hereditary or environmental factors alone. Unfortunately, efforts to determine the proportional contribution of genetic and environmental factors to observed individual differences in given traits have not met with great success. Anastasi suggested that apart from the difficulties in controlling conditions, the investigations have usually been based on the assumption that hereditary and environmental factors combine in an additive fashion. A number of studies (Haldane, 1938; Loevinger, 1943; Woodworth, 1941) have demonstrated, however, that a more likely hypothesis is that of interaction, i.e., the nature and extent of the effect of each factor depends upon the contribution of the other.

In a more recent work Anastasi (1965) cited studies that demonstrate that differences in motivation and temperament as well as characteristics like emotionality and susceptibility to stress have a strong genetic component. If this is the case, it is possible that there is a genetic factor which sensitizes a person to threat or at least
renders him capable of being more reactive to it. This genetic susceptibility in a given individual would interact with his past environment to produce a predisposition to respond to any threat in the immediate situation.

Another possible reason for the lack of support for the hypothesis may have been the nature of the threat that was employed. It was felt that an attack on the individual's philosophy of life would constitute a threat to his belief system and would therefore increase his level of dogmatism. It is possible that subjects did not perceive the questioning of their values and beliefs from an external source as threatening.

Sales and Friend (1973) in a study of the effects of success and failure on levels of authoritarianism reported that the subjects' explanations in the failure condition for their poor performance made a difference. Those who internalized the failure and took personal responsibility for their performance were most affected by the experience and their authoritarianism scores increased considerably. In contrast, those who put the responsibility for their failure elsewhere, i.e., externally, showed small changes in their authoritarianism scores. Sales and Friend concluded that subjects who accepted the blame for their failure were especially threatened as it reflected on them personally, whereas those who blamed external reasons were not threatened by their poor performance as it presumably had
nothing to do with their own abilities. It is possible that in this experiment the subjects perceived the questioning of their beliefs as an external and, perhaps, impersonal or remote threat and did not internalize any of the doubts that were raised about the validity of their value systems. This interpretation is suggested by the data on compliance with the request to sign the petition. Contrary to expectations, compliance decreased as threat increased. This indicates that the source of threat may have been seen as external and subjects were, with increases in this external threat, increasingly unwilling to be of assistance to the source of that threat. It is possible that to be effective any threat manipulation employed in a study of this nature will have to be one which involves the subjects on a more personal or intimate level.

While the results of this study do not support the notion that individuals' levels of dogmatism can be increased by increasing situational threat, it is felt that there have been a sufficient number of investigations demonstrating changes in supposedly enduring personality characteristics that further research into this area is warranted.
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APPENDIX A
WAYS TO LIVE

1. The individual for the most part should "go it alone," assuring himself of privacy in living quarters, having much time to himself, attempting to control his own life. One should stress self-sufficiency, reflection, and knowledge of himself. The direction of interest should be away from intimate associations with social groups, and away from the physical manipulation of objects or attempts at control of the physical environment. One should aim to simplify one's external life, to moderate those desires whose satisfaction is dependent upon physical and social forces outside of oneself, and to concentrate attention upon the refinement, clarification, and self-direction of oneself. Not much can be done or is to be gained by "living outwardly." One must avoid dependence upon persons or things; the center of life should be found within oneself only.

2. Life is something to be enjoyed - sensuously enjoyed, enjoyed with relish and abandonment. The aim in life should not be to control the course of the world or society or the lives of others, but to be open and receptive to things and persons, and to delight in them. Life is more a festival than a workshop or a school for moral discipline. To let oneself go, to let things and persons affect oneself
is more important than to do - or to do good. Such enjoyment, however, requires that one be self-centered enough to be keenly aware of what is happening and free for new happenings. So one should avoid entanglements, should not be self-sacrificing; one should be alone when the need arises and have time for oneself. However, sociality is a basic necessity of the good life.

3. Self-control should be the keynote of life. Not the easy self-control which retreats from the world, but the vigilant, stern, forceful control of a self which lives in the world, and knows the strength of the world and the limits of human power. The good life is rationally directed and holds firm to high ideals. It is not bent by the tempting voices of comfort and desire. It does not expect social utopias. It is distrustful of final victories. Too much cannot be expected. Yet one can with vigilance hold firm the reins to his self, control his unruly impulses, understand his place in the world, guide his actions by reason, maintain his self-reliant independence. And in this way, though he finally perish, man can keep his human dignity and respect, and die with universal good manners.

4. Enjoyment should be the keynote of life. Not the hectic search for intense and exciting pleasures, but the enjoyment of the simple and easily obtainable pleasures:
the pleasures of just existing, of savory food, of com-
fortable surroundings, of talking with friends, of rest
and relaxation. A home that is warm and comfortable,
chairs and a bed that are soft, a kitchen well stocked
with food, a door open to the entrance of friends - this
is the place to live. Body at ease, relaxed, calm in its
movements, not hurried, grateful to the world that is its
food - so should the body be. Driving ambition and the
fanaticism of ascetic ideals are the signs of discontented
people who have lost the capacity to float in the stream
of simple, carefree, wholesome enjoyment.

5. A person should let himself be used. Used by other
people in their growth, used by the great objective pur-
poses in the universe, which silently and irresistibly
achieve their goal. For persons and the world's purposes
are dependable at heart, and can be trusted. One should
be humble, constant, faithful, uninsistent. Grateful for
the affection and protection which one needs, but unde-
manding. Close to persons and their nature, and secure
because close. Nourishing the good by devotion and sus-
tained by the good because of devotion. One should be
serene, confident, a quiet vessel and instrument of the
great dependable powers which move to their fulfillment.
APPENDIX B
FUTURE ORIENTATION (FO) SCALE

The Future Orientation Scale consists of the following fifteen items (Likert responses: strongly agree, mildly agree, neither agree nor disagree, mildly disagree, strongly disagree).

1. The California State Universities should be on a quarter rather than on a semester basis.

2. My thinking about vacations to come makes it possible for me to endure the difficulties of everyday living.

3. All a person should want out of life is a secure not too difficult job with enough pay to afford a decent car and someday a home of his own.

4. The most important reason for working hard while you're young is the benefit it will gain you in the future.

5. I would be in favor of a three-year bachelor's program with abbreviated summer vacations.

6. Everybody should plan for the future by purchasing life insurance.

7. The most important part of employment is long-range job security.

8. I am willing to endure unpleasantness now, as long as I know that it will someday be worth it.

9. Nowadays, with the world conditions the way they are, the smart person lives for today and lets tomorrow take care of itself.

10. I do not think that man will be able to effectively utilize the leisure time that comes with a shorter work week.

11. It is important to plan now for your retirement even though it's many years away.
12. To achieve the happiness of mankind in the future it is sometimes necessary to put up with injustices in the present.

13. It is very important to save money for a rainy day.

14. The trouble with most people today is that they just don't think enough about the future.

15. My belief in a life after death very much influences my general behavior.

Items 1, 3, 5, and 10 were camouflage items and intended to disrupt response set. They were not included in the scoring of the scale.
ROKEACH DOGMATISM SCALE FORM D

The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale Form D consists of the following forty items (Likert responses: agree a little, agree on the whole, agree very much, disagree a little, disagree on the whole, disagree very much).

1. Most people don't really know what is good for them.

2. Communism and Catholicism have nothing in common.

3. The principles I have come to believe in are different from those believed in by most people.

4. In a heated discussion people have a way of bringing up irrelevant issues rather than sticking to the main issue.

5. While the use of force is wrong up to a point, it is sometimes the only way possible to advance a noble ideal.

6. Even though I have faith in the intelligence and wisdom of the common man I must say that the masses behave stupidly at times.

7. There are certain "isms" which are really the same even though those who believe in these "isms" try to tell you they are different.

8. In a discussion I sometimes interrupt others too often in my eagerness to put across my own point of view.

9. It is unfortunately true that people often won't practice what they preach.

10. Many people are failures and it is the system that is responsible for it.

11. To compromise with your political opponents is to be guilty of appeasement.
12. There is no point in wasting your money on newspapers which you know in advance are just propaganda.

13. Young people should not have easy access to books which are likely to confuse them.

14. The present is often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

15. To one who takes the trouble to understand the world he lives in, it is a relatively easy matter to predict future events.

16. It is sometimes necessary to resort to force to advance an ideal one strongly believes in.

17. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain groups.

18. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

19. Basically, the world is a lonesome place.

20. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

21. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

22. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

23. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things that they stand for.

24. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a few really great thinkers.

25. A person is probably pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

26. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

27. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.
28. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something good.

29. A good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don’t really understand what is going on.

30. If a person is to accomplish a mission in life, it is sometimes necessary to gamble all or nothing at all.

31. It is often desirable to reserve judgement about what is going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

32. The worst thing a person can do is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same things he does.

33. A person without a great cause has not really lived.

34. I would rather be a dead hero than a live coward.

35. Most of the ideas which get printed these days aren’t worth the paper they are printed on.

36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one’s own.

37. In this complicated world of ours the only way that we can know what is going on is to rely on experts who can be trusted.

38. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he is wrong.

39. There are two kinds of people in this world; those who are for the truth and those who are against it.

40. Many people just don’t give a damn for others.
ROKEACH DOGMATISM SCALE FORM E

The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale Form E consists of the following forty items (Likert responses: agree a little, agree on the whole, agree very much, disagree a little, disagree on the whole, disagree very much).

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

3. Even though freedom of speech is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain groups.

4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

7. Most people just don't give a damn for others.

8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

14. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great person, like Einstein, or Bach, or Shakespeare.

16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something good.

17. If given a chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things that they stand for.

20. A person who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty wishy-washy sort of person.

24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from us.

26. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same things he does.
28. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

29. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

30. There are two kinds of people in this world; those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he is wrong.

32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.

33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

35. It is often desirable to reserve judgement about what is going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

37. The present is all too full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

38. If a person is to accomplish a mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble all or nothing at all.

39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what is going on.

40. Most people just don't know what is good for them.