

# GATHER THE PEOPLE

Community and Faith-Based Organizing and Development Resources

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## SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZING

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## INTRODUCTION

The past two decades of community organizing around issues of racial, political, and economic justice confirm that grassroots practice for social change, notwithstanding local and national successes, has not harnessed citizen action into a movement that can substantively redistribute power in American society. There are at least three chronic problems: (1) funding arrangements, particularly the vagaries of top-down sponsorship; (2) formal organizational structuring, the legal rubric to institutionalize direct citizen action in corporate and government decision-making; and (3) systematic technology for organizers, based on scientific knowledge of human behavior. It is the formulation of suitable technology for influencing behavior and community organizations that is the present focus.

It is sometimes difficult, especially for organizers, to appreciate the inadequacies of the existing knowledge base for training new community practitioners. The wonder is that so much has been achieved with so little. It is a testimonial to the inordinate dedication of the members of the profession. The curriculum consists of anecdotal accounts passed on by colleagues, ideological rhetoric mixed with disjointed rules of practice, less than compelling attempts to apply social science research and casework or groupwork principles, useless conceptual overviews of practice, and all too rarely, a fragment of well-developed technology, such as those for mass mobilization and grant acquisition.

These are at best shaky underpinnings for a profession that aspires to sustain if not shape and direct basic changes in the policies and institutions of the state. Medical practitioners have more sophisticated technology for transplanting a single heart. Then, of course, their profession is more than 2,000 years old and organizing is not yet 100.

There is an uncomplicated link between systematic technology for organizers and more effective organizing. Contemporary organizing is without an empirically based paradigm for understanding and predicting social behavior. For understanding behavior, the best available guide to practice is the Alinsky dictum to pay attention to self-interest. My goal here is to lay the groundwork for organizing technology based on social learning theory. Social learning provides a scientific framework for analyzing human behavior, but more importantly, it serves as the foundation of concepts and procedures for *changing* social behavior in organizational life.

## SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

Community organizing has been characterized as a problem-solving process.<sup>1</sup> In large measure the problems to be solved are related to organizers' goals of controlling behavior. For every organizing objective, near- or long-term, large or small, whatever ideology, it is individual and group *behavior* that is targeted. Myriad forms of "action" and "participation" have been the objectives of professional change agents, from modest efforts aimed at bureaucratic policymakers to large-scale mobilization geared to compel institutional change. When on occasion attitudes or ideology rather than behavior seem to be the center of attention, presumably the ultimate objective remains behavioral, the assumption being that modifying these mental states is a direct means to influence social action.

## Psychodynamic Theories

Despite the importance of behavioral change in community organizing, modern practitioners are without an experimentally grounded systematic explanation of human behavior in social settings. That is not to say community organizers are without models of human behavior. As Kunkel has noted, “. . . every program design of social action contains a model of man. Even when nothing specific is said . . . there are implied propositions about the nature of man and the determinants of behavior.”<sup>2</sup> Three of the best-known explanations of human behavior are the instinctual, emphasizing fixed aspects of behavior; environmental, with response tied to external variables; and humanistic.<sup>3</sup> It is the third approach, encompassing psychodynamic theories, but has been the most heavily drawn upon by modern change agents.

Even with the historical trend to move away from “personified causes” as explanations of physical phenomena, human behavior continues to be accounted for in both popular media and professional circles by intrapsychic “essences, qualities, or natures.” People are said to act from indwelling causes that cannot be seen or measured.<sup>4</sup> Millenson specifies the bases for three of what he terms “fictional” causes of behavior: (1) the chance correlation of response to event – the basis for superstition; (2) the attributing of behavior to *supposed* events occurring in the central nervous system – “exhausted nerves” for example; and (3) explanations that rely on *hypothetical* “inner mental processes” – these are labeled urges, needs, drives, etc.<sup>5</sup> In the latter, “a behavioral trend may be attributed to a hypothetical force (a need, drive, or propensity) within the organism . . . [and] the proper way of conceptualizing this force is a matter of debate.”<sup>6</sup> In some schemas whole constellations of inner forces are proposed, in others only one “sovereign drive.”<sup>7</sup>

The main defect of psychodynamic theories is that they are circular: the hypothetical inner force, not experimentally verifiable, is deduced from behavior and in turn said to be its cause. In effect, neurotic *behavior* is evidence of indwelling neurosis – a hypothetical inner force – which is then advanced to account for the neurotic behavior. Not surprisingly, psychodynamic theories are notable for their lack of predictive power.<sup>8</sup> Trait-oriented theories of personality suffer from similar problems. The “traits” are no more than generalized diagnostic categories that suggest an unnatural consistency of behavior. They also tend to be circular, giving little or no insight into causal factors, and are not suitable for experimental verification.<sup>9</sup>

Social learning theory of human behavior is an alternative for community organizers to psychodynamic and trait-oriented conceptions. Setting aside momentarily a full exposition of the theory, we note its main distinction is an inclusive claim of all, but only verifiable behavior is relevant for study. While environmental variables are central, thinking and emotions are also incorporated. The theory does not deny inner psychological or biological processes, only unobserved, unverifiable intrapsychic states.<sup>10</sup>

Bandura describes the differences between social learning and psychodynamic perspectives on inner psychological events: “Social learning approaches treat internal processes as covert events that are manipulable and measurable. These mediating processes are extensively controlled by external stimulus events and in turn regulate overt responsiveness. By contrast, psychodynamic theories tend to regard internal events as relatively autonomous. These hypothetical causal agents generally bear only a tenuous relationship to external stimuli or even to the ‘symptoms’ they supposedly produce.”<sup>11</sup>

Social learning theory categorizes behavior as *respondent* and *operant*. Respondent behavior is learned through Pavlovian (prior) conditioning and may be generally characterized as emotional. Naturally fear- or pleasure-producing prior stimuli in the form of objects, circum-

stances, information, etc., can also be paired with neutral stimuli which then acquire the capacity to engender fearful or pleasurable responses.<sup>12</sup> The citizen who once attempted to speak out at a public hearing and was belittled by an arrogant elected official may experience uncomfortable feelings when entering the same setting in the future. The neutral stimulus of the public building assumes a negative value by being paired with the unpleasant stimulus of the personal attack. On the other hand, the newly emerging citizen activist who participates in a protest demonstration that succeeds in gaining concessions may in the future experience pleasant feelings whenever engaging in preliminary planning for confrontations. Respondent behavior, then, is what we generally call emotional and is understood in terms of stimuli that proceeded in time.


It is operant behavior, however, that is of primary interest to community organizers. Behavior that impacts on the environment to produce reinforcing or punishing consequences for the actor is termed operant. It involves the gross muscle system, molar behavior patterns (walking, talking, etc.) that are under conscious self-regulation, and it is controlled mainly by reinforcement that follows it in time.<sup>13</sup>

## Social Learning Theory

In social learning theory, “. . . man is neither driven by inner forces nor buffeted helplessly by environmental influences.” Instead, there is a reciprocal process between behavior and the conditions that control it.<sup>14</sup> The theory integrates prior stimuli, cognition, behavior, and consequent reinforcement. In this view the environment is a behavioral creation that acts back upon the behavior of the actor(s) who created it.<sup>15</sup> To understand behavior, then, social learning theory looks to the stimulus events that precede a particular response, cognitive processes that mediate the stimuli, the behavior itself, and reinforcing events that follow. There is also feedback from the reinforcing and punishing consequences to stimulus and mediation of processes for future behavior. Luthans has adapted the theory to organizational behavior, as represented schematically in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Model For Human Behavior in Organizations<sup>16</sup>



The salient contingencies of operant behavior, most simply stated, are “rewards and punishments [that] play a major role in our everyday lives.”<sup>17</sup> There is an increased probability for behavior that has been rewarded (reinforced) and there is a decreased probability for behavior that has been punished or not reinforced. Reinforcement is intensified or diminished by states of psychological deprivation and satiation (state variables) that have cultural and material origins and are an integral part of the learning calculus. To the extent that one possesses a great deal of something, its value as a reward is lessened, and vice versa.

*Prior Stimuli* – Prior stimulus control of behavior occurs through cues that suggest probable consequences, punishments or rewards, that either inhibit or facilitate responses. This “foresightful behavior” stems from direct experience, learning by observing others, and symbolic information. Bandura explains that symbolic “. . . behavior is partly regulated by characteristics of people that *predict* the consequences likely to accompany certain courses of action.”<sup>18</sup> (Emphasis mine.) Consider as an illustration of the cueing effect of prior stimuli a poster or flyer announcing an upcoming organizational action. Based on prior social learning, the organization’s allies and adversaries differ drastically in the consequences they anticipate.

*Cognition* – Social learning theory acknowledges the human capacity for thinking and knowing, cognition. Bandura suggest that traditional learning theories tend to overlook or underemphasize the human potential for insight and foresight through cognition.<sup>19</sup> He notes that behavior change is viewed much differently if it is assumed that responses are mainly regulated by external stimuli or, in the alternative, partly by internal mediating events. Mahoney characterizes behavior as being contingent on mediated rather than direct reality. The idea is that “humans do not passively register the world as it really is; they filter, transform, and construct the experiences which constitute their ‘reality.’”<sup>20</sup> In the cognitive mediational perspective, behavior is guided by symbolic processes: Memory, the symbolic encoding and storage of external events, creates internal representations of the environment to guide subsequent behavior. Response options are tested through internal symbolic explorations that estimate consequences. Hypotheses are generated, and to the extent they are proven out in action, they guide future performance.<sup>21</sup>

Mahoney summarizes the theory: “Man is viewed as a complex organism capable of impressive adaptation. He is in a continuous reciprocity relationship with his environment. . . . Behavior changes are influenced by the current physiological state of the organism, his past learning history, the existing environmental situation, and a variety of interdependent cognitive processes (e.g., selective attention, anticipated consequences, etc.).”<sup>22</sup>

The cognitive capacity to represent potential outcomes in symbolic form is the basis for behavioral self-management. It explains such common practices as buying in anticipation of shortages, saving for the future, and generally adopting or avoiding action pathways that are prospectively rewarding or punishing – based, of course, on past social learning. Through this capability, “. . . future consequences can be converted into current motivators that influence behavior in much the same way as actual consequences.”<sup>23</sup>

*Reinforcement* – Reinforcement that follows response is the lodestone for understanding and predicting operant behavior. A recent study of “The Relative Efficiency of Stimulus Versus Reinforcement Control . . .”<sup>24</sup> partially explains the emphasis on reinforcement in social learning. In the experiment, designed to reduce manufacturing defects on an assembly line by both stimulus and reinforcement control of behavior, it was found that prior stimulus controls were not likely to be effective when in conflict with earlier conditioning or an active reinforcer, and under some conditions reinforcer control alone was sufficient for stable behavioral change.<sup>25</sup> A fundamental implication is that to understand current behavior one must know the learning history of the individual or group: “the causes of . . . behavior . . . are found in the way behavior has been related to reinforcement in the past.”<sup>26</sup>

Reinforcement can occur below awareness levels; however, given that behavioral consequences have several potential functions – information, motivation, and reinforcement – learning is more effective when contingencies are known. In this vein, reinforcement not only increases

the probability of a behavior, but it serves to bring the response under the influence of a particular stimulus. The caution here is that neither the prior stimulus nor consequent reinforcement create the behavior, but rather both increase the probability for it.

Consider as an illustration of reinforcement the Welfare Rights Organization member who attends a first meeting and follow-up protest at the welfare office, anticipating the rewarding prospect of receiving a special grant for household furnishings and winter clothing. If the hoped-for benefits materialize, a rewarding outcome, not only is the participatory behavior more probable in the future, but the controlling effects of prior stimuli for such behavior are more potent.

## Self-Management

The cognitive element in social learning theory expands its explanatory power beyond environmental variables. As Bandura describes the thinking process in self-management, “. . . a person sets . . . explicit standards of achievement and creates either self-rewarding or self-punishing consequences depending on the quality of . . . behavior relative to . . . [the] self-imposed standards.”<sup>27</sup> Self-managed reinforcement systems produce dual outcomes, an *internal* self-evaluation and an *external* consequence.<sup>28</sup>

Self-management may be recognized as the behavior that constitutes “autonomous” personality. The independent person, with characteristics of exceptional dedication and self-discipline in the face of diversions, may be recalled as an outstanding example of self-management. The heroic figures of Gandhi and King, the best-known modern proponents of non-violence, come to mind.

Self-reinforcement systems are “acquired” by selective reinforcement: “people learn to evaluate their [own] behavior partly on the basis of how others have reacted to it.”<sup>29</sup> Standards are conveyed by significant others in their approval and disapproval of responses. Modeling is another route to self-management, with standards for self-reinforcement learned by observation and imitation. Experiments show that “people tend to adopt standards of self-reinforcement displayed by exemplary models, they evaluate their own performance relative to that standard, and then they serve as their own reinforcing agents.”<sup>30</sup> Regardless of origins, self-managed behavior *per se* is sustained externally because social systems commonly reward high standards for self-reinforcement.<sup>31</sup>

Taking self-management a step further, Bandura points out that it may be accomplished not only by control of actual contingencies, but also via the actor’s control of *symbolic* consequences. Potential outcomes are translated into cognitive symbols that possess reinforcing properties. An organization leader may self-reinforce difficult or unpleasant behavior through a tangible reward, say a night out to a movie, or through a symbolic reward like self-congratulations. The strength of self-management by symbolic consequences may be sufficient to sustain behavior with minimal external support, and to override conflicting external reinforcers.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to self-management by control of reinforcers, the same purpose may be achieved by manipulating prior environmental stimuli. An organization’s collective decision to prohibit alcohol at business meetings is an instance of self-management through stimulus control: an important environmental cue for inappropriate behavior is eliminated.

While risking the confusion of viewing pictures within pictures, there is the unavoidable question, what is the “self” in self-management? The self is conceptualized as multiple response systems dynamically interrelated. It is a behavioral repertoire – a social learning history – that enables adaptation to the environment. Personality characteristics, more precisely behaviors, are

linked to particular complex patterns of prior and reinforcing stimuli and state variables of deprivation and satiation.

Consider Staats' comment: "Personalities' determine the individuals' present and future behaviors. *But the personality characteristics, although general and enduring, are themselves learned.* It is suggested that man learns complex repertoires of interrelated types of behavior. . . . with the acquisition of one repertoire leading into . . . a more complex repertoire. . . . Because these personality characteristics are relatively enduring . . . , they help give the erroneous impression of internal psychodynamic causation."<sup>33</sup>

The self or personality, then, is acknowledged in part as ". . . a *hypothetical cause* of action," a reinterpretation of largely external variables into internal agents or causes.<sup>34</sup> Given the inconsistency of the environment for learning, personality components (behavioral repertoires) connected to specific prior and reinforcing stimuli may be manifested as "identity problems." For example, a normally passive employee may be aggressive as a member of a social action organization, each personality "trait" surfacing in response to particular stimulus variables. And so-called identity-conflict problems would not be surprising if the person's *employer* also became a member of the action group.<sup>35</sup>

Notwithstanding the importance of external environment on acquiring the behavioral repertoire comprising the self, there is, again, a reciprocal relationship between responses and controlling contingencies, stemming mainly from cognition and the capacity for self-management. It is through this reciprocal relationship that counter-control is understood. Experimental studies demonstrate that aggressive and hostile behaviors elicit similar responses that in turn have a counter-controlling effect on the environmental source of threat.<sup>36</sup> The potential for counter-control is grounded in the mutuality of ongoing relationships, a form of exchange: "in social interactions . . . participants are dependent upon each other to get what they want and consequently they have some power over each other."<sup>37</sup> The principle holds even in the most unbalanced of relationships, between rich and poor. While the former may give or withhold their resources, the latter possess the presently less powerful yet potentially compelling leverage of protest, strike, and tax resistance.

Excessive control typically produces strong emotional responses, such as fear, anxiety, depression, and rage.<sup>38</sup> Mahoney labels counter-control the "screw you" phenomenon.<sup>39</sup> It is associated in experimental studies with lack of response choices, conspicuous coercion or manipulation, and exposure to models who are themselves unresponsive to rewards and punishments.<sup>40</sup> It may also be that counter-controlling behavior is covertly self-reinforced by imagined highly valued autonomy.

## Summary

Change agents have traditionally relied on psychodynamic models of human behavior that emphasize hypothetical inner states. They tend to be circular, not verifiable experimentally, and have little predictive power. Social learning theory is scientifically based on formal experimental research. The theory encompasses stimulus events preceding behavior, cognition, response, and consequent reinforcement. Aspects closely related to organizing are operant behavior, controlled mainly by reinforcers, the potential for self-manage behavior, and conditions for counter-control.

From this overview of social learning theory, we see that behavior can be altered by rearranging elements of the social environment. As Kunkel put it, "one of the most important propo-

sitions of the behavioral perspective . . . is that behavior is replicated when contingencies remain the same, and behavior is changed when contingencies are altered.”<sup>41</sup>

## CONCEPTS & PROCEDURES

Before examining social learning concepts and procedures, we shall briefly consider an intervention strategy for their practice. As the reader may easily imagine from personal experience, to successfully influence human behavior involves more than haphazardly dispensing or arranging rewards and punishments.

### Intervention Model


Several models for intervention have been proposed, differing mainly by design for micro, mezzo, or macro applications. Some are for individual therapy, some for group or organizational change, and others for large-scale economic development.<sup>42</sup> Given our primary interest in community organizing, the model developed by Mager and Pipe is a good choice for illustration because of its systematic approach and organizational perspective.<sup>43</sup> The intervention strategy is pictured in Figure 2.

The practitioner’s first analytical step is to describe the gap between actual and desired behavior. Often at this stage there is confusion about behavioral deficits that originate in lack of knowledge or skill and those related to anticipated consequences (or the lack of them). For example, the suggestion that a staff member, one who is chronically late for mandatory meetings, be “taught” punctuality ignores the fact that more information will not solve the problem.

The second step is to determine if the discrepancy warrants a remedy. If so, it is necessary to determine whether results from an authentic skill deficiency. (The test is whether the person could perform the behavior if life itself depended on it.) A vast array of organizational problems, however, are not related to skills but the contingencies for desired behavior. And typically, when performance problems relate to environmental contingencies but are treated as skill deficits, the remedial approach to them is “you really oughta wanna.” As Mager and Pipe observe, “no amount of information, no amount of exhortation, is necessarily going to change an ‘oughta wanna’ situation. What’s needed is a change in the conditions or consequences surrounding the desired performance.”<sup>44</sup>

The model specifies four generic environmental conditions for non-performance: (1) desired behavior is punishing – consider the staff member (probably female) who is always asked to take minutes when arriving at meetings on time; (2) alternative behavior is rewarding – an instance would be when staff meetings are always scheduled during evening hours, thus interfering and competing with recreational and family activities of the workers; (3) performance is without consequences, good or bad – an illustration is when the only difference in treatment of on-time and late staff is that the latter are exhorted to be more like the former; and (4) performance is blocked by environmental obstacles – for example, public transportation may be the problem.<sup>45</sup>

Figure 2  
Mager and Pipe Intervention Model<sup>46</sup>



Bandura's hypothesis regarding expectations of personal efficacy allows for a refinement in the Mager and Pipe intervention model in the form of a *cognitive* condition for non-performance. He states that self-efficacy expectations "determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained."<sup>47</sup> There is a distinction here between "outcome" and "efficacy" expectations. A person may think that certain behavior will lead to certain results, but not be influenced by that knowledge because of doubts about personal efficacy in performing the necessary behavior. In assessing efficacy expectations, then, it is important not to confuse hopes for rewarding outcomes with belief in personal mastery.

Bandura outlines four sources of information that feed expectations of personal efficacy: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states (emotions).<sup>48</sup>

Other steps that may be added as needed to the Mager and Pipe model are (1) ensuring performance opportunities after new reinforcers have been arranged, and (2) devising an extended contingency management plan if necessary to ensure transition from artificial to natural reinforcers.

## Concepts

*Discriminative Stimuli* – As noted in our overview of social learning theory, behavior is controlled in part by prior environmental stimuli – objects, situations, information, etc. – that signify outcomes likely to follow particular actions. People learn to discriminate stimulus-consequence relationships through the reinforcing effects of earlier social learning. In grassroots organizing, spokespersons for social action organizations tend to quickly learn the importance of having a supportive constituency present when making demands on public and private officials. Without their presence, organization leaders are discounted and dismissed by officeholders, so they acquire a stimulus value. In short, any stimulus present when behavior is reinforced “. . . acquires control in the same sense that the [response] rate will be higher when it is present.”<sup>49</sup>

Establishing specific discrimination in the relationship between a stimulus and a consequence involves reinforcing a desired behavior in the presence of selected stimuli. Reinforcement is withheld in the absence of that stimuli or in the presence of some other. Thus, discrimination learning occurs. The discriminative stimulus (SD) is associated with the behavior that is reinforced; the stimulus associated with response extinction – where reinforcement is withheld – is referred to as S $\Delta$  (ess-delta). Stimulus control may be said to exist when a “. . . response is more likely to occur in the absence of the SD than in the presence of the S $\Delta$ . . .”<sup>50</sup>

The application of this principle can be seen in the responses of a grassroots organization member to stimuli such as attacks by external opponents and internal factional conflicts. In so far as the member's behaviors that show leadership are conditioned by suitable reinforcers, such as statements of respect and appreciation or election to office under the stimulus circumstances described, the impact of threatening situations is likely to be an increase in leadership behaviors.

Discriminative stimuli can be easily constructed and communicated. Virtually all forms of written instruction function as SD, from “keep-the-office-clean” signs to complex behavioral scripts for organized actions. Rules and laws are formal qualifications of discriminative stimuli.<sup>51</sup> A common use of SDs by grassroots organizations is when members wear distinctive buttons or wave flags to identify themselves during certain types of actions.<sup>52</sup> It is also possible to construct

SAs. Identifying representatives who need not be lobbied on some pending legislation by marking their names on the list creates “. . . a self-informing process wherein a response . . . is known not to be behavior that will be reinforced.”<sup>53</sup>

In considering the use of rules as discriminative stimuli for desired behavior, it is important to know that such behavior, bringing more remote consequences into play, is more deliberate and less impulsive; it appeals to intellect and logic rather than emotion; and it tends to be more monotonous for the actor.<sup>54</sup> These are all characteristics that may be problematic depending on behavioral objectives, learning history, and situational variables.

The potential for altering behavior by constructing stimuli is demonstrated in a novel experimental study to reduce shoplifting in a department store. Large cardboard stars covered with red aluminum foil were placed near merchandise frequently stolen. The result was “a dramatic reduction in missing target merchandise when the merchandise was specified [for shoppers] as being frequently taken by shoplifters.” While sales were not affected, the theft problem was “virtually eliminated.”<sup>55</sup>

Landlord-tenant problems have occasioned the novel use of stimuli constructed for strategic purposes: “Mimeographed ‘Notice to Landlord’ forms were sent to landlords. The first invited the landlord to a housing negotiation; the second, sent after a few days, specified on the first, got tougher; the third, if no answer had yet been received, informed the landlord that the MCO [Mission Coalition Organization] would take further appropriate action to get the landlord to the bargaining table. At the outset, the tables were being turned and the tenants enjoyed it. The landlord, who was always able to send 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> notices to tenants, including the eviction notice, now was being served with a notice from the tenants, supported by the community organization.”<sup>56</sup>

*Reinforcing Stimuli* – The technical term for reward is reinforcer. It is narrowly defined because of behavior that has a strengthening effect, increasing the probability that the response will be repeated in the same circumstances. The definition does not say *why* a stimulus is reinforcing: “. . . it says nothing about satisfaction or pleasure. . . .”<sup>57</sup>

Reinforcers, then, increase the probability of a response. They are positive or negative depending on whether their effect is by their appearance or disappearance. A positive reinforcer *presented* after a response *increases* its future probability, and a negative reinforcer *withdrawn* after a response has the same effect.<sup>58</sup> The timing of reinforcement is critical because it may affect *whatever* behavior it immediately follows. There is always a danger of accidental conditioning, stimulating superstitious behavior.

One method of determining the presence of reinforcing activities is by observation of naturally occurring behavior. The Premack principal predicts that “if one activity occurs more frequently than another, it will be an effective reinforcer for that other activity.”<sup>59</sup> In a community organization, if “socializing” occurs more often than “business” behaviors, the former may be scheduled as a reinforcer for the latter.

Prerequisites for successful reinforcement include introducing the response to be reinforced; selection of powerful, durable reinforcers appropriate to the behavioral objective; and arranging for reinforcing events to follow desired behavior.<sup>60</sup> Generally, for a consequence to be reinforcing it must immediately follow the response. It will also reinforce in diminishing degrees, however, more distant earlier responses. Bandura states that the general rule of diminished effect from delayed reinforcement is qualified for humans when reinforcing contingencies are specified in advance. In other words, reinforcement can be postponed without loss of effect when the individual cognitively connects present behavior with ultimate consequences.<sup>61</sup> But it may be necessary to arrange “subsidiary immediate incentives” pending long-term payoffs. Interim

substitutes may range from tangible rewards to social recognition.

Most unconditioned or primary reinforcers are related to biological needs for air, water, food, and heat. Not only is primary reinforcement more powerful than its conditioned counterpart, but actors must also often be deprived of it for the secondary reinforcers to be effective. Other powerful reinforcers are affection and body contact, and opportunities for new and exploratory behaviors. Subjects in experimental studies consistently manifest a preference for exploring, sometimes at the expense of food.<sup>62</sup> Then, too, “. . . deprivation of activity serves as a drive operation for *activity*,” increasing its value as a reinforcer.<sup>63</sup> (Emphasis mine.)

Conditioned reinforcers in the organizational world are often in the form of social approval, praise, and attention. Social reinforcers differ from those in the “mechanical environment” by being more flexible, less consistent. For several reasons, planned social rewards and punishments tend to drift.<sup>64</sup>

A generalized reinforcer is one that has been linked numerous times with many different primary and secondary reinforcers, that is, with a variety of deprivation states. Their power decreases if not occasionally re-paired. Approval and money can be especially good, generalized reinforcers because they are independent of deprivation and satiation and are easily conveyed and exchanged. While they can be used for conditioning new responses, maintenance of the behavior requires that reinforcers be present in the natural environment. Compliance with the demands of another is a generalized social reinforcer: “. . . the power it gives . . . is a generalized means, parallel to money, which can be used to attain a variety of ends.”<sup>65</sup>

It is not at all uncommon in organizational settings to find individuals and groups reinforcing destructive and punishing behavior that conforms to consensually validated norms.<sup>66</sup> The importance of this fact is that displacement of organizational goals is often related to “. . . unofficial contingencies [that] reinforce non-goal-oriented behavior which is not counter-balanced by group-approved sanctions.”<sup>67</sup> The effect, overall, is to undermine formal and ongoing patterns of reinforcement within the organization. From micro to macro frames, at least three likely results have been identified when there is “. . . a lack of the contrived reinforcers which induce people to observe rules . . . to behave ‘for the good of others’”:<sup>68</sup> (1) there is an increasing probability for attention-getting “deviant” behavior by individuals;<sup>69</sup> (2) there is what Haggstrom calls an organizational “power bind” – when an organization is unable to develop or maintain its internal power structure, members must cease relying on it to “stabilize, regulate, reward, and punish them”;<sup>70</sup> and (three) when the larger normative social fabric disintegrates, people are described as lacking values or being anomic.<sup>71</sup>

The effect of reinforcers on behavior has been shown in several mezzo-level applications. Anti-littering behaviors have been established and maintained by arranging special privileges or small rewards (25¢) for bags of litter collected and turned in.<sup>72</sup> So-called pedestrian behaviors for school-age children – making a complete stop at the intersection curb, looking in all directions for oncoming traffic, etc. – have been successfully maintained using social approval, candy, and “Good Pedestrian Citation” awards as reinforcers.<sup>73</sup> And reinforcers in the form of services (advocacy), information, and “Christian toys” were shown “. . . to attract new [welfare rights organization] members regularly, but not necessarily to keep them.”<sup>74</sup>

Bailis contends that the “Boston model” for National Welfare Rights Organization affiliate-organizing was initially successful because it addressed the interests of members, leaders, and staff. The mechanism was a loophole in Massachusetts’ welfare regulations through which staff could guarantee supplemental welfare grants for participation in welfare rights activities, thus inducing large numbers of public assistance recipients to attend meetings and demonstrations. As Bailis puts it, “the organizers needed members to have a group, the leaders needed

members in order to lead, and the members needed the group to get their benefits. . . .”<sup>75</sup>

*Schedules of Reinforcement* – There are two broad categories of reinforcement scheduling, continuous and intermittent. When continuous, each response is reinforced, an artificial laboratory condition not often found in the social world. When intermittent, reinforcement follows response occasionally. Intermittent reinforcement may be delivered on a fixed or variable ratio to response, and may be scheduled by fixed or variable time intervals.

The characteristic effects of different reinforcement scheduling have been verified by extensive experimentation. With continuous reinforcement (CRF), behavior continues at a high rate if reinforcers are maintained. Each performance is rewarding. The potential disadvantages of CRF schedules are (1) the danger of premature satiation, and (2) rapid extinction if reinforcement is interrupted for any reason. Another potential disadvantage is excessive cost. CRF schedules are especially useful for conditioning new, unstable, or low-level behaviors. Intermittent reinforcement can produce high rates of response and has the advantage of avoiding early satiation. Most important, intermittent reinforcement results in behavior more resistant to extinction from subsequent withholding of reinforcers.

Fixed-ratio (FR) intermittent scheduling delivers reinforcers contingent on a specified number of responses, as with reward in the form of vacation pay given for working a set number of days. Fixed-ratio reinforcement can sustain high, stable response rates. There is, however, a post-reinforcement pause, that is, a temporary break or diminution of response after reinforcement, the intensity of which is proportional to the ratio. With vacations, an organization might be well-advised to encourage staff to take more frequent, shortened holidays, thus minimizing post-reinforcement pause in the form of after-vacation work depression.

Variable-ratio (VR) schedules present reinforcement for a varying, random number of responses. Behavior maintained on a VR schedule also tends to be stable and resistant to extinction. The variable ratio has the added advantage of minimizing post-reinforcement pause since, as with door-to-door canvas-fundraising, reinforcement may occur at any time. VR scheduling, however, may not be effective in initiating new or maintaining weak behaviors.

Reinforcement delivered on a fixed-interval (FI) schedule ties rewarding consequences to the passage of time, but time alone without appropriate behavior is not sufficient to gain reinforcement. “Deadline” situations in daily life are variations of FI scheduling. Resulting behavior shows a slow-rising response curve for each reinforcement interval. Imagine any activity for which there is a deadline that must be met to earn reinforcement: employment tasks, household chores, or personal responsibilities – typically more is done later rather than sooner

Variable-interval (VI) schedules provide reinforcement after the passage of variable time intervals. The result is a consistent yet moderate response rate that is resistant to extinction, with few or no post-reinforcement pauses. Since the timing of reinforcers is unknown, following their delivery actors tend to immediately resume responding, but at a leisurely pace.

The contrast in reinforcement schedules is apparent in organizational approaches designed to increase “volunteering” by members for undesirable tasks, such as repetitious research, clean-up chores, etc. Continuous reinforcement might be accomplished by a set discount on dues for *each* act of volunteering. We would expect, however, that the desired behavior might diminish quickly if reinforcement were interrupted. The CRF schedule nonetheless might be a good initial strategy. A fixed-ratio solution to the problem might involve granting special status or privilege for a *set number* of instances of volunteering, always anticipating a post-reinforcement pause, but otherwise high, stable response rates. Variable-ratio scheduling might rely on *random*, informal social reinforcers, good for maintaining stable behavior and extinction resistance, but possibly not adequate for initiating new or maintaining low-level behaviors. Fixed-interval rein-

forcement for volunteering might be arranged in the form of a regularly *set time* for an annual awards banquet. Would we then anticipate more acts of volunteering as the annual dinner approached?<sup>76</sup> Finally, the variable-interval scheduling might be achieved by distributing free tickets for special events to outstanding volunteers at *random* times.<sup>77</sup>

*State Variables* – The power or value of any reinforcer is enhanced by withholding it, its effectiveness increasing with the length of deprivation. Deprivation also increases the value of a class of related reinforcing stimuli: depriving food increases the probability for several food-seeking behaviors. Deprivation is sometimes said to create a “drive” to obtain reinforcement.<sup>78</sup> In contrast, reinforcer power is diminished with more presentations, the ultimate effect being called (not caused by) satiation. Technically, a person is defined as satiated when behavior declines despite continuous reinforcement.<sup>79</sup> It is apparent that reinforcers are generally poor conditioning agents if they have not been withheld for a period.

While state variables (deprivation and satiation) have a “directive property” – food deprivation is linked to food-seeking rather than sex – the effect is related to past learning. Unless the behavioral repertoire includes the learned responses necessary to obtain reinforcement, the deprivation will not eventuate in more food-seeking behavior.

Deprivation, as an operation that increases reinforcer power, has several predictable effects on behavior. It has a *strengthening* effect on the following: resistance to satiation, response rates for behavior reinforced on variable-interval schedules, resistance to extinction, and reinforcer preference. Practical results are that people overcome more obstruction to reinforcement, complete more work, and have greater tolerance for poorer quality reinforcers.<sup>80</sup>

The effects of extended deprivation are notable: “If deprivation operations are carried out long enough, the behavior that leads to the reinforcer rises to a maximum strength, then eventually declines.”<sup>81</sup> Progressively widening a variable reinforcement ratio, increasing the number of responses required for each successive reinforcement, leads to a “breaking point,” at least a temporary cessation of responding.<sup>82</sup>

Abeles has written that relative deprivation and rising expectations are variables that “predispose” people to support social movements that promise remedies. Using a survey questionnaire, he was able to verify a relationship between deprivation and degree of militancy among urban black population. While adding some qualifications, Abeles concludes that “in general, the analyses . . . are supportive of the ‘relative deprivation’ and ‘rising expectations’ explanations of militancy.”<sup>83</sup>

*Aversive Stimuli* – An event is technically a “punisher” when it decreases the future probability of behavior it follows. Picketing the office of a politician who refuses to meet with members of a citizens’ organization is punishment for the official only to the extent it lowers the probability for the officeholder’s intransigent behavior in the future. Punishing stimuli need not have primary (unconditional) aversive characteristics but may be conditioned by association with such stimuli, that is, by pairing a neutral stimulus with a primary stimulus. Re-pairing must usually occur from time to time for conditioning to remain effective on a long-term basis.

Response cost, removal of a positive reinforcer following a response, is also an aversive contingency, which, unlike physical punishment, tends not to generate damaging emotional reactions. Thus, aversive contingencies can be arranged by identifying reinforcers and withdrawing them because of undesirable behavior. The practice of scheduling “time-out” from positive reinforcers, say by withholding a normally granted privilege, is another example of aversive stimuli. The effectiveness of time-out from reinforcers hinges on the opportunity for alternative behavior that is unpunished and reinforcing. An important principle here is that reward of reinforcers results in reduction of undesirable behavior *if* there is a response option available. But this seems

to be less true, once punishment is suspended, for behavior that is powerfully self-reinforcing.

Many studies show that response reduction is proportional to the degree of punishment,<sup>84</sup> and that the effects of punishing contingencies are generally reversible upon removal except when delivered at high intensities.<sup>85</sup> Extremely high and continued punishment is necessary to reduce undesirable behavior when few or no alternatives exist for securing positive reinforcement. Stated another way, undesirable behavior can be more efficiently eliminated when reinforcement is available for preferred responses. Under circumstances of intense punishment and absence of reinforcers for alternative responses, what may be expected is “. . . refinement rather than elimination of anti-social behavior . . . ,”<sup>86</sup> a common situation in prisons and other closed institutional settings.

Like reinforcement, punishment works best delivered as soon as possible following targeted behavior; however, short-term delays are not critical, and timeframes can be expanded by cognitive association of present behavior and future consequences. The character of punishing contingencies is typically to suppress rather than eliminate the behavior they followed. Coterminal positive reinforcement determines the “. . . reductive power of punishment and the extent to which punished responses are subsequently reinstated.”<sup>87</sup> Social learning experiments show (as already noted) that people continue behavior that is consistently and substantially punished if a small reward is occasionally given and there is no other route to reinforcement. Specifically, behavior maintained on a variable-interval schedule is not extinguished but only reduced by continuous punishment; and continuous punishment of behavior reinforced on a fixed-ratio schedule reduces response rate only slightly. Behavior reinforced on a fixed-interval schedule, however, is vulnerable to continuous punishment.<sup>88</sup>

Bandura identifies a number of variables affecting the outcome of punishment: “. . . the intensity, duration, frequency, and distribution of aversive consequences; their temporal relation to the behavior to be modified; the strength of punished responses; the availability of alternative behavior patterns that are positively reinforceable; the presence of discriminative stimuli that signify the probability that a given performance will result in adverse consequences; the level of instigation to perform the negatively sanctioned behavior; and the characteristics of punishing social agents.”<sup>89</sup>

Knowing that negative behavior can be reduced more efficiently by punishment alone than if initially rewarded and then punished, it is easier to understand that aversive contingencies delivered upon *indications* of undesirable responses are more effective than those presented after the behavior.<sup>90</sup> This sequence forecloses the possibility of the actor enjoying the reinforcing qualities of the behavior itself and thereby offsetting punishment.

*Problems with Punishment* – The use of punishment to control behavior has serious disadvantages. Beyond pain, extended exposure to punishment can produce “acute psychological bodily changes,”<sup>91</sup> the bases for stress-related illnesses such as ulcers and high blood pressure. Punishment may inhibit currently undesirable behavior that is useful in the future, assertive behavior, for example, restricted in youth, is expected for adults. This effect may be minimized by combining punishment with discrimination training. Another problem is that the *modeling* function of disciplinary action may be inconsistent with the intended aim. The most blatant example is physically punishing someone for striking another person.

In addition to retaliatory (operant) aggression against the source of punishing contingencies, the use of punishment also results in what has been labeled “elicited aggression.”<sup>92</sup> when painful external stimuli are presented to one person in the company of another, the first is likely to attack the second, notwithstanding the latter person’s lack of culpability for the initial punishment.<sup>93</sup> This is not uncommon in organizations when individual members are feeling the brunt of

punishment from external opponents: they become overly aggressive toward other members *within* the organization.

Punishment also serves to reinforce passive resistance to the person or agency that is dispensing or arranging the aversive contingency. Passive resistance – “not behaving in conformity with controlling practices” – often results when extinction has diminished efforts to rebel or escape.<sup>94</sup> Thoreau’s refusal to pay taxes for expansionist warfare and racist institutions (the Mexican war and Southern slaveholding) is an illustration of passive resistance to government control.

Within an organization, the potential for arousing fear and hostility toward a change agent can be reduced by limiting the use of punishment to *mutually*-agreed-upon contexts. Acceptance of punishment is related to one’s estimate of the change agent’s intent and the purpose of the punishment, for whose convenience and interest it is applied.<sup>95</sup> Aversive contingencies should be presented in a timely, consistent, and businesslike way, avoiding any arbitrary or vindictive overtones.

Punishment may operate as a discriminative stimulus for future *rewards* (and punishment). The problem arises because a punisher is still a stimulus: “. . . it can be inadvertently associated with reinforcing stimuli, with periods of reinforcement, with periods of extinction, and with other punishing stimuli.”<sup>96</sup> The punishing value of a stimulus, by selective temporal linkage, may be strengthened, neutralized, or reversed.

Escape behavior is an important disadvantage of using punishment in community organizations. Because of escape attempts, punishment in natural settings may compound behavior problems. Avoidance is another punishment-related response that is often more troublesome than the initial behavioral problem. When escape is not possible, people attempt to avoid punishment before it occurs.

Escape behavior can be reduced by having more positive reinforcers in the punishing environment. Escape is transformed into avoidance when the actor can circumvent punishment by engaging in appropriate behavior. Avoidance of punishment creates its own maintaining conditions and is more resistant to extinction than escape behavior. The reason appears to be that while the nature of extinguishing escape behavior (withholding punishment) informs the actor immediately that aversive consequences are no longer in effect, with avoidance the actor’s response – prior in time to punishment – precludes a determination of whether punishers are still present.

Azrin and Holz conclude that although punishment reduces behavior, it is less useful for *eliminating* it. They suggest a number of maxims to increase punishing effects: precise specification of targeted behavior and aversive contingency, constant contact between actor and punishment, and minimal fear- or anxiety-producing qualities.<sup>97</sup> They also recommend the following optimum conditions for punishment: escape foreclosed, intensity maximized,<sup>98</sup> scheduling continuous, delivery immediate, extended low-intensity punishers avoided, punishing stimuli not connected with positive reinforcement, positive reinforcers for undesired behavior reduced, punishment and SD for extinction, and reinforcers presented for preferred alternative responses.<sup>99</sup>

## Procedures

We have reviewed the main concepts for social learning – discriminative stimuli, reinforcement, state variables, and punishment – and move on now to consider procedures for their application in practice.

*Differential Reinforcement* – Reinforcement for preferred behavior was suggested above

as one of the ways to enhance the efficacy of punishing events. Differential reinforcement (DR) is the process of reinforcing one response from a class of behavior and withholding reinforcers from other instances. A DR procedure would be to ignore someone who interrupts others during a meeting, calling on the person to speak only during periods when not interrupting.

An interesting laboratory study of differential reinforcement is reported by Hastorf.<sup>100</sup> Four subjects were assigned to discuss “problem cases” from their job experiences. Each subject faced a small box with red and green lights, not visible to the others, which “experts” in an adjoining room could activate and thereby reinforce or punish verbal responses. Unknown to the subjects, the lights were operated not to provide evaluative feedback for contributions to problem-solving, but to reinforce one person’s verbal output and withhold reinforcers from the others. Not only did the target subject’s verbal behaviors increase, but so too did perceptions of that person as a leader by the other participants in the study. A reasonable conclusion is that differential social reinforcement can be helpful in developing leadership potential by reinforcing verbal risk-taking.

*Successive Approximation* – Shaping, or the reinforcement of successive approximations of a desired *terminal* behavior, employs differential reinforcement. One response is selected from all others and is reinforced. By differential reinforcement of successive approximations, shaping establishes new behavior not formally in the actor’s repertoire.

Two response characteristics may be targeted in shaping: topography – behavior in relation to surrounding space; and intensity – the strength or “force” of a response. The first step is to decide on the desired terminal behavior. The person is then observed closely to identify an existing response, termed the initial response, that is in some way related to the terminal response, even if only distantly. The initial response is then reinforced. Then another response, more closely resembling the terminal behavior, is identified and reinforced; and so on, in a series of successive approximations, until the actual terminal behavior appears and can be directly reinforced.

Shaping is used in recruiting organization members. Organizers use agitation and other means to surface deeply felt issues that are energy sources for citizen action. As prospective members express resentment for past injuries and injustices, the incentives for membership, successive verbal approximations of the desired terminal behavior – paying membership dues – are reinforced by the organizer. The first approximation may be a statement vaguely critical of a particular official, the last may be a question to the organizer asking, what can be done?

A novel variation of shaping is the “trapping” procedure used in preschool described by Baer and Wolf.<sup>101</sup> They state that one approach to shaping behavior is to introduce the person into an existing, ongoing “. . . community of fellow behavior modifiers. . . .”<sup>102</sup> Permanent decision-making bodies in community organizations, like other social learning environments, are mini-communities of reinforcement contingencies that shape and maintain behavior. Members share and are subject to common expectations about behavior and its consequences. In lieu of attempting to shape an individual’s behavior to be appropriate for a leadership role, a simple entry response – seeking nomination to office – may suffice: “. . . once entered [by election], the trap cannot be resisted in creating general behavioral change.”<sup>103</sup> the new environment constitutes a massive behavior change program, and the shaping of an entry response is all that is required to bring the contingencies to bear.

*Modeling* – Most new behavior is a result of modeling rather than shaping. This is especially true of complex behavior in natural settings. Bandura relates that “. . . responses are typically acquired through modeling in large segments or *in toto* rather than in piecemeal, trial-and-error fashion.”<sup>104</sup> Learning that occurs through direct experience, then, can almost always be achieved indirectly by observation of others’ behavior and its consequences. This process is

identified as modeling, imitation, observational learning, identification, copying, vicarious learning, and so on. It may be overt, as commonly understood, or covert. In the latter, learning takes place by *imagining* modeling situations without using actual external models.<sup>105</sup>

Competent models reduce the risk of learning new behavior because usually “. . . a good example is . . . a much better teacher than the consequences of unguided actions.”<sup>106</sup> This type of learning is not exclusively imitative but can result in innovative behavior when there are opportunities to observe diverse models. Although observational learning is more efficient, direct experience of reinforcers is necessary for long-term maintenance of responses.

Bandura specifies four keys to observational learning: attention to modeled behavior, verbal or image representation for long-term retention, adequate motor coordination, and reinforcement for overt performance.<sup>107</sup> The last point bears further clarification because social learning theory distinguishes between observational learning and actual performance. Although response capabilities can be acquired by observation of the model, *performance* of what has been learned may not be activated without appropriate reinforcing incentives. Observation without performance leads to acquisition of the modeled responses in cognitive, representational forms (images or language symbols). Stimuli are encoded into memory and function as mediators for later responses.

Performance may also be retarded, as noted earlier, by low expectations of personal efficacy. Self-efficacy is most improved when people experience performance accomplishments. Bandura states that “participant modeling” is a clearly better aid to successful performance than modeling, symbolic desensitization, or covert modeling.<sup>108</sup> The process encompasses modeling, behavior rehearsals (role-play), and “guided reinforcement”: “Desired activities are repeatedly modeled, preferably by different models, who demonstrate progressively more difficult performances. . . . After the demonstration, individuals are provided with necessary guidance and ample opportunities to enact the modeled behaviors under favorable [reinforcing] conditions. . . . Various response-induction aids are used whenever needed to assist participants through difficult performances.”<sup>109</sup>

People are selective in the responses they reproduce, an indication that imitation is as much a function of imagined utility as immediate reinforcement. Not all models are copied, only those whose behavior is judged to have some usefulness, based on past social learning. Observers learn to judge models through situational cues such as age, sex, socio-economic status, and other factors.

Beyond acquisition of new behavior, exposure to models may inhibit or disinhibit previously learned responses. Inhibitions are strengthened or weakened by vicarious experience of a model’s rewards and punishments. Vicarious punishment diminishes the probability for similar behavior, even when punishment is self-administered. In vicarious positive reinforcement, seeing modeled behavior that is ordinarily disapproved go unpunished has the same effect as observing rewards for that behavior.

Modeling can also be a source of vicarious emotional conditioning. The observer is vicariously conditioned to the stimuli impinging the model. The observer infers the model’s emotional state from a variety of behavioral cues such as facial expressions, vocalizations, etc. These “affective [emotional] expressions” serve as conditioned aversive stimuli for observers. Bandura explains: “If affective expressions of others have been repeatedly followed by emotional consequences for observers, affective social cues alone gradually attain the power to instigate emotional reactions in observers.”<sup>110</sup> The observer is presumed to identify with the model, self-imagining the pain or pleasure.

There are many experimental studies of modeling. One especially relevant for community

organizers demonstrated the effect of behaviorally oriented training (using models) on development of problem-solving responses in meetings of a community board.<sup>111</sup> Prior to the training, board meetings (for a head-start program) were fragmented, chaotic, and unproductive. Clear decisions were not being made, or when rarely made, were not carried out. The experimenters identified three terminal behaviors: problem identification and isolation, specification and evaluation of alternative solutions, and solution choice coupled with implementation strategy.<sup>112</sup> The successful training involved model presentation of these behaviors with follow-up role-playing and reinforcement.

Other studies have shown that modeling by actors can be more effective than by natural models,<sup>113</sup> and that covert modeling, while requiring significantly less time and personnel resources, can produce results comparable to overt modeling.<sup>114</sup>

Luthans and Kreitner have proposed a seven-step modeling strategy that includes: (1) identification of target behavior that will improve performance; (2) selection of appropriate model (or medium); (3) determination that subject has skill requirements for terminal behavior; (4) creation of a favorable learning environment; (5) modeling terminal behavior and consequences; (6) providing positive reinforcement for learning progress; and (7) strengthening new behavior by scheduling appropriate reinforcers.<sup>115</sup>

While observational learning initially relies on exposure to actual or pictorial modeling cues, with adequate language skills responses may be guided by verbal cues alone, as with instruction manuals for operating complex equipment. Verbal instructions – spoken or written – serve as imitative discriminative stimuli, “. . . a symbolic model for the subject to imitate.”<sup>116</sup>

*Behavioral Rehearsal* – Methods of behavioral rehearsal, that is, enactment of problem situations and their solutions, sometimes called role-playing, are useful in several ways. Skill development may be achieved by observing and then copying a model. Rehearsals can be used to retain learned responses when performance is delayed, and like modeling itself, the practice sessions may be overt or covert. Role-playing is also helpful for desensitizing conditioned fearful or anxious feelings that are related to problem situations. However, role-playing *per se* maybe anxiety-producing for certain individuals and the procedure should emphasize the *play* aspects of the activity.

Role-playing has been used successfully in many different settings. Two examples that may be of interest to community organizers involve teaching negotiation and public speaking behaviors. In the first, three parent-child pairs were taught negotiation responses using descriptions of response options, behavioral rehearsal, and reinforcement.<sup>117</sup> Training consisted of (1) “pre-session simulation,” presenting hypothetical conflict situations to role-play without instruction; (2) discussion and practice, based on a procedure designated “Situations – Options – Consequences – Simulation” in which trainers and subjects alternated matching response options with consequences, discussing which of the latter were most desirable and practicing selected options; and (3) post-session simulation, similar to the pre-session mode but with negotiation as a new option. Three kinds of terminal negotiation behaviors were identified: complete statements of position accompanied by a request for an evaluative response; statements that identify issues in conflict; and statements that propose alternative forms of issue resolution, preferably accompanied by a request for an evaluative response.<sup>118</sup> Training included terminal agreement behaviors: “compliant agreements,” where one party capitulates to the initial position of the other; and negotiated agreements that represent a compromise, not satisfying the original position of either party.<sup>119</sup>

The second study, to teach public speaking behaviors, relied mainly on an instructional package with scripts and presentation of models on slides.<sup>120</sup> Terminal behaviors included audi-

ence eye contact, appropriate dramatic gestures, introduction acknowledgments, etc.<sup>121</sup> After reviewing the instruction manual and being quizzed, behavior was rehearsed, with feedback on performance, until the required mastery was achieved.

*Extinction* – Decreasing undesirable behavior may be accomplished by withholding reinforcement previously given for the targeted response. Reducing behavior by extinction procedure, however, is not the same as punishment. With the latter, a positive reinforcer is removed or an aversive stimulus is presented contingent on performance of the undesired behavior. By way of illustration, abusive verbal behavior in organization meetings, reinforced by attention from others present, may be reduced by the extinction procedure of withholding the attention. The chairperson may *as a rule* refuse to recognize and give the floor to anyone who is engaging in abusive verbal behavior.<sup>122</sup> Punishment for such behavior might simply take the form of a monetary fine for each outburst.

A decrease in behavior is best achieved by discontinuing positive reinforcers and rewarding instead incompatible but desirable behavior (differential reinforcement). The procedure may be complicated when sources of reinforcement are not amenable to control or when reinforcers are not withdrawn consistently. The rate of reduction in response is a function of past reinforcement consistency, effort required for the targeted response, deprivation level during extinction, the actor's ability to apprehend changes in reinforcement, and options for reinforcers through other behavior.<sup>123</sup>

Extinction procedures can also be used to decrease avoidance behavior. Responses that are geared to avoid known aversive consequences are reduced when the avoidance behavior is prevented and punishment is not forthcoming. This method – preventing avoidance responses in threatening situations where punishers are no longer present – produces quick changes in behavior, although there is likely to be temporary lag in reduction of related fears and anxieties. Another approach to decrease avoidance behavior is repeated activation of the response in circumstances that are not reinforcing, called “mass practice.” Citizen-activists who avoid public demonstrations from fear of consequences<sup>124</sup> may be engaged in such behavior via massed practice in *realistic* rehearsals. Decrease of avoidance behavior can also be accomplished by introducing aversive stimuli at weak intensities – not sufficient to evoke avoidance – and “gradually increasing their threat value until the most fearsome situations have been neutralized.”<sup>125</sup> Possibly the least effective method of eliminating avoidance behavior is application of high-intensity punishment.

A good example of extinction to decrease avoidance behavior is the way the United Farm Workers Union uses a picket line. Matthiessen quotes Chavez: ““Oh, the picket line is a beautiful thing, because it does something to a human being. People associate strikes with violence, and we've removed the violence [from picketing].””<sup>126</sup> In effect, the fear and avoidance of participation on the picket line is diminished when avoidance is “prevented” and anticipated violence does not materialize.

Positive incentives, too, may play an important role in decreasing inappropriate avoidance if actors are to overcome conditioned fears and remain in threatening situations. Social reinforcers are often used for this purpose. One form of positive incentives is feedback on performance that gives the actor confirmation of progress. Caucus sessions, where organization members convene privately for mutual counsel during an action or negotiations, often secondarily serve this purpose.

Extinction may occur vicariously through observing a model. A model engaged in fear-provoking behavior without being subjected to punishment serves to reduce an observer's fears and inhibitions. Avoidance responses per se may be vicariously diminished by exposing observ-

ers to a model undergoing graduated punishment. The fear-provoking stimulus is introduced at very low intensity to forestall avoidance, and then incrementally increased.

There are three main factors in modeled extinction of avoidance behavior: observation of a model whose fearless behavior does not result in punishment, incidental information received regarding feared stimuli, and immediate contact with such stimuli without unfavorable consequences.<sup>127</sup>

*Group Contingencies* – Procedures for influencing behavior by arranging discriminative and reinforcing stimuli for collectivities rather than individuals have been developed and tested mainly in institutional settings, particularly schools and therapeutic programs. Yet knowledge of group contingency practices derived from institutional experience has promising applications for community organizers.

In many social settings, task assignments, performance, and consequences may be administered by individuals or a group, and in various combinations. Two types of group contingencies extensively studied are *collective reinforcement* contingent on (1) a single individual's performance or (2) a group performance. Hayes reviews numerous experiments that show the effectiveness of group consequences to alter individual behavior.<sup>128</sup> The subject's undesirable behavior in these instances is a discriminative stimulus for group behavior: collective pressure is applied to alter the targeted behavior because the group is punished for the individual's inappropriate responses and rewarded for appropriate ones. A possible problem here is that the subject may be incapable of performance but nonetheless put under intense peer pressure. Another potential drawback is that when group consequences are arranged for the behavior of one or more members, the result may be a continuing loss of group rewards if an individual finds inappropriate behavior sufficiently reinforcing.

Group behavior may be assessed by combining or averaging individual performances. For example, a canvas-fundraising operation might improve its income by giving group rewards when its revenues from all canvassers' receipts for a certain period exceed a set amount.

Group consequences for group behavior tend to foster cooperation among participants. In one study, group consequences tied to the poorest performing members led to more cooperation than individual rewards.<sup>129</sup> In another study, where group response costs were used to reduce cash register shortages in a small family restaurant, workers handling money had to make up losses in equal shares.<sup>130</sup> The authors state that group response costs “. . . immediately [and substantially] reduced the undesired cash shortages. . . .”<sup>131</sup> Group reinforcement or punishment is especially useful when the particular individuals behaving inappropriately cannot be identified.

Hayes finds in reviewing the literature on group contingencies that comparisons of individual and group consequences are inconclusive.<sup>132</sup> Some studies find both arrangements equally effective, others find group reinforcement superior. Hayes concludes that “. . . situational factors should be the most important consideration in determining whether group contingencies are appropriate,”<sup>133</sup> and she passes on the suggestion that the best approach may be to combine the two strategies.

Apart from *effectiveness*, studies at Achievement Place, a small residential treatment program for teenage boys, indicate that “individual assignment-individual consequence” was most preferred and “group assignment-group consequence” was least preferred.<sup>134</sup>

*Self-Management* – Our earlier review of self-reinforcement suggested that in certain situations it may be a more powerful influence on behavior than external contingencies. People self-administer rewards and punishments based on how well their performances meet their own standards. The process is initially established by selective reinforcement in socialization. Bandura emphasizes the role of modeling, that we learn how and when to reward and punish our-

selves by observing models.<sup>135</sup>

There are several practical self-management techniques. Self-imposed satiation or deprivation – arguing out one’s position on an issue before a meeting, or vice versa – is one route. Eliminating or introducing discriminative or reinforcing stimuli that have known effects on respondent and operant behavior is another. Self-management can also be achieved by constructing problem-solving stimuli – for instance, denoting past behavior to preclude re-covering the same ground, as when canvas-fundraisers mark on a street map at the end of each work day the blocks they have canvassed; or by setting up aversive consequences that lead to desirable escape behavior – an example is when an organization makes a public announcement that some action will be taken, creating an incentive for the specified behavior through escape from the aversive consequences of failure to make good on the promise. Self-imposed physical restraint, say clenching one’s teeth together or leaving the room as means to avoid an inappropriate outburst during sensitive negotiations, can also accomplish self-management purposes. The list can be further extended by the practice of arranging or presenting stimuli to induce desired behavior later, as with an appointment calendar. A final method of self-control, one without parallel in the control of others, is engaging in alternative behavior to avoid punishment, as with changing the subject to avoid an unpleasant topic.

Successful self-management requires external or self-administered reinforcements. The self-managing individual must not only provide rewards and punishments but must arrange for them to be consequences of particular responses. There must also be well-defined terminal behavior and some type of contractual agreement (possibly with oneself) “. . . to practice self-controlling behaviors in . . . daily activities.”<sup>136</sup>

The prospect for orchestrated self-management by large population groups is now being actively considered by way of preventive healthcare programs. A recent article in the *New England Journal of Medicine* enthusiastically commented on the present possibilities for large-scale behavior change through self-control, pointing out that “. . . the passive role of the patient is transformed into the active one of participant.”<sup>137</sup>

## Summary

Reviewing social learning concepts and procedures makes clear the potential for applying the theory to community organizing. While the intervention strategies discussed are not drawn from community organization settings, they are nonetheless relevant for organizing. The dynamics of discriminative and reinforcing stimuli, reinforcement scheduling, and punishment can be readily seen in the interorganizational social action-field in which organizers operate. These principles are acknowledged in our own actions as well as those of allies, adversaries, and third parties. The social learning procedures for modeling, shaping, role-playing, differential reinforcement, and extinction are the practical tools for initiating, altering, maintaining, and eliminating behavior.

## ORGANIZING TECHNOLOGY

Boorstin tells us that the leaders of the American Revolution “. . . were interested less in the ideology . . . than in the technology of politics”; and he goes on to say, “they were testing

well-known principles by applying them to their specific problems.”<sup>138</sup> That is exactly the purpose here: to analyze problems in community organizing using social learning concepts.

Technology of organizational behavior has been defined as “. . . the mechanical techniques and abstract knowledge that are employed by humans to help attain organizational objectives.”<sup>139</sup> It may be helpful to conceptualize technology as a package of information that is a cognitive and behavioral script for a *specific* practice outcome. Analogizing to medical practice, heart transplant technology has a single, specific medical objective – successful transplantation (and recovery) – and brings together various types of information for that purpose. Equivalents in community organizing are housemeeting and canvassing technologies. Practice technology, whether for health or social well-being, integrates a range of information, from theory to specialized techniques: one learns epigenetics and suturing in medicine and community power structures and role-playing in organizing.

Technology in the present sense is praxis, a combination of science, technical craft, and art. It is a manifestation of behavioral reciprocity, that is, a continuing response to the human condition, always growing and changing as people seek new solutions to their problems. It never relies exclusively on experimental science, but may draw on history, philosophy, and other sources. The essential function is to inform practice with understanding and prediction sufficient to influence the numerous individual and group actors, forces, and events in the action-field. The focus may shift back and forth from individuals and dyads through small groups to organizations and larger collectivities. To remain vital, technology must be sustained by contemporary practice and theory development<sup>140</sup> – and in turn it must foster values and ethics, and be sensitive to biases of sponsoring organizations, the profession, and social class.

Organizing technologies fit into the generic social work problem-solving process. Goldstein marks the onset of practice as when “the social worker enters the problem situation with a knowledge base and an *array of strategies*. . . .”<sup>141</sup> (Emphasis mine.) Every organizer begins with a repertoire of specialized behaviors and cognitive knowledge, with incipient to sophisticated technologies for recurring tasks.

The application of social learning concepts to community organization practice can be approached several ways. Weisner proposes formulation of decision-rules, or what may be termed “if-then” postulates for practice.<sup>142</sup> A decision-rule specifies that, under certain conditions, certain actions (the “ifs”) will lead to certain outcomes (the “thens”). In contrast, technology is developed here as a “practical art,” that is, a practice role, a conger of integrated specialized behaviors. Rather than generating an if-then formula to guide action, social learning theory and concepts are used to derive from a community organizing experience behavioral segments for a practice role-construct. The distinction is admittedly subtle: decision-rules in practice technology are not exclusive but reflect different emphases, the first mezzo or macro context and the second micro intervention, although both may encompass the full range of social action, from individual to institution.

Two segments of practice technology are spelled out in this final section by looking at the life of a social-action organization, the Mission Coalition Organization (MCO), through the social learning lens. The analysis is made possible by a participant-observer account<sup>143</sup> of this community organization and a descriptive narrative by its principal organizer.<sup>144</sup>

My assumption is that it is not possible by *ex post facto* analysis to explain with certainty the success or failure of complex organizations. That kind of second-guessing is a cheap shot at the people who invested their time, energy, and resources in the hope of achieving worthwhile change. Examining the life of the MCO serves then not as a platform to criticize or re-do, but to learn. The task is to discern important events, decisions, and action-sequences, and to sensitively

draw out practice technology by applying the social learning framework. My intention has been to take care not to ignore the work of dedicated organizers, and their realities, resources, and contingencies.

It may be argued that only an insider can “really *know*” what happens in an organization. But then of course there is the difficult question about limitations and prejudices of those who have stakes in the organization. The insider argument is also weakened by the counter that the person presumably in a position to know the organization best – a leader or staff member – does not share the same experiences (learning history) and social realities as the organization’s fund-raisers, citizen members, or middle-level leaders.

It is an untenable assertion that only an inside principal can fully understand, accurately portray, and evaluate the life of an organization. The argument runs that one must not only be an insider, but to understand any single decision or action-sequence, there must be personal involvement in the preceding activities; supposedly one must know firsthand all the actors and their contacts and communications. If this is true, it seems preferable to have the account of a competent and credentialed participant-observer rather than an inside principal. We proceed now to a review and analysis of the MCO based on such an account.

## Background of the Mission Coalition

The population of the Mission neighborhood remained stable at about 50,000 for three decades, from 1940 through 1970. While the neighborhood includes several ethnic groups, with Latinos in the majority, a definite feeling of community exists among Mission residents. Regarding community organization, many of the Spanish-speaking were resident aliens and reluctant to get involved in “militant causes.”

The Mission’s residents in 1968 were (and still are) living under conditions of social deprivation in terms of income, employment, housing, and crime.<sup>145</sup> Median income in 1970 was significantly less than for the average family in the city, \$7,354 compared to \$10,503. Nearly a quarter of the district’s population fell below the Social Security Administration’s poverty level (\$3,743 for a family of four). Approximately three-quarters of male family heads were blue-collar or service workers. In 1970 unemployment was at 10.5 percent, compared to the 7.3 percent citywide average. Household overcrowding was nearly twice the rate of most of their neighborhoods, and in 1969 a Mission resident was 50 percent more likely to be a victim of burglary or auto theft than the average person.

The MCO was preceded by a successful single-issue organization that halted an urban renewal project slated for the neighborhood. The Mission Council on Redevelopment, drawing together more than 50 local organizations, represented a broad-based coalition that opposed full-scale renewal in the Mission. It was a forerunner for the Alinsky-style MCO design “. . . to weld all the various existing organizations in the community into a single, powerful coalition that can be said to speak for the entire community”<sup>146</sup> – an organization of organizations.

The new coalition organization first took form as the Mission Community Action Committee, with support from Catholic Church groups and the Community Service Organization. It favored and fought for “target area control” with the Equal Opportunity Council (the OEO Community Action Agency) to ensure representation of the Mission’s Latin population in the so-called war on poverty. And it was in winning the fight for neighborhood control of poverty programs that, “. . . for the first time, made Mission community leaders truly understand the need for a communitywide umbrella organization.”<sup>147</sup> The Community Action Committee was replaced

by the Mission Area Community Action Board, Inc. (MACABI), a decentralized arm of the Equal Opportunity Council.

In early 1968 at a second annual MACABI conference, Mayor Alioto announced he would seek Model Cities funding for the Mission if asked by a broad-based organization within the district. The call was taken up by organizers earlier involved in the successful campaign to stop urban renewal in the Mission. They saw an opportunity to develop a multi-issue coalition.

The MCO's first year was not especially noteworthy for winning victories, much of the time bogged down in bargaining over Model Cities and responding to issues already defined by small member-groups. Spanish-speaking student members, for example, demanded that the coalition support the San Francisco State College strike.

Throughout the second year, with several substantial short-term victories, participation on such committees as housing and employment showed rapid gains. The principal organizer describes the operation of the employment committee: "We call it the 'point system.' An individual got a point for each Jobs Committee activity he or she participated in, including meetings, negotiations, and direct action. Jobs were dispatched according to one's position on the point ladder. The individual then had three options. The job could be taken, it could be referred – that is given to someone by the individual, such as a member of the family or church – or it could be passed on down the list with the individual retaining his/her position on the point ladder. Obviously, if the job was taken or referred, the individual had to start again at the bottom of the point ladder."<sup>148</sup>

Rosenbloom describes the procedure as "... a brilliant organizing tool, one which not only promised a selective incentive for participation but also provided a quicker payoff the more one participated."<sup>149</sup> The employment committee nevertheless ran into problems as employer-targets became more sophisticated in handling demands and members of the committee became more conservative. Morale problems surfaced in 1971; and by 1972, while the committee still drew as many as a hundred or more people to weekly meetings, most attended only to find jobs, and "... fewer and fewer were showing up for its negotiation sessions and protest demonstrations."<sup>150</sup>

The Coalition succeeded in bringing a Model Cities program into the Mission, but by 1973 the organization's social action character had been largely displaced by the program's administrative demands and internal conflicts. Rosenbloom states that by this time the organization has lost most of its "vitality." Many of the best leaders had left, and the Model Cities program, in which so much had been invested, was about to be discontinued. The coalition at the end of 1973 "... had lost most of its political clout and seemed close to disintegration."<sup>151</sup>

The MCO was initially funded by small labor and church grants, totaling less than \$10,000. The organization's budgets for the first two years were about \$40,000 per annum, three-quarters of which came from foundation and church sources. Fundraising events such as raffles and donut sales were disappointing. The funding sources were not pressuring the organization on its agenda or action style, but it was understood they would only provide seed money and the Coalition had to become financially self-sufficient within three years.

MCO funding, beginning in 1971, was from the federal government. The money came from the National Science Foundation by way of a two-year research grant to Stanford University, and \$43,000 was channeled without strings to the Coalition. When the grant ended in June 1973, however, the organization's internal conflict was at a peak – principals had no spare energy for funding problems – and the MCO had to survive on borrowed money and small gifts until by December all but one staff person and the secretary had been laid off.

## Coalition Tensions

Early, larger member organizations in the MCO were mainly directed toward the single objective of winning a Model Cities program for the district (and themselves). The organizers, however, aimed to build a multi-issue Alinsky-style organization, and Model Cities represented only the first tactical step in this plan. The “Alinskyite cadre,” as Rosenbloom refers to the organizers and a small leadership core, had far different goals than the larger, established MCO member agencies. They hoped to centralize the organization to reduce the power of the agencies within the coalition. They were largely successful at the outset, “. . . but the result . . . was to help create factionalism later.”<sup>152</sup>

The principal organizer acknowledges his own commitment to build a mass action organization not in the political interests of the established agency members. About including conservative agencies in the coalition, he states: “Balancing the new and old was an act that took up a good deal of time. . . . On the one hand, the proliferation of existing social and service organizations had to be bypassed because their purpose was not one of mass action on issues. On the other hand, these organizations had to be involved because their participation was needed to give legitimacy to [the] MCO.”<sup>153</sup>

He describes the early internal conflict over the basic role of the organization, whether to support member organizations or whether to function as a strong, independent federation. The established agency members opposed the latter type of organization because of its potential competition with them for Model Cities and other federal funds.

There were several active factions in the coalition following the first convention:

### Figure 3

#### MISSION COALITION FACTIONS<sup>154</sup>

Militant Youth VERSUS More Moderate Adults

Latinos VERSUS Non-Latinos

One Latino Group VERSUS Other Latino Groups

Larger Agencies VERSUS Smaller Grassroots Groups

Larger Agencies VERSUS Alinskyite Cadre

MCO structure was biased to afford greater representation to small groups. The main structural elements were the annual convention and the delegates council that met monthly to set interim policy. A steering committee met weekly to manage priorities and implement policies; it was comprised of all elected officers and committee heads. Standing committees were open and acted under the direction and supervision of the steering committee. The structure was designed to accommodate conflicting ethnic group interests by incorporating them in the main leadership body through “interest group vice presidents.”

## Convention History

The first convention of the MCO was marked by conflict over a proposed (and unopposed) slate of nominees for office put up by the Alinsky cadre. Following a one-month adjournment, the reconvened convention – with participation cut in half and no longer representative of the coalition’s membership – endorsed the catalog of non-negotiable demands. These included a police review board and withdrawal from Vietnam, neither of which would likely have passed a vote of the full membership.

The principal organizer describes the first convention’s problems as the result of an irresponsible youth faction that made unreasonable demands after claiming to have been excluded from the coalition’s development. While remarking that they were supported by about 10 percent of the delegates present, the organizer’s account does not note that one bone of contention was the leadership cadre’s slate of nominees.<sup>155</sup>

The Alinsky leadership wanted a multi-issue organization, a goal not opposed by the established agencies so long as it remained a “loose confederation,” which was not what the leadership had in mind. Rosenbloom says that “it was only later, when the larger organizations felt the core was developing a centralized, multi-issue coalition *at their expense* that they objected.”<sup>156</sup> The cadre worked to build a centralized organization, independent of the powerful agencies, by organizing local neighborhood associations around issues of landlord-tenant grievances, poor municipal services, unemployment, etc. These would become constituent groups with voting delegates at annual conventions. The uncooperative agencies were to be placated by helping them get grants and contracts.

The third convention in October 1970 resulted in a walkout by one hundred delegates over the leadership cadre’s slate of candidates. The core group’s nominee for president had already served two terms and a third would require a change in the bylaws. The election competition between the core groups candidate and his main opposition, who was the head of a large member-agency, became a conflict over the ongoing issue of a loose versus a centralized federation.

The incumbent president appointed himself to chair the bylaws committee that would decide if he could run for a third term. For many of the delegates this was “a glaring affront to democratic procedures.”<sup>157</sup> The bylaws floor vote was 317 in favor to 153 opposed, just a shade over the two-thirds requirement, with fully a third of the delegates not voting. At that point the challenger’s supporters walked out and the perfunctory vote was taken. This third convention was the real beginning of “. . . intense factionalism which was to plague the organization in the future. . . .”<sup>158</sup> The three main groups, large agencies, young militants, and the Alinskyite cadre (with allies among grassroots neighborhood units), continued to be the main conflicting factions.

The “dual agenda” of Model Cities activities and standard Alinsky-type confrontation and conflict had for a time satisfied the needs of all three major factions. The coalition’s three-term president was seen as the *indispensable* juggler who could broker the interests of all parties.

The fourth convention again split the organization and the permanent agency caucus began to emerge. Shortly after, the convention the president was disabled in a traffic accident. He resigned and was replaced by two “relatively inexperienced leaders.” Soon after there was near open warfare between the Alinsky and agency caucuses. The groups split over ideology (class vs. ethnicity), strategy (protest vs. self-help), and organizing objectives (small groups vs. agency coalitions).

The heightened internal conflict following the president’s accident and resignation is explained by the organizer. He observes that a secondary layer of “*collective* leadership” failed to

emerge. He also acknowledges directly that the president played a critical role in the maintenance of the coalition: “He was everywhere . . . visiting member organizations, soothing out difficulties between them, playing a role in community development, sitting in on staff meetings, heading up negotiations, serving as press spokesman for the organization, and so on.”<sup>159</sup>

The fifth convention in November 1972 was attended by 1600 delegates and several hundred observers. Each of the two feuding caucuses charged the other with creating large numbers of “paper organizations” to gain delegates. Many resolutions were passed, and the presidential candidate of the agency caucus was elected, the remaining offices being split about evenly between the two groups.

Following the convention, the organization was deeply divided between the Alinsky and agency factions, with control shifting from one group to the other. The Alinsky forces called for attention to external targets and extrication from burdensome Model Cities program administration. As Model Cities cutbacks began to take effect, the political infighting increased, further isolating the two groups. This fratricidal scenario was capped at a June 1973 meeting of the delegates council when open warfare erupted, and the agency forces took control of the organization by subverting constitutional procedures. That summer the Alinsky caucus withdrew from the coalition under successful high-pressure agency tactics. The defeated faction finally brought a suit for procedural violations (outcome unknown) and boycotted the sixth convention held in December 1973.

## Analysis

In all social learning theory, concepts, and procedures, modeling seemingly offers the most potent tool for organizing technology. Its capacity as a mechanism for initiating, altering, maintaining, and eliminating behavior is the basis for its value in organizing. In the following analysis of the MCO, the modeling idea is applied as (1) an analytical device to examine the impact of *inadvertently* modeled behavior, and (2) to directly inform practice by pointing to different approaches to “leadership development.”

This effort is barely a first step toward a systematic, behaviorally sound technology for organizing. It draws upon a single case study and seeks to illuminate the relevance to practice of only one (albeit major) dimension of social learning. Expansion and refinement from this modest beginning will require the application of a wide range of social learning concepts to many diverse practice experiences.

*Inadvertent Modeling* – The Mission Coalition from its beginnings may have encompassed within its boundaries more than the “normal” coalition tensions. One of the first goals of the principal organizer was to expand the membership “. . . to build a coalition that could act independently of its original base” of strong, rather conservative groups whose primary aim was a Model Cities program for the Mission.<sup>160</sup>

Rosenbloom argues that from the outset the Alinsky cadre failed “. . . to live within the constraints that such an organizational [coalition] structure imposes.”<sup>161</sup> In effect, the leadership core refused for various strategic and ideological reasons to regard a major segment of the organization as full members, to be accepted and treated as such. For their part, the established agencies saw the coalition as “. . . a competing power center in the community, a center which, as a united front, would have more power than any of their organizations individually.”<sup>162</sup>

By the time of the third convention in 1970, the divisions were deep and permanently set. The Alinsky core, apparently holding the balance of power within the organization, managed to

maintain control by severely bending if not actually subverting democratic process. The reader will recall the self-serving parliamentary ruling by the two-term president that facilitated gaining a third term. Here, then, was a striking example of inadvertent modeling. The coalition's established agency members could hardly avoid observing the behavior of the Alinsky leadership core under conflict-crisis conditions, nor could they have failed to see the consequences: the reward for violating the democratic spirit was continued control; there were no punishments. It can plausibly be argued that this observational learning, while not manifested in immediate performance, was to find expression several years later when similar discriminative stimulus conditions and potential rewards – intense competition for control and direction of the coalition – were present, along with necessary resources.

By then stability was probably beyond rehabilitation. Control was passing back and forth between the factions. The established agency members, anticipating their prospective reward of achieving permanent control, presumably performed the behavior earlier learned from observing the Alinsky leadership cadre at the third convention: they subverted constitutional procedures.

The Mission Coalition serves as an excellent illustration of the negative potential of inadvertent modeling. Certainly, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the Alinsky forces did not imagine at the third convention that two and a half years later the behavior they were modeling would be imitated successfully by their opponents.

*Collective Brokering* – The MCO experience also provides an opportunity to consider potential applications of modeling in community organizing.

The inherent presenting problem in coalition organizations is maintenance of the coalition. Such organizations (as all do to some degree) have a natural tension, by definition, related to the diversity of interests and objectives held by factions within them. Maintenance of the coalition is achieved by having as few as one or as many as all the members directly brokering the conflicting demands. In some organizations, one person – a leader, usually an officer – assumes this role; other times there is a leadership group brokering; and occasionally we find “collective” leadership where everyone takes part. There is a continuum here, and depending on which point an organization corresponds to, certain organizer and member behaviors follow.

Some of the behaviors of a single leader brokering are obvious. Organizations that rely on leader-brokers are very often formally structured to provide a decision-making leadership incumbency with only the most perfunctory supervisory oversight by members during that period. In other words, people are elected to office for a set period to make decisions for others, and short of gross malfeasance or nonfeasance, they can expect to complete their terms. The person in this role informally manages the organization's agenda, brokering competing demands to direct its behavior, its action life and resources. The leader-broker acts as an intermediary in complex zero-sum negotiations between factions. People who fill these roles are able for a host of reasons to maintain working relationships with all the organization's competing individual and group members.

The organizer's main job in this mode of coalition maintenance is to identify potential or proven leaders and to propel them, using a variety of techniques, toward leadership roles. The task is also, in part, to define those roles, to suggest coherent behavior patterns that satisfy the group's task requirements and that can be assumed by the organization's leading members. And training, too, is included in the job.

The advantages of narrowly controlled brokering power to coalition maintenance are that it can be put into place quickly, with a minimum of time and resources, and it permits closely held management. The organization relies on one member (or a small group) to broker conflicts. The trade-off cost is vulnerability to both internal and external forces. The MCO is a demonstra-

tion: An un-fortuitous traffic accident in one fell swoop denied the organization its broker, thus seriously weakening the coalition's structural glue. But narrow brokering also had internal impacts. The democratic process was first tellingly assaulted to keep the coalition's leader-broker in office for a third term, thus feeding factional conflict.

The analysis is bolstered by the belief of most MCO members that the organization's disintegration can be traced to ". . . a lack of secondary leadership. . . ." <sup>163</sup> Models for collective brokering did not exist within the organization, and the necessary roles, processes, and structures for so-called secondary leadership never came about. Instead, a temporary alliance was maintained through the brokering skills of a single individual. The MCO problem, however, went beyond the leader-broker's failure to train a replacement. Consider a staff member's description of the coalition president as the ". . . key to keeping the organization going. . . . He didn't try to have people learn to work together as allies." <sup>164</sup>

In the alternative of collective brokering, members directly (or through representatives of all factions) adopt mutually understood ground rules and expectations for reaching consensus or majority agreement on organizational action, thus founding a process through which they broker their interests face-to-face. As might be expected, behaviors of organization members, and organizer practices, differ fundamentally for collective- and leader-brokering.

In the collective-brokering mode, structure is developed to ensure ongoing face-to-face negotiation on policy by the general membership. The organizer works to identify leading members and to construct leadership roles that emphasize modeling, in contrast to training certain individuals to act for others. When the emphasis is on modeling, the leader succeeds by the fact of the membership acting productively for itself; when the emphasis is on developing individuals to act (and decide) for others, the successful leader is defined as one who achieves objectives for the organization.

The prime advantage of collective brokering is its relative invulnerability, grounded as it is not in any single person or small group but in the collective membership. By defining leadership as effective modeling, the organization acquires compound layers of leaders. The trade-off cost is that collective leadership is slow to build and initially consumes more organizational resources.

## Concluding Notes

The MCO story shows several social learning applications for community organizing. Deprivation conditions preceded and doubtlessly influenced the successful formation of the coalition, and reinforcement was used in an innovative and effective way to stimulate participation on an employment committee. Through analysis, the destructive effects of inadvertent modeling have been shown, and the case suggests the potential use of modeling as an alternative approach to leadership development.

Two segments of organizing technology emerge from this analysis: (1) The conditions for observational learning are such that major destructive effects are possible from behavior modeled *inadvertently* by the principals of an organization. (2) Modeling procedure is another route to brokering competing interests within an organization, leading to replacement of leader-brokers with collective-brokers.

## CONCLUSIONS

The social learning model represents a third wave of behaviorism – the first being Pavlov’s stimulus-response work, the second Skinner’s contributions to understanding operant behavior, and now the work of Bandura, Mahoney, and others on the role of cognition. While the updated theory is a more complete paradigm, concepts that reflect certain aspects of the theory – mainly operant behavior and related procedures – have received more attention here because of their accessibility and effectiveness in changing behavior.

Social learning procedures are the practical tools for organizers to influence individuals and groups. By drawing on the most versatile of these, modeling, and exploring its explanatory power in an Alinsky-style coalition, incipient organizing technology has been uncovered. This preliminary effort points to the usefulness of social learning for community organizers, indicating areas of organizing technology that appear promising for future elaboration and refinement.

Without implying at all any lessening of social learning concepts for understanding the lawful relationships in human behavior,<sup>165</sup> several important topics and related questions not considered here are still pending and must be treated elsewhere at another time. While complementary, social learning theory does not fully explore the behavioral processes that create shared social meanings (ideologies) for complex collective experiences in the political-economic action-field. The ideological *meaning* of the elements in an encounter between a delegation of novice citizen-activists and an executive representing a corporate environmental polluter is typically established in the group interchange *subsequent* to the action. Citizens exit such encounters able to describe the physical aspects of what took place but confused about their meaning. The post-action review serves to construct a normative cultural base for the *collectivity* to perceive similar future circumstances, actors, events, etc., as good or bad, rewarding or punishing.

This collective social construction of reality warrants further exposition and integration with social learning concepts in a unified action-field model for community organizing.<sup>166</sup> Closely related is the need for theoretical contributions to a field model that will supplement social learning theory for applications to political-economic arenas of aggressive competition for scarce resources, where actors are rarely natural allies.<sup>167</sup> In this regard, exchange theory appears promising.<sup>168</sup>

Possibly the most conspicuous omission here is a discussion of ethical issues and questions about the uses of social learning procedures by community organizers. While the subject obviously deserves lengthy examination, far beyond present limitations, two brief points can be made: First, social learning knowledge is at times a powerful lever for controlling human behavior. While the potential (already realized) for abuse by public and private institutions is clear, the widest circulation of the concepts and procedures – grassroots organizations should not be excluded – may be the best strategy in an open society where suppression is not possible or desirable. Second, there is a humanistic rejection of “behavioral control.” It is more rhetorical than real, however, because all efforts at social change involve attempts to control human behavior. The use of social learning techniques within a community organization, like every understanding and practice among allies, can only be justified and legitimated by acceptance through open, democratic consent. Manipulation and coercion are not only unethical but likely to be unproductive by generating counter-control.

As a final thought, there is a moral conundrum in creating technology: it can be put to any use and there is a long reach to unintended consequences. There is always a harvest of unanticipated burdens that accompany the benefits. Situational demands, however, preclude forgoing new and powerful resources; and this has always been true, from the first weapon that could fell

an animal through the printing press to nuclear, electronic, biochemical, and now behavioral technologies. Withal, it is no more possible to abandon the quest for better solutions to human problems than it is to permanently halt use of the resulting technologies for special rather than (or at the expense of) the general interest. We are finally left with only the hope that our efforts will elevate more than enervate humanity, and with the opportunity to personally model the behavior that will fulfill that hope.

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## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See Murray G. Ross, *Community Organization* (2d ed.), (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); Howard Goldstein, "Theory Development and the Unitary Approach to Social Work Practice," in (Harry Specht and Anne Vickery, eds.) *Integrating Social Work Methods* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 70; Neil Gilbert and Harry Specht, "Social Planning and Community Organization: Approaches," in (John B. Turner, ed.) *Encyclopedia of Social Work*, Vol. 2 (17th ed.), (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Social Workers, 1977), p. 1419.
- <sup>2</sup> John H. Kunkel, *Behavior, Social Problems, and Change, A Social Learning Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 109.
- <sup>3</sup> Anne E. Freedman and P.E. Freedman, *The Psychology of Political Control* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 5.
- <sup>4</sup> B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Bantam/Vintage, c. 1971, 1975), pp. 5-6.
- <sup>5</sup> J.R. Millenson, *Principles of Behavioral Analysis* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 362.
- <sup>6</sup> Henry A. Murray, "Some Proposals for a Theory of Personality," in (Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek, ed.) *Varieties of Personality Theory* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1964), p. 189.
- <sup>7</sup> Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (ed.), *Varieties of Personality Theory*, pp. 80-148; Kurt Goldstein, "On the Structure of Personality," in *Varieties of Personality Theory*, p. 249.
- <sup>8</sup> Ruitenbeek argues that few of these theories qualify as such by contemporary concepts in philosophy of science (p. xiii).
- <sup>9</sup> Albert Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 14-16.
- <sup>10</sup> Edwin J. Thomas, "Social Casework and Social Group Work: The Behavioral Modification Approach," in *Encyclopedia of Social Work*, Vol. 2, p. 1309.
- <sup>11</sup> Bandura, pp. 10-11.
- <sup>12</sup> Richard W. Malott and Donald L. Whaley, *Elementary Principles of Behavior* (Kalamazoo: Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, 1969), pp. 21:10-13.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21:11-12.
- <sup>14</sup> Albert Bandura, *Social Learning Theory* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971), p. 2.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- <sup>16</sup> Fred Luthans, *Organizational Behavior* (2d ed.), (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 104.
- <sup>17</sup> Malott and Whaley, p. 1:2.
- <sup>18</sup> Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*, pp. 17-18.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>20</sup> Michael J. Mahoney, *Cognition and Behavior Modification* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1974), p. 29.
- <sup>21</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 45.
- <sup>22</sup> Mahoney, p. 145.
- <sup>23</sup> Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*, p. 3.
- <sup>24</sup> George A. Johnson, "The Relative Efficacy of Stimulus Versus Reinforcement Control for Obtaining Stable Performance Change," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 14(3):321-41 (December 1975).
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 338-39.
- <sup>26</sup> Millenson, p. 363.
- <sup>27</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 249.
- <sup>28</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, *Social Learning Theory*, pp. 27-28.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

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- <sup>32</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 239.
- <sup>33</sup> Arthur W. Staats, *Child Learning, Intelligence, and Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 7.
- <sup>34</sup> B.F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1953), p. 283.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 285-86; *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, pp. 189-91.
- <sup>36</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 46.
- <sup>37</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>38</sup> Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 362.
- <sup>39</sup> Mahoney, p. 245.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 243-47.
- <sup>41</sup> John H. Kunkel, *Society and Economic Growth, A Behavioral Perspective of Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 285.
- <sup>42</sup> For examples, see Eileen D. Gambrell, *Developing Skills in Behavior Modification: Taking Advantage of What We Already Know*, paper presented at the First Meeting of the Social Work Group for the Study of Behavioral Methods at the Annual Meeting of the Council on Social Work Education, Phoenix, February 27-March 2, 1977, p. 2; Fred Luthans and Robert Kreitner, *Organizational Behavior Modification* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1975), pp. 68-83; Phillip Fellin, Jack Rothman, and Henry J. Meyer, "Implications of the Socio-Behavioral Approach for Community Organization Practice," in (Edwin J. Thomas, ed.) *The Socio-Behavioral Approach and Applications to Social Work* (New York: Council on Social Work Education, 1967), pp. 74-77; Kunkel, *Behavior, Social Problems, and Change, A Social Learning Approach*, pp. 159-68; *Society and Economic Growth, A Behavioral Perspective of Social Change*, pp. 289-308.
- <sup>43</sup> Robert F. Mager and Peter Pipe, *Analyzing Performance Problems or 'You Really Oughta Wanna'* (Belmont, Calif.: Fearon Publishers, 1970), p. 100.
- <sup>44</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- <sup>46</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>47</sup> Albert Bandura, "Self-Efficacy: Towards a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change," *Psychological Review* (in press).
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>49</sup> B.F. Skinner, *Contingencies of Reinforcement, A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 7.
- <sup>50</sup> Malott and Whaley, p. 8:2.
- <sup>51</sup> Skinner, *Contingencies of Reinforcement*, p. 141.
- <sup>52</sup> Tim Sampson, "Flags, Small, How to: At Organizing's Cutting Edge," *Just Economics*, 6(1):6 (January 1978).
- <sup>53</sup> Skinner, *Contingencies of Reinforcement*, p. 137.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169-71.
- <sup>55</sup> M. Patrick McNees, Daniel S. Egli, Rebecca S. Marshall, John F. Schnelle, and Todd R. Risley, "Shoplifting Prevention: Providing Information Through Signs," *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, 9 (4):399-405 (Winter 1976), p. 403.
- <sup>56</sup> Michael J. Miller, *An Organizer's Tale* (Xerox, n.p., 1974), p. 87.
- <sup>57</sup> Malott and Whaley, p. 1:19.
- <sup>58</sup> To reduce the probability of a response, a positive reinforcer for the previously reinforced operant performance is withheld (extinction), or a negative reinforcer is presented after the response (punishment).
- <sup>59</sup> Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*, pp. 13-14.
- <sup>60</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 225.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.
- <sup>62</sup> Millenson, p. 397.
- <sup>63</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>64</sup> Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 300.
- <sup>65</sup> Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 21-22.
- <sup>66</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 344.
- <sup>67</sup> Robert I. Paulson, *A Behavioral View of Goal Displacement in a Social Welfare Agency* (D.S.W. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977), p. 84.
- <sup>68</sup> Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, pp. 112-13.
- <sup>69</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 373.

<sup>70</sup> Warren C. Haggstrom, *The Power Bind* (mimeograph, n.d.), p. 59. He notes: "An organization has a structure of internal power, the power to ensure that its internal process is effectively mobilized on behalf of its external objectives. An organization must coordinate and direct the work of its members on behalf of its decisions and in such a fashion that it will continue to acquire resources and move toward its objectives. Without the ability of an organization to direct and control its members, that is, without the structure of internal power, there would be no organization. However clear the symbolic system might be, the necessary relationships among, and activities of, members would not be produced. . . . When the internal structure of power of an organization collapses, the members may suddenly find their own situations undefined, or redefined in a fashion that no longer allows them to anticipate the future. Other definitions, organizations and objects, immediately appear different to them, may acquire more salience in their lives. The members lose the power which they have been able to exercise by virtue of their position in the organization and their relationships with other members within it. We may say that when an organization fails to develop or to maintain its internal structure of power, the members find themselves in a power bind insofar as the organization is concerned." (Pp. 58-59.)

<sup>71</sup> Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, p. 112.


<sup>72</sup> Steven C. Hayes, V. Scott Johnson, and John D. Cone, "The Marked Item Technique: A Practical Procedure for Litter Control," *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, 8(4):381-86 (Winter 1975). Typically, a "marked item" technique is used to prevent "artificial production of trash." A number of undetectable pre-marked litter items are distributed throughout the littered area, some of which must be in the litter turned in to receive a reward (pp. 382-84).

<sup>73</sup> Donald A. Jackson, William J. Mayville, and Joseph B. Cowart, Jr., "The Auto-Pedestrian Safety Project," in (George Semb et. al., eds.) *Behavior Analysis and Education—1972* (University of Kansas, Department of Human Development, Support and Development Center for Follow Through, 1972), pp. 310-17.

<sup>74</sup> L. Keith Miller and Ocoee L. Miller, "Reinforcing Self-Help Group Activities of Welfare Recipients," *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, 3(1):57-64 (Spring 1970), p. 59.

<sup>75</sup> Lawrence Neil Bailis, *Bread or Justice, Grassroots Organizing in the Welfare Rights Movement* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 3.

<sup>76</sup> Gary Trudeau's pictorial humor (*Los Angeles Times*, April 9, 1978) provides a topical answer to this question:



<sup>77</sup> For more detailed discussion of reinforcement scheduling, see Luthans and Kreitner, p. 51; Malott and Whaley, pp. 6:2, 6:16-27, 6:8-9, 7:4-11; Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, pp. 27-29; Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, pp. 99-106.

<sup>78</sup> Millenson, pp. 365-67.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 370.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 383.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 379.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 381.

<sup>83</sup> Ronald P. Abeles, "Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectations, and Black Militancy," *Journal of Social Issues*, 32(2):119-37 (Spring 1976), p. 133. For some caveats on this perspective, see Roy Wallis, "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Cautionary Note," *British Journal of Sociology*, 26(3):360-63 (September 1975).

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<sup>84</sup> For examples, see N.H. Azrin and W.C. Holz, "Punishment," in (Werner K. Honig, ed.) *Operant Behavior, Areas of Research and Application* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), pp. 380-447.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 436.

<sup>86</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 315.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 295.

<sup>88</sup> Azrin and Holz, p. 400.

<sup>89</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 295.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303.

<sup>91</sup> Millenson, pp. 455-56.

<sup>92</sup> Azrin and Holz, pp. 440-41.

<sup>93</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, p. 360.

<sup>95</sup> Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 317.

<sup>96</sup> Azrin and Holz, p. 442.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 383-85.

<sup>98</sup> It should be noted, however, that when behavior is suppressed by severe threat, the subject is likely to continue valuing the prohibited activity. When the threat is milder but still adequate for suppression, the subject may ". . . convince himself that the desired objects are less worthwhile . . . to eliminate disturbing dissonance caused by the incongruous behavior. . . ." See Bandura, *Principles of Behavior Modification*, p. 306.

<sup>99</sup> [THE FOLLOWING BLANK FOOTNOTES WERE LOST IN THE PROCESS OF COPYING THIS PAPER MANY YEARS AGO. FOOTNOTES RESUME AT 159.]

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<sup>159</sup> Miller, *An Organizer's Tale*, pp. 100-01. The organizer maintains that “this kind of leadership role may be essential to the beginnings of a mass organization” (p. 100). He might have added that it is also essential in some instances to its ending.

<sup>160</sup> Rosenbloom, p. 136.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 429.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 427.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 328.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 330.

<sup>165</sup> They are also helpful in understanding the transmission of normative cultural symbols and the ways in which culture influences the behavior of individuals and groups. See Arthur W. Staats and Carolyn K. Staats, *Complex Human Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c. 1963, 1964), pp. 321-45.

<sup>166</sup> For related theoretical developments and practical applications, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 18-29; Warren C. Haggstrom, “Can the Poor Transform the World?” in (Irwin Deutscher and Elizabeth J. Thompson, eds.) *Among the People: Encounters with the Poor* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 75; “The Psychological Implications of Community Development Process,” in (Lee J. Cary, ed.) *Community Development as a Process* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970), pp. 85-87, 106; *The Practice of Socio-Analysis* (mimeographed, n.p., n.d. ), pp. 1-5.

<sup>167</sup> Natural allies are defined here as individuals and groups whose values, interests, and objectives are virtually identical, or nearly so.

<sup>168</sup> For a brief review of exchange theory, see Peter M. Blau, “Social Exchange,” in (David L. Sills, ed.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 7 (Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), pp. 452-58.

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